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This thesis takes account of east-west power differentials to explore Poles’ experience of 
mobility and their positioning within EU and UK equality frameworks. Through a 
systematic content analysis of laws and legal discourse related to mobility and equality, I 
explore how the historical hierarchy positioning the west as superior and the east as unable 
to be fully ‘European’ can still be observed today in how EU and UK policies have pushed 
the eastern region and its nationals to the periphery of Europe and of whiteness. Whereas 
cleavage between EU ideals and EU citizens’ actual experience of its policies has been 
attributed to the EU’s limited competence, I propose that the EU project itself has been 
founded on and continues to propagate differentiation between the west and the east, at 
odds with the EU’s fundamental rights narratives.  
 
Notably, EU rhetoric has imagined the EU project as a western endeavour. Unequal 
accession policies and post-accession transitional mobility restrictions had helped to 
support the creation of a social reality that enables Polish movers’ racialisation and 
inequality, reinforced through the recently increasing willingness of EU institutions to limit 
workers’ access to mobility. EU institutions have tended to overlook mobile Poles’ 
experiences of inequality and exploitation, further naturalising their status as second-class 
EU citizens. The Racial Equality Directive has not accounted for them in its promulgation 
or interpretation, and has been especially unfit for protecting their rights. Similarly, movers 
have been absent from how equality is conceptualised in the UK. The Equality Act’s 
ineffectiveness appears compounded when it comes to protecting the rights of Polish 
movers, as revealed through my review of employment tribunal cases. Through such 
othering and omissions, the west’s relationship with the east has reproduced markers of 
coloniality.  
 
My research also suggests that critical race theory and critical whiteness studies 
frameworks should pay greater attention to contemporary transnational power dynamics 
and mobility. Only then can the concepts of racism and race begin to more accurately 
reflect the nuanced picture of micro-level racial and ethnic power relations in today’s 
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The EU was explicitly founded on the promise of equality and inclusion. According to the 
European Commission, it ‘arose from the ashes of World War Two’ (1996: 4), to promote 
‘humanitarian and progressive values’ (2014: 5). More specifically, ‘human dignity, 
freedom, [and] equality’ form the EU’s ‘spiritual and moral heritage’ (CFR, Preamble). 
That same promise underlay the gradual expansion of the EU. The accession of eight 
Central and Eastern European (‘CEE’) states1 in 2004 has been situated within this 
‘historic task … to further the integration of the continent by peaceful means’ 
(Commission 2003a: 4), ‘transcend … former divisions and … forge a common destiny’ 
(Constitutional Treaty, Preamble). But how effectively has that promise been met? Despite 
such rhetoric, direct and indirect transitional mobility restrictions were imposed by 
fourteen2 of the EU-15 Member States3 on CEE nationals for up to seven years after the 
Eastern Enlargement; recent decisions by the European Court of Justice have been 
facilitating Member State limitations on their access to social benefits; and CEE movers 
have been targeted by anti-immigrant rhetoric across EU-15 States. Moreover, scholars 
have documented incidents of disadvantage (e.g., Ciupijus 2012b; Drinkwater et al 2009), 
racism, hate crimes4 (e.g., Fox 2012; Rzepnikowska 2019; Sime et al 2017), and 
discrimination experienced by Poles and other CEE movers in the UK (e.g., Johns 2013) – 
long before the spike in public antagonism associated with the Brexit referendum.  
 
To help reconcile this apparent gap between EU rhetoric and the actual experience of 
mobility, the goal of this thesis is to critically examine how the CEE region and its 
nationals have been conceptualised and approached by EU and UK equality frameworks 
and policies that have been critical to the Eastern Enlargement process and the freedom of 
movement right. To help critique conventional legal norms and ideology in this context, I 
rely on and explore the limitations of critical race theory (‘CRT’). Despite this framework’s 
focus on the intersection of law, power, and race, it has been underutilised in the study of 
contemporary migration, of minority (white) ethnicities, and of transnational power 
                                                      
1 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. 
2 All except Sweden. 
3 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
4 See also http://www.irr.org.uk/news/eastern-european-workers-under-attack/. 
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dynamics. I chose Poles as my study group5 because they constitute the largest group of 




Racism constitutes part of Europe’s heritage. For example, black and ethnic minority 
groups were targeted as inferior during the colonial era, and their post-war migration and 
descendants have often been unwelcomed in western countries such as the UK, Germany, 
France, and the Netherlands. Moreover, internal racisms within Europe had led to 
attempts to exterminate the Roma, Jews, and Slavs during WWII; the historical 
racialisation7 of the Irish in Britain; violence in the former Yugoslavia; and widespread 
opposition to the Roma and Muslims today. Within this milieu, CEE nationals have 
experienced racism within Europe by being positioned as lesser than the imagined 
European community created by western thinkers (Samaluk 2016). Since the 
Enlightenment, the CEE region has ‘been subjected to the Western gaze founded on a 
presumed superiority and subordination’, and the term ‘Eastern’ came to suggest inability 
to be fully ‘European’ (Ciupijus 2012a: 56-7). The economically driven, imperialist concept 
of ‘Mitteleuropa’ was applied to Poland8 in the early 1900s to support German plans to 
impose economic and cultural hegemony over Central Europe (Meyer 1955). Some have 
noted that this approach permeates modern relations. CEE states are perceived in western 
discourse as a buffer zone between east and west (Kuus 2006: 230), and as a repository of 
otherness, not quite part of Europe culturally or politically (Todorova 2003; Jedlicki 2005). 
During the Eastern Enlargement, the EU—which had been created by western European 
countries9—first admitted Members from the former Eastern Bloc.  
 
Before the Eastern Enlargement, there had been little public or political interest in intra-
EU mobility. The movement of German au pairs and Spanish waiters did not raise public 
concerns in the UK or other western countries. After 2004, however, public debates about 
immigration in the UK shifted from concerns about asylum seekers to anxieties about 
                                                      
5 Throughout this thesis, I rely on some observations pertaining to CEE countries or CEE nationals 
collectively. However, Poland and Poles constitute my focus – as evidenced, most notably, by my analysis in 
Chapters 3, 4, and 6. 
6 Followed by India, Pakistan, and Ireland, in that order. See 
https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-in-the-uk-an-overview/. 
7 That is, implicit and explicit discourses—from individual to institutional levels—which assume a group’s 
inferiority and affect its outcomes (Rattansi 2005; Kushner 2005; Phillips 2011). 
8 As well as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Austria. The term ‘Mitteleuropa’ still appears in EU discourse 
(e.g., Council 2011). 
9 The European Economic Community was founded in 1957 by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
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CEE nationals, incensed by media misinformation about economic ‘migrants’10  stealing 
British jobs (Anderson 2017). Just how politicised the issue of CEE mobility had become 
was perhaps most poignantly illustrated in the context of Brexit. Leavers’ rhetoric 
concentrated on opposing CEE movers, described as ‘criminals’ (UKIP 2016; Leave.EU 
2016) who had been ‘living like animals’ in their home countries (Bienkov 2013). A survey 
of voters conducted right after they had voted in the referendum indicates that EU 
mobility was one of the main reasons behind voters’ decision to leave the EU11. Based on 
their analysis of aggregate level data and individual survey data from the British Election 
Study, Goodwin and Milazzo (2017) concluded that increases in the rate of immigration at 
the local level and sentiments regarding control over immigration were key predictors of 
the vote for Brexit (see also Tammes 2017). 
 
This hostility against CEE nationals’ mobility has been accompanied by empirical evidence 
of their experience of inequalities12. In particular, numerous studies have documented 
Polish movers’ inequalities. For example, in the employment context, Poles have 
experienced more deskilling, lower incomes, inferior working conditions, and lower 
upward mobility than British workers or pre-2004 CEE immigrants of comparable skills 
(Drinkwater et al 2009; Fox et al 2012a). Discrimination cases brought by Polish workers 
also refer to incidents of verbal abuse and patterns of harassment13. Hate crimes against 
Poles, both before and since the Brexit referendum, have also been documented 
(Rzepnikowska 2019). Furthermore, both tabloid and broadsheet newspapers in the UK 
have tended to portray them either as criminal, welfare sponging hordes or as obedient, 
hardworking, albeit temporary and low-paid labourers, with the stereotype of the ‘Polish 
plumber’ coming to mind – not culturally acceptable as permanent residents or as non-
menial workers (Drzewiecka 2014b; see also Cap 2017). Political discourse, pushed further 
right by groups like UKIP, has been similarly frequently filled with negative remarks about 
Polish movers, even years before Brexit (MacShane 2011). Despite such political and 
media hostility which would not be tolerated against non-whites (O’Cinneide 2014a), UK 
anti-racist policy initiatives and equality discourse have continued to either overlook them 
or not adequately address their concerns14.  
 
                                                      
10 EU nationals residing in other EU States are movers, not migrants, despite frequent mislabelling by the 
western media, the public, and politicians. The misnomer ‘migrant’ has been applied especially to low-skilled, 
low-class movers on the periphery of whiteness (Anderson 2013). 
11 See http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/ (based on a survey 
of 12,369 voters). 
12 For a summary of key empirical findings, see Appendix 1. 
13 See cases discussed in Chapter 6.  
14 As discussed in Chapter 6. 
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It is true that a simple, doctrinal reading of both the Race Equality Directive and the 
Equality Act indicate that white minority ethnic groups are protected from discrimination -  
due to their racial or ethnic origin (in the case of the Directive), and their nationality, 
ethnic origin, or national origin (under the Equality Act)15. As a critical scholar, however, I 
look beyond formal equality protections to interrogate their assumptions and politics, and 
to situate them in the wider socio-cultural context. I acknowledge that statutory anti-
discrimination measures and their judicial applications can only do so much to affect 
racism, inequalities, disadvantage, discrimination, and other race-based wrongs. In fact, 
widespread prevalence of racism and discrimination can co-exist alongside formal 
prohibitions against discrimination (Matsuda et al 1993), and inequalities might even be 
tacitly sanctioned by law (Delgado and Stefancic 2017). Fundamentally, any anti-
discrimination law reflects compromises between various political and social groups, and 
the concept of equality is broader than just making discrimination unlawful. Whatever 
potential law might hold to fight subordination (Williams 1992), it is never complete, 
particularly without economic, political, and cultural shifts to support equality law. What I 
seek to examine in this thesis, however, is whether the EU and UK equality frameworks 
strive to or are even inherently capable of ensuring substantive equality rights. In addition 
to presenting such general critique, I also explore whether these equality frameworks might 
be particularly unfit for protecting the rights of Polish or CEE movers more generally. 
 
3. My Research Questions and Goals      
 
My key research goal is to explore how EU and UK anti-discrimination laws and equality 
discourses conceptualise and approach discrimination of CEE movers (especially Poles), 
and how they intersect with policy areas that have been critical to their mobility – the 
Eastern Enlargement process, the right of free movement, and the UK’s employment 
context. Given my critical theoretical background, some questions important to my study 
include: How do anti-discrimination laws and the wider equality rhetoric conceptualise 
equality, discrimination, racism, and whiteness? What goals and assumptions underlie both 
EU and UK frameworks, especially concerning CEE movers? How do they imagine and 
attempt to respond to equality concerns of Polish movers, and is that consistent with the 
inequalities that empirical data indicates? Moreover, are they capable of addressing Poles’ 
inequalities and racialisation? How do the equality frameworks interact with, and are they 
consistent with, the process of Poland’s accession to the EU, and with how the right to 
                                                      
15 The question of whether racial equality protections apply to white minority ethnic groups has been settled 
since the 1970s, due to litigation by Irish victims of discrimination. 
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mobility was afforded to Poles post-accession? Finally, are there any tensions between the 
Race Equality Directive and how it was transposed into UK law?  
 
In my analysis of pertinent legal frameworks, and of the EU project as a whole, I also 
study the role of myths – that is, narratives and modes of thinking that underlie political 
and philosophical imagination, frame social thought, and construct social order, including 
law. The material quoted at the beginning of this Chapter hints at some myths relied on by 
EU institutions. As Fitzpatrick (1992) explains, contemporary western law relies heavily on 
myths, which portray it as universal and progressive, while differentiating it from the 
otherness of the primitive and the non-western. Hence, to help address some of my 
research questions, I explore whether western policymakers rely on myths to position the 
west’s legal and political systems as superior to those of the CEE region. Moreover, myths 
support the inherent tensions of modern law – for example, through narratives of law’s 
being autonomous yet socially contingent, being stable yet historically responsive, and 
expressing sovereign imperative yet popular spirit (id: ix-xi). Thus, I also look for evidence 
of tensions within the policies I analyse, and within myths that support them.  
 
My overarching goal is to explore how the concepts of race, racism, discrimination, and 
equality can better reflect the complexity of today’s context-specific differences and power 
hierarchies, such as between eastern and western Europe. In the process, I also enquire 
whether critical race based theories can facilitate better understanding of discrimination 
and equality in the context of intra-EU movers or, more broadly, racialised whites.  
 
4. Literature Review 
 
A. Research on EU Law 
 
Although comprehensive analyses of EU law have tended to be based on black letter law 
(e.g., Barnard 2013; Chalmers et al 2014; Craig and De Búrca 2015; Foster 2017; Szyszczak 
and Cygan 2008; Woods et al 2017), since the mid 1990s, critical legal scholars have been 
devoting more attention to the EU’s legal framework. Early notable examples of critical 
analyses (e.g., Shaw and More 1995; Ward 1996) sought to contextualise EU law within its 
broader economic, philosophical, historical, and political contexts, and some offered 
Marxist analysis (e.g., Peebles 1997). The role of mythology in EU law’s design and its 
conceptual opposition to the Orient was also noted (e.g., Fitzpatrick and Bergeron 1998). 
More recently, the volume by Adams et al (2017) offers a critical perspective on the EU’s 
rule of law. Discrete areas of EU law have also been scrutinised by critical scholars – 
especially human rights policies (e.g., Williams 2004), and equality law (e.g., Chopin and 
Niessen 2002; Howard 2009; Schiek et al 2007; Somek 2011).  
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The Eastern Enlargement has not escaped critical scholars’ attention. For example, at the 
time of the Enlargement, many critiqued the EU project (e.g., Zielonka 2007), and more 
specifically, its eastern expansion for its imperialist attributes and for inferiorising the CEE 
region (e.g., Behr 2007; Böröcz and Kovacs 2001; Buchowski 2006; Engel-Di Mauro 2006; 
Kovacs 2006). Some academics have turned their critique especially to the post-accession 
mobility derogations (e.g., Adinolfi 2005; Carrera 2005; Dougan 2004; Jileva 2002; Kvist 
2004) and their potential lasting impact on the experience of mobility by CEE nationals 
(e.g., Currie 2008; Engbersen et al 2017).  
 
While firmly situated within such critical analyses of select aspects of the EU project and 
the Eastern Enlargement process, my thesis seeks to present a more holistic critique of 
Poland’s accession and of Poles’ positioning within the EU mobility and equality 
frameworks (Chapters 2-5), before tracing them to Poles’ experience of mobility in the UK 
(Chapter 6). Moreover, my theoretical contribution lies in applying CRT—and a related, 
critical whiteness studies (‘CWS’) framework—to this analysis. The value of both these 
analytical frames has not been afforded sufficient attention in the analysis of EU law. The 
few exceptions that exist do not address the treatment of movers. For example, McVeigh 
(2010) has relied on CWS, and Möschel (2014) on CRT, both in the context of EU policies 
to exclude (non-white) third-country nationals. Moreover, Solanke (2009) has applied CRT 
when analysing the treatment of (non-white) racial minority groups under EU law. 
 
B. Research on CEE Nationals’ Mobility to the UK 
 
Generally, migration scholarship has been grounded in sociology, anthropology, 
geography, politics, and cultural studies, and has often been embedded in economic 
theoretical approaches (O’Reilly 2015). In the last decade, scholars have called for greater 
attention to the role of inequalities and discrimination in migration studies, and to the need 
to contextualise migration within global political and social changes (e.g., id; Anderson 
2017; Castles 2010) and the study of racialisation (Erel et al 2016: 1354-55; see also Burrell 
et al 2018). One of my goals is to address these gaps, in the context of my study group. 
 
The post-Enlargement influx of CEE movers to the UK has reshaped Britain’s 
demographics, and has consequently inspired research within various academic disciplines 
– especially by sociologists, anthropologists (e.g., Fox et al 2012a; Garapich 2016; Moore 
2013; Osipovic 2010; Parutis 2011; White 2016), and labour scholars (e.g., Ciupijus 2012a; 
Drinkwater et al 2009; McDowell et al 2007; Ruhs and Anderson 2010). Most of this 
research has focused on CEE movers’ motivations for migration, their impact on the 
 20 
British labour market, and their identity and integration (Halej 2014: 11). The oftentimes 
xenophobic responses16 by the British media (e.g., Grayson 2013) and through policies 
restricting EU nationals’ access to benefits have also been met with dismay by scholars 
(e.g., O’Brien 2015b), especially as exhibited in the context of the Brexit referendum (e.g., 
Barnard and Butlin 2018; Dennison and Geddes 2018; Virdee and McGeever 2018). 
 
Due to their large numbers (exceeding 900,000 by 201717) and visibility, Polish movers 
have featured prominently in this literature. Especially prevalent have been studies of their 
labour market experiences, evidencing exploitation and deskilling (see Appendix 118). 
Scholars have also discussed discrimination and expressions of racism against Poles (e.g., 
Fox 2012; Johns 2013; Rzepnikowska 2019), and their negative media portrayals (e.g., 
Drzewiecka 2014a; Fox 2012; Spigelman 2013). Many have focused on their identity, 
integration (e.g., Botterill 2011; Erdal and Lewicki 2016; Garapich 2016; Kubal 2012; 
Lopez Rodrigues 2010; Ryan 2018; White 2016), and mobility strategies (e.g., Coniglio and 
Brzozowski 2018; Grzymala-Kazlowska 2017; Karolak 2016). Brexit has often featured in 
recent scholarship, especially in the context of post-referendum violence and racism (e.g., 
Burnett 2016; Rzepnikowska 2019; Sime et al 2017), and of Poles’ responses to it (e.g., 
Burrell et al 2018; Mcghee et al 2017).  
 
My thesis draws on the above research, while situating it more firmly within the UK’s legal 
equality framework. My focus differs from existing legal scholarship, which has tended to 
analyse discrete aspects of Polish and other CEE movers’ experiences in the UK. For 
example, Kubal (2012) has situated Polish movers’ responses to the British legal 
framework within Polish legal culture. Currie (2007, 2009) has looked closely at post-
accession UK regulations affecting CEE movers’ employment and access to welfare 
benefits19. Moreover, Barnard and Ludlow (2016), and Barnard et al (2018) have addressed 
CEE workers’ experiences before employment tribunals. The former article is based on a 
quantitative analysis of tribunal filings, and the latter explores why so few CEE nationals 
file claims. On the other hand, my analysis (in Chapter 6) is based on a close analysis of 
Poles’ claims and adjudicators’ decisions, which I situate within the broader UK equality 
discourse. Furthermore, I employ a theoretical framework which has not been heavily 
relied on by scholars of UK law. Although UK sociologists have been applying CWS and 
CRT frameworks (particularly in education research) (e.g., Bonnett 2000; Fox et al 2012a; 
                                                      
16 And across EU-15 States more generally (e.g., Sobis et al 2016). 
17 Based on country of birth. See https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-in-
the-uk-an-overview/ (citing ONS data). 
18 Summarising key empirical evidence of their inequalities and exploitation in the UK. 
19 I draw heavily on this research in Chapters 4 and 6. 
 21 
Garner 2012; Hickman et al 2005; Phoenix 2009), legal scholars have not made much use 
of these tenets.  
 
This thesis is informed by, but does not simply replicate research of the migration and 
equality experience of other marginalised white groups in the UK. For example, the 
Irish—who have greatly influenced how the British equality legislation is applied to all 
whites—differ in significant ways from Polish movers. Notably, they share the same 
language, and have had a much longer and significant history of migration to the UK, 
filled with much religious and political strife. Similarly, subtleties of each CEE group’s 
history, migration patterns, stereotypes, and identity demand that the application of my 
findings to other CEE groups be nuanced. For example, compared to movers from other 
CEE states, Poles tend to have stronger historical ties20 to the UK, and better established 
migration networks (Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski 2008) – traits which might make 
them more welcomed by native Britons. They are also uniquely subjected to the 
superficially positive21 stereotype about their strong work ethic (MacKenzie and Forde 
2009). Recent movers arguably positioned most differently from Poles are Romanians and 
Bulgarians, who were subjected to especially tight mobility controls (Fox et al 2015), and 
who lack any historical links to the UK. That being said, my research will shed some light 
on how other non-western movers—all of whom share some similarities22—fare under the 
UK (and EU) equality frameworks.  
 
5. My Theoretical Framework   
 
A. Critical Race Theory   
 
Building on the work of European theorists such as Foucault and Derrida, and American 
race study pioneer W.E.B. Du Bois, CRT was developed in the 1980s by American legal 
scholars, as a response to the perceived stalling of the civil rights era progress. CRT 
scholars seek to address the widespread prevalence of everyday informal microaggression, 
racist stereotypes, institutional racism, and discrimination against Afro-Americans, all of 
which continue to exist despite rhetoric of equality and formal equality laws (Matsuda et al 
1993). 
 
                                                      
20 Including Poles who settled in the UK after WWII, and pre-2004 political refugees and clandestine 
economic migrants. 
21 Wu (2002) notes how superficially positive stereotypes nevertheless carry stigma. 
22 All CEE states experienced similar power imbalances with the west during their accession processes; and 
EU rhetoric tends to inferiorise and lump CEE states together. All CEE groups are treated alike under 
formal equality laws, and tend to be racialised (e.g., Cook et al 2011; Fox et al 2015; Kofman et al 2009; 
Spencer et al 2007) and subjected to political, media, and public hostility (Pasic 2013).  
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CRT scholars explore how formal legal concepts overlook, silence, or even tacitly sanction 
inequalities (Delgado and Stefancic 2017). Because those in position of social power create 
laws to benefit themselves, laws construct and legitimate interests that benefit them 
(Crenshaw and Peller 1995). Moreover, the dominant group employs the rule of law and 
legal ideology to obscure law’s weaknesses and hidden politics (Delgado and Stefancic 
2017). Crenshaw (2011) points out, for example, how by having addressed some overt 
obstacles to inequality, formal equality law gives the impression that inequality has been 
erased, thus substantiating equality rhetoric and inhibiting efforts to address milder—even 
if more pervasive—forms of racism. Consequently, to unpack the function of anti-
discrimination law, one must look not only at equality doctrine, but also at what interests it 
conceals, how it relates to underlying social relations, how it is interpreted and enforced, 
and how it relates to the broader political and social climate (id).  
 
The role of race in inequality is central to CRT. Unlike some critical legal studies (‘CLS’) 
scholars who dismiss the concept of race as overly essentialist, CRT writers focus on how 
law creates and naturalises the construct of race, which in turn affects experiences (Lopez 
2005)23. Racism and race-based wrongs are ordinary, and prevalent (Williams 1992). The 
legal system is not equipped to redress most such wrongs because its vocabulary and scope 
are insufficient (Crenshaw 2011). That being said, CRT scholars value legal rights for their 
potential to bring about equality (Harris 2013). Because the status quo benefits dominant 
whites, however, steps to change the legal order are made only when doing so benefits the 
dominant group, that is, when there is ‘interest convergence’ between the interests of the 
dominant and subjugated groups (Bell 1980). For example, the US Supreme Court’s Brown 
v Board of Education24 ruling mandating racial desegregation in public schools can be 
attributed to the white elite’s geopolitical motivations (building credibility with other 
countries, and alleviating the threat of widespread black discontent at home) and economic 
concerns (facilitating industrialisation in the American South) (id). Although based on 
black-white relations in the United States, the concept can be expanded to address all 
dominant groups’ self-interest in promoting disadvantaged groups’ legal or social 
advances.  
 
Despite its roots in American legal history, CRT has been noted for its usefulness to the 
analysis of international law and economic globalisation (Valdes et al 2002: 303-9). ‘CRT 
provokes a critical thinking that is not limited to a historical time and place, but confronts 
                                                      
23 Moreover, according to the concept of intersectionality, domination is multi-dimensional, and depends 
also on factors such as gender, class, and sexual orientation (Williams 1992). 
24 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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law’s complicity in the violent perpetuation of a racially defined economic and social order’ 
(Douzinas and Gearey 2005: 259). Moreover, according to Heinze (2008), to maintain 
CRT’s credibility, scholars should apply it more to non-US laws25. Although postcolonial 
scholars have been relying on CRT themes—without necessarily acknowledging them as 
such—in studies of European colonialism (e.g., Eze 2007; Fanon 1988), the potential of 
CRT to analyses of non-American law has been underutilised so far. The few exceptions 
that exist either focus on the global North versus the global South (e.g., Valdes et al 2002) 
or, if looking at Europe, do not address intra-EU mobility (e.g., Goldberg 2006; Möschel 
2014; Solanke 2009; Tuitt 2004). My work expands CRT’s application to EU and UK legal 
frameworks. 
 
Some CRT scholars have begun to explore how immigrants are racialised (e.g., Garcia 
2017). This has been especially notable among Latina/o CRT (‘LatCrit’)26 scholars, who 
focus on both the historical and contemporary oppression of Latin American immigrants 
in the United States (id). Romero (2008) notes the practical benefits of applying CRT to 
migration studies, to address issues such as anti‐immigration sentiment and policies. 
Although her sociological research focuses on non-Caucasian immigrants to the United 
States, she emphasises the importance of applying CRT to immigration laws (see also 
Johnson 2004). Moreover, despite focusing on the experience of Mexicans in the United 
States, Garcia (2017) notes CRT’s usefulness to exploring how law marginalises or 
excludes certain migrants. This thesis contributes to such migration scholarship that relies 
on CRT. 
 
i. CRT and CEE Movers 
 
It might not seem obvious at first why the CRT framework, which stems from Afro-
Americans’ civil rights struggle, might be of use when studying white ethnic minority 
groups. It is true that, unlike non-white groups, CEE movers’ white skin offers them at 
least partial access to white privilege, and their progeny is likely to become invisible in 
predominantly white western countries. However, at its core, CRT focuses on unequal 
access to legal and other power structures, and on how such power differentials reproduce 
material and social inequalities. Thus, conceptually, this framework is suitable to the study 
of equality of any group that is not locally privileged. For example, CRT has been applied 
to the study of inequalities experienced by ‘queers’ (e.g., Misawa 2012), and poor whites 
                                                      
25 CRT framework appears especially suitable for analysing laws of the UK since it shares with the United 
States a common-law tradition and race relations embedded in civil rights concerns. 
26 In addition to LatCrits, CRT has given rise to other offshoots, each dedicated to the study of its respective 
ground of subjugation – including ClassCrits, QueerCrits, and AsianCrits (Delgado and Stefancic 2017). 
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(e.g., Pruitt 2015). Moreover, demonstrating CRT tenets’ usefulness to analyses of groups 
and contexts to which it has not been traditionally applied—such as in my study—will test 
and expand this theory, making it more robust.  
 
An initial discomfort with applying CRT and, more generally, with studying racialisation 
and discrimination of CEE movers might also be prompted by an incorrect assumption 
that it somehow devalues BAME27 groups’ experiences of racism or discrimination. It does 
not. I do not ignore the fact that even those at the bottom of the hierarchy of whiteness 
benefit from being phenotypically white (Garner 2006). Moreover, the use of the term 
‘racialisation’ should not promote false equivalency with the concept of blackness or with 
non-whites’ experience of inequalities. Similarly to Hartigan (1999: 13), I acknowledge that 
whites and blacks are racialised differently, and that the social and political ramifications of 
those racialisations are vastly different.  
 
I suspect that resistance to applying CRT to white groups might also be prompted by an 
unease with acknowledging that some whites are less privileged than others, and that some 
face discrimination. There is a long-standing argument, propagated in public debates, that 
opposing or stigmatising CEE movers does not constitute racism, because they are white 
(Anderson 2017) and hence privileged28. This outlook is also internalised by some CEE 
movers, who have difficulty conceptualising apparent racism against them as such (Fox et 
al 2015; Haley 2014: 153). Such views, of course, reflect how naturalised white privilege is, 
rendering whiteness invisible. This reinforces the need to explore fractures within 
whiteness. 
 
Notably, CEE movers’ race rarely gets addressed by the dominant group. For example, 
white Britons in Moore’s (2013: 212) study never explicitly mentioned CEE movers’ race 
when differentiating them. Instead, they focused on movers’ social class, respectability, 
appearance, language, living conditions, poverty, and low-skill employment. The fact that 
whiteness as a racial identity tends to be invisible does not render it irrelevant. If anything, 
it points to how naturalised it is as a concept, and makes it more important for researchers 
to address. Race, including whiteness, always operates culturally and structurally, and 
through unconscious everyday practices and discourses. Notably, ‘race has not only to do 
with colour, but with tying culture to bodies in a hierarchical way’, so that there is no neat 
line between white and non-white (Garner 2009: 48). White skin does not shield CEE 
movers from processes of racialisation and the effects of racism (e.g., Fox et al 2012a; 
                                                      
27 Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic. 
28 Moreover, political correctness norms constrain the expression of negative attitudes towards non-whites 
(Lewis 2005). 
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Garner 2009, 2012). Whiteness in the UK has been ‘fashioned through and against other 
versions of whiteness’ (Nayak 2002: 243), such as of the Irish historically and of ‘chavs’ 
today, through a process which delineates those who are considered ‘white’ from those not 
‘white enough’ and those excluded from whiteness altogether (id: 258). Similarly, Fox et al 
(2012a: 681) argue that ‘racialisation does not require putative phenotypical or biological 
difference’. Instead, racism can also rely on cultural traits as a basis of differentiation 
(Barker 1981), and racialisation occurs whenever the ‘category of “race” is invoked and 
evoked in discursive and institutional practices to interpret, order, and indeed structure 
social relations’ (Fox et al 2012a). Notably, white Britons’ comments racialising CEE 
workers as inferior in both Halej’s (2014: 111) and Moore’s (2013: 303) studies showed 
some parallels to racist discourses used to stigmatise black and postcolonial populations in 
the UK. Therefore, the concept of race is relevant to any study of how dominant whites’ 
position is constructed by excluding less privileged white groups. 
 
ii. Responding to Critiques of CRT 
 
CRT scholars have sometimes been critiqued for relying too heavily on the black/white 
binary, attributing inequalities exclusively to (non-white) race, and using personal 
anecdotes rather than methodologically rigorous studies29 (Crenshaw and Peller 1995). 
One of my aims is to look beyond the black/white binary, by exploring how migration and 
ethnicity affect the experience of inequalities, discrimination, and privilege. I also guard 
against methodological weaknesses through my empirically rigorous research design, as 
described below. 
 
B. Critical Whiteness Studies   
 
The study of white privilege constitutes an essential component of CRT30. Often traced to 
the work of 19th-century African-American scholars who illuminated how white privilege 
deprives people of colour of access to material and social resources (Twine and Gallagher 
2008: 7-10), critical whiteness studies (‘CWS’) focus on how whiteness is construed at both 
institutional and everyday levels. CWS scholars explore how privilege accrues to the 
dominant whites (McIntosh 198831) through racism against and racialisation of inferiorised 
                                                      
29 In response, CRT scholars have begun to rely more heavily on rigorous quantitative and qualitative 
research methods (e.g., Foster 2014; Oei and Ring 2015; Paul-Emilie 2015), including systematic content 
analyses of hard laws (e.g., Clarke 2014). 
30 Not surprisingly, some have combined CWS and CRT in their studies (e.g., Fredericks 2009; Gillborn 
2005). 
31 McIntosh (1988) listed some poignant examples of white privilege, such as: being able to shop anywhere 
without being harassed; being surrounded by other whites in daily contexts, on television, and in newspapers; 
having one’s national heritage and the concept of civilisation attributed to whites; being surrounded by 
products and traditions that reflect white culture; and being treated as an individual rather than a 
representative of one’s race. 
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groups (Frankenberg 1993; Roediger 1991). All whites benefit from whiteness 
economically, politically, legally, socially, and culturally (Frankenberg 1993; Garner 2007b). 
Whiteness has traditionally been unmarked and unquestioned, and thus normalised as the 
position of power (Bonnett 2000). Both CWS and CRT scholars have disrupted that 
image, by revealing and problematising the construction of white privilege — through 
laws, discourse, economics, politics, and culture (Lopez 2005).  
 
Whiteness has been deeply embedded within European history. McVeigh (2010) has traced 
the significance of whiteness to the construction of the Roman Empire and of the Holy 
Roman Empire (in opposition to barbarians); hostility towards Saracens, Jews, and 
Gypsies; and antagonism towards non-white colonial subjects. Contemporary debates 
about whiteness can be observed in the concept of Fortress Europe32 to keep (mostly non-
white, non-Christian) third-country nationals out of the EU, and in widespread opposition 
to the potential accession of Turkey (id).  
 
Not only people of colour get excluded from the concept of whiteness. Instead, it is a 
relational concept, constructed by positioning others at its borders or by dismissing them 
altogether as inferior (Said 1978). There are degrees of whiteness that differentiate between 
dominant whites and non-dominant Caucasian groups (Hartigan 1999: 14). Moreover, 
whiteness has permeable and shifting boundaries (Linke 1999), constructed through local, 
national, and global relations, past and present (Frankenberg 1993). Thus, Slavs, Celts, and 
Latins had been ranked as less white than Anglo-Saxons as far back as the Enlightenment 
(Eze 2007). A century ago, the Irish, Jews, Italians, and Slavic immigrants in the United 
States only came to belong to the dominant white group by increasing their political 
engagement, assimilating culturally, acquiring wealth, and differentiating themselves from 
non-whites (Roediger 1991; Jacobson 1998). Likewise, in the UK, Jews and the Irish were 
initially racialised; as Gypsies and Travellers continue to be to this day (Garner 2007b; 
Kusher 2005).  
 
Some CWS scholars of contemporary power relations have sought to dismantle the idea 
that whiteness is a monolithic identity (Twine and Gallagher 2008), by exposing its 
fractures and how closely circumscribed the locally privileged white norm is (Levine-Rasky 
2013). Hartigan (1999: 3) argues that social researchers need to pay more attention to 
differences within racial groups, and to local settings in which racial identities become 
articulated. Some phenotypically white people are marginalised due to their class, gender, 
sexuality, or nationality (e.g., id; Bonnett 2008; Garner 2007b; McDowell 2009; Wray et al 
                                                      
32 Hepple (2004). 
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2001). For example, the privileged British white norm excludes migrants, perceived as a 
threat to British values, ethnicity, and health (Garner 2012).  
 
i. Whiteness Studies and CEE Movers 
 
Garner (2006) calls for a more nuanced application of CWS to micro level power relations 
among white groups, which have come to the foreground due to the arrival of post-
communist refugees and of post-2004 CEE movers in western countries. Indeed, CEE 
movers represent an interesting and timely group for a study of whiteness in the UK. For 
the first time since the great Irish exodus of the 1800s, white Britons became confronted 
with a large group of people who share their phenotype and thus a degree of invisibility. 
These movers’ position has been rather ambivalent in that they are considered neither an 
oppressed minority, nor a part of British society or its colonial heritage, nor immigrant 
outsiders33. Notably, they are phenotypically white, but not white enough to belong to the 
British norm. 
 
Non-legal researchers, especially sociologists and labour scholars, have relied on CWS 
tenets to explore both the benefits accruing to CEE nationals from their race, and their 
incomplete access to white privilege. For example, they have addressed British 
immigration policies’ preference for CEE nationals over non-white immigrants – such as 
for post-war Baltic volunteer workers (McDowell 2005), and for post-04 movers34 
(McVeigh 2010). In line with historical labour studies (e.g., Roediger 1991), CEE movers’ 
white skin offers them some advantage in the UK, such as easier access to front desk and 
home care jobs (e.g., Burrell et al 2018; McDowell 2009; Samaluk 2014). CEE nationals 
appear aware of such benefits of their whiteness. For example, being white leads CEE 
movers to expect not to suffer racism35, and to be in a privileged position in the labour 
market (McDowell et al 2007) and within British power hierarchies (Fox et al 2012a; see 
also Halej 2014: 153). This sense of privilege might also help to explain CEE movers’ 
racism towards non-white groups (e.g., McDowell et al 2007; Parutis 2011)36. On the other 
hand, CEE movers have been racialised through the white majority’s attribution of 
‘deprecatory features’ to them, focused on their ‘alien values’, primitivisation, and 
criminalisation (Halej 2014: 111). They have also been racialised by the UK media and in 
popular discourse – as cheap, exploitable, criminal, or uncivilised workers (e.g., Fox et al 
2012a; Garner 2012). Studies in both urban (e.g., Halej 2014) and rural areas (e.g., Moore 
                                                      
33 Before Brexit immigration policies become implemented. 
34 Before Brexit, that is. 
35 In Halej’s (2014: 161) study, several CEE respondents insisted that the concept of ‘racism’ could not apply 
to them because of their whiteness. They reserved it for BAME individuals. 
36 In turn, CEE workers have experienced racism from non-white co-workers (e.g., McDowell et al 2007). 
 28 
2013) indicate that some white Britons perceive CEE movers as innately inferior, ‘not 
quite white’37 enough to integrate into English life – largely due to their appearance and 
perceived lifestyle characteristics38 (Moore 2013: 27), and due to being conflated by some 
with undocumented migrants (Halej 2014: 119). Notably, this racialisation process often 
relies on rhetoric resembling that which was applied to oppose non-white, colonial 
migration to the UK (id: 90). It is also reminiscent of the historical racialisation of Jews, 
the Irish, and Eastern Europeans. My thesis seeks to contribute to such research, while 
exploring CWS’s utility to legal analyses of intra-EU power hierarchies. 
 
ii. Responding to Critiques of CWS 
 
The CWS framework has been critiqued for ignoring the importance of the global 
backdrop of financial relations (Delgado and Stefancic 2017), and for approaching 
whiteness as a category abstracted and removed from daily race issues (Bonnett 2000). 
More fundamentally, Arnesen (2001) argues that ‘whiteness’ is a social construct that is 
impossible to define39, and therefore, is vulnerable to manipulation by researchers seeking 
to promote their own subjective interpretation. I guard against the danger of infusing 
subjectivity into this research through my methodological training at the LSE40 and through 
my rigorous research design (described below, and in Chapters 2 and 6). Moreover, my 
work addresses contextual background factors (economic, historical, political, and cultural) 
and data (including quantitative studies) on inequalities that embed my discussion of 
whiteness within a broader, lived context. One of my goals is to infuse CWS with a more 
global perspective, by considering intra-EU fractures within whiteness. I am also aware of 
intersectionality issues that affect the experience of equality by CEE movers, and especially 
the role of class (addressed below and throughout the thesis, as applicable).  
 
Some critics attack CWS for potentially idolising whiteness – or, on the contrary, for 
demonising whites (Dyer 1997; Kolchin 2002). I do neither. Instead, one of my aims is to 
expand critical race theories to consider how whiteness is internally fractured, thereby 
exposing its fabrication. Caucasian scholars who study whiteness to explore its 
construction have been termed ‘race traitors’ or ‘neo-abolitionists’ because revealing the 
construction of white privilege and making it visible constitute steps towards abolishing it 
(Ignatiev 2008). Some note that race traitor scholars have contradictory aims of attempting 
                                                      
37 Three interviewees in Halej’s (2014: 138) study even questioned whether CEE movers are phenotypically 
white, and described them instead as ‘pale’ or ‘not black’. 
38 Such as their clothing, hairstyles, food and alcohol consumption, gender relations, sexuality, employment, 
perceived poverty, living circumstances, and housing. 
39 The same critique can be applied to any socially constructed category (such as gender or sexuality). 
40 Including modules on Socio-Legal Theory and Practice, and on Qualitative Methodologies. 
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to abolish all racial constructs, while studying different experiences of each race, thus 
reifying the concept of separate races (Garner 2007b). As I explore the boundaries of 
whiteness, I share both these goals, and do not think that the two positions are 
inconsistent: Race is unfortunately a lived reality, with material effects, steeped in 
historical, social, economic, and political power relations. As such, before the possibility of 
change can be conceptualised, pre-existing racial categories must be used to address the 
position of groups at each race’s centre and at racial margins. As US Justice Blackmun had 
noted in a key affirmative action case, ‘[i]n order to go beyond racism, we must first take 
account of race’41.  
 
C. Other Potentially Relevant Analytical Frameworks 
 
i. The Role of Class   
 
Both CRT and CWS scholars note that not only race, but also class has material and 
symbolic effects on our experiences. The concept of intersectionality recognises that we 
are simultaneously members of many groups—such as those based on gender, class, 
religion, and sexual orientation—and these complex identities shape the specific way in 
which we access privilege, experience discrimination, and suffer inequalities (Delgado 
2011: 1263). Whiteness is mediated by class (Levine-Rasky 2011), as demonstrated through 
the construction and experiences of ‘white trash’ in the US (Haylett 2001; Pruitt 2015) and 
‘chavs’ in the UK (Hayward and Yar 2006; Jones 2011), and the marginalisation and 
criminalisation of ‘the white working class’ (Webster 2008; Mondon and Winter 2018). 
More specifically, scholars have noted that CEE nationals’ whiteness and racialisation in 
the west have been affected through their (lower) class - both historically (Roediger 1991) 
and today (Fox et al 2012a; Halej 2014; McDowell 2009). Within the broad EU backdrop, 
all CEE nationals are relatively poor in comparison to EU-15 nationals. Not surprisingly, 
there is little, if any, mention of middle or upper class CEE nationals in today’s western 
discourse. Thus, my study implicitly addresses intersectionality of race and (lower) socio-
economic class. 
 
Class differentiation among members of my study group, or among CEE nationals more 
generally, is not always at the forefront of my thesis, however. This is partly driven by the 
fact that both EU and UK equality frameworks ignore class42. Moreover, the concept of 
class is not straightforward when applied to CEE movers in the UK. In Halej’s (2014: 137) 
                                                      
41 Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
42 Of course, policies limiting access to welfare benefits, imposing financial tests to access the right of free 
movement, or encouraging precarious employment disproportionately affect CEE nationals who are poorer 
or lower-skilled. Moreover, it is more difficult for poorer claimants to assert their rights before tribunals. 
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study, although some white British respondents associated CEE movers with the lower 
class or even ‘below’ lower class43, others regarded CEE movers as insufficiently integrated 
to occupy a particular position in the British class hierarchy. Notably, it is not simply CEE 
nationals’ class positioning within the EU or in the UK that appears to provoke anxieties 
in the west. For example, movers from other poor Member States, such as Greece of 
Portugal, have not evoked as much concern in the UK44 (as explained in Chapter 6) or 
exclusion through EU discourse (as addressed in Chapter 2) as CEE nationals have. 
Hence, despite noting the importance of class to the experiences of my study group, I 
situate my work within a framework based on race instead. In Chapters 6 and 7, I revisit 
the concept of class and the potential usefulness of class-based analysis to my project. 
 
ii. Postcolonial Analysis 
 
In Europe and the UK, studying whiteness is rooted in ideas of postcoloniality (Ponzanesi 
and Blaagaard 2013). Postcolonial theory largely emerged in the mid 1900s, as former 
colonies (such as India and Algeria) struggled for and gained independence. Postcolonial 
scholars have explored the symbolic, political, economic, and social effects of colonial 
exploitation on the new postcolonial environments, and on westerners’ views not only of 
their former colonial subjects but also of themselves (e.g., Fanon 1988; Said 1978; Kerner 
2018). For example, postcolonial scholars often note how white Britons define their 
whiteness in opposition to their former colonial subjects, and formulate it around the 
values of Christianity and proper English middle class behaviour (e.g., Bonnett 2000; 
Garland and Chakraborti 2006; Lopez 2005). Contemporary postcolonial theorists explore 
the voices of former colonial subjects, which have been historically disparaged and 
excluded by the west (e.g., Spivak 1988). Some also address modern colonisation 
processes, such as in the Middle East (e.g., Gregory 2004), and due to North–South 
economic power asymmetries (e.g., Kerner 2018). More generally, Fitzpatrick (2001) 
argues that today’s globalism, fuelled by neoliberal economics, can be approached as a 
continuance of western imperialism, albeit without actual colonies. There are some 
obvious intersections between postcolonial theory and CRT. Both emerged out of, and 
represent an intellectual challenge to racial oppression. Borrowing heavily from one 
another, both expose that race and racism are intricate parts of social history and social 
systems. Both seek to create more racially just societies. 
 
                                                      
43 Due to movers’ ignorance of workers’ rights, and poor language skills. 
44 Although historically, Mediterranean immigrants did provoke opposition in the UK (Panayi 2010). 
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In the context of CEE movers, most applications of postcolonial theory have focused 
either on the CEE region’s decolonisation from the Soviet Union or on the west’s ongoing 
role in economic neo-colonialism of the CEE region (e.g., Böröcz and Kovacs 2001; 
Buchowski 2006; Hipfl and Gronold, 2011; Samaluk 2014, 2016a; Stenning and 
Hörschelmann 2008). Böröcz (2001) argues that both the ‘Europeanisation’45 process and 
the Eastern Enlargement were characterised by neo-colonial export of governmentality 
and economic control by western governments and companies, which approached the 
CEE region as in need of modernising. This gaze of western superiority has been 
reinforced by the UK media and public, which in turn helps employers to legitimise their 
exploitation of CEE workers (Samaluk 2016). The success of the EU’s eastern 
‘colonialism’ has been facilitated by the local elites’ embrace of western discourse (Behr 
2012)46. Scholars have also argued that this outlook has been internalised by the CEE 
public. That is, their imagination of the west is informed by the postcolonial logic of 
western economic, political, and cultural superiority (Kiossev 1995). This ‘self-colonial 
logic’ guides CEE workers’ decisions to take up low-skill, low-paid employment in the 
west – tradeoffs they are willing to make to be able to partake of western culture (Samaluk 
2016a).  
 
Postcolonial theory is relevant to my research questions because the east-west power 
differentials are at the core of my study, as is western ideology othering the CEE region. I 
consider postcolonial approaches to studying the CEE region, and cite postcolonial 
scholars throughout the thesis as appropriate. But the postcolonial framework is of lesser 
utility to my purpose than CRT/CWS framework because postcolonial theory is less 
concerned with fractures within whiteness. Moreover, one of my goals in this thesis is to 
critique and test CRT and CWS frameworks as applied to my research questions. Hence, I 
rely on those theoretical approaches, without discounting the relevance of postcolonial 
theory to my study. I revisit these issues in Chapter 7. 
 
6. My Methods   
 
In their analytical approaches, both CRT and CWS scholars re-examine historical and legal 
records to focus on the underlying interests that they further, and replace majoritarian 
interpretations with those in line with the experience of minorities (Harris 2013). Both 
question the underlying definitions and foundations of the current legal order - including 
equality theory, legal reasoning, and the apparent neutrality of law (Delgado and Stefancic 
                                                      
45 A misnomer. In this context especially, it would be more accurate to call the process ‘westernisation’. 
46 Of course, the recent pushback by the Polish Government against some EU policies might be indicative 
of the gradual evolution of Polish consciousness away from western norms. 
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2017). To expose various forms of subjugation, they tend to rely on qualitative research 
methods (e.g., Crenshaw 2011; Harris 2013; Levine-Rasky 2013; Matsuda et al 1993; 
Williams 1992). Rather than adhering to a particular method, however, CRT scholars focus 
on producing knowledge that will make a difference to those who are dominated, by 
naming forms of discrimination that are not addressed by formal legal language and by 
majoritarian legal discourse (Crenshaw 2011).  
 
A qualitative approach is more appropriate for my research than a quantitative design 
because my questions are open-ended and I seek an in-depth understanding of complex 
social processes. Moreover, my critical approach is more in line with interpretivist than 
positivist studies (Snape and Spencer 2003). Qualitative methods are especially useful for 
exploring understudied topics, and gaining insights about how legal systems operate 
(Webley 2010). They are also well-equipped to take account of social contexts and of the 
complexity of real social phenomena (id). I rely on documentary qualitative analysis 
because law and legal discourse are highly verbal fields. As Webley (2010) notes, 
documentary analysis is of great importance to empirical legal studies, and scholars should 
consider not only hard laws, but also other (currently underutilised) legal documents. 
Critical scholars view the binary distinctions between hard and soft law as illusory (e.g., 
Bennoune 2012; Trubek 2006). Close analysis of soft laws is especially important when 
researching the EU’s legal framework, because the EU is ‘primarily a textual enterprise, a 
“print community”’ detailing its own development and practices (Williams 2003: 666). 
 
The documents I reviewed and cite in this thesis include: (1) anti-discrimination laws (the 
Race Equality Directive, the Equality Act 2010, and anti-discrimination cases); (2) all 
foundational EU treaties; (3) (a) laws and (b) official discourse behind Poland’s accession 
and the right of free movement; (4) legislative histories of all aforementioned laws; and (5) 
soft law documents related to all of the aforementioned laws47. All these sources are 
relevant, credible, and representative of the common view of the groups that had drafted 
them (Finnegan 2006). I reviewed all documents relevant to categories (1), (2), (3)(a), 3(b), 
and (4) listed above. I also reviewed approximately 20% of the more than 100,000 
documents responsive to category (5). I chose that sample based on relevance as 
determined by EUR-Lex search engine48. I also made sure that my sampling was 
                                                      
47 Moreover, since I consider the significance of my data in the broader institutional, economic, historical, 
and political contexts, I also researched and cite relevant background information as appropriate. 
48 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu. Managed by the EU Publications Office, this official database is updated 
daily and includes all EU laws, preparatory documents, agreements, legislative history documents, 
Parliamentary questions, and other public documents, dating back to 1951. 
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representative by looking quickly at all the relevant documents that my queries had 
produced.  
 
I chose content analysis as the most suitable method given my theoretical background, the 
availability of large numbers of relevant documents, and the complexity of the phenomena 
that I research. Content analysis is especially useful for highly communicative areas of 
study (Krippendorff 1989), for mapping out key characteristics of large bodies of legal and 
policy texts (Webley 2010), and for addressing the complexity of materials being studied 
(Bryman 2004). Moreover, content analysis allows the researcher to take a theoretical 
position that frames the development of her research criteria and inferences made from 
texts (Krippendorff 2003); to analyse texts within their social, cultural, economic, and 
political contexts (Short 1995); and to consider texts’ latent characteristics and any missing 
parts (Elo et al 2014). When reviewing each document in my data sets, I created categories 
based on how often certain concepts appeared, and how well they were developed. Where 
possible, I sought to link the various categories that had emerged by combining them and 
by creating subcategories. I then compared the various categories that had emerged in each 
data set, merging categories where possible, and deleting categories that were the least 
significant within my data sets. Throughout the thesis, I include the main categories that 
had emerged from my data sets in headings and subheadings, and I refer to the most data-
rich sources to illustrate my findings. More detailed descriptions of my methodology are 
included in Chapters 2 and 6.  
 
Qualitative research is sometimes criticised for subjectivity, limited validity and reliability, 
and lack of (statistical) generalisability (Webley 2010). I recognise that my Polish ethnicity, 
my background as a litigator, and my theoretical orientation might have affected my data 
collection and analysis by predisposing me to feel biased towards Poles, and thus prone to 
perceive inequalities, discrimination, or injustice where they do not exist. To help address 
these challenges, I was mindful at each step of my research about the effect my political, 
cultural, and personal values and assumptions might have had on my research design, data 
collection, data interpretation, and data presentation. I designed and carried out my 
research with transparency, and with methodological appropriateness - by generating and 
analysing my data with integrity, in a systematic and rigorous way, documenting all my 
research steps, carefully developing and revising coding categories, and discussing this with 
my supervisors. I acknowledged contradictory data where it exists, and paid attention to 
diverse views in scholarship. Moreover, I situated my data interpretation within pertinent 
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quantitative evidence about migration flows and labour market outcomes49, and within 
methodologically rigorous studies of racialisation and inequalities. To address ethical 
implications of my work, I was careful throughout my study about not producing or 
enabling theories or arguments that might be construed as racist.  
 
7. Roadmap   
 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 sets the background to the way in which the EU 
equality regime, the enlargement project, and Poles’ mobility have been embedded in a 
certain set of values and ideologies. It closely examines foundational fundamental rights 
mythology and some of its derivative myths, seeking to uncover hidden goals and 
assumptions within such myths. My aim is to explore whether EU rhetoric reveals a 
conceptual hierarchy of Europeanness or whiteness. Chapter 3 takes a close look at 
Poland’s accession process, and situates it within EU narratives. Specifically, I examine 
how Poland’s economic and political challenges after the fall of Communism might have 
been reinforced through specific pre-accession policies imposed by western financial 
institutions and the EU, prompting Poland to enter the accession process on an unequal 
footing. I also consider the dynamics of the accession process, and analyse some key 
aspects of the acquis that have been particularly disadvantageous to Poland. Chapter 4 
seeks to trace EU myths and inequalities built into the enlargement process to direct and 
indirect limits on CEE nationals’ ability to reside and work in the EU. I explain pre-04 EU 
immigration policies, and the context leading to the imposition of post-accession mobility 
derogations. I also address how the UK and other EU-15 States had applied transitional 
measures, before exploring how the mobility framework has been evolving over the last 
decade. Finally, I take a broad look at mobile Polish workers’ experiences and their 
mobility’s effects. In Chapter 5, I explore how the right to equality under EU law, which 
has been intimately linked to the right of free movement, has been conceptualised in the 
context of CEE movers. Specifically, I consider whether CEE movers have been included 
in the Race Equality Directive’s legislative history, and whether the Directive’s text and 
ECJ interpretations are fit to address their equality concerns. I also address the Directive’s 
transposition process in EU-15 States, and discuss how CEE nationals have been 
approached by the EU’s equality discourse.  
 
The UK becomes the focus of my thesis in Chapter 6. I explore CEE nationals’ experience 
of discrimination, disadvantage, and racialisation in the UK, and their position within the 
British equality framework. After presenting a historical analysis of the British race 
                                                      
49 For a summary of labour market outcomes studies, see Appendix 1. 
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relations framework, I offer a close critique of key provisions of Equality Act 2010. I then 
review recent employment tribunal claims brought by Poles, exploring whether their 
frequent racialisation is taken into account by the tribunals. More generally, I ask whether 
the current equality framework is capable of responding to Poles’ experience of inequality. 
Finally, Chapter 7 situates my findings within the long-standing western othering of the 
east, and draws out my study’s theoretical and policy implications (including in the context 
of Brexit). I also explore links between how the CEE region and CEE nationals have been 
approached by the EU and British legal regimes, before noting some limitations of my 
study, and suggesting areas for further research.  
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As mentioned in the Introductory Chapter, western intellectuals have relied on discursive 
practices to imagine the east as inherently different from, and lesser than, the west - 
politically, socially, ideologically, scientifically, and artistically (e.g., Said 1978) – beginning 
during the Enlightenment (Wolff 1994), and gathering force in the early 1900s (Meyer 
1955). Some scholars have argued that this conceptual approach has continued since the 
fall of Communism, with the CEE region still being imagined as an embodiment of 
inferiority and otherness within Europe (Todorova 2003), inherently unable to be fully 
‘European’ (Ciupijus 2012b), and hence in need of western tutelage (Brubaker 1998).  
 
In this Chapter, I seek to address whether such perspectives underlie EU discourse. That 
is, my goal is to explore whether the Eastern Enlargement, and CEE nationals’ mobility 
have been embedded in ideologies that similarly other, exclude, or silence the CEE region 
or its nationals. Specifically, I pay close attention to whether legal narratives construct a 
hierarchy of whiteness or ‘Europeanness’ within the EU. I seek to illuminate what interests 
are emphasised and served by EU discourse, which ones are ignored or silenced, and 
whether EU narratives are internally consistent. These topics are necessary to explore as I 
move towards my discussion in later Chapters of whether the EU’s equality framework is 
internally consistent, and of how it interacts with key EU policies.  
 
Critical race scholars have noted the importance of legal ideology, communicated through 
texts and symbols, in producing a social reality, which reflects and reinforces existing 
power relations (Delgado and Stefancic 2017: 8-10). The dominant group employs not 
only formal laws, but also legal rhetoric to obscure, excuse, and deny racism (id: 77), 
distancing itself from potential criticism. It creates and employs legal myths—
predominantly contained in soft law instruments—to also affect what becomes think-able 
and do-able (Della Sala 2013). By presenting the current system as basically fair and 
inevitable, while obstructing the real assumptions and goals behind laws, legal rhetoric also 
reduces policy efforts aimed at addressing inequalities (Crenshaw 2011). Moreover, the 
dominant group employs rhetoric to create a sense of commonality among members of 
that group, while differentiating, othering, and racialising all others (Rodriguez 1999). 
Below, I test whether these tenets can be applied to help explore the questions I pose in 
this Chapter. 
 
I begin with a brief discussion of my methods and sources. Next, I address the 
dissemination process of EU mythologies, the EU’s foundational fundamental rights 
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mythology, and some key derivative myths that support it. I then explore the concept of 
integration and continuing economic imperatives within such myths. Next, I address the 
role of western heritage in EU narratives, and seek to situate the CEE region and the 
Eastern Enlargement within them. In the conclusion, I summarise how Europeanness is 
conceptualised within the EU project, and note some theoretical implications of my 
findings.  
 
A. Methods and Sources 
 
I searched the official EU website (EUR-Lex) for all documents that contained any of my 
a priori thematic codes (race, racism, equality, ethnicity, xenophobia, white, Caucasian, and 
discrimination) – each in conjunction with the terms Poland, polish, or east. These 
searches produced approximately 55,000 documents. After eliminating duplicates, I 
skimmed the data sets to exclude documents that did not engage with my questions in any 
meaningful way, were not relevant, or beyond the scope of my topic. This narrowed down 
my document pool to approximately 10,00050. They were comprised predominantly of 
preparatory documents (that is, staff working documents, reports, resolutions, opinions, 
communications, impact assessments, and proposals), legal acts (regulations, decisions, and 
directives), case law, and parliamentary questions51. I first reviewed approximately 10% of 
the resulting data sets for each of the searches I had executed, selected due to being ranked 
as highest in relevance according to the EUR-Lex search engine (as determined by the 
frequency with which my search terms had appeared). In this initial review, I focused on 
the content in the proximity of my search terms. I used this to test my a priori thematic 
codes, and to formulate new data-driven codes. I then reviewed and coded the remainder 
of my document sets (approximately 9,000 documents), modifying final codes based on 
my data, and creating subcategories. My final codes included Christian(ity), fundamental 
rights, freedom, culture, heritage, symbol, peace, diversity, mission, values, education, and 
integration.  
 
To refine my findings, I then performed additional searches of all documents on EUR-Lex 
for codes that needed further elaboration, and reviewed approximately 10% of resultant 
data sets (again, those determined as the most relevant by the EUR-Lex search engine). I 
also expanded my purposive search for those final category terms to CADMUS (EUI 
Research Repository)52, and the EU’s online bookshop53. Moreover, I reviewed all EU 
                                                      
50 Upon request, I will submit an Appendix of the approximately 10,000 documents I had reviewed. 
51 Questions posed by Members of the European Parliament to the European Council or the European 
Commission. 
52 See http://cadmus.eui.eu/. 
53 See https://bookshop.europa.eu/en/home/.  
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foundational treaties, and all Jean Monnet Lectures54, focusing my analysis on both the a 
priori thematic codes and the final codes that had emerged from the analysis of my data 
pool from EUR-Lex. I then looked for relationships between various codes, used the most 
robust as key themes in this Chapter, and selected the most data-rich texts to cite.  
 
Most of the documents that my search produced and which I cite here consist of soft law 
instruments, written primarily by EU officials and western politicians. Soft law elaborates 
hard law, expresses its goals, and affects how hard law is interpreted. Therefore, soft law is 
essential to legal interpretation (Babić 2007). As Banakar and Travers (2005: 17) note, 
analysis of non-binding soft law documents is an essential component of legal 
interpretation. Critical scholars tend to view the binary distinction between ‘hard law’ and 
‘soft law’ as illusory (Trubek 2006), and often explore the role of soft law in the roots and 
persistence of inequalities (e.g., Bennoune 2012). EU soft law is an especially important 
source of legal knowledge because of the lack of EU-wide media to disseminate legal and 
political discourse, and because it influences and is influenced by Member States’ discourse 
and policies. To interpret soft law instruments and other relevant texts in this Chapter, I 
relied on qualitative content analysis (as explained in the preceding Chapter).  
 
2.  The Significance and Dissemination of EU Myths 
 
A. The Role of Myths in EU Law 
 
The rhetoric used to express legal ideology in both hard and soft EU laws which I cite 
throughout this Chapter frequently takes on attributes of myths. Myths continue to be 
relevant to modern European law, presenting it not only as coherent, rational, and 
universal (Fitzpatrick 1992: 10), but also as modern and progressive (id: 101). To help 
accomplish this, myths differentiate the European legal regime from pre-modern systems, 
and inferiorise or exclude certain individuals such as women, children, non-citizens, and 
imperial subjects (id: 75; 107-9). More generally, the idea of modern Europe and its laws is 
constructed through excluding outsiders, and by rejecting those who are deemed to be the 
other within Europe (Fitzpatrick and Bergeron 1998: xx).  
 
Moreover, by connecting present practices with the past or with calls to a higher order, 
legal myths strengthen cultural and national identities, and legitimate and naturalise the 
status quo (Beetham 2013: 104). As Beetham (id: 171) points out, obtaining the 
appearance of legitimacy has been of particular importance to the EU - widely 
acknowledged to suffer from a legitimacy deficit, and thus in need of justification based on 
                                                      
54 Twenty-five lectures were organised between 1977 and 2006.  
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providing beneficial policies and reflecting shared values. Legal myths must be 
deconstructed to uncover the assumptions behind the current political, social, and 
economic systems, and to reveal any shortcomings of law (Lin 2015). More specifically, 
Williams (2003) advocates that for any EU policy to be understood in depth, it must first 
be placed within its broader EU discourse, through a close examination of both formal 
and informal institutional narratives, rhetoric, and hidden meanings.  
 
Two types of EU myths have been widely propagated: ‘foundational’ myths, which relate 
to the EU’s identity and purpose (Jo 2007: 59); and secondary, ‘derivative’ myths, which 
respond to changing societal concerns (Bouchard 2013: 4). Drawing strength from 
references to collective memories and actual events (id), foundational myths tend to be 
vague and elusive (Williams 2004: 63). Although the EU’s role in implementing social 
policy has always been subsidiary to that of the Member States, the EU’s fundamental-
rights rhetoric—the predominant foundational myth today (Smismans 2010)—has been 
developed through various policies and European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) case law. 
Embedded within foundational myths, derivative myths help to explain what the EU does 
and why, and support discrete political actions and policies (Della Sala 2013). For example, 
derivative myths pertaining to equality and freedom support and reflect the Race Equality 
Directive, the four market freedoms, and the Eastern Enlargement.  
 
Despite the importance of myths, rhetoric, and symbols to EU identity and policies, they 
remain under-studied, especially by critical and legal scholars (Shore 2000: 33). Della Sala 
(2013) argues that the role of myths in the EU has not been given sufficient attention 
because the EU is perceived and portrayed as a pragmatic construct that does not rely on 
myths, unlike nation states. The role of foundational fundamental-rights rhetoric, widely 
propagated only since the late 1980s55 (Smismans 2010), is especially understudied because 
of its newness. Below, I seek to unpack the fundamental rights myth and its derivative 
myths, and to begin addressing inconsistencies within such myths, paying close attention 
to how they imagine and conceptually situate the CEE region.  
 
B. The Dissemination of EU Myths 
 
Since the 1950s, various EU institutions have been producing written materials and 
supporting academic efforts to preserve their historical memory – especially the European 
Commission (‘Commission’), the ECJ, the European Parliament (‘Parliament’ or ‘EP’), and 
their representatives. Despite its merely consultative role, the European Economic and 
                                                      
55 After having replaced myths referring to peace, stability, prosperity, and economic integration (Della Sala 
2013; Jones 2010). 
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Social Committee (‘EE&SC’) has also propagated myths. The EU’s various myths have 
been diffused widely, also through the participation of civil society members, scholars, and 
the Member States56 (Della Sala 2013; Smismans 2010). Legitimation and identity building 
through myths have also entailed bottom-up discourse (Sassatelli 2009: 71), propagated by 
grassroots networks, NGOs, and individuals, and with the involvement of various 
associations and agencies acting as ‘European’ groups (or being conflated with the EU57). 
By now, at least the key foundational EU myths have become widely self-propagating, 
with the additional involvement of lesser ranked EU officials and civil society 
representatives (Smismans 2010). 
 
EU institutions have circulated research devoted specifically to applauding the EU project, 
‘a success story that is unrivaled globally’ (Commission 2014), and to endowing it with 
mythical attributes. The book Europe: Giving Shape to an Idea notes that ‘Europe has existed 
down the centuries as a myth, … an idea, a source of identity’ (Council 2009: 1). This 
vision took a concrete shape through ‘a Union of Member States working together … in 
pursuit of a common destiny’ (id). The book’s cover – shape of the European continent, 
shrouded in mist and clouds - evokes united Europe’s mythical origins and inevitable 
destiny. It brings to mind the reaction of one of the participants at the 1948 Hague 
Congress58: ‘Where am I? In what epoch? In a dream? … I hear a voice saying … “We 
must here and now resolve that a European Assembly be constituted.” … Yes, it is a 
dream’ (Brugmans 1970: 135). Having ‘emerged from the dreams of poets and intellectuals 
… Europe was born’ (EUI 1992). The then-President of the European Council, Herman 
Van Rompuy noted in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech (on behalf of the EU), 
that what guides the EU is ‘speaking to us from the centuries … the idea of Europa 
itself’59. In such mythical, nostalgic references, western Member States have served as a 
synecdoche for all of Europe, thus implicitly othering the east as not fully European. 
Moreover, such rhetoric forecloses less praiseworthy evaluations of the EU project, 
including of any inequalities built into the accession process.  
 
Treaties and institutions significant to the EU’s evolution have received great attention. 
For example, on the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, it was 
                                                      
56 Since their accession, CEE states have occasionally attempted to influence EU narratives. For example, 
they have been pressuring the EU to condemn Stalinist crimes against CEE states (Littoz-Monnet 2013). 
57 For example, the Council of Europe—often mistaken for being an EU institution—drafted the 1954 
European Cultural Convention, and promoted the adoption of both the EU flag and the EU anthem 
(Sassatelli 2009: 44). 
58 The Congress of Europe at The Hague is often considered the first federal moment of modern European 
history. 
59 Reminiscent of the use of postcolonial racialised nostalgia to create the UK’s cultural identity (Gilroy 
2005). 
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celebrated through the booklet Building Europe Together 1957-1997 - Treaties of Rome: 40 Years 
of Peace and Cooperation (Commission 1997a). To celebrate its 50th anniversary, the 
Commission (2007a) published 50 Ways Forward – Europe’s Best Successes, with fifty examples 
of EU nationals who had benefited from the EU project. In A Union of Law: from Paris to 
Lisbon: Tracing the Treaties of the European Union (Commission 2012), the EU was validated 
through a narrative of linear progress. Many of the historic images of EU delegates 
gathered on momentous occasions are labelled ‘family photographs’ (id) to better 
emphasise the benevolence, permanence and inevitability of the EU mission. The 
Commission itself, which publishes many such commemorative materials, has been 
celebrated through historical timelines (e.g., EU 2014). 
 
Many such publications target a general audience, thus serving to increase a sense of EU 
polity and legitimacy, while shaping what is think-able. EU institutions have sought to 
disseminate information about their activities to the public, the media, and ‘opinion 
leaders’ (EP undated). For example, The European Union Explained series describes the EU’s 
accomplishments (e.g., EU 2014); and the Commission’s (1996) booklet Europe… Questions 
and Answers, How Does the European Union Work? explains how the EU benefits its citizens. 
On the eve of significant events, such as the Eastern Enlargement, efforts to disseminate 
EU narratives have tended to increase. For example, in 2002, the Commission (2002a) sent 
Media Pack: The Enlargement of the European Union to national, regional and local media, and 
published a visually engaging booklet Europlus: Come and Visit the Countries Wishing to Join the 
European Union! (Commission 2004a), targeting secondary-school students.  
 
To make the EU’s mission come to life, real-life stories are often used. The Commission 
(2012b) has praised integration with headlines such as ‘From a small farm to an online 
business thanks to EU funds’; ‘There are many jobs out there’; ‘Studying abroad, a life-
changing experience’; and ‘Saving lives through medical cooperation’. On the tenth 
anniversary of the Eastern Enlargement, the EE&SC (2014) published a pamphlet with 
personal anecdotes from CEE nationals: 
 
someone came and waved a “magic wand” over us. … it was the EU … of course. 
… When I look at Poland ten years after its accession … I … feel a sense of pride. 
… we have finally managed to join the European family after several decades of 
troubled history….  
 
In the above, the Polish national’s statement implies that Poland did not belong to proper 
Europe before having joined the EU. Again, pre-04 EU, composed of only western 
Member States, stands as a synecdoche for the entire Europe. 
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Education has always been a part of the EU’s efforts to propagate and preserve its 
narratives, while fostering a sense of common identity among EU academics. For example, 
the European University Institute (‘EUI’) was envisioned as early as at the 1948 Hague 
Conference, and has supported research into the ‘joint culture’ of Europe (EUI 1977). It 
houses the EU’s Historical Archives, and has been praised for its ‘major contribution’ to 
‘the European project’ (EUI 2006). Such efforts have been strengthened through EU-
funded scholarly journals60; the Jean Monnet Programme61 supporting EU academics; and 
research devoted specifically to improving methods for the preservation of unpublished 
EU documentation62. Moreover, the EU has created and preserved tangible symbols of 
collective history - through assigning the European Heritage Label to sites or objects with 
‘a symbolic European value’ (EU 2014b); and establishing The House of European 
History museum in Brussels. The museum’s permanent exhibitions focus on creating a 
distinct European identity, steeped in ‘universal values’, such as peace, democracy, and 
human rights, which are ‘a legacy of its Ancient era’63.  
 
3.  Fundamental Rights Narratives  
 
Building upon early federalists’ grand vision of a united Europe (Della Sala 2013), EU 
bureaucrats have been propagating an image of the EU as a progressive, benevolent forum 
created to ensure peace, freedom, and equality. Although EU builders at first equated the 
project with economic goals64, by the 1980s, its initiatives had become firmly situated 
within the foundational mythology of fundamental rights (Smismans 2010). This was 
facilitated by situating fundamental rights within ‘the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe’ (Lisbon Treaty65, Preamble). Having become consolidated as a legal 
principle, so that even EU critics deem it to be a founding principle (Williams 2004: 157), 
the fundamental rights myth is actively being constructed to this day through symbols, 
hard and soft laws, audiovisual means66, and academic undertakings.  
 
A. Foundational Fundamental Rights Myth and Derivative Myths 
 
Fundamental rights are a significant component of the acquis. Furthermore, EU rhetoric 
embeds them within myth-like narratives and logic to construct the EU’s identity and 
                                                      
60 Including the Journal of European Integration, and the Journal of European Integration History. 
61 Called the Erasmus programme since 2014.  
62 E.g., EU Grey Literature: Long-term Preservation, Access, and Discovery (European Centre for the Development 
of Vocational Training 2012). 
63 See https://historia-europa.ep.eu/en/permanent-exhibition/accolades-and-criticism. 
64 Williams (2004: 147-8) argues that founding treaties did not even foresee any human rights provisions. 
65 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed 13 December 2007, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007. 
66 Such as the films Jean Monnet: Father of Europe, A European Journey, The Tree of Europe, After Twenty Centuries, 
and A Passion to be Free. 
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legitimate its social order, while configuring our imagination of the EU project’s political 
and philosophical underpinnings. Thus, fundamental rights are conceptualised as universal 
and inalienable, and hence linked with calls to a higher, ideal order. They are portrayed as 
autonomous and stable, yet at the same time as socially contingent, stemming from the 
Member States’ heritage and being framed as a response to ravages of WWII. While they 
are linked to the EU’s founding and hence its sovereign imperatives, they are also tied to 
the popular spirit behind the project – as embodied by Member States’ histories. 
Moreover, they are portrayed as a progressive exemplification of western modernity. 
 
For example, various legislative acts have been embedded within, and have propagated, 
fundamental rights discourse. According to the Preamble of the Single European Act 
(1986)67, promoting democracy based on fundamental rights was to be a central goal of the 
EU. In the Maastricht Treaty (1992)68, Member States confirmed ‘their attachment to … 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Preamble). The Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997)69 tied the EU’s founding to ‘respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’ (Article F(1)), and conditioned membership on respect for fundamental rights 
(Article 49). The proposed European Constitution (2004)70 situated fundamental rights 
within the ‘humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal 
values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person … and the rule of law’ 
(Preamble). According to the Commission, the EU ‘arose from the ashes of World War 
Two’ (1996: 4), in order to promote such ‘humanitarian and progressive values’ (2014: 5). 
 
The European Parliament has been consolidating fundamental rights as a legal principle. 
Specific resolutions have been devoted to fundamental rights – for example, the 1977 Joint 
Declaration on Fundamental Rights71, the 1993 Resolution on the Respect for Human 
Rights in the European Community72, and the 1995 Resolution on Human Rights in the 
World in 1993 to 1994 and the Union’s Human Rights Policy73. Embedding fundamental 
rights mythology within a common European heritage, the Parliament (2007a: ¶ 5) has 
noted that the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms ‘keep alive the 
memory of European history’. Moreover, a 2009 resolution commended the ‘active role 
played by the European Union in the world as a defender of human rights’ (EP 2009: ¶ 3).  
                                                      
67 OJ L 169, 29.6.1987. 
68 Treaty on European Union, signed 7 February 1992, OJ C 191, 29.7.1992 (‘Maastricht Treaty’). 
69 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts, signed 2 October 1997, OJ C 340, 10.11.1997. 
70 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed 29 October 2004, OJ C 310, 16.12.2004. 
71 OJ C 103, 27.4.77. 
72 OJ C 115, 26.4.1993. 
73 OJ C 126, 22.5.1995. 
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The ECJ has also propagated fundamental rights, portrayed as derived from values 
common to the (western) Member States. According to the 1969 Stauder case74, 
‘[f]undamental rights [are] enshrined in the general principles of Community law and 
protected by the Court’. In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the ECJ proclaimed that respect 
for fundamental rights is ‘an integral part of the general principles of Community law’, 
having been ‘inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States’75. In 
the 1974 Nold case, the Court reiterated how ‘draw[ing] inspiration from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States’76, it would annul EU measures in conflict with 
fundamental rights. Williams (2004: 147-8) notes how Stauder’s reasoning is mythical rather 
than legal. Of course, such judicial expressions of values cannot be enforced in the same 
sense that the acquis can, and the ECJ’s efforts to treat them as law have been of 
questionable efficacy (Kochenov 2017). The ECJ’s consistent references to such 
narratives, however, have helped to propagate fundamental rights as a key foundational 
myth today, making the EU project appear fair and benevolent, and obscuring contrary 
points of view about the undertaking as a whole or about its discrete policy initiatives.   
 
Democracy, the rule of law, human rights, pluralism, tolerance, justice, and solidarity 
(Maastricht Treaty, Article 2) are some of the derivative myths stemming from the 
fundamental rights narratives. Moreover, values such as human dignity, freedom, and 
equality form Europe’s ‘spiritual and moral heritage’ (Charter of Fundamental Rights77, 
Preamble). Such derivative myths connect the EU’s fundamental rights mythology to 
actual policies. They have tended to be heavily emphasised during periods filled with 
identity and political anxieties – such as at the time surrounding the Eastern Enlargement 
(e.g., Commission 2003a, 2003b, 2004a).  
 
 
B. Integration Goals within Fundamental Rights Rhetoric 
 
Framed as inevitable and humane, enlargement and integration are consistently portrayed 
by EU institutions as always having been ‘an essential part of the European project’ 
(Commission 2006). ‘As far as Europe is concerned, change points in one direction only: 
full political and economic integration’ (EUI 1985)78. Before the EU was created, men 
considered its ‘founding fathers’—that is, Konrad Adenauer, Joseph Bech, Johan Willem 
Beyen, Winston Churchill, Alcide De Gasperi, Walter Hallstein, Sicco Mansholt, Jean 
                                                      
74 Case 29/69, ECR 419. 
75 Case 11/70, ECR 1125, ¶ 4.  
76 Case 4/73, ECR 491, ¶ 13. 
77 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 303, 14.12.2007. 
78 Speech by Giulio Andreotti (President of the European Council). 
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Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak, and Altiero Spinelli79—had noted that 
Europe had ‘political, economic and moral responsibilities … to carry great weight in the 
world’ (EUI 1983)80. EU myths look back far in history to find the seeds of this mission to 
integrate. For example, Europe: Giving Shape to an Idea (2009) notes that  
 
Europe has existed down the centuries as a myth, a geographical area, an idea81, a 
source of identity, and much else besides. Recently it has taken more concrete 
shape in the form of a Union of Member States working together within a unique 
legal and political framework in pursuit of a common destiny. … It first appears 
with Dante … ambitious vision … roots which go back deep in history… 
 
Numerous narratives reinforce how, since its creation, the EU has been evolving for the 
better, following a trajectory inherent to its mission. ‘The European Union is a living 
organism in a constant process of evolution’ (Commission 2001a: Back Cover). ‘By its very 
nature’, it is ‘destined to grow’ (Commission 2003b: 3). Enlargement, whatever its terms, 
has thus been made to appear inevitable and obvious, not to be questioned. More recently, 
in Enlargement – Extending European Values and Standards to More Countries, the Commission 
(2013: 3) pointed that the EU ‘was created in the 1950s to foster peace, prosperity and 
European values on the continent,’ and that the ‘EU’s enlargement policy accompanies 
this process’. Of course, those ‘European values’ from the 1950s were set by only a 
handful of western states, and such narratives overlook the role played in the Enlargement 
process by east-west inequalities. 
 
EU integration gets portrayed as exemplary within the history of territorial expansion 
projects, foreclosing seeing it as a neo-colonial endeavour, as some scholars have argued 
(e.g., Engel-Di Mauro 2006; Wolff 1994): 
 
The idea of unification … has sometimes meant an imperial vision of domination … 
What we are now attempting to build is a Europe based on consensus and on 
popular support. This experiment is … unique in human history… different from 
the experience of the great empires of the past … and also different from that of the 
United States (EUI 1992). 
 
Despite frequent references to the pre-04 EU as a synecdoche for the entire Europe, in 
the first few decades of European integration, the project was also portrayed as inclusive82. 
Of course, that was long before the fall of Communism, and long before the potential 
accession of CEE states could have been anticipated. With strong post-war anti-fascist and 
                                                      
79 Commission (2013a). 
80 Speech by Altiero Spinelli (a founding father). 
81 For a description of academic writings regarding how the ‘idea’ of Europe has been incorporated into post-
war mythology of the EU’s origins, see Swedberg (1994). 
82 Narratives of inclusivity have been reinforced by a derivative myth of diverse citizens working together to 
fulfil the EU’s mission. In 2000, ‘Unity in Diversity’ was adopted as the EU’s official motto. 
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anti-Soviet sentiments, EU forerunners had depicted European integration as based on a 
pan-European ideology and pan-European identity (Schimmelfennig 2001). Pursuant to 
the 1958 EEC Treaty83 establishing the European Economic Community, the six founding 
Members called for ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe … who share their 
ideal’ (Preamble), and accorded ‘any European state’84 the right to apply for membership 
(Article 237). A decade later, Walter Hallstein (1968), the first president of the 
Commission, referred to a ‘sentiment of pan-European solidarity’.  
 
C. Economic Imperatives within Fundamental Rights Rhetoric 
 
Although fundamental rights have replaced economic integration as the key foundational 
myth today (Smismans 2010), economic goals continue to be listed alongside fundamental 
rights imperatives or sometimes get nestled within them. For example, on the eve of the 
Eastern Enlargement, Europe was envisioned as not only ‘a continent of democracy, 
freedom, peace and progress’, but also ‘stability and prosperity’ (Commission 2003a: 5). 
According to the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, ‘Europe, reunited after bitter experiences, intends to 
continue along the path of civilisation, progress and prosperity’ (Preamble).  
 
Moreover, the EU’s role as a protector of human rights finds expression in and is 
facilitated through its economic initiatives. ‘Based on four fundamental freedoms, the 
internal market… is an expression of our values, of the European idea of freedom and 
responsibility under the rule of law’ (EUI 2006)85. Notably, ‘the single market is … in the 
interests of Europe’s citizens since it vastly extends their freedom not only as consumers 
and investors, but also as workers who will have the same dignity and the same rights 
whatever the country they choose to settle in’ (EUI 1992)86. Furthermore, EU-wide 
economic endeavours serve to advance racial and ethnic equality: 
 
The appalling excesses of racism and xenophobia which were often rooted in 
economic causes demonstrated a need to structure economic relationships for the 
future in a new way… The best way to fulfil … objectives of its founding fathers 
… is through a strong multilateral trading system … to improve international 
economic cooperation … (EUI 1995)87. 
 
The EU’s economic initiatives are also depicted as taking on attributes of benevolence and 
as contributing to the EU’s mission. ‘The European Union is the creation of visionaries 
                                                      
83 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed 25 March 1957 (‘Treaty of Rome’). 
84 According to Article 49 of the TEU, ‘[a]ny European State which respects the values referred to in Article 
2’ (pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality) may apply to become a Member. 
85 Speech by Jose Manuel Barroso (President of the Commission). 
86 Speech by Giovanni Agnelli (head of Fiat, and an Italian senator). 
87 Speech by Peter Sutherland (former member of the Commission, and the first WTO director-general). 
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and so is its Bank’ (EIB 2008). In addition to providing finance and expertise for 
investment projects, the European Investment Bank is praised for supporting projects that 
‘contribute to furthering EU policy objectives’, and for being ‘strongly committed to 
integrating environmental and social standards into its business activities’ (EIB 2011). It is 
also a ‘responsible bank’, tied directly to the people because it is owned by the 27 Member 
States (id). In the context of the 2008 financial crisis, the European Central Bank’s 
‘enlightened management of the Eurozone’ (EE&SC 2014: 45) was praised for having 
‘saved the euro, and ultimately the Union’ (id: 50). 
 
Similarly, the euro currency gets applauded for its European essence, and for its role in 
preserving the EU, thus benefiting all its citizens. In the First Jean Monnet Lecture, in 
1977, it was predicted that ‘economic welfare in Europe would be improved substantially’ 
due to the euro – by allowing the European economy to function better, creating more 
jobs, and increasing Europeans’ prosperity (EUI 1977)88. In addition to its numerous 
practical benefits, it also carries a symbolic significance. As ‘[o]ne currency for one Europe 
… [b]ringing Europeans together’, the euro is considered a tangible symbol ‘of the 
common identity and shared values of Europe, European nations and Europeans 
themselves’ (Commission 2011a). Due to all these functions, in 2002, the euro was 
awarded the International Charlemagne Prize of the City of Aachen, for promoting 
European unification89.  
 
4.  The Role of Shared (Western) Heritage in EU Mythologies 
 
The EU’s modern history gets traced to Robert Schuman, who, based on the ideas of Jean 
Monnet, proposed on 9 May 195090 that France and Germany combine their coal and steel 
resources in an organisation which other (western) European countries could join. Less 
than a year later, France and (West) Germany - along with Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands - signed the Treaty of Paris91. Denmark, Ireland, and the UK joined 
in 1973; Greece in 1981; Spain and Portugal in 1986; Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 
1995. Thus, all the EU-15 States had joined by 1995, nine years before the Eastern 
Enlargement92.  
 
After recognising that integration cannot be accomplished through legal and economic 
institutions alone, the Commission, with the support of the Parliament, has been at the 
                                                      
88 Speech by Roy Jenkins (President of the European Commission). 
89 Past winners of this Prize, awarded since 1950, include five of the EU’s founding fathers. 
90 Commemorated annually as Europe Day. 
91 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, signed 18 April 1951. 
92 Poland and the other CEE countries acceded on 1 May 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. 
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lead of developing cultural policies (Shore 2000: 55). Despite the EU’s limited competence 
to act in cultural matters (and only since the 1993 Maastricht Treaty), the EU’s forerunners 
have been developing its foundational narratives since the 1960s based on references to a 
shared (western) European culture93. Although fundamental or human rights were not 
referred to in either the Treaty of Paris (1951) or the Treaty of Rome (1957), by the 1960s, 
the Community began to look to the ‘spirit’ of Europe, based on its ‘common heritage’, 
and extrapolated it into the ‘spirit’ of its foundational treaties to develop its foundational 
human rights narratives (Shore 2000: 133). For example, the 1961 Fourth General Report 
on the Activities of the Community referred to the ‘establishment of a European idea … 
penetrating more and more deeply into the consciousness of the public’ (Commission 
1961).  
 
Actively protecting and promoting a sense of shared (western) culture has been on the 
EU’s political agenda since the 1970s – through narratives, rituals (such as the annual 
Europe Day), symbols (such as common passport design), policy initiatives, and soft law 
measures (Sassatelli 2009: 39). The Commission began to operate a de facto cultural policy 
after the then-Members signed the Declaration on the European Identity in 197394. This 
was followed by the Tindemans (1975) Report, which recommended implementing 
policies to create ‘A People’s Europe’. The 1983 Solemn Declaration on European 
Union95 affirmed ‘European identity’, and was followed by the establishment of 
Committee for a People’s Europe (Adonnino Committee) in 1984. Enveloped in long-
standing discourse about a common European culture, the 2000 Charter of Fundamental 
Rights made the intersection between pan-European culture and the fundamental rights 
myth explicit, noting that ‘universal values of human dignity, freedom, [and] equality’ form 
Europe’s ‘spiritual and moral heritage’ (Preamble).  
 
Although scholars have questioned whether such cultural initiatives, steeped in common 
‘European’ values, can affect actual policies (Sassatelli 2009: 195-8), if nothing else, they 
have embedded EU initiatives in a certain set of ideologies, foreclosing other points of 
view and making the status quo appear fair and inevitable. Moreover, I contend that 
references to a long-standing ‘European’ heritage and ‘European’ spirit have been creating 
an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 2006: 1-8), and positioning the east at its conceptual 
periphery. As Shore (2000: 80) notes, efforts to create a shared European cultural heritage 
                                                      
93 Modern references to a shared European heritage are much older, of course. For example, the idea was 
addressed by (western) thinkers such as Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau in the 1700s (de Rougemont 
1966). 
94 Bulletin of the European Communities, December 1973, No 12, p 118-122. 
95 Bulletin of the European Communities, June 1983, No 6, p 24-29. 
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might ironically promote new forms of xenophobia because the notion of Europeanness 
tends to be closely circumscribed. Debates in the UK surrounding the Brexit referendum 
offer a poignant example of this at a Member State level. Leave supporters relied on 
references to a uniquely British identity to justify excluding EU movers, especially those 
from the CEE region, from the polity (Virdee and McGeever 2018). 
 
A. The Roots of a Shared Cultural Heritage 
 
The EU’s shared ‘European’ culture and modern institutional heritage often get linked to 
its founding fathers, described as ‘[v]isionary leaders’ who ‘worked tirelessly towards and 
inspired the European project’ with the ideals of peace, unity, and prosperity (Commission 
2013). They are often called upon during moments of challenge. For example, after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, amid increasing global economic pressures, escalating violent conflicts, 
and internal enlargement prospects, it was noted that ‘Europe needs to … return … to the 
genius of its founding fathers’ (EUI 1995)96. Jean Monnet, the political economist widely 
considered the chief architect of European unity, continues to garner special accolades. 
For example, during the First Monnet Lecture, he was described as ‘the great statesman’, 
‘the first honorary citizen of Europe’, and ‘a great-hearted man’ who possessed ‘deep 
wisdom’ and ‘an iron will’ (EUI 1977). Like national heroes, Monnet and the other EU 
founders get extolled for ‘carrying on … combat’ for the EU’s mission (EP 1988: 3). The 
‘genius of the Founding Fathers’ was praised again by Barroso in his 2012 speech 
accepting the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the EU97. All the founding fathers have been 
western98. 
 
Moreover, references to a common cultural heritage have consistently praised significant 
western historical locations, moments, and thinkers, stretching back to antiquity. For 
example, the EUI’s location has been commended for its links to Florentine thinkers, such 
as Amerigo Vespucci, da Vinci, and Galileo (EUI 1996). More generally, Italy gets lauded 
for having contributed, more than any other country, to the foundations of European 
cultural identity – through the Roman Empire, Roman Law, and the Renaissance (EUI 
1984). Aristotle, Cicero, Tocqueville, Durkheim, Hegel, Marx (EE&SC 1999), Erasmus, 
Kant, Rousseau, and Voltaire (EUI 1990) get mentioned frequently as the founders of 
European heritage. Moreover, the Enlightenment’s ‘Christian humanism’ gets linked to 
‘Europeanism’ and integration of this ‘favoured continent’ (id99). 
                                                      
96 Speech by Peter Sutherland (member of the Commission, and the first WTO director-general). 
97 See https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2012/eu/26124-european-union-eu-nobel-lecture-2012/. 
98 As well as white and male. 
99 Speech by Giovanni Spadolini (Italian politician, European federalist, and supporter of the EUI). 
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At the Monnet Lecture titled ‘European Union: One Character in Search of an Author’, 
the key speaker, Giulio Andreotti100, compared the prudence entailed in the drafting of the 
1957 Treaty of Rome to that required of Caesar when crossing the Rubicon, and remarked 
that 
 
A European cultural identity has existed for centuries, not only in literature and in 
philosophy, but in the consciousness of its peoples ... European civilization … 
nourished over the centuries … is … irreversible; it … involves … a whole way of 
being (EUI 1985). 
 
Allegedly common values are sustained by ignoring actual history, and relying on ‘invented 
traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) –  such as embodiments of the Greek myth of 
Europa Riding the Bull101, an exaggeration of historical figures (such as Charlemagne102), and 
newly invented collective symbols103. The Dark Ages and the long history of European 
intolerances and conflicts gets overlooked. Only periods of growth and peace are 
emphasised, especially the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, which ‘improved the lives 
of the people … to an extent unprecedented in the history of mankind’ (EE&SC 2000a: § 
3).  
 
B. Othering of the CEE Region  
 
The rhetorical construction of a shared European cultural identity has relied heavily on 
references to an insider/outsider status. This has often included othering of those located 
or with roots from beyond the EU’s external borders. For example, communists were 
excluded from the idea of ‘Europe’ during the Cold War, and third-country nationals 
(especially Muslims104) are omitted from it today (Sassatelli 2009: 152; see also Douglas-
Scott 1998). More generally, as my analysis indicates, EU narratives have focused on western 
thinkers and western states. Notably, othering has also taken place internally within the 
(enlarged) EU. Thus, in the context of demographic shifts brought about by the Eastern 
Enlargement, western ‘shared values that hold our societies together … become more 
important than ever’ (Commission 2004), as the pre-04 EU encountered a region that 
apparently presented a threat to western values. This recalls how Enlightenment thinkers 
                                                      
100 At the time, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
101 Including on various euro coins and bills; and in or near significant EU buildings (such as the Council of 
Ministers Office in Brussels, the European Parliament offices in Strasbourg, and the Spaak Building that 
houses the Parliament in Brussels). The EU’s official website is Europa.eu. 
102 One of the EU buildings is Brussels is named after Charlemagne, and the EU has funded several 
exhibitions devoted to him.  
103 For example, common passport, driving license, and car number plate designs; the EU motto (‘United in 
Diversity’), and anthem (Beethoven’s Ode to Joy); and the annual Europe Day.  
104 As poignantly illustrated by some Member States’ reactions to the recent refugee crisis, Christianity also 
determines belonging to the imagined EU community. 
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emphasised their (white, western) European heritage when exploiting new races of people 
(Eze 2007). My review of post-Enlargement EU statements105 indicates that, despite 
occasional inclusive references at the time of the Enlargement (as discussed below), CEE 
heritage has not been added to the construction of this imagined EU community, and the 
CEE region has continued to be othered, as illustrated in Chapter 3, Section 1. 
 
In addition to implicitly excluding the CEE region from narratives about ‘European’ 
heritage, EU institutions (and EU-15 politicians106) have at times directly posited the 
region as un-European. During the accession process, CEE candidates were represented 
by EU bureaucrats as irrational, and in need of westernisation (Engel-Di Mauro 2006: 21). 
In Accession Country Regular Reports107 (1998-2002), for example, the Eastern 
Enlargement was framed as a civilising mission (Kovacs 2006). Similarly, my review 
indicates that the EU has been explicitly differentiating the region, as lacking in full 
Europeanness. According to western bureaucrats, Poland was seeking to join the EU to 
‘liquidate social and civilisation backwardness’ (OECD 1998), rather than to reclaim its 
European heritage. By ‘tak[ing] in’ CEE countries (EP 1996), EU-15 States were ‘opening 
up to new people’ (Commission 2004), and preparing to ‘embrace widely different peoples 
… and cultures’ (Kok 2003: 68). As an impoverished backward other, the CEE region had 
to be ‘helped’ (Commission 2007: 4) and ‘rescued’ by western Europe, which was to serve 
as a ‘mentor’ and ‘beacon to guide the applicants’ (Commission 2003b) in their efforts to 
partake of some of the achievements of proper (western) Europe. Prodi (2000), the then-
President of the Commission, deemed ‘civilization’ to be an accomplishment of western 
Europe only. Through the Eastern Enlargement, western States, as ‘the heirs of a 
civilization deeply rooted in religious and civic values’, had an opportunity to ‘spread 
peace, stability and shared values throughout the continent’ (id).  
 
Notably, the 2004/2007 enlargement was the only one to be called ‘eastern’. The 
immediately preceding enlargement had involved a geographically eastward expansion (to 
incorporate Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995). It was not given a label in EU 
discourse, and was simply described through references to its date. Moreover, despite fears 
of post-communist otherness, the absorption of East Germany into West Germany in 
                                                      
105 Although numerous sites across the CEE region have been recognised with the EU Heritage Label, 
awarded by the EU to buildings, documents, museums, archives, monuments or events for the role they 
have played in European history. See https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/actions/heritage-
label_en. 
106 For example, fears of ‘substantial’ post-1989 CEE emigration prompted EU-15 States’ concerns about 
the spread of contagious illnesses (EP Written Questions 29.10.1992). 
107 Commission’s annual reports to evaluate candidates’ progress in meeting membership preparation 
benchmarks. 
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1990 was portrayed as ‘re-unification’ (Novotná 2015: 39). Presumably East Germany was 
deemed as having been sufficiently European prior to the Cold War to deserve such 
inclusive terminology. On the other hand, the accession of CEE states encompassed 
eastern reaches of the European polity. According to Böröcz and Kovacs (2001: 6), the 
term ‘Eastern’ in the Eastern Enlargement implied inferiority or non-Europeanness.  
 
In line with such othering rhetoric, the actual policies facilitating CEE states’ accession 
privileged western Member States’ interests and western values, as addressed in more detail 
in the next Chapter. Notably, the Enlargement was to be based on pre-2004 (Commission 
2001a), that is, western values108. The CEE states were to be absorbed into the western 
framework, by undertaking major adjustments to harmonise with pre-existing EU acquis. 
Their ‘institutional framework and the ground rules ha[d] to be re-constructed’ 
(Commission, Green Paper 17.11.1993). This entailed ‘necessary adjusting actions’ and ‘a 
constant process of improvement’ by CEE states (OECD 1998) - due to not only 
economic, but also ‘social disparities’ between the two groups (e.g., Europe Agreement, 
Preamble). Both othering rhetoric and disadvantageous policies were especially prevalent 
in the context of restricting CEE workers’ mobility after accession, as discussed in Chapter 
4. In its ‘Agenda 2000’ plan, the Commission (1997) anticipated post-accession mobility 
restrictions to be helpful in preventing some ‘problems’ that were likely to result from 
CEE workers’ unrestrained mobility. Since economic predictions indicated only benefits to 
host States from CEE nationals’ unrestricted mobility (e.g., Jileva 2004)109, one can only 
speculate that the Commission was concerned about the social impact of an influx of these 
othered, new members of the EU polity.  
 
Despite othering discourse and policies, the CEE region has been occasionally included in 
the grand vision of Europe, especially during the euphoric period soon after the fall of 
communism - before CEE states’ accession had become a clear political possibility. For 
example, during the 1990 Monnet Lecture, titled ‘The Crisis of the Societies in the East 
and the Return to a Common Europe’, Giovanni Spadolini referred to an inclusive notion 
of ‘Europe as a unifying idea, … a continent-wide idea’ (EUI 1990). European Council 
bureaucrats declared at their 1989 Strasbourg summit that the EU’s objective was 
‘overcoming the divisions of Europe’ (European Council 1989: 10). Similarly, the 
Parliament expressed its intention to ‘end … the division of Europe into two blocs’ (EP 
1995: 232). As part of this rhetoric, similarities between the east and the west were 
                                                      
108 See also Commission (2013: 3) (noting that enlargements have been based on extending the EU’s values, 
created in the 1950s, to the whole continent).  
109 Discussed more in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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emphasised. For example, the Commission (1992: ¶ 40) noted that ‘for the new 
democracies, Europe remains a powerful idea, signifying the fundamental values and 
aspirations which their peoples kept alive during long years of oppression’. Such early 
rhetoric likely reflected an ideological rebuff to communism and an attempt to strengthen 
the legitimacy of the western order, rather than genuinely inclusive attitudes or support for 
the region’s accession. 
 
Othering of the CEE region also diminished in the run-up to the Eastern Enlargement. 
For example, the Commission (2003a: 4) situated the Enlargement within the task of 
integrating ‘the continent’. In his pre-Enlargement report to the Commission, Wim Kok110 
(2003: 69) portrayed CEE states as having shared ‘since the Middle Ages in the interplay of 
cultural influences in continental Europe’, and their Cold War separation as merely ‘a 
temporary aberration’. Moreover, according to the Preamble of the 2004 Constitutional 
Treaty, ‘reunited after bitter experiences’, Europe was ‘to transcend … former divisions 
and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny’. Notably, the Joint Declaration 
‘One Europe’, annexed to the 2003 Accession Treaty, emphasised the ‘inclusive’ nature of 
the Enlargement. Schimmelfennig (2001) argues that the EU had made occasional 
inclusive statements stretching as far back as the 1950s about EU membership being open 
to all European states (at a time when that option was open only to western states), which 
had rhetorically entrapped it. That is, the EU could not backtrack without losing its 
credibility111. I contend that similar inclusive rhetoric at the time of the Enlargement also 
served a pragmatic purpose – to garner EU-15 States’ support for the Enlargement, while 
maintaining consistency with the EU’s fundamental rights narratives and with the fact that 
accession had become a foregone conclusion by that point. Inclusive discourse also served 
to help obfuscate any inequalities in the actual accession policies (discussed in the next 
Chapter).  
 
5.  Conclusion  
 
In this Chapter, I have set the background to the way in which the EU project, the Eastern 
Enlargement, and Polish nationals’ mobility have been embedded in a certain set of values 
and ideologies. Although at first EU builders had equated the EU project with economic 
goals, it became infused by the late 1970s with an abstract story of a progressive, 
benevolent, and inevitable integration project based on respect for fundamental rights. By 
                                                      
110 A Dutch politician who had presided over several high-level EU policy groups. 
111 This ‘entrapment’ was reinforced by CEE politicians’ arguing that they culturally ‘belonged’ to Europe, 
and that their accession would signify their ‘return’ to Europe after an artificial division during the Cold War 
(Schimmelfennig 2001). 
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the 1980s, EU policies had become firmly situated within this foundational narrative. I 
contend that the fundamental rights rhetoric contains an underlying economic core, with 
the concepts of freedom, equality, and integration being inextricably tied to economic 
initiatives. Moreover, my analysis reveals that foundational EU narratives have been based 
on an assumption—even after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and after the Eastern 
Enlargement—that only western thinkers, western myths, and western accomplishments 
embody the imagined community of ‘Europe’. The EU’s legal rhetoric presented in this 
Chapter—reinforced through concrete symbols and references to actual events, both 
ancient and new—attempts to create a sense of a collective western ‘European’ identity 
and shared values, while legitimating and naturalising EU institutions and policies. 
Excluding outsiders, including the eastern regions of Europe, has helped to support this 
identity-building project.  
 
I argue that there is a conceptual hierarchy of Europeanness, with EU-15 States having 
served as a synecdoche for ‘Europe’, and with the CEE region having been pushed to the 
conceptual periphery of the EU project. CEE states have not been involved in creating 
EU narratives, and appear in them rarely on equal footing. Given its political foundations, 
it is not surprising that the EU was at first conceptualised as a western project. Since the 
Eastern Enlargement, however, EU rhetoric should have become more inclusive, 
especially in light of the EU’s emphasis on fundamental rights and equality. Why has it 
not? I contend that remnants of the Cold-War geographical divisions remain - in the 
continuation of othering or exclusionary discourse, and in policies privileging western 
interests. According to some scholars, Europe’s idea of itself still depends on (western) 
imperialist attitudes, fuelled by globalisation and increased migration (Ponzanesi and 
Blaagaard 2011). Intra-EU east-to-west movement continues to play a role in this process. 
Moreover, western-centric discourse has been normalised and rendered almost invisible, 
attesting to the strength of western conceptual dominance within Europe. It is difficult to 
imagine references to a ‘European’ culture and heritage discussed in this Chapter to have 
been solely based on cultural accomplishments and practices of the CEE region112. Such 
discourse would be noticeable to most readers, whereas including only western references 
is easily overlooked as normal.  
 
My analysis in this Chapter also illustrates the usefulness of CRT tenets to my study. The 
well-propagated fundamental rights narratives serve to obscure or deny policies or 
statements that are not in line with them. By presenting the EU project as fair and 
                                                      
112 Or of non-white thinkers. 
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inevitable, while concealing its anti-east assumptions, myths propagated by western 
politicians serve to naturalise the status quo. Despite frequent references to equality, 
freedom, and solidarity, an assumption of western superiority underlies EU discourse. The 
west fully benefits from white privilege, while the east lacks full access to it. This helps to 
produce a social reality which reflects and reinforces historical east-west power 
differentials. EU-15 State representatives had controlled EU institutions until 2004, and 
have therefore created not only policies but also discourse to legitimate their interests and 
outlook. The rare occasions when the CEE region has been encompassed by more 
inclusive ideology—at the time of the fall of Communism, and once the Eastern 
Enlargement became inevitable—can be attributed to interest convergence. The EU-15 
States were reasserting their ideological opposition to the communist rule, thereby 
confirming the dominance and benevolence of the western order. They were also avoiding 
undermining their legitimacy by being consistent with their pre-1989 statements.  
 
I now turn my attention to select policies central to my thesis - the Eastern Enlargement 
process, the free movement of persons, and EU and UK racial equality regimes. Given 
that the creation of inferior categories of people legitimises unequal policies, and sanctions 
discrimination and exploitation, I will seek to uncover how othering narratives addressed 
in this Chapter might reflect, drive, or at least help to explain any inequalities in the 
Enlargement process and Poles’ experience of mobility. Myths of course also contain 
inherent tensions and the potential to drive beneficial actions (Smismans 2010). Hence, I 
will also explore any redemptive qualities of the rhetoric presented above - notably, of the 
CEE region’s occasional inclusion in EU narratives. 
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The preceding Chapter set the background to how the EU project has been embedded in a 
set of values which—despite narratives of fundamental rights and equality—other the 
CEE region as inferior to the west, and often contain economic goals at their core. In this 
Chapter, I explore whether discourse and policies behind the Enlargement have been in 
line with such myths. More specifically, my aim below is to address whether the actual 
process of Poland’s accession and the application of the acquis to Poland reveal a 
hierarchy of Europeanness, silencing of the CEE region, or prioritisation of western goals. 
I explore what role east-west power differentials might have played in the Enlargement 
process. This is necessary to address because Poland’s accession constituted the first step 
that enabled Poles’ mobility to the UK. The analysis in this Chapter is also helpful to 
answering my overarching research question about how disadvantages and racialisation 
experienced by Poles in the UK might be connected to or reflect any power imbalances in 
Poland’s relationship with the EU.  
 
The EU’s political elites had disagreed with Polish politicians’ post-1989 proclamations 
that, by joining the EU, Poland would be reclaiming its proper European heritage and thus 
actively integrating with the EU-15 States as equals (Wagner-Findeisen 1992). Although 
more inclusive statements permeated EU rhetoric once the Eastern Enlargement became 
certain114, the CEE region once again became othered by western politicians after the 
Enlargement. CEE states have been blamed by western politicians for an apparent recent 
increase in organised crime in western Europe, and accused of ‘exporting their crime’ (EP 
Written Questions 18.4.2013). An alleged growth in prostitution in Denmark has been 
portrayed ‘as a result of the EU’s expansion eastwards’, with 10,000 Poles supposedly 
being forced into prostitution each year across western Europe (EP Written Questions 
14.3.2013: 61). Moreover, the ‘mass migratory flows’ of CEE nationals have been linked to 
‘encouraging the free movement of diseases, such as tuberculosis, ... allow[ing] this disease 
to take hold amongst younger age groups in the [western] population’ (EP Written 
Questions 23.10.2014: 184)115. When responding to such western MEPs’116 comments, EU 
institutions have not sought to dispel EU-15 politicians’ negative assumptions or racist 
                                                      
113 Although ‘accession’ and ‘enlargement’ refer to the same process, the former approaches it from a 
candidate’s point of view, whereas the latter denotes the EU’s position.  
114 Likely due to strategic reasons, as my discussion in the preceding Chapter shows. 
115 Similar rhetoric has been used in the UK – historically, to oppose Commonwealth immigration, and more 
recently, by the media to demonise CEE movers (e.g., Drzewiecka 2014b). 
116 Members of the European Parliament. 
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stereotypes, but have instead referred to the limits of EU competence in such matters. 
Moreover, the Commission has continued to conceptualise the CEE region as not 
belonging to proper Europe. For example, it has noted that ‘advanced countries (the 
United States, Japan and Europe) [had] returned to modest growth’, whereas ‘emerging and 
transition economies in eastern Europe … have proved more resilient’ to the 2008 economic 
crisis (Commission 2011: 5, emphases added). As before 2004, the concept of ‘Europe’ in 
this statement excludes eastern Europe. Although such differentiation might be attributed 
to some extent to historical differences in institutional and economic structures between 
EU-15 and CEE states, it nevertheless normalises the continuing discourse of eastern 
otherness and inferiority. 
 
Such examples of recent rhetoric embed Poland’s accession in a set of othering values, in 
line with the dominant narratives addressed in the preceding Chapter. My aim below is to 
explore whether the actual Enlargement process and policies also reflect such inequalities. 
Western scholars devoted little attention117 after the fall of Communism in 1989 and 
throughout the 1990s to the topic of Poland’s accession (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2002). The little pre-04 western scholarship that exists assumed that accession constituted 
the best method for Poland to catch up economically and politically with the west, and 
that it encapsulated the ideal to which CEE nationals aspired (id). Preceding the 
Enlargement, eastern intellectuals also tended to subscribe to the dominant western view 
of accession as a beneficial, ‘civilising’ mission (Engel-Di Mauro 2006: 23), which was 
inevitable, necessary, and signified a return to Europe (e.g., Blazyca and Kolkiewicz 1999; 
Cordell 2000118; Dach 1999; W Kregu 1996). The lack of critique by CEE scholars might 
be attributed to their preoccupation with the drastic post-communist domestic changes, 
and to the fact that open intellectual debate had been stymied for more than four 
decades119. Closer to the time of the Enlargement, Polish scholars continued to devote 
little attention to pre-accession policies and to the actual terms of accession (e.g., Blazyca 
and Kolkiewicz 1999). Although many acknowledged that Poland would have to bear 
some initial adjustment costs, they focused on anticipated long-term economic benefits, 
without devoting much analysis to the actual details of those costs and benefits (e.g., 
Cordell 2000).  
 
                                                      
117 Possibly due to scholars’ doubts that the Eastern Enlargement would in fact occur – an opinion fuelled in 
no small part by perceptions of the CEE region’s economic and social backwardness (Chwalba 2011). 
118 Cordell’s (2000) volume is composed of articles predominantly by Polish scholars. 
119 By the mid-1990s, most Polish academics approached the accession as a foregone conclusion (Dach 
1999), which might further explain why little academic analysis was devoted to it. 
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After the Enlargement, many scholars—of both western and eastern backgrounds—
continued to express similar uncritical views, praising the Enlargement for having 
benefited CEE nations economically, politically, and socially (e.g., Economic Bulletin 
2004; Keereman and Szekely 2009; Sobotka 2005), and even resulting in a ‘virtual miracle’ 
(Zielonka 2007: 35). They have been nestling such praise within myths of the neutrality 
and benevolence of EU policies, often embedded in fundamental rights and free market 
ideology, while helping to obfuscate any hidden inequalities behind the Enlargement. 
Polish scholars have tended to continue to express positive views of the Enlargement’s 
economic and political effects (e.g., Belka120 2013; Stankiewicz 2010), and of its symbolic 
value in confirming Poland’s European identity (e.g., Belka 2013; Błaszczak 2012). In line 
with CRT tenets, the dominant western discourse appears to have affected how eastern 
scholars tend to perceive EU integration121.  
 
Critical scholars (e.g., Behr 2007; Böröcz and Kovacs 2001; Engel-Di Mauro 2006; Jileva 
2004) have noted some negative effects on Poland of pre-accession and enlargement 
policies, but they have tended to take a broad, often abstract view of the enlargement 
process, focused only on foundational and accession treaties, and framed within 
international relations analyses. I attempt to take a more holistic look, tracing the 
Enlargement process to circumstances that prompted Poland to seek accession in the first 
place (see Section 2 below), and linking it to Poland’s post-accession experiences (see 
Section 4 below and subsequent Chapters). My contribution also lies in applying CRT 
tenets to this analysis. 
 
Below, I first examine the political and economic conditions in Poland that made it 
vulnerable to the influence and pressures of western states and financial institutions. In 
particular, I consider how those challenges were reinforced through specific pre-accession 
policies imposed by western financial institutions and the EU122, and how they prompted 
Poland to enter accession negotiations on an unequal footing. Next, I consider in detail the 
dynamics of the accession process, paying close attention to how power inequalities 
between Poland and the EU had disadvantaged Poland in its negotiation process, and had 
contributed to post-accession inequalities. Finally, I analyse some key aspects of the acquis 
that have reflected or reinforced such dynamics of inequality after accession. In the 
                                                      
120 Belka has held positions at the World Bank and the IMF, which had guided Poland’s pre-accession 
policies, as discussed in this Chapter. 
121 Such views might also have been reinforced by the lack of well formulated alternatives to integration, as 
discussed below. 
122 Similar policies were employed during the other CEE states’ accessions. Because my study focuses on 
Poles, however, this Chapter analyses Poland’s accession. 
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Conclusion, I seek to connect the inequalities addressed in this Chapter to post-04 
conditions in Poland and the large-scale movement of Poles to EU-15 States. I address 
whether hierarchies of disadvantage within the EU are likely to change in the foreseeable 
future. I also situate the accession process and its apparent goals, as well as the 
assumptions embedded within discourse surrounding the Enlargement, within broader EU 
narratives and within my theoretical framework.  
 
2. Pre-Accession Conditions in Poland 
 
A. Poland Before the Fall of Communism 
 
At the outbreak of WWII, both Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland123. By the 
end of the war, the Soviet army compelled German forces to retreat, and, after the 1945 
Yalta Conference, Polish government was formed under Soviet auspices. Under Soviet 
pressure, Poland rejected economic recovery assistance under the Marshall Plan, and living 
standards deteriorated. Throughout the post-war period, capitalism was eradicated through 
nationalising industry and redistributing farmland through collectivisation. Economic 
restructuring plans prioritised the development of heavy industry to service Eastern Bloc 
military forces. By the 1960s, Poland was plagued by economic stagnation and escalating 
consumer prices. To revitalise the economy, in 1971, wide-ranging reforms were 
introduced which involved large-scale foreign borrowing. This strategy initially caused 
improved access to consumer goods, but within a few years, it contributed to further 
economic deterioration. 
 
Some scholars argue that political and economic developments in Poland in the 1970s had 
made it dependent on the west, and thus with little choice but to accede to the EU. Poland 
was attractive to western investors due to its large deposits of coal—of strategic 
importance during the 1970s’ oil crisis—and because the west had hoped to weaken Soviet 
control over the CEE region by investing there (Poznanski 1986). At the same time, 
Poland’s communist regime started to amass foreign debt by purchasing obsolete western 
technologies and consumer goods to placate the disgruntled populace, with little thought 
about long-term repercussions. By 1980, Poland had become the third largest debtor in the 
world, and the interest alone on the $24.1b in foreign debt exceeded the value of all Polish 
exports (Tittenbrun 1993: 66-9). Repayment efforts and structural adjustments imposed by 
western creditors resulted in a significant strain on the national budget, increased 
                                                      
123 Poland’s official founding is traced to 966, when Mieszko I was baptised and adopted western 
Christianity. For a detailed discussion of Poland’s early history, see Zamoyski (2009). 
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consumer prices, decreased welfare and infrastructure spending, and reduced wages 
(Glasman 1996: 121-2). After martial law was imposed in 1981, Poland stopped making 
interest payments, yet western regimes continued to extend it credit (Wagner-Findeisen 
1992).  
 
B. Poland in the Aftermath of 1989 
 
Poland’s economic and political systems were in shambles by the time the Iron Curtain fell 
in 1989. More than four decades of central planning had left its economy with ‘deeply 
distorted structures, pervasive shortages, misallocation of resources, inefficient companies, 
and controlled prices’ (Belka 2013: 9). By 1990, with an inflation of 250% (id), Poland’s 
economic crisis was the most severe among the CEE states (Poznanski 1986). With no 
experience of multiparty governance, this period was also politically tumultuous. The first 
democratic elections for President were held in 1990, and for the Parliament in 1991. 
Throughout the mid-90s, Poland had more political parties than other CEE states (Ekiert 
and Kubik 2004: 54). For example, after the first free parliamentary elections, in which 
more than 100 parties participated, more than fifteen parties gained representation124. 
Between 1989 and 1993, Poland had two presidents and seven prime ministers (two of 
whom did not even form cabinets), and frequent votes of no confidence (id: 55).  
 
Unable to service its foreign debt, and hence not able to borrow abroad anymore, Poland 
was pressured by the international financial institutions which had extended it credit – 
especially the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’)125, and the World Bank126 - to 
transform into a market-oriented economy, through economic ‘shock therapy’ (Hofbauer 
2006). The IMF had conditioned continued financial support on these reforms, which no 
western state had ever imposed on itself for fear of detrimental effects on people’s 
livelihoods (Glasman 1996: xiv). In 1987, Poland implemented all of the IMF’s 
recommendations – for example, increasing interest rates, liberalising prices, and 
increasing privatisations (id: 122). Due to the 1990 Privatisation Act, the most viable 
Polish enterprises were acquired by western investors - including General Motors, Pepsico, 
Unilever, and Phillips (id: 123-8). Furthermore, the 1991 Law On Companies with 
Participation of Foreign Parties, passed at the suggestions of the IMF, permitted foreign-
                                                      
124 See http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/ (tab ‘Poland: Parliamentary Elections 1991’). The large number of 
parties also resulted in contentious Presidential elections. For example, there were thirteen candidates in the 
1995 Presidential elections. See id (tab ‘Poland: Presidential Election 1995’). 
125 All EU-15 States have been members of the IMF since the 1950s.  Poland was readmitted as a member in 
1986, having previously been a member between 1946 and 1950. 
126 The IMF and the World Bank had set out terms of this cooperation in 1989. See https://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/history/2001/ch20.pdf.  
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owned companies to repatriate all their profits (after taxation) out of Poland, and 
exempted them from licensing laws (id). After Poland’s trade arrangement with other 
communist countries127 was dissolved in 1991, the IMF pressured Poland to end its trade 
relations with those states (Frank 2006).  
 
Although the Solidarity movement, workers, conservative scholars, and the Catholic 
Church128 had envisioned either a planned or a mixed economy for post-communist 
Poland (Hayden 1994: 91), Polish political elites across the political spectrum supported 
free market capitalist models. Such models were perceived as the only way to guarantee 
democracy (Szczerbiak 2002), create civil society institutions (Cordell 2000: 38), and ensure 
security from the Soviet Union (Sharman 2003: 79). Moreover, free market economy 
offered a symbolic break from the communist past (Ash 1990: 37), and a way to appear 
more legitimate in western eyes (id: 16). The free market model was also perceived as less 
risky than developing new economic models (Cirtautas 1997: 216). The rapid privatisation 
process of the early 1990s, and an increasing share of western ownership of Polish 
businesses and of the banking system (Hofbauer 2006) soon made non-market options 
impossible. With no clear alternatives presented by non-governing politicians (splintered 
into many small parties), legislators approved economic shock therapy within four months 
of its development (Ash 1990: 16). The reforms, which followed closely the IMF’s 
approach to macroeconomic stabilisation (Blazyca and Rapacki 1991), were criticised 
heavily in Poland by former communists, non-governing splinters of Solidarity (Ekiert and 
Kubik 2004: 126), left-wing socialists, workers, and right-wing conservatives (Sanford 
1999: 66).  
 
The newly created post-1990 Polish political elite had ties to the EU bureaucracy, and thus 
tended to embrace not only western-style economic reforms but also accession to the EU, 
perceived as part of the same process (Szczerbiak 2002). For example, Poland’s European 
Integration Committee, created in 1998, included former and acting Polish Ambassadors 
to the EU, and a longtime Vice Chancellor of the College d’Europe. Moreover, many 
Polish administrative employees had been trained by experts from the Commission’s 
Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office or had studied at the European 
Integration College, which was established in Warsaw in 1992 (OECD 1998). Leading 
politicians tended to support accession for the same reasons they supported free market 
                                                      
127 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance operated between 1949 and 1991 under the leadership of 
the USSR to facilitate trade and development among communist states.  
128 However, Pope John Paul II supported both free market economic reforms and accession, framing them 
as a reunification of a Christian continent (Cordell 2000).  
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economic reforms - due to having accepted western norms, in the belief that it would 
improve the standard of living, and to appeal to pro-west voters (Szczerbiak 2002: 7). This 
also illustrates how the dominant group imposes its outlook and understanding of the 
world onto subjugated groups, as noted by both postcolonial (e.g., Fanon 1988: 24) and 
CRT scholars (e.g., Crenshaw 2011).  
 
The Polish Eurosceptic coalition—composed of the same groups as those who opposed 
economic reforms—feared that, through accession, the west would exploit Poland 
economically and impose excessively liberal social values (Motas 2011). The Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość (‘Law and Justice’) party, the right-wing remnant of Solidarity, warned that 
accession would lead to second-class EU membership (Szczerbiak 2002: 8), as indeed my 
analysis below and in later Chapters suggests. Other right-wing politicians were concerned 
that Poland would become a source of cheap labour for EU-15 States and a dumping 
ground for their second-rate products (Kopenhaskie 2002). Relying on nationalistic, 
Catholic, and ethnocentric arguments (Jasiewicz 2004)129, Eurosceptics appealed mostly to 
rural, less educated, older, and poorer voters (CBOS 1999). 
 
Before the Enlargement, some Polish politicians did suggest potential alternatives to 
accession. Most notable proposals included expanding trade with Russia, the former 
Russian republics, Asia, and the Americas (Moskal 2003), or strengthening ties with other 
CEE states and Balkan countries (Cordell 2000: 25). Given that free trade was already 
secured through various WTO agreements, some argued that Poland only needed capital 
infusions - which might have been obtained from the United States, Poland’s long-
standing ally (Chodakiewicz et al 2003). Expanding trade with Russia did not hold much 
voter appeal. It is not clear how beneficial expanding intra-CEE cooperation would have 
been considering that the other CEE states would be acceding to the EU. Capital 
infusions from outside the EU were also uncertain, and would have carried similar risks 
that capital from western EU institutions did. Swiss and Norwegian models of economic 
policies and relationship with the EU were not feasible for Poland due to its low level of 
social and economic development (Willa 2014). Poland also did not want to become 
internationally isolated, akin to Belarus or the Ukraine. Thus, western-driven economic 
reforms were embraced, with the hope of accession. 
 
Poland’s efforts to create a market economy out of a mismanaged state-controlled system 
constituted the first such attempt in European history (Wagner-Findeisen 1992). They 
                                                      
129 Resembling in many ways pro-Brexit rhetoric, addressed in Chapter 6. 
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resulted in a currency devaluation in 1991 (Belka 2013: 12). By the early 1990s, the annual 
decline in production output often exceeded that experienced during the Great Depression 
in the United States, and the GDP was falling by more than 10% annually (Glasman 1996: 
126-7). As ‘one of the most daring economic reform programs in history’, and the most 
radical post-communist economic transformation, Poland’s approach also produced very 
high social costs - higher than in other CEE states (Ekiert and Kubik 2004: 63). Due to 
hyperinflation, a drastic decrease in real wages130, and deep cuts in social spending, by 
1991, 30% of Poles were living in poverty and 15% were unemployed (id: 64).  
 
C. Role of the EU Before 2004 
 
During this time, the EU played a direct role in shaping Poland’s political and economic 
path. EU bureaucrats strongly encouraged the Polish electorate to support pro-western, 
pro-capitalist political parties (Hofbauer 2006). In 1989, Poland and the European 
Community (‘EC’) signed a non-preferential Trade and Commercial and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement131 (‘T&C Agreement’), which eliminated or suspended 
quantitative trade restrictions on Poland’s exports to the EC, except for textiles, steel, and 
coal (Articles 3-12) - goods in which Poland was competitive (Wagner-Findeisen 1992). 
Although the T&C Agreement merely ‘recogniz[ed] that the Community and Poland 
desire[d] to establish wider-ranging and closer contractual links that [could] permit further 
development at a later stage’ (Preamble), it prompted wide-ranging economic and 
institutional reforms in Poland, instituted in the hope that accession would follow. For 
example, the 1989 Foreign Exchange Bill introduced internal złoty convertibility, and led 
to its devaluation to boost cross-border capital transactions (Commission 1997c: 107). 
Prompted by the Agreement, Poland also liberalised foreign trade, lifted price controls, 
and legalised private enterprises (OECD 1998). 
 
In 1991, Poland and the EC entered into an association agreement, called the ‘Europe 
Agreement’132. At the time, EU-15 States were not supportive of Poland’s accession, and 
even opposed calling this document a ‘Europe’ agreement (Saganek 2009). Although early 
drafts of the agreement did not mention accession as a possibility, the final arrangement 
was built upon a ‘recogni[tion] that the Community and Poland wish[ed] to … establish 
                                                      
130 Real wages fell more than 25% in the early 1990s, while unemployment rose 16% between 1990 and 1994 
(Krok-Paszkowska and Zielonka 2004). Between 1989 and 1991, prices rose by 600% (Myant and Cox 2008: 
206). 
131 Council Decision No 99/593, OJL 339/1, Conclusion of Agreement between EC and Polish People’s 
Republic on trade, commercial, and economic cooperation, 22.11.1989. 
132 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member 
States, on the one part, and the Republic of Poland, on the other part, dated 16 December 1991. Other CEE 
states entered into similar agreements.  
 64 
close and lasting relations, which would allow Poland to take part in the process of 
European integration’ (Preamble). As a ‘holding pattern’ while the EU evaluated the 
feasibility of Poland’s membership (Böröcz 2001b: 60), the Europe Agreement 
conditioned any aid or support the EC might provide (without guaranteeing it) on 
Poland’s economic reforms and structural readjustments (Preamble) and on its ‘work 
towards fulfilling the necessary conditions’ of pre-accession (Article 1). Notably, without 
committing itself to Poland’s accession, the EC specified a detailed mechanism for 
Poland’s approximation of its laws to the acquis in 26 areas of political and economic 
activity (including banking, customs, competition, financial services, taxation, and 
environmental protection) (Articles 68 and 69). Moreover, Poland committed itself to 
‘facilitate the setting up of operations on its territory by Community companies and 
nationals’, affording them ‘treatment no less favourable than that accorded to its own 
nationals and companies’ (Article 44)133. To ensure compliance, the Agreement included 
monitoring provisions (Article 102).  
 
Pursuant to the 1993 Programme of Actions Adjusting the Polish Economy and the Legal 
System to the European Union Requirements—adopted to implement policies envisioned 
by the Europe Agreement—the Polish legislature changed 130 statutes by 1994 (OECD 
1998). Such legal reforms were aimed at benefitting the functioning of the internal EC 
market. The resultant Polish legislation committed Poland to the free movement of 
services (particularly financial services), and of capital from the west – through increased 
direct investments by western companies already established in Poland, and the 
establishment of new western companies in Poland (Commission 1997c: 129).  
 
In addition to incentivising greater western-driven economic and political reforms, the 
Europe Agreement insisted on protectionist trade measures in favour of EU-15 States. 
Although duties and quotas on manufactured-goods trade between the EC and Poland 
were to disappear within 5 years of signing the Agreement, the EC facilitated Polish 
exports of only goods which were not competitive on EU-15 markets (such as computers), 
while being protectionist where Poland was competitive (such as in textiles, steel, and 
agriculture) (Protocols 1 and 2). Concessions for the export of Polish agricultural products 
were the least generous (Annex VII; Chapter 2), despite the great economic significance of 
the sector to Poland (Nello and Smith 1997). In addition, both parties continued to be 
subject to GATT’s anti-dumping measures (Article 29), thus limiting Poland’s ability to sell 
                                                      
133 Although the EU also extended the rights of establishment and of bidding for public contracts to Polish 
firms, this provision carried little practical significance because Polish firms were not competitive in the west. 
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its more cheaply manufactured goods in the west at prices below local prices. Arguably, 
such one-sided provisions are not surprising given that Poland had no voice in Brussels at 
the time, and was struggling politically and economically. 
 
The overall impact of the Europe Agreement was to offer new export opportunities to 
western suppliers (Wagner-Findeisen 1992), while western markets were difficult for 
Polish exporters to penetrate (Zielinska-Glebocka 1995). All EU-15 economies adopted 
protectionist and anti-dumping measures against Polish imports of products in which 
Poland had a competitive advantage – such as steel, textiles, clothing, and agricultural 
products (id). Due to western states’ lack of preference for Polish exports, the elimination 
of subsidies, and the imposition of barriers to such exports (Dach 1999), Poland suffered a 
significant trade deficit with the EC throughout the 1990s134. Because of the collapse of 
trade with the former communist countries, Poland’s only option to eliminate its 
inventories was to sell them to western states, at any price (Nello and Smith 1997). 
 
To implement the Europe Agreement’s provisions, Poland was encouraged to seek 
financial assistance from the IMF, the European Investment Bank (‘EIB’), and western 
commercial banks (Articles 97 and 101). Any assistance was subject to Poland’s 
satisfaction of IMF requirements, such as restructuring its economy (Article 99). 
PHARE135, the largest of the microeconomic funding measures foreseen (but not 
guaranteed) by the Europe Agreement (Article 97), was financed by the World Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the EIB - all international 
financial institutions with close links to the EC, which had dictated the programme’s terms 
(Wagner-Findeisen 1992). The infusion of foreign capital under PHARE increased the 
value of the Polish currency, which further lowered the demand for Polish products, 
decreasing economic growth (Dach 1999). The programme also subsidised traineeships for 
Polish diplomats, facilitating western influence in the development of civil society and 
political institutions in Poland.  
 
D. Conditions in Poland in the Run-up to Accession 
 
At its meeting in Copenhagen in 1993, the European Council (1993: 13) concluded that, to 
join the EU, CEE states would have to demonstrate to the EU’s satisfaction that they 
                                                      
134 Poland did not achieve a trade surplus with the EU until 2013 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014: 77). 
135 Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy. See Programme of Community 
aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 of 18 December 
1989 on economic aid to the Republic of Hungary and the Polish People’s Republic, and amending acts. 
PHARE’s stated goals included providing Poland and Hungary with technical, economic, and infrastructural 
expertise, and with assistance to aid their transformation into market economies. 
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possessed ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, … a 
functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union’. There was ‘no question of modifying’ these Copenhagen 
criteria (Commission 2001: 6). The ‘to the EU’s satisfaction’ standard was never defined 
precisely, and thus provided the EU with leeway in dictating pre-accession policies. The 
EU deemed the adoption of the internal market acquis particularly critical (Commission 
1997c: 99). After Poland presented its application for EU membership in 1994, formal 
negotiations commenced in 1997, followed by four years of further adjustment of Polish 
laws to the acquis (OECD 1998). Further economic stabilisation programmes were 
required by western financial institutions in order for Poland to receive any financial or 
technical aid during this process (Zielonka 2007: 31).  
 
Driven by Poland’s policy reforms in line with the acquis, foreign investment in Poland 
accelerated (Commission 1997c). Thus, by 1998, the share of Polish companies with 
foreign investment approached 50% in the manufacturing, trade, and services sectors 
(Commission, 1998 Regular Report: 19-20). More than 10% of overall equity, and 5% of 
employment in Poland was attributed to foreign investment (id: 19). Furthermore, more 
than 30% of company debts in Poland were in foreign currencies (Lommatzsch et al 
2004). Facilitated by the new Banking Act of 1998 (adopted in line with the acquis), by 
2000, most banks operating in Poland had majority foreign equity, approaching 70% of the 
total assets of the sector (2001 Regular Report: 31). Foreign direct investment (‘FDI’)136 
constituted most of the capital flow into Poland, nearly half of which was directed towards 
non-tradeable sectors such as public utilities and financial institutions (Commission, 
Enlargement Paper 2001b) – and thus would not bring about any immediate economic 
benefits to Poland. In the tradeable sector, most FDI was prompted by EU-15 States’ 
desire to increase their market share in Poland, exploit wage differentials, and export 
human capital intensive products and technologies (id). It is unlikely that Poland would 
have experienced the same level, type, or pace of FDI had it not anticipated accession, 
which was driving its post-1989 economic changes.  
 
Although some Polish industries dominated by foreign firms saw an improvement in 
productivity (Weresa 2008), and some top-500 Polish corporations experienced an increase 
in wages (Karaszewska 2012), FDI resulted in significant costs for Poland. It created a 
dependency on western investors and on new western technologies; resulted in losses of 
                                                      
136 FDI involves foreign companies establishing operations or acquiring tangible, income generating assets. 
Unlike the purchase of securities by foreigners, FDI entails foreign control of business operations – its 
voting shares, technology, crucial skills, or management.  
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tax income; and pushed some Polish businesses out of the market (Dach 1999). Polish 
firms were struggling throughout the mid 1990s (Nello and Smith 1997: 12-14). This effect 
was particularly acute in sensitive sectors, which had constituted some of the largest 
producers and employers in Poland – agriculture, textiles, clothing, coal, steel, and 
chemicals (Dach 1999). At the same time, foreign debt continued to increase. By 1995, 
debt service payments accounted for more than 17% of Poland’s budget expenditures 
(Nello and Smith 1997: 10). As markets and capital became concentrated in the hands of 
foreign investors and governments, Poland’s dependency on EU States deepened again 
(Böröcz 2001b), further worsened by its sizeable trade imbalances (discussed above). 
Poland had become ‘an economic colony of … the IMF and the World Bank’ (Hofbauer 
2006: 60). 
 
While Poland’s economic activity continued to decline and unemployment continued to 
rise (Pautola 1999), the 1998 Accession Partnership137 imposed further reforms. This 
included increasing privatisations, abolishing all barriers to the free movement of goods 
and capital, removing all restrictions on FDI, and completing steel, agricultural, and coal 
sectors restructuring. Despite such extensive adjustments, the Partnership limited pre-
accession aid to Poland. Poland had to co-finance all investment projects envisioned under 
its assistance provisions (Article 4), which were conditioned on Poland’s progress in 
‘respecting’ all the conditions under the Partnership (Article 5).   
 
By 2000, Poland suffered a $13b deficit in its trade with the EU (Hofbauer 2006). At the 
same time, it experienced a substantial economic growth slowdown, currency devaluation, 
and increasing inflation (Lommatzsch et al 2004). Poland’s debt position deteriorated in 
the early 2000s, as its net borrowing (as part of its GDP) increased from 1.5% in 1999 to 
4.2% by 2002 (Commission, Enlargement Paper 2002). Furthermore, implementing IMF- 
and EU-driven economic and structural reforms caused the state budget to suffer a deficit 
(Lommatzsch et al 2004), which reduced Poland’s ability to benefit from pre-accession 
funds (all of which required matching Polish funding) (Szczerbiak 2002: 5)138. Increased 
flexibilisation and deregulation of the labour market to attract FDI (Likic-Brboric 2011) 
resulted in increasing unemployment – on average, of 19% each year between 2001 and 
2004, with particularly high rates for young people139 and for low-skilled workers 
(Lommatzsch et al 2004). Due to state budget difficulties, many unemployed Poles 
                                                      
137 Council Decision of 30 March 1998 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions 
contained in the accession partnership with the Republic of Poland, 98/260/EC, OJL 121, 23.04.1998. 
138 Some of the funding was also not utilised due to high costs incurred in providing the required technical 
documentation (Myant and Cox 2008: 223).   
139 Thirty-five per cent of those under 25 were unemployed. 
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received no unemployment benefits (Commission, 2001 Regular Report: 29). With the 
Soviet era social security system dismantled, and the IMF’s and the EU’s (id) insistence on 
diverting social spending towards servicing foreign debt, educational and health systems 
also suffered (Frank 2006). Rising inequalities in the distribution of income (Brzeziński et 
al 2011), and increased rates of crime, suicide (Höfer et al 2012), and alcoholism (WHO 
2011) plagued Poland. It is no wonder that many Poles desired to move to EU-15 States 
after the accession, as discussed in the next Chapters. 
 
In line with the occasional EU inclusive rhetoric (discussed in Chapter 2), the names of the 
above pre-accession agreements implied fairness in western Europe’s relationship with 
Poland, by referring to ‘cooperation’ and ‘association’, and finally, by subsuming both 
Poland and the EU under the ‘Europe Agreement’. My analysis, however, indicates a 
schism between such inclusive labels and the actual substance of pre-accession policies, as 
addressed above. Notably, the EU’s aid and technical assistance to the CEE states at that 
time was motivated at least in part by its desire to facilitate the region’s ability to repay 
their debts to western institutions, to increase trade with the EU (e.g., Commission, Green 
Paper 17.11.1993), and to reduce anticipated illegal emigration to EU-15 States, which was 
predicted to ‘pose serious … problems’140 (E&SC 1992: 106). Moreover, the 2001 Treaty 
of Nice preserved EU-15 States’ blocking influence over new policies in the enlarged EU, 
and the 2002 Council in Brussels introduced new limits on EU expenditures until 2006 
(Jovanovic 2004). Thus, the EU and western financial institutions had opportunistically 
taken advantage of the east-west power differentials, while reinforcing Poland’s economic 
difficulties. Concurrently, the Polish elite’s reiterating western discourse had obscured the 
fact that western-driven policies were in the service of EU-15 States. Leading up to 
accession, the west’s approach towards Poland had naturalised it as a second-class future 
Member, while reinforcing pre-existing east-west inequalities. 
 
3. The Accession Process 
In 2003, Poland (and the other EU-10 States) signed the Accession Treaty (‘Accession 
Treaty’)141. All financial commitments by the EU under PHARE, ISPA142, and SAPARD143 
                                                      
140 Western States’ anxiety about CEE migrants is consistent with the west’s historical approach towards the 
region as not belonging to proper Europe, and with the imposition of transitional mobility derogations 
(addressed in the next Chapter).  
141 Treaty concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, 
the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the 
Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union, OJ L 236, 
23.9.2003. The Treaty contains separate Appendices and Annexes for each CEE state. 
142 Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (for environmental and transport infrastructure). 
143 Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (facilitating structural adjustment 
in CEE states’ agricultural sectors and their implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy).  
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were to cease at the time of accession (Article 32). Poland was also unable to take 
advantage of EU aid programmes as they required matching Polish funding (often as 
much as 50%) – a challenge given Poland’s budgetary struggles. Moreover, the EU had 
capped regional aid to the new Member States at 4% of their respective GDPs (Kok 
2003). The EU’s post-accession structural aid to Poland was heavily offset by Poland’s 
contributions to the EU budget, especially in the first few years after accession. For 
example, in 2004, the EU provided Poland with €2.42b in structural aid, and Poland 
contributed €1.31b to the EU budget; in 2005, those amounts were €4.01b and €2.38b; 
and in 2006, €5.05b and €2.55b (Kundera 2014: 388)144.  
 
A. The EU’s Overall Approach 
 
The EU’s motivations for permitting the Eastern Enlargement have been attributed to 
several strategic goals – such as regularising a potential influx of undocumented migrants 
(mentioned above), increasing trade and access to cheap labour, strengthening the EU’s 
security and political structures, as well as expanding the EU’s political clout (Sweeney 
2005; Trzeciak 2012; Zielonka 2007). Although Sweeney (2005: 210-13) has also pointed 
to a sense of moral obligation on the part of western politicians, Trzeciak (2012: 38) and 
Schimmelfennig (2001) argue that the EU had become merely rhetorically entrapped, 
wanting to preserve its legitimacy by implementing policies consistent with some inclusive 
statements made over the years.  
 
According to EU statements, the EU and EU-15 States were driven primarily by a desire 
to expand trade (Commission, Green Paper 17.11.1993: 49-54). The Enlargement served 
the EU’s 2000 Lisbon Strategy goals of achieving global competitiveness and freedom of 
capital145 (Likic-Brboric 2011). At the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, western European 
leaders had already determined that CEE states’ accessions would be a better alternative 
for EU-15 States than the economic policy reforms they had been contemplating to 
reinvigorate their economies (id). Their acceptance of the Enlargement was likely 
reinforced by the fact that the overall economic costs for the old Member States were 
predicted to be vastly exceeded by potential benefits (Trzeciak 2012: 10). It appears that 
the EU and western Member States allowed the CEE region to accede to derive economic 
and political benefits themselves, rather than to help or save the east, as the occasional EU 
rhetoric (discussed in Chapter 2) had claimed. As Bell (1980) points out, the dominant 
                                                      
144 All CEE states were expected to make significant contributions to the EU, especially in the first few years 
after accession (e.g., Zielonka 2007: 61). 
145 Aided by deregulation of the labour markets, and the growth and decreased regulation of the finance 
sector, at the expense of the rest of the economy. 
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group adopts policies that might benefit a subjugated group only if they benefit the 
former’s own interests, that is, if the interests of the two groups converge. 
 
Although the EU would often refer to the entire accession process as ‘negotiations’, based 
on ‘cooperation’ (e.g., Commission, Green Paper 17.11.1993), it was based on non-
negotiable, one-way adjustments. Some scholars have likened the process to an ‘extension 
of club membership’ (Jileva 2004: 13) or ‘a takeover’ (Hofbauer 2006: 65). The Polish 
government was not ensured a clear understanding of the acquis, which had not been fully 
translated by EU institutions146 into Polish147 by the day of accession148, unlike during prior 
enlargements (Bobek 2007). Being unequal to the EU, Poland was not even fully informed 
of what it was acceding to. This further disadvantaged Polish legislators, who already 
lacked appropriate expertise to form well-educated opinions on the wide range of EU 
legislation (Sadurski 2002). Poland’s voice was silenced, while new laws were being 
imposed by the west. 
 
The EU imposed its norms and rules, through a take-it-or-leave-it approach which was 
more extensive, inflexible, and intrusive than in prior enlargements (Trzeciak 2012: 50). 
The EU employed conditionality – first in trade relations and in regulatory alignment 
supporting operations of the single market (addressed above), and then in shaping 
domestic policies149 (Jileva 2004: 13). Unlike in all prior enlargements, CEE states were not 
given an option to permanently derogate or opt out from any parts of the acquis150. 
Furthermore, the EU conditionality package was highly ambiguous (Zielonka 2007: 58-9), 
providing the EU flexibility in defining the conditions of accession. Poland’s position in 
dealing with the EU’s demands was also compromised by its lacking foreign policy 
specialists, and by the political elite’s belief that Poland had no other option but to accede. 
The discrepancy of power between the EU and the candidates—more significant than 
during prior enlargements—facilitated this aggressive export of EU rules. 
                                                      
146 The legal duty to translate and publish the translated acquis lied with the EU (Bobek 2007: 11). Each 
institution (Commission, Council, European Parliament, ECJ, EE&SC, Committee of the Regions, and 
Court of Auditors) has its own translation service, which is responsible for translating documents issued by 
that institution. 
147 Or other CEE languages. 
148 Less than one third of it had been translated into CEE languages by 2000 (Commission, 2000 Regular 
Report). This violates the Act of Accession, pursuant to which all binding legislation had to be published in 
the languages of the new Member States (Article 58). The entire acquis was translated and published in the 
Official Journal of the European Union only in March 2006 (Bobek 2007). 
149 Of course, Poles did benefit from some of these legal changes – for example, through the introduction of 
EU equality directives, more advanced than Polish anti-discrimination provisions. 
150 For example, the UK and Denmark had been allowed to derogate from the Justice and Home Affairs 
acquis. Moreover, several EU-15 States had opted out from Schengen, and from the economic and monetary 
union. 
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The EU’s unilateral imposition of its laws and policies was accompanied by ongoing 
monitoring by Brussels. This was comprised of verbal and written instructions, regular 
written reviews, visits to Warsaw by EU representatives (Commission, 2002 Towards the 
Enlarged Union), and sending EU experts for extended periods to specific Polish 
ministries to oversee reforms (Zielonka 2007: 56). Frequent expert reports were used to 
pressure Poland to swiftly and diligently follow the EU’s demands, and to compete with 
other CEE states in doing so (Trzeciak 2012: 49-61). In hindsight, the Commission noted 
that the ‘2004 enlargement was the best prepared in the history of the EU. … the EU 
defined precise accession criteria151…  [and] closely monitored the efforts of the candidate 
countries against the conditions’ (Commission 2006, Enlargement Myths and Facts: 4). 
The unprecedented intrusiveness and wide-ranging policy effects (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2004) of these monitoring and evaluation procedures has been compared to 
imperial preoccupation with recording, standardising, and classifying (Behr 2007: 249). 
Moreover, through the publication of official reviews, EU experts were also constructing 
and controlling the dominant discourse - about the accession process being benevolent, 
and exemplary of western civilisation (Sher 2001: 241). 
 
B. The Safeguard Clauses 
 
The EU used safeguard provisions more extensively during the Eastern Enlargement than 
in any previous enlargements (De Witte et al 2017: 149-53). All enlargements152 except for 
the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995 have included a general economic 
internal market safeguard clause, to address adjustment difficulties in either the old or new 
Member States due to sudden competitive pressures of expanding the market. Thus, for 
example, if Poland had not met its accession commitments regarding the internal market153 
or if there were a serious breach of the functioning of the internal market (or an imminent 
risk of such a breach), the Commission - upon its own initiative or upon a request of any 
Member State - could implement protectionist measures (Article 37, Act of Accession). 
Unlike in previous enlargements, during which this economic safeguard clause was of 
limited duration, it could be applied in the aftermath of the 2004 Enlargement for as long 
as the situation were not remedied. 
 
                                                      
151 As addressed above, the Copenhagen criteria were anything but precise. 
152 See Table 1 in Chapter 4. 
153 Including in energy, transport, telecommunications, agriculture, and consumer and health protection 
sectors. 
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Moreover, during the 2004 Enlargement154, two new safeguard provisions were included in 
the accession treaty. The justice and home affairs safeguard clause (Article 38) could be 
applied in cases of serious or imminent risks of serious shortcomings in the transposition 
or implementation of EU rules relating to mutual recognition in criminal law or civil 
matters. This safeguard could be initiated until 2007 (and applied for as long as the 
situation were not remedied), by temporarily suspending any rights under the acquis which 
were deemed directly related to the triggering conditions. In addition, under the 
postponement clause (Article 39), if the Commission had found clear evidence that the 
state of preparations for the implementation of the acquis had been insufficient in ‘a 
number of important areas’, the Council could postpone accession by one year. These 
clauses were ambiguously defined, leaving the Commission with power to limit Poland’s 
ability to benefit from membership rights in the aftermath of the Enlargement, while still 
requiring it to fulfil its membership obligations immediately upon accession. In effect, 
despite the costs entailed in adopting the acquis and related accession policies, Poland was 
not even guaranteed all the potential benefits of membership on the day of accession. 
 
Notably, in the run-up to accession, several Commission representatives had announced 
that they intended to use the safeguard provisions, exerting additional pressure on Poland 
and the other CEE states to fulfil all the accession requirements to the EU’s satisfaction. 
For example, EU Enlargement Commissioner Guenter Verheugen emphasised the 
Commission’s zero-tolerance policy regarding new Members’ correct implementation of 
the acquis, and noted that the EU would not hesitate to use safeguard clauses (Week in 
Europe 2004). In particular, he predicted that ‘the safeguard measures are … likely to be 
invoked concerning food safety. Slaughterhouses and dairy producers could thus be barred 
from exporting’ (id). Similarly, the Director-General for Enlargement, Eneko Landaburu, 
warned that if Poland did not implement the acquis and introduce EU standards by 
November 2003 (when the Commission was to present its final report on the applicants’ 
readiness to accede), then the ‘introduction of the so-called protective clauses would be 
inevitable’ (EU Observer 2003). David Byrne, the Commissioner for Health and 
Consumer Protection, pointed less than a year before accession that ‘[m]any problems 
need to be resolved and significant improvements need to be made between now and 
accession ... If deficiencies remain, safeguard measures can be triggered to ensure that 
                                                      
154 The accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 also included an additional accession postponement 
clause, pursuant to which the EU could delay accession for one year if the candidate states were deemed not 
to have sufficiently implemented their membership obligations (Article 39, Accession Treaty with Bulgaria 
and Romania). Croatia’s accession in 2013 added yet another safeguard provision – a pre-accession 
monitoring clause, endowing the Council to take ‘all appropriate measures if issues of concern are identified 
during the monitoring process’ (Article 36, Accession Treaty with Croatia). 
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standards are maintained’ (Byrne 2003). In its final monitoring report, half a year before 
accession, the Commission discussed all the available safeguard measures at length, and 
noted 39 areas of serious concern to the single market (such as Polish fisheries) against 
which it considered applying the internal market safeguard clause (Commission 2003c). 
None of the safeguard clauses were ultimately applied to CEE states155. 
 
Despite the EU’s use of conditionality, Poland managed to obtain some concessions. For 
one, higher Common Agricultural Policy156 (‘CAP’) subsidies were agreed to than the EU 
had offered initially. As Trzeciak (2012: 10) points, however, this merely involved moving 
already secured EU structural funds to direct payments. Notably, while politically 
advantageous for the Polish negotiators, changing the use of structural funds in this 
manner was disadvantageous for Poland’s economy. Apart from increasing Poland’s 
budgetary deficit (since co-financing would have to be covered from the national budget), 
the new arrangement turned funds normally used to help modernise regional economies 
into subsidies for land ownership (Kawecka-Wykrzykowska 2004). Furthermore, Poland 
negotiated twelve- and seven-year157 transition periods for foreign investors purchasing 
real estate there. Any leeway, however, that the EU had exhibited was in areas of little 
practical importance to the EU. More generally, any concessions made by the EU to CEE 
states were not due to benevolence, but constituted tactical moves - to reduce potential 
post-Enlargement political repercussions of a resentful CEE voting bloc (Smith 1999: 15-
16). The overall outcome of the negotiation process was very distant from Poland’s initial 
demands (such as to protect its agricultural sector, and to allow mobility immediately upon 
accession), and heavily in the EU’s favour (Trzeciak 2012: 9-10). This is partly due to the 
fact that the EU had used whatever small concessions it had been willing to make to 
prevent Poland’s seeking more meaningful concessions (id).  
 
C. Poland’s Perspective 
 
The Polish government’s campaign to increase voter support for accession158 focused on 
its economic benefits, which was an issue of great importance to Poles (Prazmowska 2010: 
                                                      
155 A safeguard clause was applied, however, to Romania - due to the influx of its nationals to Spain, as 
discussed in the next Chapter. 
156 Mandated by Article 3 of EEC Treaty, the CAP was created in the 1960s (to reflect the needs of western 
states, especially France), and by the 1990s had become the EU’s most expensive program (Wagner-
Findeisen 1992). 
157 Depending on the geographical region of Poland. 
158 Moreover, the Commission allocated €10m per year for campaigns in candidate states (Krok-Paszkowska 
2003: 13). 
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244)159. The campaign also relied on return-to-Europe rhetoric (Pluta 2010: 316), and 
references to shared European values (Trzeciak 2012: 38-40)160. The Enlargement was 
presented as an end to the Cold War division of Europe, and as rejoining of western 
civilisation (Sanford 1999: 87). Polish media—which tends to support mainstream political 
parties—continued to repeat such views, and to ignore substantive details of the accession 
process (e.g., Gazeta Współczesna 2003; Gazeta Wyborcza 2002). Poles felt poorly 
informed about the actual details of accession: on the eve of the accession referendum, 
40% of those polled felt that they were not very well informed, and 4% not informed at all 
(Eurobarometer 2003b). Moreover, lacking trust in national politicians and with only 
poorly developed political preferences, post-communist Poles were vulnerable to symbolic 
and emotive rhetoric (Ekiert and Kubik 2004). Thus, with a poorly informed public, it was 
the pro-EU political elite161 that was in control of the process (Trzeciak 2012: 160).  
 
The Polish government took affirmative steps to ensure that the accession referendum 
would be successful. Notably, voting was expanded from the typical one to two days. 
Moreover, if accession were not approved through the public referendum, pursuant to a 
newly adopted law, legislators (through a 2/3 majority vote) were empowered to call a new 
public referendum or to authorise the President to ratify the Accession Treaty162. Thus, 
even if the referendum had failed, Poland would have most likely acceded. A 2/3 majority 
vote of the parliament would likely have been obtained given that the Polish political elite 
had supported integration, and that Poland had already expended substantial costs in 
adjusting its policies to EU requirements.  
 
Polish voters had tended to be supportive of accession. In 1998, for example, 45% 
supported accession, 19% opposed it, and the remainder had no opinion on this matter 
(Eurobarometer 1998). In 2002, 52% of respondents thought that EU membership would 
be a ‘good thing’ for Poland (Eurobarometer 2003a). Interestingly, some respondents who 
did not support accession nevertheless planned to vote in support of it. Hence, 63% of 
those polled in 1998 (Eurobarometer 1998) and 61% of those polled in 2002 
(Eurobarometer 2003a) planned to vote for it. Apparently, some voters might have been 
                                                      
159 Starting with access to some western imports in the 1970s, Poles developed western lifestyle aspirations 
(Sanford 1999: 66-80), which made some desire to join the west. 
160 Polish politicians had also earlier emphasised the return-to-Europe rhetoric, to pressure the EU to invite 
Poland to accede (Schimmelfennig 2001), and likely to garner support of pro-western Polish voters. 
161 On the other hand, Eurosceptics were not well organised, lacked media access, and were torn between 
recommending abstention from voting and voting against accession (Jasiewicz 2004). They also failed to 
present a well-formulated alternative to accession (Szczerbiak 2003).  
162 If either fewer than 50% of eligible voters had voted or fewer than 50% of those voting had approved 
accession. See http://referendum2003.pkw.gov.pl/akty_prawne/Uch103.pdf. 
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motivated by public perception that accession was a foregone conclusion163 or that Poland 
did not have any viable alternatives. During the referendum, held in June 2003, 58% of 
eligible voters participated, and 77% of them voted for accession, resulting in 45% 
mandate strength164.  
 
Notably, Poles at the time had higher esteem for EU citizens and institutions than for 
Polish ones (Roguska 2003). Such sentiments, of course, are in line with pro-western 
rhetoric disseminated by EU and Polish politicians. I wonder whether this might not only 
have reflected disillusionment with domestic politicians and voters’ western consumer 
aspirations, but also been prompted by some Poles’ internalised western othering of the 
east. Thus, accession represented an attempt to become more ‘European’, while breaking 
away from Russian influence. Everyday Poles’ and mainstream Polish politicians’ 
propagation of pro-west rhetoric is reminiscent of how colonised subjects attempt to 
elevate themselves by assimilating and reproducing their oppressor’s language and ideology 
(Fanon 1988; Spivak 1988). Combined with the post-communist cultural distress and 
social challenges (discussed earlier), this ‘self-colonisation’ caused Poles to be especially 
vulnerable to emotional and rhetorical manipulation, such as politicians’ appeals for a 
‘return to Europe’.  
 
4. Aspects of the Acquis Most Damaging to Poland  
 
The Enlargement entailed Poland’s transposition of the acquis—composed of more than 
10,000 documents, arranged into 31 accession chapters165—which became effective 
immediately upon accession. At the time of accession, some negative post-accession 
impact of the acquis was anticipated in vital sectors of the Polish economy, such as 
agriculture, heavy industry, and banking (Szczerbiak 2002). Moreover, in anticipation of 
the Enlargement, the EU adopted some new policies to increase its benefits to EU-15 
States (Inglis 2004) – for example, Agenda 2000 and CAP reforms, discussed below. Behr 
(2012: 13) labels it ‘an epitome of structural violence’.  
 
                                                      
163 In a May 2003 poll, most Poles did in fact assume that Poland would join the EU regardless of the result 
of the referendum (The Economist 2003). 
164 See http://referendum2003.pkw.gov.pl/sww/kraj/indexA.html. 
165 On Free Movement of Goods; Free Movement of People; Freedom to Provide Services; Free Movement 
of Capital; Company Law; Competition Policy; Agriculture; Fisheries; Transport Policy; Taxation; EMU; 
Statistics; Social; Energy; Industrial Policy; Small and Medium Enterprises; Science and Research; Education 
and Training; Telecommunications and Information; Culture and Audiovisual Policy; Regional Policy and 
Co-ordination; Environment; Consumers and Health Protection; Justice and Home Affairs; Customs Union; 
External Relations; Common Foreign and Security Policy; Financial Control; Finance and Budgetary 
Provisions; Institutions; and Miscellaneous. 
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It is true that accession benefited Poland in certain ways. It gained access to EU markets 
and structural funds. Moreover, after the expiration of transitional measures, its nationals 
obtained the right to mobility. Polish government’s economists estimate that not joining 
the EU would have resulted in slower economic growth, lower GDP, and higher 
unemployment (e.g., MSZ 2014). Over the last two decades, Poland has experienced the 
most stable economic growth in the EU, with an average rate of 3.7% per year (Aldaz-
Carroll et al 2018). Kolodziejczyk (2016: 13) attributes this growth primarily to Poland’s 
exports to the EU. Based on Eurostat data, Horridge and Rokicki (2018: 505) concluded 
that, among Visegrád countries166, Poland would have suffered the most economically 
without accession. They predicted that without accession, Poland would have experienced 
regional growth rate reductions of between 8% and 17% (id: 509).  
 
Of course, it is very difficult to directly link Poland’s current economic conditions to the 
effects of accession, as opposed to purely domestic factors or to geopolitical forces 
beyond the EU. Moreover, any economic benefits have not been distributed evenly across 
Poland, with large urban areas having benefited the most (Kundera 2014). The accession’s 
impact on individual Poles has also been uneven, depending on their age, education, and 
socio-economic class (Hardy and Fitzgerald 2008: 5-6). Notably, since 2004, Poland has 
experienced increasing inequalities, escalating prices, and an increase in precarious and 
illegal work167. Not surprisingly, this has resulted in more than 2 million Poles moving to 
EU-15 States between 2004 and 2014, leading to a brain drain168 (Willa 2014). This exodus, 
composed mostly of workers, has been linked to depressing Polish GDP between 0.16% 
and 0.31% annually in the first ten years after accession – despite the considerable 
remittances being sent back to Poland169 (Kundera 2014).  
 
EU regulations have also been increasing the cost of living in Poland. The 2011 VAT 
regulation170 changed the standard VAT rate for Poland from 8% to 23%171. This has 
increased, for example, the cost of children’s clothing, and has been speculated to 
                                                      
166 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
167 Along with Latvia, Poland has experienced the highest rates of informal and illegal employment among 
CEE states, which has further motivated many Poles’ emigration (Hardy and Fitzgerald 2008: 6-7). 
168 By 2016, Poland ranked second in the world (after India) in outflow of qualified personnel (with the UK 
being their second most attractive destination, after the USA). See World Bank (2016). It remains to be seen 
whether Brexit will affect these numbers or will merely impact migrants’ destinations. 
169 For example, between 2004 and 2011, Poland received more than €26b in remittances (Kundera 2014: 
387). 
170 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 of 15 March 2011 laying down implementing 
measures for Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax. 
171 Pursuant to EU law, VAT rates differ among the Members, with the highest (27%) applied in Hungary, 
and the lowest (17%) in Luxembourg. See https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/ 
resources/documents/taxation/vat/how_vat_works/rates/vat_rates_en.pdf.  
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contribute to Poland’s declining birth rate (EP Written Questions 1.8.13). Even though 
‘medical care’ is exempt from VAT under EU rules, the Commission referred Poland to 
the ECJ in 2014 for failing to apply the new rates to fifteen medical equipment and 
pharmaceutical products. Applying the new rate to such products would have increased 
the costs of medical care in Poland – especially because hospitals and other healthcare 
providers are unable to deduct VAT under Polish rules (EP Written Questions 19.3.2014: 
198). The ECJ ruled against the Commission regarding most of the products in question 
because the Commission was unable to prove that most of the items at issue did not fall 
within the scope of items specified under EU rules as exempt from the increased VAT 
rate172. Thus, Poland’s partial success in this case can be attributed to the lack of 
definitional specificity under EU rules, and the fact that the burden of proof falls on the 
Commission in infringement cases173. Notably, the ECJ made it clear that social concerns 
had no place in the imposition of VAT rules. Poland had put forth a moral argument, that 
a reduced rate of VAT should be applied to all goods used for health purposes, even if 
they do not fall within exempted products under EU law, in order to make them more 
affordable to all persons. In response, the ECJ pointed that ‘[w]ith regard to social 
considerations raised by the Republic of Poland, …  it suffices to state that the arguments 





Due to its significance to the Polish economy175, agriculture presents an especially 
significant example of damaging, or at least unequal, EU policies. Although this was one 
sector in which Poland could have benefited greatly from open trade with the EU, trade in 
agricultural products was closely regulated during a seven-year transitional period, driven 
by EU-15 States’ fear of competitive pressures (Dach 1999). EU-15 States, however, have 
been permitted to freely export their agricultural product surpluses to Poland since the 
time of accession. Moreover, the EU had imposed limits on all Members’ production of 
dairy and wheat, Poland’s key agricultural products, until 2015 (id). Thus, Polish farmers’ 
profits were reduced, and some were forced to incur costs associated with changing their 
operations in order to survive.  
 
                                                      
172 Case C-678/13 Commission v Poland, 4 June 2015. 
173 More generally, such infringement cases are difficult for the Commission to prove because it must 
demonstrate a constant and consistent VAT practice by national administrators, which is often difficult to 
document and might be contrary to national law (in conformity with EU law). 
174 Case C-678/13 Commission v Poland, ¶ 51. 
175 For example, in 1999, almost 20% of Poles listed agriculture as their main employment (Commission, 
Enlargement Paper 2001b: 53). 
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In anticipation of the Enlargement, the CAP underwent its most far-reaching reforms 
since its inception in the 1960s (Sweeney 2005). Agenda 2000 included overall cuts to its 
funding, and redirected funding away from production towards protection of the 
environment176. At the time of accession, the Commission had opposed providing much 
direct aid to Polish farmers because it feared redirecting resources away from EU-15 
farmers (Kundera 2014: 390). CEE agriculture was excluded from many EU agricultural 
policies (such as equalising grants, subsidising agricultural exports, and guaranteeing 
minimum prices). Agricultural subsidies to Poland and other CEE states were significantly 
lower than those for pre-existing Member States or those that had been offered during 
prior enlargements177. Direct payments to CEE farmers started in 2004 at 25% of what 
EU-15 farmers were receiving, to be slowly increased over a period of 10 years (Zielonka 
2007: 61). Inequality in these payments between EU-15 and CEE farmers has continued 
under the 2014-2020 programming period, to be equalised by 2019178. 
 
Despite being excluded from full access to subsidies and payments under the CAP, Poland 
was required to meet quality, production, processing, and hygiene standards of its 
agricultural products from the day of accession. Adopting all the CAP rules resulted in 
increased production costs – especially due to VAT increases on agricultural machinery 
and supplies, and the requirements to modernise operations and ensure environmental 
protection (Kundera 2014: 392-3). At the time of accession, such outlays amounted to 
over €1.7b (id: 393). EU compensation was not sufficient to reimburse Polish farmers for 
the costs they had to incur (Ziolkowska 2007: 10). Moreover, no reimbursements for agri‐
environmental measures were available at all between 2004 and 2006, and farming lots 
smaller than 1 hectare were never eligible for such EU or Polish funding (id: 8). Within 
two years of accession, 1.5 million Polish farms had to be liquidated due to the application 
of these agricultural policies (Zielonka 2007: 80).  
 
B. Other Sectors 
 
EU policies have also been causing significant trade imbalances in other industries, by 
constraining Polish exports both before and since the accession. For example, Poland was 
permitted to supply EU-15 States with raw and minimally-processed materials rather than 
manufactured goods, which inhibited its ability to modernise its economy and to profit 
                                                      
176 Agri-environmental policy is mandatory under EU Regulation 1257/99 on support for rural development 
from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund. There were no similar policies in Poland 
before PHARE was implemented in 2000. 
177 For example, CEE states were offered €137 per person in regional policy support, compared to €231 that 
had been offered during the Southern Enlargement (of Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986). 
178 See https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cap-reform/. 
 79 
from its low manufacturing costs (Dach 1999). Since 2006, the Commission has imposed 
limits on the production of sugar in Poland, and requires that any sugar shortage be offset 
by imports from other States, such as Germany (EP Written Questions 17.07.2013: 231). 
As a result, in 2013, the price of sugar in Poland was 60% higher than in Germany (id). As 
of 2014, a new regulation179 has reduced permissible levels of tarry substances in smoked 
meats. Poland produces and exports the largest volume of traditional food products in the 
EU - many made using wood-fired smoking ovens (EP Written Questions 22.08.14: 94-5). 
When using such ovens, it is extremely difficult to meet EU norms (id). Notably, the EU 
regulation is less restrictive for tarry content of smoked fish, mussels, and processed foods 
based on cereals and cocoa, which tend to be produced in EU-15 States. Since it is difficult 
for small traditional food producers to change their production technologies, many will 
likely be forced to scale down or even close.  
 
Pursuant to Agenda 2000, Poland and other CEE states were required to incur high 
facilities spending in numerous sectors, including education, technical research, transport 
networks, and environmental protection (Commission 1997c). Notably, Poland was 
expected to invest in renewable energy resources and ecological standards, while reducing 
big mining and industrial plants deemed by the EU to be high polluters. The EU’s carbon 
dioxide emission limits have increased production costs in coal, construction, chemical, 
and steel industries, cutting production and jobs (EP Written Questions 7.8.13: 181). 
Emission limits became even more stringent pursuant to the EU’s 2013-2020 plan180. At 
the same time, the Commission has not taken any steps, such as applying customs duties, 
to protect the coal mining industry against competition from third countries. These 
policies will likely result in a significant decline of the coal industry, on which Poland had 
depended historically. Although Poland used to be the biggest coal producer in Europe, by 
2014, it became an importer of approximately 17,000,000 tons of coal annually (EP 
Written Questions 17.7.14: 14).  
 
C. Effects on the West 
 
In addition to gaining sources of cheap materials and cheap labour181, and new investment 
opportunities, western States’ economic benefits from the Enlargement have been 
carefully orchestrated182. For example, in the pre-accession period, Poland bore the impact 
                                                      
179 Commission regulation (EU) No 10/2011 of 14 January 2011 on plastic materials and articles intended to 
come into contact with food. 
180 EU Emissions Trading System, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en. 
181 The economic benefits of CEE workers’ mobility to EU-15 States are addressed in the following Chapter. 
182 Ost (1992: 221) argues that the Cold War itself was a key contributor of western Europe’s post-war 
prosperity.  
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of any future inflation and output stabilisations, whereas western States and businesses 
benefited from reduced risk premia, increased FDI, and incentives for technological 
innovation (Ca’Zorzi and De Santis 2004; Nello and Smith 1997: 37). By 2014, Poland 
made more than €33b in direct contributions and more than €143m as loan repayments to 
the common budget (Ministerstwo Finansow 2014). Moreover, since the Enlargement, the 
European Social Fund—intended to enhance skills of unemployed workers and of 
employees at small and medium enterprises—has been used mainly by large multinationals 
in Poland, including ING, Unilever, Philips, Mercedes Benz, BMW, Renault, Nestlé, and 
Deutsche Bank (EP Written Questions 21.11.13: 583). By 2013, around €7m from the 
Fund was spent by multinationals to provide training for their own employees (EP Written 
Questions 28.11.2013: 337). Meanwhile, multinational corporations in Poland have tended 
to transfer profits between their subsidiaries as to avoid paying taxes in Poland (EP 
Written Questions 12.02.14: 356–57). Given pre-accession policies and the imposition of 
the acquis, Poland has had little power to stop such exploitation. Frank (2006: 102) argues 





As if attempting to pre-empt potential criticism, the Commission noted on the 25th 
anniversary of the fall of the Iron Curtain that, in evaluating the Enlargement, it is 
important ‘to avoid pitfalls of an “imperialist” categorization’ (Commission 2014, 25 Years 
After: 13). The EU’s pre-accession policies, the accession process, and many aspects of the 
acquis, however, suggest that such categorisation might be apt. The legal, political, and 
economic frameworks behind Poland’s accession and its membership have served the 
interests of western financial institutions and EU-15 States - before the Enlargement and 
since. While Poland’s alternatives to accession were either not fully satisfactory or not 
investigated at length, western EU States misused their bargaining power stemming from 
east-west power differentials, and approached the negotiation process and specific 
accession policies in a self-serving fashion. Poland’s voice and interests were at least 
partially overlooked, and at times actively silenced. It is true that historically, more 
powerful countries have often approached weaker ones in an opportunistic fashion. 
However, the EU’s self-interested actions towards Poland have taken place in the context 




My analysis indicates significant tensions between (1) the benevolent fundamental-rights 
foundational myth (presented in the preceding Chapter) and derivate myths about the 
Enlargement as a ‘re-unification’ of Europe, and (2) the actual enlargement process and 
policies, in line with the rhetorical positioning of Poland as an eastern other. While the 
former serve to obscure inequalities, and distance the EU from a potential criticism of its 
approach towards Poland, the latter have helped to support the creation of a social reality 
that enables post-accession racialisation and inequalities experienced by Poles, reinforcing 
a hierarchy of Europeanness and whiteness - to be explored in more detail in the rest of 
this thesis183. At the same time, the economic core of the EU’s fundamental rights myths 
which I had exposed in the preceding Chapter is also visible in the Enlargement policies, 
which have been structured largely to benefit EU-15 States’ economies, and which have 
been reproducing hierarchies of power within the EU. The privileged position of EU-15 
States has been strengthened via Enlargement policies, which had been created by EU-15 
politicians to benefit western interests, while overlooking or even sanctioning ongoing 
inequalities between Poland and the west. Any benefits accrued by Poland appear only 
ancillary, and are more aptly attributable to interest convergence rather than benevolent 
intentions on the part of the pre-04 EU.  
 
Poland has remained on the periphery of the dominant (western) EU group. Its ability to 
benefit more from its accession or to gain an equal footing with western Members appears 
unlikely in the foreseeable future. Poland lacks much clout within the EU, despite having 
the sixth largest184 population among its Members. Although the Polish government has 
argued—likely due to electoral pressures—that Poland had become a ‘significant player’ 
and a ‘strong and influential member state’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014: 7, 11), 
scholars dispute this assertion. For example, Copsey and Pomorska’s (2010) analysis of the 
EU’s policy towards its eastern neighbours—an issue of key strategic importance to 
Poland—indicated that Poland’s influence on EU policies has been low. This is likely due 
to Polish politicians’ inexperience at alliance building, Poland’s low administrative capacity, 
and other Members’ lack of receptiveness towards Poland’s concerns (id; see also 
Szczerbiak 2012)185. Presumably, with time, Poland’s political competencies might grow, 
                                                      
183 One wonders whether without a long history of western othering of the east, and without inequalities in 
the accession process, David Cameron (2013; 2014) would have felt at liberty to explicitly target Polish 
movers as the face of immigrants’ alleged exploitation of the UK’s social welfare system or Jack Straw (2013) 
would have called his Government’s decision to allow unlimited immigration from ‘states like Poland’ a 
‘spectacular mistake’. 
184 After Germany, France, the UK, Italy, and Spain. 
185 Moreover, Polish business interest groups have had only a limited influence on the EU’s decisions 
(Cianciara 2013). 
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but it is debatable whether other Member States (other than the Visegrád group186) will 
become responsive to its interests. Poland’s priorities have frequently diverged from those 
of the EU-15 States – especially regarding climate, migration, and defence (Buras 2017). 
The Eurosceptic Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (‘PiS’)187 party, governing since 2015, has come 
into direct conflict with the Commission on several occasions: most notably, due to PiS’s 
refusal to accept refugees under the EU relocation scheme; its support for logging in an 
ancient Polish forest; and its refashioning of Poland’s media and the judiciary. Its clash 
with the EU intensified in 2016, after the EU sought to monitor the rule of law in Poland. 
Moreover, Poland was the only Member openly advocating Lisbon Treaty reforms in 2016 
(to shift power from the Commission to the Member States, and calling for Juncker’s and 
Tusk’s resignations) (EU Observer 2016). Such conflicts have undermined Poland’s 
trustworthiness in the eyes of not only the Commission, but also EU-15 States (id). 
 
Although Poland has played a significant role within the EU by bridging differences 
between the Big Three (France, Germany, and the UK) (Parkes 2013), that impact does 
not amount to having a direct effect on EU policies. Moreover, it is uncertain how Brexit 
will reshape these dynamics. Furthermore, Donald Tusk’s188 tenure (2014-2019) as 
President of the European Council has not helped Poland’s agency within the EU. Instead, 
it has only exposed political strife within the Polish government, unlikely to help its image. 
For example, the Polish government has accused Tusk of ‘attacking’ Poland after he 
voiced criticism of some of its domestic policies189, which are arguably in contravention of 
EU laws. Moreover, Poland’s opposition to his re-election as Council President in 2017 
had left Poland isolated from the other Members, all of which had backed his second term 
(Rankin 2017). It remains to be seen if Brexit will affect Poland’s influence within the EU. 
On one hand, Poland’s ally in the EU will depart. On the other, Poland will become the 
fifth largest State, with a greater share of MEPs in the Parliament. Hence, its support will 
become more critical if legislative proposals are to be approved by the Parliament190. 
Moreover, its economy is predicted to keep growing191, possibly increasing its clout. 
                                                      
186 In the past few years, however, internal divisions have appeared within the group, with Hungary 
remaining Poland’s only consistent ally (Nič 2016). 
187 PiS was founded in 2001 as a nationalistic, conservative, Christian party.  
188 A strong supporter of free market economy and integration, and a former Prime Minister of Poland, Tusk 
was also President of the Council of the EU in 2011. 
189 See https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42049973. 
190 European Parliament decisions are reached through majority voting - simple majority, absolute majority 
(half plus one), or qualified majority (a specific majority, such as two-thirds), depending on the type of 
decision and the subject of the vote. The current number of MEPs is 751 (to be reduced to 705 after Brexit), 
with Poland having 51 seats (due to representing more than 7% of the EU’s population).  
191 See https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/poland/overview#3. Poland is the first CEE country to be 




One should also be cautious not to mistake Poles’ post-accession support for EU 
membership—which has been higher than in other CEE states (e.g., Eurobarometer 2007; 
CBOS 2017)—as indicative of fairness or equality in Poland’s relations with the west. As 
discussed above, some Poles considered the EU to be their only option during the 
upheavals of the post-communist period, and might still harbour such attitudes. For 
example, in 2014, Poles’ security concerns over instability in the Ukraine were linked to an 
all-time high (89%) support for accession (CBOS 2014b)192. Being part of not only NATO 
but also the EU certainly has provided Poland with security benefits. Moreover, a higher 
number of Poles than of nationals from other CEE states have taken advantage of the free 
movement right, which—despite some shortcomings and challenges discussed in later 
Chapters—has been of central importance to Poles in supporting EU membership. 
Arguably, many also feel proud at finally being considered ‘European’ – a sentiment 
reinforced through self-colonisation (addressed earlier). Any positive attitudes about 
accession should also not be conflated with its economic repercussions. Since 2000, Poles 
have continued to be consistently negative about the functioning of the market economy 
in Poland, with around half of those polled in 2014 disagreeing with the assertion that 
capitalist economy has been the best option for Poland (CBOS 2014a). Moreover, even if 
its economy is healthy according to international financial benchmarks, this does not 
necessarily have an impact on Poles’ lives. Indeed, many have felt compelled to better their 
lives by relying on the right of free movement, to which I turn next. 
 
  
                                                      
192 Notably, however, Poles’ trust in EU institutions was not high at around that time, at only 41% 
(Eurobarometer 2015). 
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Chapter 4:  The Right to Free Movement, and Poles’ Mobility 
1. Introduction   
The last Chapter explored how western-driven pre-accession policies, the Enlargement 
process, and select aspects of the acquis have taken advantage of and reinforced Poland’s 
unequal position to the west. More generally, Kukovec (2015) has argued how EU laws 
and discourse have ignored the concerns of ‘peripheral’193 EU countries, their workers, and 
their companies, and hence reproduced the existing power hierarchies between dominant 
and peripheral EU countries. For example, while the dominant Member States’ arguments 
against social dumping (of cheaper CEE workers in the west) have been honoured under 
EU law194, peripheral States’ concerns with western goods and services dumping195 have 
been unchallenged by EU competition rules (id). Moreover, increasing free markets and 
competition have worked to the detriment of peripheral States’ companies, which are 
structurally disadvantaged compared to companies in the dominant States (id). This 
Chapter zooms in on a key policy area that stems from the Enlargement, and seeks to 
situate it within such power hierarchies: Poles’ access to the freedom of movement right. 
This right constitutes the backbone of my thesis.  
 
Often portrayed as ‘labour migrants’ in western popular and political discourse196, Poles’ 
mobility has been implicitly not free. This erroneous label unfortunately appears in line 
with reality, given that Poles’ mobility has been predominantly economically-driven197 
(Ciupijus 2011), and often marred by exploitation and racism in the receiving States, as 
discussed below. My aim is to explore whether the west’s unequal pre-accession approach 
towards Poland, reinforced through othering discourse, has shaped Poles’ access to 
mobility. I focus particularly on how the right to free movement has been conceptualised, 
applied to, and experienced by Poles who are workers198, as that is by far the largest group 
                                                      
193 Defined by Kukovec (2015) as Member States with lower GDPs; less prestigious products, services, and 
institutions; smaller investments in research and development; less ingoing and outgoing FDI; lower wages; 
and lower life expectancy than in the States belonging to the centre. This peripheral region includes all CEE 
states, Portugal, Greece, and Cyprus (id). 
194 For example, in both Viking and Laval cases (n 377), ECJ and scholarly debates overlooked CEE 
workers’ concerns. Instead, they framed the factual circumstances as a conflict between (all) workers’ rights 
versus (all) companies’ right to free movement of services (in Laval) or right to relocate (in Viking), not 
differentiating between the interests of CEE as opposed to western companies and workers. Notably, in 
Laval, the ECJ condemned social dumping of cheaper CEE workers in the west.  
195 Western exports to the peripheral region at prices below those charged on the domestic markets, a 
practice which ultimately benefits companies of the centre and disadvantage companies of the periphery (due 
to lost capacities, lost investment, and contraction or elimination of whole industries) (Kukovec 2015). 
196 Unlike western ‘expats’ and ‘movers’. 
197 Although some young CEE nationals’ mobility has been driven by a sense of adventure. 
198 I do not address highly-skilled professionals because they have comprised a minority of mobile Poles, and 
are often governed by specific regulations (such as those applying to nurses, doctors, or lawyers).  
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of Poles who have been mobile since 2004199. Moreover, it is the influx of CEE workers 
that had provoked stern opposition in EU-15 States at the time of accession and since 
then, most poignantly in the debates surrounding Brexit. 
 
A. The Significance of the Free Movement Right 
As one of the four freedoms200 forming the bedrock of the EU, the freedom of movement 
of persons was included in Spaak’s 1956 blueprint for the establishment of the European 
Common Market201. Enshrined as a fundamental EU principle in TFEU Article 45, and 
developed through secondary legislation and ECJ case law, this right entitles each EU 
citizen to seek employment and to work in other Member States, and to reside there for 
that purpose, while enjoying equal treatment with the receiving State’s nationals in the 
employment context and access to social and tax advantages. As a prerequisite for the 
exercise of most other EU rights202 (including the right to equality) and a tangible symbol 
of integration, the right carries great social, economic, and political importance (Mortera-
Martinez and Odendahl 2017: 3-5). The free movement right has become widely 
regarded—by politicians and scholars alike—to constitute a central aspect of the European 
integration project (Johns 2013b).  
In line with the fundamental rights rhetoric addressed in Chapter 2, mobility has been 
proclaimed by the Commission (e.g., 2008b), the Parliament (e.g., 2013), the ECJ203, and 
key EU representatives (e.g., Reding 2014) to constitute a fundamental right, a founding 
principle, and a core right of EU citizenship. The freedom of movement right is 
considered ‘one of the most important objectives of the Community’, ‘one of the most 
concrete expressions of the concept of Union citizenship’ (EE&SC 2001: § 1.1), and of 
‘paramount economic importance and great symbolic value’ (EE&SC 1991: ¶ 4.14)204. The 
EU public also deems it to be one of the most prized EU achievements. For example, in 
1986, 74% of EU nationals polled supported an unlimited right to reside in other Member 
                                                      
199 I do not analyse the Employment Equality Framework Directive 2000/78 (to combat discrimination of 
workers on grounds of disability, sexual orientation, religion, and age) because the focus of my thesis is on 
discrimination due to racial or ethnic origin. Hence, the Race Equality Directive 2000/43 is more relevant to 
my questions, as discussed in the next Chapter.  
200 Along with the freedom of movement of goods, services, and capital. 
201 Drafted by a Committee headed by Paul-Henri Spaak, the Brussels Report on the General Common 
Market eventually led to the signing of the Treaty of Rome. 
202 Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Uecker, and Jacquet v Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, ECLI:EU:C:1997:285. 
203 E.g., Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:493. 
204 Historically, of course, unrestricted mobility was the norm. It was only in the late 1700s that national 
passports were introduced in most European countries. The first modern immigration border control laws 
were promulgated only in the last two centuries – for example, the 1905 Aliens Act in the UK, and the 1882 
Chinese Exclusion Law in the US. For a discussion of the history of mobility and of modern immigration 
controls, see Dowty (1987). 
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States (Eurobarometer 1986). More recently, almost 90% of EU citizens surveyed 
considered mobility to be a fundamental right of their EU citizenship (Special 
Eurobarometer 2011). The majority deems it to be the main EU right (Flash 
Eurobarometer 2013), and the most positive achievement of the EU (Eurobarometer 
2013). In the context of the Eastern Enlargement, moreover, the right to mobility served 
as ‘a key symbol of the “return to Europe” that EU accession represent[ed]’, especially 
poignant to CEE nationals given the restrictions they had experienced behind the Iron 
Curtain (Maas 2002: 2). Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, both the Enlargement 
process and the freedom of movement right have been framed by EU institutions as 
fundamental to the re-unification of Europe and to liberating CEE nationals.  
By the mid 1980s, approximately 2 million workers (that is, 0.5% of the total EC 
population)205 were relying on the freedom of movement right (Hantrais 2007: 217-18). In 
2000, approximately 6 million EU-15 nationals (1.6% of the total population) resided in 
other EU-15 States (Koikkalainen 2011). In the last decade, intra-EU mobility has 
increased. By 2013, 3.1% of EU citizens were mobile (Canetta et al 2014: 1). Due to 
employment opportunities and gaps in earnings (Barslund and Busse 2014: 116-17), post-
2004 mobility has been predominantly from the CEE region to EU-15 States206. Most of 
this influx occurred between 2005 and 2007, before overall mobility began to diminish due 
to the economic downturn (Commission 2008e).  
As the largest group of movers, Poles have constituted more than 20% of annual intra-EU 
mobility since 2004 (OECD 2012: 174-6). By 2009, approximately 2.3 million Poles (more 
than 6.6%207 of Poland’s population) were living in other EU States (Barslund and Busse 
2014: 129)208. The UK has been Poles’ top post-04 destination209. Between 2006 and 2015, 
more than 30% of Polish mobility each year has been to the UK210. By 2016, more than 
900,000 Poles were residing in the UK211. A substantial portion of this mobility has been 
temporary in nature – likely due to reduced post-recession employment opportunities in 
the UK, improving living standards in Poland, Polish government’s reintegration 
                                                      
205 And 5.5 million family members. 
206 Third-country nationals (‘TCN’) have continued to constitute the largest group of immigrants to EU-15 
States, however. For example, in 2010, 23% of migrants in the EU were EU citizens, 77% were TCNs 
(Eurostat 2012).  
207 The second highest percentage, after Romanians.  
208 Counting those staying abroad for more than three months.  
209 Followed by Ireland, and Germany, in that order (OECD 2012). 
210 See http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/migracje-zagraniczne-ludnosci/informacja-o-
rozmiarach-i-kierunkach-emigracji-z-polski-w-latach-20042015,2,9.html. 
211 See https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/ 
internationalmigration/bulletins/ukpopulationbycountryofbirthandnationality/2016. 
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campaigns, and homesickness (Filimonau and Mika 2017). The Brexit referendum also 
appears to be responsible for some return migration (id). According to the Commission 
(2010a), mobility has always been hindered by some obstacles that are difficult to 
overcome – such as Member States’ incorrect applications of EU law, and hurdles in 
recognising educational and professional qualifications. One of my goals in this Chapter is 
to explore whether CEE workers’ mobility might face such or any additional impediments. 
Before the Eastern Enlargement, intra-EU labour mobility did not pose a threat (either 
real or imagined) to host States’ welfare regimes, labour markets, or social cohesion 
(Engbersen et al 2017). Hence, the right to free movement was not politicised. It became 
one of the most contested topics during the CEE accession process, however, and very 
unpopular among EU-15 citizenry (Currie 2008: 11). Responding to public anxieties, and 
allegedly fearing welfare tourism (although studies indicated that such concerns were not 
warranted, as addressed below), most EU-15 States resisted CEE nationals’ post-accession 
access to free movement and to social benefits (Kubal 2012: 74-6). All CEE governments 
had opposed mobility restrictions (Jileva 2002). They argued that such restrictions would 
diminish the concept of equality, and degrade the scope of their EU membership and of 
their belonging to the European community (Barnard 2000). With the largest population 
among CEE states, a strong culture of emigration, and a greater number of its nationals 
residing in EU-15 States pre-accession than from other CEE states, Poland would be 
particularly affected by mobility restrictions, symbolically and practically. The Polish 
accession negotiator critiqued transitional restrictions for introducing inequalities among 
Members, and for portraying CEE states as not properly ‘European’ (Jileva 2002). Despite 
this, seven-year restrictions on workers’ mobility were included in the 2004 accession 
treaty212. 
B. Westerners’ Opposition to CEE Mobility  
Despite greatly valuing their own mobility (as mentioned above), the western public has 
exhibited anxieties about the presence of CEE movers in their States. In the run-up to the 
Enlargement, various surveys taken between 2000 and 2003 indicated that about 40% of 
EU-15 nationals opposed granting civil rights to lawful migrants, and 20% favoured their 
repatriation (Erel 2007: 2). Eurosceptic populist discourse across EU-15 States213—fuelled 
by the 2008 economic crisis and the refugee crisis—has condemned intra-EU mobility, 
and has been incorrectly labelling CEE movers as ‘migrants’ and ‘foreigners’ 
                                                      
212 Similarly, mobility from Bulgaria and Romania, which acceded in 2007, was restricted for seven years. 
213 Right-wing, anti-foreigner populist discourse has also been observed in CEE states – after the collapse of 
communism (Wallace 1998) and more recently against refugees, especially Muslims (Bachman 2016). 
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(Kostakopoulou 2014: 5). Sobis et al (2016) note that Poles and Romanians have been 
especially targeted by xenophobic language in the media, and by both extreme-right and 
mainstream politicians. When transitional limitations were coming to an end, renewed 
popular and political debates about ‘benefit tourism’ and ‘poverty immigration’ spread 
across EU-15 States (Poptcheva 2014: 3). In a 2011 survey, majority of nationals in every 
EU-15 State other than Sweden and Luxembourg agreed with the statement that the 
internal market had ‘flooded’ their country with ‘cheap labour’ (Special Eurobarometer 
2011a: 20). A survey conducted in 2013 showed that a substantial majority of respondents 
in the UK (83%), Germany (73%), France (72%), Italy (66%), and Spain (60%) felt that 
their governments should be able to restrict EU movers’ access to benefits (Seeleib-Kaiser 
2018). In a 2013 letter to the President of the European Council for Justice and Home 
Affairs, Ministers representing Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom called for limitations on the mobility of intra-EU ‘immigrants’, due to CEE 
movers’ alleged abuse of and strain on the social systems of ‘benefit magnet’ States (Mikl-
Leitner et al 2013). Cameron’s renegotiation of the UK’s membership in the EU sought to 
decrease mobility into the UK, or at least EU citizens’ welfare access, even by 
economically active movers (Barnard and Butlin 2018). In 2017, 33% of respondents 
disagreed and 12% strongly disagreed with the statement that immigration is a good thing 
for their country (Eurobarometer 2018: 9). 
Survey data suggests that Britons have been especially apprehensive about mobility, and 
about migration more generally. A review of Eurobarometer Public Opinion polls and 
Ipsos MORI Issues Index findings between 2003 and 2013 indicates that UK nationals 
have tended to express more concern than other Europeans about immigration (Duffy 
and Frere-Smith 2014: 10). For example, two months before the Enlargement, 41% of 
Britons (compared to the EU-15 average of 16%) regarded immigration as the most 
important issue facing the UK; and 62% deemed immigration as the most important issue 
for the upcoming European Parliament elections (Eurobarometer 2004). The importance 
of migration to the British public reached a peak in 2007 and 2008—when CEE mobility 
was at its highest (Drinkwater and Garapicz 2013: 1). For example, more than 40% of 
those polled by Ipsos MORI during each month between September 2007 and April 2008 
considered race and immigration among the most important issues facing Britain, ahead of 
concerns about the economy or crime214. According to 2014 surveys, 52% Britons 
                                                      
214 See https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/issues-index-2007-onwards. This is much higher than in 
the years preceding the Enlargement (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014). For example, in both 1985 and 2000, 
only 18% of respondents named immigration and race relations as one of the top issues facing the UK (id). 
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exhibited negative attitudes towards EU movers, which was the highest percentage among 
all EU respondents (Seeleib-Kaiser 2018). Since the Brexit referendum in June 2016, 
however, Ipsos MORI surveys indicate that immigration has been receding as the most 
salient issue, falling from 48% of respondents in June 2016 to 21% in December 2017 
(Blinder and Richards 2018). YouGov polls also show a slight decrease in Britons’ 
opposition towards immigration since 2016, although many respondents continue to 
express concern about it (Wells 2018). In April 2018, for example, 63% of those polled felt 
that immigration into Britain in the last ten years had been too high (39% ‘much too high’, 
and 24% ‘a little too high’) (id). 
CEE nationals have consistently constituted a highly disfavoured group in the UK, even 
long before the Brexit referendum. For example, British Social Attitudes Surveys between 
1983 and 1996 revealed that white Britons were prejudiced not only against non-white 
groups, but also against Eastern Europeans (more than against all the other white groups 
measured215) (Ford 2011: 1026-7). Although Britons’ attitudes towards some non-white 
immigrant groups appear to have improved since then, a hierarchy among whites has 
continued. For example, according to a 2007 immigration survey, 34% of Britons felt that 
EU-14 nationals should be given priority to immigrate to the UK; whereas 27% supported 
that approach towards Australians, New Zealanders, and Canadians; 9% for Americans; 
1% for those from the Indian Subcontinent and African Commonwealth countries; and 
0% for CEE nationals (Ipsos MORI 2007)216.  
Both Brexit Leavers and Remainers showed higher preference for non-CEE white 
immigrants than for Poles. For example, according to calculations by the Migration 
Observatory, 61% of Remainers and 25% of Leavers would allow ‘some’ or ‘many’ Poles 
to come and live in the UK; 70% Remainers and 35% Leavers would allow French 
immigrants; and 72% Remainers and 57% Leavers would allow those from Australia 
(Blinder and Richards 2018). As whiteness scholars have noted, whiteness is often most 
contested at its edges (Garner 2007b: 101-2). Unlike other Caucasian groups frequently 
measured, CEE movers do not share a colonial history with the UK or its language; come 
from much poorer regions; and undertake lower-skilled employment. Furthermore, unlike 
EU-14 nationals, who have been trickling into the UK for decades, CEE movers’ sudden 
influx likely helped to fuel opposition to them. On the other hand, Poles were preferred by 
                                                      
215 Including EU-14 nationals, Americans, Canadians, Latin Americans, South Africans, Australians, and 
New Zealanders. 
216 Bulgarians and Romanians fare particularly poorly in this survey – with 8% of those polled stating that 
they should not be allowed to enter the UK at all, which is higher than for any other white group measured. 
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both Leavers and Remainers to some other groups, notably Romanians, Pakistanis, and 
Nigerians (Blinder and Richards 2018). Thus, Poles’ whiteness (and their Christian 
religion) appear to bestow some privilege on them. The erroneous public association of 
Romanians with the Roma might help to explain Britons’ preference for Poles over them. 
Perhaps most poignantly, public opposition to CEE nationals’ mobility featured 
prominently in Brexit debates (Engbersen et al 2017), and in the referendum outcome 
(Dennison and Geddes 2018; Thielemann and Schade 2016). While renegotiating the UK’s 
EU membership, David Cameron (2013) condemned Labour for giving CEE nationals 
access to the UK’s labour market in 2004, and referred to Poles to illustrate immigrants’ 
alleged exploitation of the UK’s social welfare system (Allen 2016: 14). Right-wing groups 
were less measured in their opposition to mobility, especially by CEE nationals. Free 
movement was criticised as an ‘unrestricted right of movement to criminals’ (UKIP 2016) 
and a ‘free-for-all that doesn’t even stop convicted murderers from coming into the 
country’ (Vote Leave 2016; see also Leave.EU 2016). According to Farage, Romanians and 
Bulgarians had been ‘living like animals’, and so it would be expected of them to desire to 
live in a ‘civilised country’ like the UK (Bienkov 2013; see also UKIP undated). Such 
statements are in line with the historical anti-eastern western discourse and with 
institutional othering addressed in the preceding Chapters. Those who supported Brexit 
cited immigration as their most important worry, and were guided by identity and ethnicity 
concerns more than by economic ones (Kaufmann 2016). Notably, post-referendum 
studies have shown that voters’ support for Brexit was inversely related to EU movers’ 
presence in their communities (Sampson 2017), and hence likely motivated by negative 
attitudes rather than by practical concerns or negative experiences. While directing 
anxieties against non-white groups (other than Muslims) is perceived as socially 
unacceptable, it appears less condemnable against white minority ethnic groups217.  
 
Of course, anti-CEE Brexit climate appears to have emboldened public antipathy against 
all groups that are perceived as outsiders. There was a rise in reported hate crimes in the 
immediate aftermath of the referendum (Home Office 2017), with some well-publicised 
incidents committed against Poles (e.g., Dearden 2016) and against BAME individuals 
(UN OHCHR 2018)218. Although hate crimes are difficult to measure219, the 
                                                      
217 Notably, Gypsies and Travellers tend to be especially stigmatised.  
218 Anti-migrant, anti-foreigner rhetoric developed around the Brexit campaign became widespread and 
‘normalised’ in the UK, even among some high-ranking officials (UN OHCHR 2018). 
219 Hate crimes are often not reported by victims (HMICFRS 2018: 4). On the other hand, data collection 
has been benefiting from recent improvements in crime recording (Home Office 2018: 10).  
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policerecorded a spike in hate crimes after the referendum (Home Office 2017: 5-6) 220. 
Hate crimes gradually increased after the referendum campaign had begun, in April 2016, 
to reach a peak in the week after the 24th June referendum, before falling again in August, 
albeit remaining at a level higher than before the referendum (id). Similar spikes were 
recorded following terrorist attacks in London and Manchester in 2017221 (Home Office 
2018: 13-14). 
C. Existing Scholarship and Roadmap 
Academic analyses of the right to free movement have traditionally focused on black letter 
law at specific moments in time (e.g., Barnard 2013; Chalmers 2014; Craig and De Búrca 
2015; dal Pozzo 2013; Foster 2017; Szyszczak and Cygan 2008; Woods 2017). Some 
authors note that the right to free movement has always been limited (e.g., Barnard and 
Butlin 2018; Doherty 2016), especially due to ECJ decisions decreasing movers’ 
entitlements to social benefits (e.g., Zahn 2015) and tolerating Member States’ discretion 
in doing so as well222 (e.g., Dougan 2013; O’Brien 2015b). Moreover, many have noted the 
economic core of this right - including its continued focus on workers’ economic activities 
(e.g., Cook 2011; Peebles 1997; Tryfonidou 2009), and its links to the western capitalist 
appetite for cheap production sites and for an exploitable workforce (e.g., Dale and El-
Enany 2013).  
Scholarship specifically addressing CEE nationals’ mobility rights has tended to explain 
black letter law at the time of the Enlargement (e.g., van Elsuwege 2005), and the effects 
of mobility on both sending and host States (e.g., Dustmann and Preston 2018; Kahanec 
and Pytliková 2017; Recchi and Favell 2009) as well as on mobile CEE nationals (e.g., 
Botterill 2011; Ciupijus 2010). Dominant research considers the freedom of movement 
right as purely benefiting CEE workers (e.g., Budnik 2012). Critical scholars have 
acknowledged CEE workers’ exploitation in EU-15 States, but have tended to focus on 
quantitative studies of economic and migration trends (e.g., Favell 2008) or on interview-
based analyses of movers’ perceptions (e.g., Botterrill 2011; Ciupijus 2010). Some scholars 
have also critiqued post-accession transitional mobility limitations for undermining the 
concepts of equality and EU citizenship, and have questioned their validity under EU law - 
                                                      
220 On account of all measured grounds (race, religion, sexual orientation, disability, and transgender). 
221 At Westminster Bridge in March; Manchester Arena in May; and London Bridge in June (Home Office 
2018: 13-14). 
222 Member States have been increasingly treating even movers who are economically active as inactive, 
placing heavy burdens on workers to prove their entitlement to worker status, and designating work as 
‘marginal and ancillary’ simply due to being based on temporary contracts (O’Brien et al 2015: 8-11). 
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including TEU Article 18223 (e.g., Currie 2008), Article 15(2) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights224 (e.g., Kochenov 2003), and ECJ case law forbidding nationality 
discrimination of movers225 (e.g., Carrera 2005; Stalford 2003). Currie (2008: 201) argues 
that transitional derogations endowed CEE nationals with ‘second-class citizenship’, while 
responding to western needs for flexible labourers. According to Böröcz (2001: 27), they 
had transformed CEE states into ‘restricted-exit homelands or reservations’.  
 
I hope to add to such analyses by situating Poles’ mobility within the historical 
development of the freedom of movement right by various EU branches, and by seeking 
to connect it to pre-accession policies and discourse, and to data of the actual experiences 
of mobility. Below, I first provide an overview of the right to free movement and of 
ancillary regulations supporting it. I then describe pre-04 policies, and the context leading 
to the imposition of post-accession mobility derogations. Next, I address how EU-15 
States have directly and indirectly applied transitional measures, before explaining how the 
legal framework has been evolving over the last decade. Finally, I analyse mobile CEE 
workers’ experiences and their mobility’s effects, and contextualise them within my 
theoretical framework. In the conclusion, I explore connections between my findings in 
this Chapter, othering rhetoric discussed in the preceding Chapters, and inequalities 
experienced by Poland in the context of its accession, addressed in Chapter 3. Throughout 
the Chapter, in line with CRT tenets (as explained in Chapter 1), my aim is to explore how 
the conceptualisation and application of the law on free movement—steeped in myths of 
neutrality, liberty, and equality—might be perpetuating existing power differentials 
between east and west.  
2. Overview of the Right to Free Movement 
 
From the beginnings of the integration project, EU institutions recognised that, to 
facilitate the creation of the common market, workers had to be protected against 
nationality-based discrimination. Both the 1951 Paris Treaty (Article 69) and the 1957 
Treaty of Rome (Articles 7 and 48) prohibited discrimination in employment between 
domestic workers and movers226. The 1993 Maastricht Treaty extended the right of entry 
and residence without discrimination to all EU citizens, reiterated by the Free Movement 
                                                      
223Prohibiting, ‘within the scope of application of the Treaties, … any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality’.  
224 ‘Every citizen of the Union has the freedom to seek employment, to work … in any Member State’. 
225 Joined Cases C-502/01 and C-31/02, Silke Gaumain-Cerri v Kaufmännische Krankenkasse—Pflegekasse, 
and Maria Barth v Landesversicherungsanstalt Rheinprovinz. 
226 The right may be limited directly, however, for reasons of public security, public policy, or public health, 
and in the context of employment in the public sector (EC Treaty, Article 39(3)). 
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Directive 2004/38227. The ECJ defines movers’ equality rights broadly - to include ‘all 
rights or benefits which in any way impact on the ability … to exercise the right to move 
and reside’ in other Member States228. Prohibitions pertain to not only direct 
discrimination (being treated less favourably than another due to nationality)229, but also 
indirect discrimination230. Thus, even criteria applicable irrespective of nationality can be 
found impermissibly discriminatory (unless they satisfy the proportionality test) if they are 
liable to place workers at a ‘particular disadvantage’231. For example, a language 
requirement disproportionate in relation to the job’s requirements, which is more easily 
satisfied by host country’s nationals than by movers, has been found impermissible232.  
 
EU institutions’ prohibition of discrimination against mobile workers appears to have 
been guided by broad economic goals, rather than by concerns with improving workers’ 
wellbeing. For example, while strengthening the links between EU citizenship and movers’ 
equality, the ECJ has often referred to arguments about labour needs in EU-15 States233. 
Moreover, the Commission has explicitly noted that its support for anti-discrimination 
measures is not grounded in human rights, but rather, was intended to reduce employers’ 
use of worker exploitation as ‘an instrument of competition’, which would inhibit the EU’s 
economic success234 (Commission 1993: 69). This is in line with Bell’s (1980) observation 
that steps to promote equality tend to be taken when they benefit the dominant group. 
The freedom of movement right is inherently linked to the right to reside abroad, and to 
having equal access to social and tax advantages (Commission undated b). After all, one is 
less likely to move if her residence rights and access to social benefits in a host State are 
not secure. EC Treaty mandates that all mobile EU citizens are entitled to equal treatment 
with respect to all benefits (which includes social and tax advantages) falling within the 
scope of EU law (Article 17). Consistently supported and expanded through ECJ 
                                                      
227 Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ 2004, L 158/77. 
228 Case C-135/99, Elsen v Bundesversicherungsandstalt fur Angestellte [2000] ECR I-10409. 
229 E.g., Case-42/02, Lindman [2003] ECR I-13519. 
230 Case C-152/73, Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost. 
231 Case C-237/94, John O’Fynn v Adjudication Officer. 
232 Case C-379/87, Groener v Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational Educational 
Committee. 
233 E.g., Case C-86/96, Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691; Case C-274/96, Criminal 
proceedings against H O Bickel and U Franz [1998] ECR I-7637; Case C-184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v le 
Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193; Case C-224/98, Marie-
Nathalie D’Hoop v Office national d’emploi [2002] ECR I-1691; Case C-413/99, Baumbast. 
234 Similarly, scholars have argued that the EU has supported gender equality to promote employers’ 
economic interests (e.g., Debusscher 2015).  
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decisions235, these rights have been reaffirmed through several market-enabling legislations, 
pertaining to: 
- Coordination of social security benefits: Regulation 1408/71236 (replaced by 
Regulation 883/2004237) facilitates coordination of movers’ social security 
benefits. 
 
- Social and tax advantages: Regulation 1612/68238 (amended by Directive 
2004/38, and replaced by Regulation 492/2011) mandates equality of mobile 
workers and jobseekers in access to training, housing, social and tax 
advantages (Articles 7-9), and access to jobseekers’ assistance (Article 5).  
 
- Residence rights: Directive 360/68239 required receiving States to recognise movers’ 
right of residence (Article 4(1)). It was replaced by Directive 2004/38, which 
provides all EU citizens with the right of free movement and residence across the 
EU, as long as they have comprehensive sickness insurance (Article 7(1)) and do 
not pose an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the host’s social welfare system (Article 
14(1)). The right to reside for longer than three months, however, is granted only 
to workers, legitimate jobseekers240, and those with ‘sufficient resources’ not to 
become a burden on the social assistance system of the receiving State (Article 7).  
 
Despite strengthening the free movement right, Directive 2004/38 endowed 
Member States with greater discretion than had been available previously to limit 
movers’ access to residence rights. For example, States now have discretion not to 
confer any social assistance benefits during movers’ first three months of 
residence, even if they are workers (Article 24). Moreover, determining ‘sufficient 
resources’ is a fact-intensive individualised process, to be made at the host State’s 
discretion (Article 8). A State may also expel movers who have not become 
permanent residents yet (status available after five years of residence (Article 16)) if 
                                                      
235 E.g., Case C-237/94, O’Flynn; Case C-337/97, Meeusen v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer 
Groep [1999]; Case C-212/05, Hartmann v Freistaat Bayern [2007]; Case C-527/06, Renneberg v 
Staatssecretaris van Financiën [2008]. 
236 Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security 
schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community.  
237 Regulation 883/2004 of the European Parliament and Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of 
social security systems mandates the coordination of social security benefits systems, without harmonising 
them, so that States decide on the types and amounts of benefits to be granted. It pertains to social security 
(contributory) benefits, and special non-contributory cash benefits (‘SNCB’) only. 
238 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers 
within the Community. 
239 Council Directive 360/68, Abolition of Restrictions on Movement and Residence, OJ L 257. 
240 Those who can demonstrate a genuine chance of getting engaged (as defined per ECJ case law). 
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they become an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the host’s social assistance system 
(Article 14). The ECJ has increasingly interpreted ‘sufficient resources’ and 
‘unreasonable burden’ provisions as to endow host States with greater discretion to 
impede mobility241. As intra-EU mobility has been mostly from east to west, all 
these discretionary provisions have served primarily to protect EU-15 States. 
Moreover, provisions tied to ‘sufficient resources’ have likely served as a greater 
impediment to CEE than EU-15 movers, due to CEE states’ lower GDPs (as 
discussed below). 
 
3. The Context Leading to the Imposition of Transitional Derogations 
 
A. Poles’ Access to EU States Before 2004 
Before the Enlargement, Poles’ right to work or reside in EU Member States was severely 
limited. In addition to an essential ban under Communism on Poles’ ability to leave242, they 
were required until 2001 to obtain a visa to enter Schengen countries243 (Düvell 2004). The 
1989 Agreement on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation entered into by 
the EEC, existing Member States, and Poland244, focused on just that—trade, commercial, 
and economic cooperation—with no mention of mobility. The 1991 Europe Agreement 
approached Polish workers akin to TCNs and did not provide them with any degree of 
mobility. Despite the Agreement’s liberalisation of the movement of capital, goods, and 
services, its section on the ‘Movement of Workers, Establishment, Supply of Services’ did 
not even mention free movement of persons (Title IV). Instead, Member States were 
permitted to continue applying their domestic immigration rules to Poles, although they 
were not permitted to make them more demanding than they had been at the time of 
signing the Europe Agreement (Article 41).  
 
Thus, Poles lawfully residing in EU-15 States before 2004 were there pursuant to a few 
national regimes and ad hoc bilateral agreements that permitted temporary-worker 
schemes and responded to specific employer needs245, as refugees, or as family members of 
EU nationals. Data regarding their numbers is not precise. For example, Poland’s Central 
                                                      
241 See discussion of cases such as Brey, Dano, Alimanovic, and Garcia-Nieto in Section 5 below. 
242 Despite prohibitions on leaving, however, more than two million Poles left clandestinely between 1950 
and 1992 (Dustmann et al 2012). 
243 All EU countries other than the UK and Ireland. 
244 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Polish People’s Republic on trade and 
commercial and economic cooperation, 22.11.1989, OJEU L 339. Other CEE states entered into similar 
agreements.  
245 For example, since the early 1990s, Poland had agreements with Germany for trainees and posted 
workers, and a special regime for border regions – all tied to German labour market needs, and permitting 
small quotas of temporary workers. 
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Statistics Office registered more than 125,000 Poles as official emigrants246 to the EU 
between 1991 and 2000 (Grabowska-Lusinska 2008: 248-9), and 451,000 Poles as either 
temporary247 or long-term migrants to the EU in 2002 (Okólski and Salt 2014). Such 
statistics, of course, do not adequately capture all short-term migrants, and overlook 
undocumented migrants. This restricted pre-accession entry regime resulted in Polish 
migrants in the EU being largely undocumented, mostly male, often exploited, and heavily 
engaged in temporary migration248 (Ciupijus 2011; see also Gozdziak and Pawlak 2016). 
 
Poles who managed to lawfully reside in EU States prior to 2004 had their equality rights 
protected by EU institutions. Under the Europe Agreement (Article 37(1)), those lawfully 
employed in Member States in accordance with domestic immigration laws249 were entitled 
to protection from nationality-based discrimination in the employment context, and could 
be joined by their families. According to Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, this provision had a direct 
effect, so Polish workers could rely on it before national courts250. Moreover, its scope was 
deemed identical to equality rights conferred on EU-15 nationals under EU law251. Hence, 
the ECJ struck down a German regulation allowing positions for foreign-language 
assistants to be filled through fixed-term contracts, whereas for other teaching staff, 
recourse to such contracts had to be individually justified252. In Kolpak253, the Court 
concluded that a German sports federation rule authorising clubs to field only a limited 
number of players from among TCNs could not be applied to lawfully employed CEE 
athletes. Despite the ECJ’s broad application of Europe Agreements’ non-discrimination 
clauses, they were of little practical impact, however, because the Agreements applied to so 
few categories of CEE nationals. They did not apply to economically inactive persons, 
jobseekers, or posted workers254. They also did not apply to those engaged in informal 
work arrangements, which has been popular among Poles (Kubal 2012: 52-6; Ciupijus 
2011)255.  
 
                                                      
246 This includes only those who cancel their Polish domicile prior to departure, a requirement rarely 
complied with. 
247 Those who have been staying in a foreign country (at the time of measurement) for at least three months, 
yet retain their official domicile in Poland. 
248 With the exception of post-war Polish military personnel settled in the UK, as mentioned in Chapter 6. 




253 Case C-438/00, Deutscher Handballbund eV v Kolpak, ECLI:EU:C:2003:255. 
254 Posted workers have been governed by a separate legal regime.  
255 Self-employed Poles relied on non-discrimination provisions under Europe Agreement’s establishment 
clause (Title IV), but only if they could demonstrate sufficient financial resources. Case C-37/98, The Queen 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ECLI:EU:C:2000:224. 
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None of the Europe Agreements with CEE states addressed social benefits, other than 
coordinating social security systems for workers256. As TCNs, CEE migrants were not 
endowed with access to social benefits in EU-15 States. The only TCNs to whom 
Regulations 1408/71 and 1612/68 applied were family members of EU citizens257. During 
the 1990s, the Commission had made several proposals to extend social security 
protections to TCNs lawfully employed in the EU (e.g., Commission 1991, 1997d), but 
none garnered sufficient support to come to fruition.  
 
While CEE nationals had little access to lawful migration to the EU, mobility rights for 
both workers258 and economically inactive259 individuals from EU-15 States were getting 
expanded through regulations and ECJ decisions. EU-15 nationals’ access to social 
benefits was also receiving progressively more expansive treatment260. The ECJ would 
often draw on Treaty provisions regarding non-discrimination and, post-Maastricht, on the 
concept of EU citizenship to sidestep some of the limitations on mobility imposed by 
secondary legislation261.  
B. EU Institutions’ Approach Towards Poles’ Mobility   
Although EU institutions did not give the possibility of Poles’ mobility much thought 
when formalising Polish-EU relations soon after the fall of Communism in 1989, they did 
not support transitional mobility derogations. Notably, this approach was justified by 
economic and pragmatic, as opposed to human rights, considerations. By the late 1990s, 
the Commission had deemed any post-accession mobility restrictions to be unnecessary to 
                                                      
256 For example, Article 38 of the Europe Agreement with Poland. 
257 And refugees under Regulation 1408/71. 
258 E.g., Regulation 1612/68; Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions on 
movement and residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families; Case 
48/75, Royer, ECLI:EU:C:1976:57; Case 53/81, Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:1982:105; 
Case 66/85, Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg, ECLI:EU:C:1986:284; Case 139/85, Kempf v 
Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:1986:223; Case 196/87, Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:475; Case C-344/95, Commission v Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1997:81; Case C-86/96, 
Martínez Sala; Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, ECLI:EU:C:1999:126; Case C-
337/97, Meeusen; Case C-413/99 Baumbast; Case C-413/01, Ninni-Orasche v Bundesminister für 
Wissenschaft, Verkehr und Kunst, ECLI:EU:C:2003:600. 
259 E.g., Directive 68/360; Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence; Directive 
93/96/EEC of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students; Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 
1990 on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational 
activity; Case 48/75, Royer; Case C-292/89, Antonissen, ECLI:EU:C:1991:80; Case C-224/98, D’Hoop; 
Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk; Case C-413/99, Baumbast.  
260 See, e.g., Regulation 1612/68; Case 249/83, Hoeckx v Openbaar Centrum voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn, 
ECLI: EU:C:1985:139; Case 137/84, Mutsch, ECLI:EU:C:1985:335; Case C-175/88, Biehl v Administration 
des contributions du grand-duché de Luxembourg, ECLI:EU:C:1990:186; Case C-237/94, O’Flynn; Case C-
86/96, Martínez Sala; Case C-337/97, Meeusen; Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk; Case C-209/03, R (Bidar) v 
London Borough of Ealing, ECLI:EU:C:2005:169.  
261 E.g., Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk; Case C-413/99, Baumbast; Case C-224/98, D’Hoop. 
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protect EU-15 States’ economic interests due to predictions of low262, mostly temporary 
(Morawska 2000) mobility of well-educated CEE workers (Byrska 2004: 3). Moreover, as 
discussed in the preceding Chapter, EU institutions might have felt entrapped into 
endowing CEE nationals with mobility due to their occasionally inclusive rhetoric 
(Schimmelfennig 2001). 
 
Leading up to the Enlargement, various studies predicted that EU-15 States would benefit 
economically from CEE workers’ mobility, which was anticipated to alleviate bottlenecks 
in the labour market, boost demand for goods, lower wage inflation, and address labour 
needs of ageing populations (Boeri and Brücker 2005; Jileva 2002; Stalford 2003). In fact, 
scholars predicted that States with the greatest influx of CEE movers would reap the 
greatest economic benefits (e.g., Heuser 2001). Some even argued that an influx of CEE 
workers was necessary for continued western economic growth (Stalford 2003). CEE 
workers were predicted to only pose a potential labour threat to TCNs, and forecasts that 
they might disadvantage unskilled EU-15 workers were uncertain (e.g., Boeri and Brücker 
2005). Even western labour organisations – including the Association of the German 
Chambers of Industry and Commerce (Jileva 2002: 692), the European Trade Union 
Confederation, and the Union of Industrial and Employer’s Confederations of Europe 
(EP 2006: 232) - supported unrestrained CEE mobility due to its anticipated benefits to 
EU-15 labour markets263. 
 
One of the earliest indications by the Commission that post-accession derogations might 
be employed came in its 1995 report to the Madrid European Council. The Commission 
(1997c: 71), however, recommended that any such restrictions be limited in scope and 
duration. Notably, although the Commission continued to question mobility derogations 
until a few years before the Enlargement, it never acknowledged any conceptual difficulties 
with withholding this right from CEE nationals. Instead, it focused on economic and 
pragmatic reasons only: expecting transitional arrangements to be ineffective 
(Commission, European Report 2001; Commission 2000) and difficult to negotiate with 
the CEE states, and forecasting CEE mobility to benefit EU-15 economies (Commission, 
Info Note 2001).  
 
                                                      
262 Despite some inconsistencies (Byrska 2004; Kvist 2004) - attributable to differing methodologies - almost 
all studies predicted low migration flows without mobility restrictions: of between 41,000 and 335,000 CEE 
movers per year in the first few years following the Enlargement, and long-term movement of no more than 
2 or 4 million (e.g., Alvarez-Plata et al 2003; Commission 2002b; Commission, Info Note 2001). This was 
lower than the expected post-04 inflows of TCNs and EU-15 movers (Lang 2007). 
263 Discrimination of workers constitutes an economic market distortion as employers overlook certain 
groups’ skills, leading to an inefficient use of human capital, wage distortions, and depressed wages (Milgrom 
and Oster 1987). 
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In addition to responding to public fears in EU-15 States (addressed below), social and 
identity concerns might help to explain the Commission’s eventual support of transitional 
restrictions. According to Dougan (2004), the Commission perceived CEE mobility as a 
threat to (western) civil solidarity. Both the western public’s and EU institutions’ anxieties 
might have been driven at least in part by the fact that the population of CEE states264 on 
the eve of their accession amounted to 74 million, close to 19% of the EU’s pre-04 
population. Apprehensions about this potential influx were likely stoked by westerners’ 
increasing perceptions that their dominant ethnicities’ privileged status and identity have 
been under threat due to globalisation and an economic slow-down (Kaufmann 2004: 1-
12). Similar anxieties appear to have fuelled Brexit supporters’ opposition to CEE movers 
(Kaufmann 2016), and the rise of right-wing, anti-immigrant parties throughout western 
Europe in recent years265. 
 
After the Enlargement, the Commission continued to question the imposition of 
transitional derogations, but again, its critique was dominated by economic concerns – that 
is, the beneficial impact of CEE workers on western economies (e.g., Commission 2006c; 
2008b). Whereas the Commission’s critique of transitional measures tended to privilege 
EU-15 States’ economic priorities, the European Parliament had at times looked beyond 
the western gaze. For example, it noted that mobility restrictions not only contradicted the 
principle of solidarity between western and CEE states, but also constituted ‘a major 
contributory factor’ to CEE movers’ frequently illicit employment, and experience of 
exploitation and discrimination (EP 2006: 5-6)266. Such EU acknowledgements have been 
rare, however. Generally, EU institutions have tended to oppose mobility derogations due 
to interest convergence between CEE workers’ mobility and the economic growth of EU-
15 States. 
 
In addition to generally not finding legal or conceptual difficulties with mobility 
restrictions, EU institutions have at times justified them as benevolent and helpful to CEE 
states and their nationals. For example, despite having supported the inclusion of the 
freedom of movement right in the Europe Agreements (EE&SC 1991), the Economic and 
Social Committee opposed post-accession CEE workers’ mobility because it feared 
xenophobic reactions in EU-15 States against CEE nationals (EE&SC 2001: § 1.1). The 
                                                      
264 Restrictions on the mobility of those from Malta and Cyprus (which had replaced Bulgaria and Romania 
in the 2004 accession negotiations) were never considered, likely due to their small populations and high 
GDPs (Maas 2013: 96-7). 
265 Including Dutch Freedom Party, Danish People’s Party, National Democratic Party of Germany, 
National Front in France, Freedom Party in Austria, and UKIP.  
266 The Parliament did not explain how it drew this link. 
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Commission also emphasised that mobility restrictions would help to prevent labour 
shortages and brain drain in CEE states (Dougan 2004). In line with CRT tenets, EU 
institutions demonstrated how vacuous legal norms can be, and how they might in fact 
perpetuate inequalities. 
C. EU-15 States’ Approach Towards Poles’ Mobility 
Whereas EU institutions, motivated by economic goals, have tended to support the 
extension of the free movement right to CEE workers, western citizenry has opposed it 
(as discussed earlier). This is perhaps not surprising given that it is on the national, rather 
than the supranational, level that polities come into contact with migrants. Western fears 
of CEE migration were voiced as soon as the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 (Currie 2008: 13), 
crumbling the physical and ideological barriers between east and west. In 1991, 63% of 
EU citizens polled wished to restrict CEE migration, and 20% desired to ban it altogether 
(Eurobarometer 1991). By the late 1990s, the western public (particularly in Germany, and 
Austria267) began to express concerns about an ‘invasion’ by CEE criminals and prostitutes 
(Haynes 1998). For example, the chief of the German police union proclaimed that the 
lifting of border controls with Poland was ‘an invitation to criminals’ (Johnstone 2007). 
Kvist (2004) argues that westerners feared CEE nationals’ negative effects on EU-15 
States’ cultures and identities. Nearing the time of the Enlargement, 76% of EU-15 
nationals surveyed who expected a ‘considerable’ influx of post-accession movers regarded 
it as a ‘negative’ development (Eurobarometer 2002). Moreover, almost half of EU-15 
nationals surveyed did expect such a ‘considerable’ influx (id). The assumption that CEE 
nationals would naturally prefer to move to western States was likely reinforced by 
perceptions of western superiority. Such attitudes have also been linked to anti-CEE 
prejudices (e.g., Byrska 2004: 4).  
 
Likely driven by these electoral pressures, many EU-15 politicians came to oppose post-
accession CEE mobility, notwithstanding western labour shortages at the time. In 1998, 
the German ambassador to the Commission noted that EU-15 States would oppose Poles’ 
mobility (Haynes 1998). By 2000, German Chancellor Schröeder proposed a seven-year 
transitional period (Jileva 2002: 694). This is despite the fact that Germany was expected to 
receive approximately 45,000 CEE workers annually during the first few years after 
accession 268, while it required an annual inflow of more than 300,000 workers to keep a 
stable working-age population (Commission, Info Note 2001). Western politicians’ 
                                                      
267 Likely fuelled in part by their geographical proximity to the CEE region. 
268 Considerably exceeded by annual inflows of ethnic Germans, asylees, and TCNs (Oezcan 2004). 
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opposition to CEE mobility is also in line with their use of migration as a scapegoat for 
the failures of the political market and of neoliberal economic policies, which have been 
driving the rise of right-wing populism across Europe (Malone 2014). On the other hand, 
UK politicians tended to support CEE nationals’ mobility. This was likely driven by the 
significant labour gaps in the UK at the time (Currie 2007: 106). I contend that the UK’s 
geographical distance from the CEE region might have also played a part.  
 
Leading up to the Enlargement, public opposition to CEE mobility increased across 
western States. Many trade unions, the press, and the public focused on unsubstantiated 
fears of benefit tourism and social dumping269 (Byrska 2004). In response, western 
governments intensified their support of derogations (Dougan 2004) to provisions 
pertaining to mobility and to social and tax advantages (Kubal 2012: 74-6). Notably, some 
western politicians also argued that limiting labour market access would benefit CEE 
nationals themselves, by protecting them from employer exploitation in EU-15 States 
(Morawska 2000). This is reminiscent of the Economic and Social Committee’s support of 
mobility restrictions to avoid xenophobic reactions in EU-15 States, as mentioned above. 
Through such attitudes, western leaders acknowledged—without condemning—the 
likelihood of racism against CEE movers. Shared race did not protect CEE nationals from 
such exclusion. Whiteness scholars (e.g., Garner 2007b; Levine-Rasky 2013) have noted 
the need for a more nuanced look at fractures and hierarchies within whiteness. 
Widespread western opposition to CEE movers, both before the Enlargement and since, 
illustrates just how closely circumscribed the privileged subgroup of whites can be, 
composed of only the ethnic group in power at a given time and place.  
D. Transitional Mobility Derogations  
Although EU citizenship has always been differentiated, workers have traditionally been 
privileged over those who are economically inactive. The Eastern Enlargement temporarily 
reversed that hierarchy in the context of CEE nationals. The 2003 Accession Treaty 
provisions pertaining to each of the CEE states expressly blocked270 the application of EC 
Treaty Article 39(2), which had abolished discrimination against movers in the context of 
employment. Member States could derogate for up to seven years from Articles 1 through 
6 of Regulation 1612/68 (pertaining to workers’ mobility), and from provisions of 
Directive 68/360 (pertaining to mobile workers’ residence rights)271. Transitional 
                                                      
269 Moving employer sites to the east or relying heavily on CEE workers, thus leading to worsening working 
conditions for all workers. 
270 E.g., Accession Treaty, Annex XII, ¶ 2(1). 
271 E.g., id, ¶ 2(2). 
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restrictions also limited workers’ families’ access to EU-15 labour markets272. The 
Accession Treaty (and its legislative history) were silent about residence and citizenship 
rights, and did not offer any justification for these derogations. In effect, these restrictions 
reinforced a sense of commonality among EU-15 nationals, while differentiating those 
from the CEE region. Since, among CEE states, Poland had the largest population and the 
greatest number of its nationals living unlawfully273 in EU-15 States pre-accession, and a 
strong culture of emigration, mobility restrictions posed especially significant practical and 
symbolic effects for Poland. 
 
As Currie (2008: 31) notes, these transitional derogations ‘by their very nature [were] 
designed to protect the interests of the older Member States’. This approach is in line with 
the accession process, addressed in the preceding Chapter. EU-15 States were provided 
wide discretion in restricting CEE workers’ mobility during the seven-year transitional 
period. For the first two years after accession, EU-15 States could continue to apply their 
pre-accession national measures, as long as they were not more restrictive than those in 
force on the day of signing the Accession Treaty274, and as long as employers gave priority 
to EU workers (including CEE workers) over TCNs275. EU-15 States were free to make 
their national measures more restrictive up to that date – and many in fact did, as 
discussed below. The requirement that employers prefer EU over TCN workers had 
limited practical implications because it could be satisfied by favouring only EU-14 
applicants over TCNs.  
 
Before the end of the initial two-year phase, the Council was to ‘review’ the functioning of 
Member States’ transitional arrangements. This process was not explained in the Acts of 
Accession. It had no binding effect, however, and the Council did not have the power to 
terminate national policies (Byrska 2004: 10-12). In practice, Member States could decide 
unilaterally to continue imposing their national measures during the second (three-year) 
phase, after simply notifying the Commission once the Council had completed its 
review276. Thereafter, States that had been applying restrictive measures had the discretion 
to continue applying them for two additional years ‘in case of serious disturbances’ of their 
labour markets or merely in response to ‘a threat thereof’, after notifying the 
                                                      
272 This treatment was likely in conflict with ECJ ruling that mobility restrictions in an accession treaty must 
be interpreted restrictively. See Case C-77/82, Peskeloglou v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, ECLI:EU:C:1983:92. 
273 The status of CEE nationals residing unlawfully in EU-15 States became regularised upon accession. 
274 E.g., Accession Treaty, Annex XII, ¶ 14. 
275 E.g., id., ¶ 2. 
276 E.g., id., ¶ 3. 
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Commission277. No prior authorisation by any EU body was required, and neither the 
Commission’s role nor the concept of ‘serious disturbances’ was ever clarified (Adinolfi 
2005: 493). It was not even clear whether a ‘serious disturbance’ should have been directly 
related to an actual or just an expected increase in immigration (Fic et al 2011: 69). 
 
In addition, any Member State that had not initially applied transitional restrictions could 
request, at any point before the end of the seven-year period, that the Commission 
authorise mobility restrictions. This provision applied if a Member State had experienced 
labour market disturbances or could simply foresee them, if such disturbances ‘could 
seriously threaten the standard of living or the level of employment in a given region or 
occupation’278. Any restrictions authorised under this provision could be in place until the 
situation was restored to ‘normal’279. Again, none of the key terms were defined. Moreover, 
in ‘urgent and exceptional’ cases, Member States could unilaterally suspend the application 
of the free movement acquis at any point before the end of the seven-year period280. In the 
end, none of these provisions were applied in the aftermath of the 2004 Enlargement281, 
but they indicated how much leeway EU institutions were willing to provide to EU-15 
States in undermining CEE nationals’ right of free movement. 
 
Transitional mobility restrictions are not challengeable under EU law. Article 18 of the EC 
Treaty allows the adoption of measures limiting the free movement right282. Moreover, the 
ECJ did not have jurisdiction to challenge derogations’ legality because they were an 
integral part of the Accession Treaty, which constitutes primary law283. Of course, since 
provisions limiting the freedom of movement right must be interpreted strictly284, the 
Commission could have brought infringement procedures against any Member for 
imposing overly broad direct mobility restrictions. No such procedures were initiated. 
 
Mobility derogations applied only to workers285 and jobseekers. However, access to 
mobility of other types of CEE nationals was severely impeded. For example, 
                                                      
277 E.g., id., ¶ 5. 
278 E.g., id., ¶ 7. 
279 E.g., id. 
280 E.g., id. 
281 Spain relied on the ‘serious disturbance’ clause to impose restrictions in July 2011 on Romanian nationals 
due to Spain’s unemployment rate of 21%. The decision was subsequently legitimated by the Commission. 
282 ‘Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures 
adopted to give it effect’. 
283 See Cases C-31/86 and 35/86, Levantina Agricola Industrial SA v Council, ECLI:EU:C:1988:211.  
284 Case C-55/94, Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-
4165. 
285 Except posted workers. They are beyond the scope of my discussion, however, since they rely on the 
freedom of movement of services and do not directly enter host States’ labour markets. 
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economically inactive individuals, retirees, and students had to demonstrate financial self-
sufficiency and sickness insurance to access mobility. Since the concept of self-sufficiency 
is tied to the living standard in the host State, it would have been inherently difficult for 
CEE nationals to satisfy this test, given the economic and wage differentials between CEE 
and western States. Mobility derogations also did not apply to self-employed persons. 
Although legally not a very onerous standard to meet, as discussed below, becoming self-
employed requires financial resources and familiarity with local markets. These hurdles 
would have been difficult for CEE nationals to overcome, due to economic reasons and 
their limited ability to reside in EU-15 States before 2004. Transitional measures also did 
not apply to CEE nationals who had been working lawfully in EU-15 States for an 
uninterrupted period of at least twelve months prior to accession, as long as they did not 
move to another Member State within the first twelve months after accession286. The rights 
of such workers, however, could be limited at the discretion of the host State287. Moreover, 
this provision carried little practical significance given how few CEE nationals had access 
to lawful employment opportunities before the Enlargement. Moreover, their propensity 
to engage in short-term migration (Stalford 2003: 4) and informal employment (Kubal 
2012: 121-5) likely caused many of them to lack an uninterrupted twelve-month period of 
work. Thus, in comparison to workers and jobseekers, the types of CEE nationals to 
whom transitional derogations did not apply constituted a small number of potential 
movers, were less eligible for public benefits, and were less likely to remain permanently in 
the receiving States. Hence, they likely provoked fewer concerns among western publics 
and western politicians. 
 
On the basis of reciprocity, CEE states were permitted to limit labour market access to 
EU-15 nationals288, via equivalent measures that EU-15 States had imposed on their 
nationals289. The practical effect of this measure would have been negligible, however, as it 
is doubtful that EU-15 nationals would have had much interest in moving to Poland in 
search of work, particularly given its lower wages and high unemployment rate in the run-
up to accession, as addressed in the preceding Chapter. As Dougan (2004) notes, giving 
such a reciprocal right was merely a strategic move on the part of the EU, to enhance the 
perception that CEE states were equal partners during the accession process – which had 
                                                      
286 E.g., Accession Treaty, Annex XII, ¶ 2. 
287 For example, pursuant to the UK’s Worker Registration Scheme, CEE movers would lose their right to 
residence if they did not maintain continuous registered employment for twelve months after their arrival, as 
addressed in Section 4(E) below. 
288 CEE states could also impose restrictions against labour movement from any other CEE state against 
which any EU-15 State had imposed restrictions. None applied this provision. 
289 E.g., Accession Treaty, Annex XII, ¶ 10. 
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been anything but equal, as my discussion in the preceding Chapter indicates. Only 
Slovenia, Hungary, and Poland imposed reciprocal measures, on all EU-15 States that had 
applied transitional measures to them290. Since there were very few EU-15 workers 
interested in employment in CEE states, all three renounced such measures two years after 
accession (Lang 2007).  
 
E. Comparison to Mobility Restrictions During Earlier Enlargements 
During prior enlargements, the freedom of movement right did not provoke much 
controversy, particularly since mobility had been low historically. The first enlargement 
incorporated Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973, adding 64 million 
people to the pre-existing 209 million, the highest ever relative increase (31%) of the EU’s 
population (see Table 1, below). Despite economic concerns caused by the oil crisis, and 
Dutch and French worries about disruptions to their labour markets, no mobility 
restrictions were imposed. Of course, the pre-Maastricht scope of the free movement right 
was much narrower than it was in 2004. During the 1995 enlargement that included 
Austria, Sweden, and Finland, free-movement rules were already applicable to the acceding 
states before accession291, despite adding 29 million new EU citizens, an increase of 8% 
(id).  
 
Although every accession had produced some economic concerns in the pre-existing 
Member States, transitional mobility restrictions had been imposed only once before 2004. 
During the Southern Enlargement, mobility derogations were applied for six years to 
Greek nationals (in 1981), and for seven years292 to those from Spain and Portugal (in 
1986). At the time, there were no labour shortages in the old Member States (Boeri et al 
2002), so it is understandable why they were hesitant to open their doors to 58 million new 
citizens (an increase of the EU by 21%).  
The mobility derogations imposed during the Eastern Enlargement appear less warranted 
and more restrictive than during the Southern Enlargement. Although CEE states 
acceding in 2004 added 74 million new citizens to the EU, and thus expanded its 
population by 19% (and the 2007 wave added another 29 million, a further 6% population 
increase) (see Table 1), EU-15 States were experiencing labour shortages at the time. 
                                                      
290 Thus, Poland allowed British, Swedish, and Irish nationals to work freely in Poland, but imposed work-
permit restrictions on all other EU-15 nationals. 
291 Pursuant to the European Economic Area Agreement. 
292 Movers from Spain and Portugal were required to first obtain work permits from host States. During each 
year of the transitional period, approximately 1,000 Spanish and 6,000 Portuguese workers obtained such 
permits. The transitional period was shortened to six years after Council review concluded that free 
movement was not likely to cause labour market disruptions. 
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Moreover, mobility restrictions after the Eastern Enlargement are at odds with the post-
Maastricht expansion of EU citizenship and of free-movement rights293, and with the 
borderless Schengen Area created through the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty. In addition, 
predictions about unrestricted mobility’s economic benefits to the receiving States and 
about the lack of effectiveness of transitional measures were well substantiated during this 
Enlargement, unlike during the Southern accession (Boeri et al 2002: 49-54). Accession of 
countries from the east appears to have been particularly problematic to the western 
European psyche. Notably, at the insistence of EU-15 States, they were given the 
flexibility to apply unique domestic restrictions, unlike during the Southern Enlargement, 
when all but one294 of the Member States adopted identical transitional policies (Kvist 
2004: 311). This might be indicative of just how much anxiety CEE mobility had provoked 
among western publics and politicians.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of Enlargements and Free Movement Restrictions 
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293 Maastricht Treaty (Article 8) established EU citizenship. Available to all nationals of all the Member 
States, it encompasses the freedom of movement and residence rights. 
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Sources: Eurostat (2018); author’s calculations.  
 
 
4. Mobility During the Transitional Period 
 
A. EU-15 Workers’ Mobility Rights  
While mobility rights of CEE workers were restricted between 2004 and 2011, they were 
getting expanded for EU-15 nationals. Existing regulations and case law pertaining to 
mobility and residence rights were consolidated and replaced by Directive 2004/38 (the 
‘Free Movement Directive’), which was adopted two days before the 2004 Enlargement. 
The Directive strengthened substantive and procedural safeguards available to movers, 
and expanded the right to reside in other Member States to all EU citizens for up to three 
months without any formalities or conditions (Article 6). Moreover, the Directive 
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extended the right to be joined by family members to all mobile EU citizens (Article 3), 
and granted a new right of permanent residence after five years of lawful residence 
(Articles 16-17).  
 
Under Directive 2004/38, workers (including self-employed individuals) have an automatic 
right to reside in other Member States for longer than three months, without any 
conditions (Article 7(1)). The ECJ has defined the concept of a ‘worker’ broadly295, as 
engaging in any ‘effective’ and ‘genuine’ employment activity, which is more than purely 
marginal and ancillary296. The ECJ does not require minimum working hours or wages297, 
and does not expect workers to be self-supporting without any public assistance298. Thus, 
those employed under fixed-term or training contracts or in part-time work can qualify as 
workers. Relying on the host State’s social security system to supplement insufficient 
income does not prevent such individuals from qualifying as workers – even if their main 
aim of securing work in a host State was to obtain access to its public assistance299. From 
day one of qualifying as a worker, equal access to the host State’s social security benefits300 
(Regulation 883/2004, Article 3), social and tax advantages301 (Regulation 1612/68, Article 
7(2)), and social assistance (Directive 2004/38, Article 24(2)) follows. The ECJ has 
supported workers’ receipt of all these benefits302. 
Like all economically non-active groups, those who enter another Member State to seek 
employment must demonstrate being self-sufficient and having sickness insurance 
(Directive 2004/38, Article 7(1)). Article 14(4)(b) prohibits first-time jobseekers’ expulsion, 
however, as long as they are deemed to have a ‘genuine chance’ of finding employment – 
that is, demonstrate some prospects of finding employment, even after having been 
seeking employment for more than six months303. This protection from expulsion has 
been interpreted by the ECJ as providing first-time jobseekers with the right to reside in 
other Member States without having to prove self-sufficiency304. The ECJ supports this 
                                                      
295 Case C-456/02, Trojani v Centre public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles, ECLI:EU:C: 2004:488. 
296 Case C-53/81, Levin; Case C-413/01, Ninni-Orasche. 
297 Even fewer than 5.5 hours per week have been found sufficient. Case C-14/09, Genc, 4 February 2010. 
298 Case C-139/85, Kempf. 
299 Such actions do not constitute fraud or abuse under Article 35 of Directive 2004/38. See C-413/01, 
Ninni-Orasche. 
300 These are contributory benefits (including old-age pensions, survivor’s pensions, disability benefits, 
sickness benefits, birth grants, unemployment benefits, family allowances, and healthcare benefits), and 
special non-contributory cash benefits (such as income support or jobseeker’s allowance) (Regulation 
883/2004, Article 3). Non-contributory benefits fall outside the scope of EU law. 
301 Such as benefits associated with improving professional qualifications (e.g., study maintenance grants).  
302 Case C-456/02, Trojani. 
303 Case C-292/89, Antonissen. 
304 Case C-138/02, Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 23.03.2004, ¶ 18; Case C-258/04, 
Ioannidis, 15.09.2005, ¶ 38. 
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approach as necessary to encouraging mobility305. By facilitating the movement of those 
lacking prior job experience and without secured positions, it also responds better to 
employers’ needs, and is likely to result in movers’ undertaking flexible labour 
arrangements. 
 
Even though Directive 2004/38 does not distinguish between different types of 
economically inactive movers in terms of their access to benefits, the ECJ appears to have 
privileged jobseekers among such movers. For example, under Article 24(2), States may 
deny access to social assistance to movers during their first three months of residence, and 
in the case of jobseekers, for as long as they remain in that status. The ECJ has limited the 
scope of that provision, however, by ruling that it does not apply to social benefits 
‘intended to facilitate access to the labour market’ (such as jobseeker’s allowance), which 
must be granted whenever a jobseeker can demonstrate a ‘real link’ with the host country’s 
labour market. To demonstrate this, a jobseeker must have merely genuinely sought work 
(as demonstrated, for example, by being invited to job interviews, registering as a jobseeker 
with employment agencies, and participating in events organised by such agencies) for a 
reasonable period, even without ever having worked306.  
B. Polish Workers’ Rights  
Six307 of the EU-15 States had declared from early on in the accession process that they 
planned to apply tight restrictions on CEE workers’ (and jobseekers’) mobility. Likely due 
to their geographical proximity to CEE states, Austria and Germany spearheaded such 
efforts. Once they had voiced their plans, five other States implemented a variety of direct 
measures - including work permits308, annual quotas, bilateral agreements, seasonal permits, 
sector-specific permits, and residence permits - in a ‘race to the bottom’ (Boeri and 
Brücker 2005: 632-39). Despite healthy economies in most EU-15 States, and labour 
shortages in some (including the UK) (id), during the first phase of the transitional period, 
fourteen EU-15 States applied direct or indirect barriers to CEE nationals’ mobility (see 
Table 2, below). The UK and Ireland did not apply direct barriers to mobility, but adopted 
registration requirements and limited movers’ access to some social benefits (as discussed 
below, in Section 4E, in the case of the UK). Although most EU-15 States—with the 
notable exceptions of Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Denmark—began to ease their 
restrictions after 2006, they did not do so immediately after it had become evident that 
                                                      
305 Case C-292/89, Antonissen. 
306 Case C-367/11, Déborah Prete, 25.10.2012. 
307 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and Luxembourg. 
308 Typically issued only in exceptional circumstances (when no local workers could be found). 
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CEE mobility did not threaten their labour markets or economies. At the end of the 
second phase, in 2009, direct mobility derogations were abolished by all EU-15 States 
other than Austria and Germany. Ireland and the UK continued their indirect measures 
restricting CEE workers’ access to social benefits until the end of the transitional period in 
April 2011. 
 
Table 2: Direct and Indirect Restrictions on CEE Workers’ Mobility (2004-2011)  









Poles residing in 
2011 
Austria Direct (quotas for 







Belgium Direct (akin to 
restrictions for 
TCNs) and indirect 
(same as 
phase 1) 
open 13,000 47,000 
Denmark Direct (under 
collective agreements, 






open 10,000 21,000 
Finland Direct (akin to 
restrictions for 
TCNs) 
open open 400 2,000 
France Direct (akin to 
restrictions for 
























Greece Direct (akin to 
restrictions for 
TCNs) and indirect 
open  open  13,000 15,000 
                                                      
309 Remaining longer than three months in a EU-15 State. 
310 Residence and work permits withdrawn if unemployed. 
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Italy Direct (quotas) and 
indirect 
open open 59,000 94,000 
Luxembourg Direct (akin to 
restrictions for 




open 1,000 1,800 
Netherlands Direct (quotas) (same as 
phase 1, 
until 2007) 
open 23,000 95,000 
Portugal Direct (quotas) and 
indirect 
open open 500 1,000 
Spain Direct (akin to 
restrictions for 
TCNs) and indirect 
open open 26,000 40,000 
Sweden Open  open open 11,000 36,000 






















(of 3.5m CEE 
nationals) 
Sources: Commission (2006b); Commission (2008c); Fihel et al (2015); Lang (2007); ONS 
data; author’s calculations. 
 
Nothing in the Accession Treaty had provided Member States the right to impose 
restrictions falling outside of direct labour market access limitations. For example, as 
explicitly stated in Annex XII, derogations to the free movement acquis in Poland’s case 
pertained only to Articles 1 through 6 of Regulation 1612/68 (regarding ‘eligibility for 
employment’). Anything not expressly excluded by the Treaty was subject to the general 
equality principles of the EC Treaty – specifically, Article 12 (prohibiting discrimination on 
grounds of nationality), and Article 39 (prohibiting nationality discrimination in 
employment). Thus, although Member States were permitted to limit CEE workers’ access 
to their labour markets (and to jobseekers’ assistance), once that access was granted, host 
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States were not allowed to restrict access to any benefits that accrue from worker status. 
Notably, pursuant to the remaining provisions of Regulation 1612/68, mobile EU workers 
and jobseekers were entitled to equal treatment with host States’ nationals in the context 
of employment conditions, access to social and tax advantages (Article 7), and access to 
housing (Article 9), from the moment they qualified for that status. ‘Social advantages’ 
have been interpreted broadly311 by the ECJ – to include discretionary benefits312, benefits 
granted after employment is terminated313, and at least some benefits not directly linked to 
employment (such as the right to be accompanied by a partner when relying on the free 
movement right314). Furthermore, Polish movers were also automatically entitled to 
protections of Regulation 1408/71, explicitly mentioned in the Accession Treaty (Annex 
II, ¶ 13315), which guaranteed equality of treatment in respect to social security, both non-
contributory and contributory. 
 
As indicated in Table 2 above, however, all EU-15 States other than Sweden adopted 
restrictions on post-2004 EU workers’ access to either social assistance or social security 
benefits. These new restrictions took various forms – for example, by defining ‘worker’ 
status more narrowly than under EU law, imposing additional entry or residence 
requirements, or expanding the State’s power to expel movers reliant on benefits (Boeri 
and Brücker 2005: 637-8). Such indirect constraints on mobility were implemented 
notwithstanding the lack of empirical evidence to suggest that Member States with liberal 
welfare benefits policies would become magnets for an influx of welfare migrants (Kvist 
2004: 307-9). 
C. Polish Self-Employed Movers’ Rights  
Transitional mobility derogations did not apply to self-employed CEE nationals, so from 
the day of accession, they had the same rights as mobile self-employed workers from EU-
15 States. Under EU law, self-employed movers have the same rights as workers. The ECJ 
has defined self-employment status broadly - as working for oneself, and being solely 
responsible for one’s own business failures or successes316. A self-employed mover merely 
needs to abide by applicable national laws, such as those pertaining to registering as self-
employed, keeping records, and paying income taxes. It is the host State’s responsibility to 
demonstrate sham self-employment317. Although legally not an onerous standard to satisfy, 
                                                      
311 Case C-207/78, Even [1979] ECR 2019. 
312 Case C-65/81, Reina [1982] ECR I-33. 
313 Case C-57/96, Meints [1997] ECR I-6689. 
314 Case C-59/85, Netherlands v Reed [1986] ECR 1283. 
315 With an exception for Austria.  
316 Case C-212/97, Centros, 9 March 1999. 
317 Id. 
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becoming self-employed would have been difficult for CEE nationals to accomplish 
financially and due to historical restrictions on their travel, as already mentioned.  
 
Nevertheless, some Poles did rely on this status during the transitional period. It is difficult 
to estimate their numbers because Member States did not consistently record them, and 
any estimates included some incidents of sham employment. In the UK, for example, self-
employed workers were not required to register under the Worker Registration Scheme. 
Some estimates, based on Labour Force Survey data, indicate that 14% of Poles working 
in the UK during the transitional period were self-employed (Okólski and Salt 2014: 16), 
amounting to approximately 75,000-100,000 persons over the course of 2004-11. This 
percentage varied considerably by sector, with as many as half of construction workers 
engaging in self-employment (id).  
D. Polish Economically Inactive Movers’ Rights  
Economically inactive CEE nationals (such as students, pensioners, and the unemployed) 
also gained access to post-accession mobility. Thus, pursuant to Directive 2004/38, they 
could reside in other Member States if they possessed sickness insurance and sufficient 
resources so as not to become a burden on the host State (Article 14(2)). Member States 
were not allowed to specify a fixed amount necessary to demonstrate sufficiency, and were 
not allowed to require resources exceeding the threshold under which their own nationals 
became eligible for social assistance (Article 8(4)). According to the ECJ, determination of 
sufficiency is to be individualised and holistic, based on all the resources that might be 
available to a mover, including from third parties318. Being heavily fact-specific, this 
calculation provided host States with much discretion. Moreover, CEE nationals have 
tended to be less wealthy than those from EU-15 States. For example, in 2003, CEE 
countries’ GDPs (in terms of purchasing power) ranged from 42% (Latvia) to 77% 
(Slovenia) of the EU-25 average, with Poland’s GDP being 46% of the EU-25 average 
(Eurostat 2004). Hence, it would have been more difficult for CEE nationals than for EU-
15 citizens to satisfy the sufficiency test. 
 
The ECJ has been instrumental in protecting access to social benefits of economically 
inactive movers319. Their access stems from demonstrating a ‘real link’ to the host State 
                                                      
318 C-413/99, Baumbast. 
319 Although those rights can be limited in some cases, as long as those limits are proportionate to legitimate 
State goals. See Case C-413/99, Baumbast. More generally, any limits on fundamental freedoms (such as the 
right of free movement) must be narrowly interpreted, applied in a non-discriminatory manner, justified by 
imperative requirements in the general interest, suitable for securing the attainment of their objective, and 
may not go beyond what is necessary to attain those objectives. Case C-55/94, Gebhard, 30 November1995. 
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society, based on a holistic determination of factors such as the duration of stay on the 
host country, intentions, and family situation320. Pursuant to the ECJ, the test is to be 
broad and flexible, and is not satisfied only when it is inconceivable that a real link 
exists321. The test may even be met by recently unemployed movers since they do not lose 
worker status for at least six months following involuntary unemployment (Directive 
2004/38, Article 7(3))322. However, several EU-15 States (including the UK, as discussed 
below) sought to limit economically inactive movers’ access to social security, and to 
special non-contributory cash benefits (‘SNCB’), by implementing residency tests that had 
to be satisfied in addition to the habitual residence test under Regulation 883/2004, and 
thereby, also limiting their ability to demonstrate a ‘real link’ to their host States.  
 
Member States are endowed with discretion to deny economically inactive movers’ access 
to social assistance (means-tested, and non-contributory benefits) during the first three 
months of residence (Directive 2004/38, Article 24(2)). After that period, however, 
economically inactive movers’ access is to be the same as that of host State nationals, albeit 
movers must also demonstrate self-sufficiency so that they do not lose their right to reside 
(id).  
E. The UK’s Approach to Polish Movers During 2004-2011  
From the beginning of accession negotiations, the UK had expressed its intention to apply 
the free-movement acquis immediately after accession. At the time, the UK was 
experiencing a substantial need for foreign labour (Editorial Board 2014). Moreover, 
studies commissioned by the Home Office had predicted low post-Enlargement mobility 
to the UK (of between 5,000 and 13,000 per year in the first six years following the 
Enlargement) (e.g., Dustmann et al 2003: 57).  
i. The Worker Registration Scheme 
The UK imposed the Worker Registration Scheme (‘WRS’) on CEE workers and 
jobseekers entering its labour market during the transitional period. CEE workers were 
required to pay a £60 fee323, and to provide confirmation of employment within 30 days of 
starting employment. They also had to re-register within 30 days after changing 
                                                      
320 Case C-90/97, Swaddling, 25.02.1999. 
321 Case C-258/04, Ioannidis. 
322 Expiration of a fixed-term contract can amount to involuntary unemployment. Case C-413/01, Ninni-
Orasche. 
323 Later increased to £90. According to the Commission, ‘if an old Member State is applying full free 
movement of workers …, it may issue work permits to nationals from the new Member States for 
monitoring purposes … however, these work permits must be issued automatically’ (Commission Guide 
undated: 3). No institution had addressed whether the UK’s imposition of the registration fee was 
permissible. 
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employment during their first twelve months in the UK. If they failed to do so, they would 
forfeit the already-worked months for the purposes of satisfying the residence test. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that under EU law, a six-month period of unemployment was 
permitted for retaining residence rights324. Until CEE workers had engaged in registered 
employment for twelve consecutive months, they had no right to reside, and thus no full 
access to non-contributory welfare benefits (such as jobseeker’s allowance) or to 
contributory social benefits (such as unemployment), even though during that time they 
might have qualified for worker status under EU law.  
 
The WRS programme benefited the British purse and British employers while 
disadvantaging CEE workers. By the end of the transitional period in 2011, more than 1.1 
million CEE workers had registered under the WRS, including more than 740,000 Poles325. 
While the WRS limited their access to benefits, they were adding to the public purse 
through their national insurance and tax contributions. Moreover, British employers were 
not prosecuted for hiring workers who did not comply with the WRS. Some employers 
and employment agencies even encouraged CEE workers not to register (apparently to 
avoid bureaucratic and financial repercussions of lawfully employing them), thus further 
limiting CEE workers’ access to residence rights and social benefits during the transitional 
period (Currie 2008: 37). More generally, given Poles’ propensity to be employed in 
precarious, temporary, and part-time arrangements326 (BIA 2007: 16; Drinkwater and 
Garapich 2015: 1911), it would have been difficult for them to meet the twelve-month 
consecutive employment test and the 30-day re-registration deadlines to be eligible for 
benefits327. Furthermore, by exerting pressure on CEE workers to find employment as 
quickly as possible and to hold onto it, the 30-day registration requirement might have 
contributed to CEE workers’ deskilling, and their prevalence in low-paid jobs and the 
informal economy (Currie 2007: 92-4). Ciupijus (2011) also argues that the WRS 
reinforced British employers’ and government officials’ view that CEE nationals are 
suitable as temporary labour migrants only, akin to TCNs. 
 
In effect, the UK’s ‘half-open and half-closed approach’ (Kubal 2012: 49) exemplifies just 
how broad Member States’ discretion was during the transitional period to limit movers’ 
                                                      
324 Directive 2004/38, Article 7(3). 
325 These numbers likely underestimated actual arrivals by up to 40% as many movers elected not to register 
(Okólski and Salt 2014: 16). 
326 For example, 52% of CEE workers who had registered under the WRS between September 2006 and 
September 2007 were in temporary employment (BIA 2007: 16). 
327 Moreover, the WRS system was complicated, and the application form and explanatory notes were 
provided in English and online only (Currie 2008: 45).  
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access to EU rights. In Zalewska v Department of Social Development328, the House of Lords 
upheld the Court of Appeal decision to apply the twelve-month WRS registration 
requirement rigidly, and to deny income support to a Polish mover who had engaged in 
registered employment for six months and thereafter in unregistered employment for 
more than six additional months. Firstly, the House of Lords ruled that limits on access to 
‘social advantages’ under the WRS were permissible under EU law because Article 7(2) of 
Regulation 1612/68 (mandating equality in the provision of social advantages) depended 
on workers’ compliance with all the national measures determining their eligibility for 
accessing the labour market (such as satisfying the WRS). Moreover, the House of Lords 
found WRS limitations on access to social advantages to meet the proportionality test329, 
by being a necessary method to attain the legitimate goals of monitoring movers during 
the transitional period and of protecting the public purse330. Currie (2009: 53-4) has 
questioned whether it was proportionate to expect CEE nationals to re-register under the 
WRS following employment changes, and to deny access to social welfare to those like Ms 
Zalewska (who had worked for more than twelve months, albeit not registered the entire 
time). More generally, the House of Lords ignored the fact that the Accession Treaty 
referred to transitional derogations from Articles 1–6 only (regarding entering host labour 
markets).  
ii. The ‘Right to Reside’ Test 
In addition to the WRS, the UK adopted Social Security (Habitual Residence) Amendment 
Regulation 2004331 on the day of the Enlargement, as a response to concerns about CEE 
movers’ impact on the public purse (Kennedy 2011: 3). This governed newly arriving EU 
movers’ access to most social benefits (including social security benefits under Regulation 
883/2004, and social advantages under Regulation 492/2011), including income support, 
jobseeker’s allowance, pension credit, housing benefit, housing assistance, council tax 
benefit, child benefit, and child tax credit. EU movers were now required to be both 
habitually resident under EU law332, and ‘lawfully resident’ under UK law to obtain these 
benefits. Unlike EU-14 nationals (who were deemed resident in the UK under different 
regulations333), CEE nationals who were unemployed, seeking work, or were within the 
                                                      
328 [2008] UKHL 67. 
329 According to EC Treaty (Article 18), movers’ right to reside in other States must be provided without 
nationality discrimination, and may only be limited if a host State regulation satisfies the proportionality test. 
E.g., Case C-413/99, Baumbast. 
330 The Court did not refer to any statistics indicating CEE workers’ reliance on public benefits. 
331 SI 2004/1232. 
332 Based on a fact-intensive assessment of one’s link to the host State, including where her current interests 
are focused and where she intends to remain for the foreseeable future. 
333 EU-14 jobseekers and former workers who had become unemployed had a right of legal residence under 
Immigration (EEA) Regulation 2000 SI 2000/2326, and Immigration (EEA) Regulation 2006 SI 2006/1003. 
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first twelve months of registered employment under the WRS were not eligible for these 
benefits. Unlike EU law334, the UK test did not differentiate between first-time jobseekers 
and those who had lost a job and were seeking employment. Thus, CEE nationals could 
not retain worker status if they stopped working unless they had completed twelve months 
of continuous registered employment. 
 
Echoing its stance in Zalewska, the Supreme Court ruled in Patmalniece v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions that these restrictions were not indirectly discriminatory335 against CEE 
movers, and that even if they were, they met the proportionality test because they were 
justified by the need to combat benefit tourism336. The Commission, however, disagreed 
with the right-to-reside test’s lawfulness under EU law, and argued that only the EU 
habitual residence test should be applied to determine eligibility for social security benefits. 
The Commission found the application of the UK test particularly objectionable when 
used to deny access to jobseeker’s allowance to those who had worked in the UK and had 
become unemployed (and hence still retained worker status under EU law). When the 
Commission commenced its infringement proceedings in 2011, it argued that the EU 
habitual residence test’s criteria were strict enough to ensure that certain social security 
benefits337 were only granted to those genuinely residing in the UK. However, the eventual 
ECJ proceedings338 were confined to child benefit and child tax credits only because the 
ECJ’s decision in Brey339 had limited access of economically inactive movers to means-
tested SNCB benefits (classifying them as ‘social assistance’), as discussed below.  
 
The ECJ dismissed the infringement proceedings in 2016, after finding that the UK test 
was a proportionate measure (based on an individual review of each claimant’s situation) 
that served a legitimate need (of protecting UK finances). This ruling is in line with its 
2004 conclusion in Collins340 that EU law does not preclude conditioning entitlement to 
jobseeker’s allowance on a national residence requirement, in so far as it is justified by 
objective considerations proportionate to a legitimate aim (such as protecting host State’s 
                                                      
334 Case C-138/02, Collins. 
335 As discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6, indirect discrimination occurs when an apparently neutral 
provision, criterion or practice (‘PCP’) would put persons protected by the general prohibition against 
discrimination at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that PCP satisfies the 
proportionality test. 
336 [2011] UKSC 11. 
337 State pension credit, income-based jobseeker’s allowance, child benefit, and child tax credit. 
338 Case C-308/14, Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
339 Case C-140/12, Brey. 
340 Case C-138/02, Collins. 
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finances). This line of cases constitutes one of the earliest indications of EU institutions’ 
succumbing to EU-15 States’ allegations of benefit tourism by CEE movers. 
5. Post-2011 Freedom of Movement Laws 
Directive 2004/38 continues to be in force today. In the last few years, however, EU 
institutions have imposed or approved Member States’ increasing limitations on the 




Recent laws have expanded the EU’s conceptual approach towards workers’ mobility. 
Regulation 492/2011341 defines workers’ right to free movement broadly, as including ‘all 
matters relating to the actual pursuit of activities as employed persons’, and ‘conditions for 
the integration of the worker’s family’342. Directive 2014/54343 denounces any ‘unjustified 
restrictions and obstacles’ to mobility. Moreover, the ECJ has continued to define ‘worker’ 
status broadly. For example, in Saint-Prix, the Court extended worker status to a woman 
who had stopped working due to complications from pregnancy and childbirth, as long as 
she were to return to work within a ‘reasonable’ time (to be determined based on specific 
factual circumstances)344. The ECJ has also ruled that motivations for undertaking work in 
another Member State are irrelevant to the definition of ‘worker’. Thus, the Court 
extended worker status to a full-time student who had entered the host State with the 
intention to study and was employed part-time345. Furthermore, as stated in the 
Conclusions of the 2016 European Council summit, the ECJ opposes restricting workers’ 
right to social assistance (European Council 2016). For example, Ms Saint-Prix was 
entitled to income support (a type of SNCB)346.  Moreover, in Gusa347, the Court ruled that 
self-employed movers can retain their worker status and hence their right to reside under 
Directive 2004/38 (and thus be eligible for social benefits such as jobseeker’s allowance).  
 
The economic core of the right of free movement has come to the foreground in recent 
jurisprudence. Notably, the Gusa decision focused on how the claimant was deserving of 
access to social benefits due to having worked and paid taxes in the host State for four 
years and having relied on his family (rather than the public purse) for financial support 
                                                      
341 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union.  
342 Id., Recital (6). 
343 Directive 2014/54/EU of 16 April 2014 on measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on 
workers in the context of freedom of movement for workers, Article 3. 
344 Case C-507/12, Jessy Saint Prix v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2007. 
345 Case C-46/12, L N v Styrelsen for Videregående Uddannelser og Uddannelsesstøtte, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:97. 
346 See Case C-507/12, Jessy Saint Prix. 
347 Case C-442/16, Florea Gusa v Minister for Social Protection, Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1004. 
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upon his arrival in the host State. Unlike in its older decisions, the Court did not refer to 
Treaty rights, and instead focused on market citizenship. Coutts (2018) notes how the 
Gusa decision places the responsibility for integration on movers themselves, and equates 
it with economic participation. Moreover, the decision adds a qualitative test to 
determining whether economic activity is sufficient to warrant access to EU rights (id). 
This, of course, not only departs from statutory provisions, but also introduces a 
subjective, individualised approach to judicial interpretation. 
 
Moreover, the European Council and the Commission have recently become more 
explicitly responsive to western States’ initiatives to limit movers’ access to social benefits, 
even by workers. This became especially evident during David Cameron’s renegotiation of 
the UK’s membership in the EU. Essentially, Cameron was seeking to extend the 
application of ECJ decisions limiting economically inactive movers’ access to benefits348 to 
workers. Under the ‘New Settlement’349, EU workers would have been restricted from 
access to in-work benefits and social housing for the first four years of residence in the 
UK. Moreover, the amount of any child benefit EU movers could receive would be 
indexed to the standard of living in the child’s country of residence (typically lower than in 
the UK). In acquiescing to this proposal, the Council noted that it was warranted by 
‘conditions of necessity’ brought about by the large influx of movers into the UK, and 
that, more generally, ‘Member States have the right to define the fundamental principles of 
their social security systems and enjoy a broad margin of discretion to define and 
implement their social and employment policy’ (European Council 2016, Section D, 
Annex I: 19).  
 
Notably, to facilitate granting Member States greater discretion in this area, the Council 
declared its intention to submit proposals to amend: (1) Regulation 883/2004 (on the 
coordination of social security systems) so that child benefits claims could be indexed by 
host States to benefits levels in the place of child’s residence; and (2) Regulation 492/2011, 
to provide an ‘alert and safeguard mechanism that responds to situations of inflow of 
workers from other Member States of an exceptional magnitude over an extended period of 
time, including as a result of past policies following previous EU enlargements’ (id: 23). 
The only limitation on these new restrictions would be that EU workers must not be 
treated less favourably than TCN workers (id). The Commission was in support of these 
proposals (id: 33-4). Although these plans were not adopted, they nevertheless indicate EU 
                                                      
348 Including Dano, and Alimanovic, discussed below. 
349 Ultimately scrapped due to Brexit. 
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institutions’ openness to prioritising EU-15 States’ concerns by limiting even mobile 
workers’ access to benefits.  
 
It is not clear what evidence the UK had presented to warrant such Conclusions, which 
are incompatible with the free movement, and anti-discrimination acquis. The 
Commission simply declared that ‘the kind of information provided’ by the UK indicated 
that ‘the type of exceptional situation that the proposed safeguard mechanism is intended 
to cover exists in the United Kingdom today’ (Commission 2016b). This is despite the 
findings of a study commissioned by the Commission in 2013 which indicated mobility’s 
economic benefits to the UK (and to other receiving States) and no evidence of benefit 
tourism across the EU (ICF GHK 2013). It seems that the Commission might have been 
simply accepting the UK’s arguments at face value, perhaps especially motivated to do so 
due to the upcoming Brexit referendum. 
 
In addition, EU institutions have been silent regarding recent initiatives in several EU-15 
States to reduce mobile workers’ access to benefits. For example, the UK adopted 
legislation in 2013 and 2014 to limit EU workers’ access to social benefits350. In 2017, 
Denmark began to require parents to have worked for six years (instead of two) to receive 
full child benefits (Commission 2018: 7). In Germany, 2016 proposals sought to prevent 
movers’ access to benefits during first five years of residence, and to restrict eligibility to 
only those who had worked full time for at least one year. Such national measures depart 
from Treaty principles because they seek to reduce mobility. Moreover, they perpetuate a 
‘xenosceptic’ legal and administrative culture (O’Brien 2015b: 124), and implicitly signal 
that lower-waged EU workers do not belong in richer host States. 
 
B. Economically Inactive Movers (Including Jobseekers)  
 
Whereas in the late 1990s and early 2000s the ECJ had provided—by expansively 
interpreting Treaty provisions—economically inactive movers with access to some social 
benefits not available to them under secondary EU legislation, the Court has been 
retracting on this approach in the last few years and instead, has been narrowly reading 
secondary legislation. The Brey holding suggested that an economically inactive mover’s 
entitlement to a means-tested SNCB (such as compensatory supplement benefit) could be 
an indication of not having sufficient resources351, thus calling into question the right to 
                                                      
350 Including three-month residence rule for jobseeker’s allowance; new ‘compelling evidence of genuine 
prospects of work’ test and three-month cut-off for jobseeker’s allowance, child benefit, and child tax credit; 
jobseekers’ ineligibility for housing allowance; and new minimum earnings threshold requirements to be 
classified as a ‘worker’. 
351 Case C‑140/12, Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey, ECLI:EU:C:2013:337. 
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reside for longer than three months. Pursuant to the subsequent ruling in Dano, however, 
economically inactive movers’ application for social assistance benefits automatically 
causes them to lose their right to reside, without the need for an individual assessment352. 
Moreover, Member States do not have to provide access to SNCBs to economically 
inactive EU citizens - at least to those who, like Ms Dano, had never been employed in the 
receiving State, and were not searching for work. Thus, despite fundamental EU 
citizenship rights, in practice, Member States may attach conditions of residence from 
Directive 2004/38 to the provision of SNCBs with a social assistance component, thus 
limiting access to them even if they are available under Regulation 883/2004. Notably, 
similarly to its decision in Gusa (discussed earlier), the Court in Dano engaged in a 
subjective discussion of the claimant’s personal circumstances which were not relevant to 
the legal question before it353. For example, it mentioned how the claimant had been 
receiving public support for her child ‘whose father’s identity is not known’354, lacked any 
educational certificates or professional training, could not write in in the host State’s 
language, had never worked, and had not provided evidence of having looked for work355. 
Thereby, the ECJ created the impression of someone who does not deserve protections of 
EU law. 
 
In Commission v United Kingdom, the ECJ extended Dano’s exclusion of SNCBs to all social 
security benefits (including family benefits), not just those with a social assistance 
element356. The Court imported Dano’s approach of not requiring an individual assessment 
and Brey’s principle of permitting Member States to impose conditions (such as the UK’s 
right-to-reside test) on economically inactive movers’ access to SNCBs into Article 4 of 
Regulation 883/2004 (regarding social security benefits, such as child benefits and child 
tax credits). Moreover, the Court reversed its prior approach regarding the burden of 
proof, so that Member States are now presumed to be acting in a lawful non-
discriminatory manner when denying access to social benefits if they justify their actions as 
meant to protect their public finances.  
 
The ECJ also lessened the scope of fundamental Treaty principles by narrowly applying 
secondary EU legislation in Alimanovic357, an even stricter application of Directive 2004/38 
                                                      
352 Case C-333/13, Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358. 
353 Such details would have been relevant to proportionality analysis, not applicable in Dano. 
354 Dano, ¶ 38. 
355 Id., ¶ 39. 
356 Case C-308/14, Commission v United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:2016:436. 
357 Case C-67/14, Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v Alimanovic, ECLI:EU:C:2015:597. The petitioner did not 
retain worker status under Article 7(3)(c) only due to a technicality, having become a jobseeker after working 
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than Dano. Despite research evidence to the contrary, the Court accepted EU-15 States’ 
welfare-magnet argument, and concluded that even if individual social assistance claims 
did not place an unreasonable burden on national social security systems, host States could 
argue that accumulated claims would do so. Thus, States are entitled to prevent mobile 
jobseekers’ access to certain SNCBs which constitute social assistance under Directive 
2004/38 (but are not intended to facilitate access to the labour market). Moreover, 
although Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38 allows former workers to retain their worker 
status for six months after becoming unemployed, the ECJ concluded that after that 
period, they are eligible for social assistance only if their right of residence is based on 
more than the non-expulsion provision of Article 14(4) (for former workers continuing to 
seek employment).  
 
The Court in Alimanovic also narrowly construed the ‘intended to facilitate access to the 
labour market’ test, so that only benefits that are necessary to jobseekers’ ability to access the 
labour market fall outside the scope of Article 24(2), and thus cannot be withheld during 
the first three months of residence or to first-time jobseekers. Moreover, the Court ruled 
that expulsion decisions due to presenting an unreasonable burden on a national social 
assistance system do not require an individual assessment. This stance was reiterated in 
Garcia-Nieto, in which the ECJ held that jobseekers are never eligible for unemployment 
benefits, even if such benefits facilitate access to the labour market, because they contain a 
social assistance element – that is, their primary aim is the preservation of dignity, rather 
than facilitation of access to the labour market358. Consequently, jobseekers can be 
automatically excluded from access to social assistance, even in the first three months of 
residence. 
 
C. CEE Nationals  
 
The above laws have fully applied to CEE nationals since transitional mobility restrictions 
had come to an end. Given that CEE nationals’ mobility has been primarily motivated by 
employment opportunities in EU-15 States, measures decreasing workers’ and jobseekers’ 
rights have been especially detrimental to their movement. The EU’s increasing 
responsiveness to EU-15 measures to combat alleged welfare tourism has generally had 
more impact on movers who are poor or not employable as highly-skilled workers in the 
receiving States. Limitations on jobseekers’ access to social benefits are especially prone to 
negatively impact CEE nationals since they have access to fewer financial resources than 
                                                      
for eleven rather than twelve months, and having just passed the six-month period for retaining worker 
status. 
358 Case C-299/14, García-Nieto. 
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EU-15 nationals, and tend to be employed in temporary, flexible, and semi-legal 
arrangements (Kubal 2012: 98-100). Now that western labour shortages have been filled, 
and the western public has become vociferously opposed to CEE movers once again, their 
right to mobility has been shrinking. As with post-accession mobility derogations, western 
preferences have become prioritised once again, reproducing social, economic, and 
political power that EU-15 States wield. 
 
6. CEE Nationals’ Experience of Mobility and its Effects  
 
A. Effects of CEE Mobility on UK and Other EU-15 States 
 
i. The Impact of CEE Mobility on EU-15 States 
Generally, intra-EU mobility has benefited the receiving States, by increasing their 
economic outputs and public finances (Barslund and Busse 2014). For example, during 
2004-15, mover households have been a larger fiscal asset than native households in all 
EU-15 States (Nyman and Ahlskog 2018: i). East-to-west mobility has been the driving 
force behind this positive economic impact. As shown by independent studies (Fic et al 
2011), and noted by EU institutions, the combined GDP of EU-15 States between 2004 
and 2009 increased by between 0.3% and 1% due to post-2004 mobility (Commission, 
Five Actions 2013). More recent studies have confirmed CEE movers’ positive impact on 
EU-15 economies. For example, Kahanec and Pytliková (2017) concluded that CEE 
workers have had positive effects on EU-15 States’ collective GDP, GDP per capita, and 
employment rate; and a negative effect on output per worker. They calculated that a 10% 
increase in the number of CEE movers per destination population increased the 
destination’s GDP per capita by 0.3% (id: 427). Moreover, CEE movers—especially 
Poles—have been shown to contribute more to host States’ welfare systems than what 
they use in public services, and to not disproportionately crowd out native workers or 
lower their wages (Barslund and Busse 2014; see also Commission, Five Actions 2013). 
The greatest overall positive economic effects of CEE mobility have been observed in 
States with the greatest numbers of CEE workers - that is, the UK, Ireland, and Germany 







ii. The Impact of CEE Mobility on the UK 
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Empirical evidence indicates that the UK has benefited economically from EU mobility, 
especially in recent years359. Dustmann and Frattini (2014) concluded that immigrants from 
the European Economic Area (‘EEA’)360—and especially those arriving since 2000—have 
made a positive fiscal contribution in each of the years analysed (1995 to 2011), even 
during periods when the UK was running budget deficits. EEA movers have been 
generally less likely than Britons to receive public benefits or tax credits, and less likely to 
live in social housing (id). In 2013-14, EEA nationals received £0.56b in tax credits and 
child benefit, but paid £3.11b in income taxes and national insurance contributions 
(HMRC 2016b: 6). Moreover, between 1995 and 2011, EEA movers had endowed the UK 
labour market with human capital that would have cost the British education system £14b 
to produce (Dustmann and Frattini 2014: 595).  
 
Unlike TCNs361, EU movers have not had significant negative effects on employment rates 
or wages of even low-skilled British workers, and even in geographical areas that had 
experienced large increases in EU migration (Wadsworth 2017). Instead, decreases in 
wages in the UK since 2008 are associated with the global financial crisis (id). There is also 
little evidence that movers have had negative effects on crime, education, health, or social 
housing (id). On the other hand, there is evidence of UK workers being pushed into more 
managerial and supervisory positions due to migrant workers’ taking on low-skill jobs 
(Vargas-Silva et al 2016: 10-11).  
 
Among EU movers, CEE nationals have been especially responsible for such economic 
benefits to the UK. For example, post-04 CEE mobility has been directly linked to an 
increase in British economic output of nearly 1.5% by 2010 (Fic at al 2011), and a long-
term increase in GDP of up to 0.6% (Commission 2008e). Between 2001 and 2011, CEE 
movers’ net fiscal contributions amounted to almost £5b (Dustmann and Frattini 2014: 
595). CEE nationals have been 6% less likely than natives to live in social housing (id: 
616). That being said, Coulter (2018) argues that CEE movers’ frequent employment in 
low-cost manufacturing and services industries has undermined firms’ incentives to invest 
in training, and thus intensified cleavages between high-paid/high-cost and low-paid/low-
cost sectors. This had likely increased discontent felt by low-paid British workers, and thus 
contributed to social divisions that helped to bring about Brexit (id). 
                                                      
359 See http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit05.pdf. 
360 EU Member States, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. 
361 TCN migration slightly lowers low-skill wages in the UK (Vargas-Silva et al 2016), and results in negative 
fiscal contributions (Dustmann and Frattini 2014).  
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iii. Causes Behind CEE Workers’ Economic Benefits to EU-15 
States 
CEE mobility’s economic benefits to host States have been attributed to their high 
employment rates (higher than those of host country nationals362) (Barslund and Busse 
2014; Wadsworth 2017) and their willingness to participate in flexible labour markets (e.g., 
Tamas and Munz 2006). Transitional mobility restrictions likely facilitated demand-driven 
CEE mobility to the west: EU-15 States were given discretion to choose the numbers and 
types of CEE workers suitable to their needs, and national restrictions on residence rights 
and access to social benefits incentivised CEE movers to take on any jobs available.  
 
EU institutions have praised CEE workers’ flexibility. The Commission has lauded their 
responsiveness to the increasingly flexible western labour markets as an effective 
adjustment mechanism (e.g., Commission 2006, 2012c). Despite acknowledging that 
increasing labour market flexibility, which relies heavily on precarious jobs363, has resulted 
in poor working conditions and inadequate social protections for workers, the 
Commission has supported it (e.g., Commission 2006). Similarly, the European Parliament 
has resolved that, to address unemployment and labour shortages across the EU, ‘it is 
essential to take steps to provide greater flexibility …, increase mobility, and make the 
markets more adaptable’ (EP 2006). Such neo-liberal economic approach has long been 
advocated by EU and western State politicians (Dougan 2004), for being responsive to 
changing labour needs and posing little burden on hosts’ welfare systems (Favell and 
Hansen 2002).  
 
Despite CEE workers’ economic contributions, their mobility has continued to be met 
with public, political, and media opposition across EU-15 States – perhaps most 
poignantly in the Brexit context. Of course, the public might not be aware of economic 
studies. Indeed, attitude surveys indicate Britons’ opposition to immigration as driven by 
their concerns about the loss of their cultural homogeneity and about social tensions 
(Dustmann and Preston 2018: 42). Thus, objections to mobility are likely due to cultural 
opposition by the privileged group which perceives its position of power threatened by 
foreigners. Unfortunately, after Brexit, Britons’ economic position of power is likely to 
                                                      
362 Estimates of CEE movers’ employment rates in EU-15 States have hovered at around 78%-80%, more 
than 10% higher than the employment rates of native workers in EU-15 host States (Commission 2008e; 
Dustmann and Frattini 2014: 613). Poles have tended to have the highest rates of employment among CEE 
movers, of up to 90% (Barslund and Busse 2014; Wadsworth 2017). 
363 Including fixed-term, part-time, on-call, zero-hour, and freelance contracts, and temporary arrangements 
through employment agencies (Commission 2006). 
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deteriorate, as living standards are predicted to fall in direct relation to decreases in EU 
immigration (Wadsworth 2017: 14). 
 
B. Impact of Poles’ Mobility on Poland  
Out of the total population of 38 million, approximately 1.8 million Poles were residing in 
EU-15 States ten years after accession (Kolodziejczyk 2016: 37). Due to its size, 
emigration has had significant economic and social effects. For example, it resulted in a 
temporary drop in unemployment, and the ongoing receipt of remittances (of more than 
4% of the annual GDP since 2006) (Chmielewska 2015; see also Horridge and Rokicki 
2018). Those emigrating have been younger, better skilled, and more educated than those 
who remain (Dustmann et al 2012: 2). Hence, their departure has increased wages of 
intermediate-level skill workers remaining in Poland, but slightly decreased wages of lower-
skill workers. Moreover, Poles’ mobility has been linked to long-term labour shortages364, a 
decrease in social security contributions, brain drain, youth drain, brain waste, significant 
skills mismatches, decrease in productivity, long-term unemployment, and breakups of 
family units (including the rise of ‘Euro-orphans’365). This has been documented through 
both EU-sponsored (e.g., Commission 2008c, 2009b; Fic at al 2011), and independent 
studies (e.g., Budnik 2012; Drinkwater et al 2007; Horridge and Rokicki 2018; 
Kolodziejczyk 2016; Lang 2007; OECD 2012; Traser 2007).  
 
Of course, it is difficult to estimate the exact degree to which some of these negative 
developments in Poland have been directly caused by workers’ mobility – as opposed to 
by domestic factors or policies implemented due to accession. What has been clear, 
however, is EU institutions’ tendency to minimise any causative link between Poles’ 
mobility and these developments. For example, the Commission has attempted to attribute 
brain drain and labour shortages in CEE states to domestic factors (such as strong 
economic growth, relatively low labour market participation, and low internal mobility), 
without referring to any research supporting this conclusion (Commission 2008c: 13-14). 
It has also sought to minimise the significance of any negative effects - emphasising that 
labour shortages are mostly sector-specific, that some workers are likely to return, and that 
increasing enrolment rates in tertiary education in CEE states will likely compensate for 




                                                      
364 This has led to greater reliance in Poland on foreign labour, especially of TCN seasonal workers (OECD 
2012). 
365 Children raised by their extended families in Poland, while their parents work in EU-15 States. 
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C. CEE Movers’ Experiences in EU-15 States 
 
i. Migration Before and During the Transitional Period 
Poles’ restricted access to western labour markets before 2004 resulted in Polish pre-
accession migrants in the EU often being irregular, and heavily engaged in temporary and 
circular migration (Gozdziak and Pawlak 2016: 109, 115). Although many regularised at 
the time of the Enlargement, their pre-04 experiences might have had repercussions for 
how Poles continue to perceive their labour market position in western States, and for 
how western employers approach them. 
 
At the time of the Enlargement, some scholars had expressed concerns that mobility 
restrictions would push CEE workers into irregular employment during the transitional 
period (e.g., Adinolfi 2005: 497), which carries higher risks of underpayment, abuse, and 
disadvantage. Those predictions might have come true. The European Parliament 
acknowledged that mobility restrictions had resulted in ‘more illegal work, the promotion 
of the black economy and worker exploitation’ (EP 2006: 231), as well as discrimination 
against CEE workers (id: 232). Similarly, the Commission has noted that transitional 
measures had pushed many CEE workers into undeclared work, leading to negative social 
consequences (Commission 2008e: 120) and their experience of inequalities in EU-15 
States (Commission, European Report 2006: 47). Interestingly, the Commission’s 
observation that many CEE movers were engaging in unlawful employment appears 
motivated not by a concern for their wellbeing, but by the Commission’s preference for 
legal migration because it is ‘easier to control’ by the receiving States (Commission 2006: 
8). Again, western States’ interests have been privileged over those of CEE movers. 
 
Scholars have also noted that mobility restrictions might have produced negative long-
term effects on CEE movers, even after the expiration of transitional measures. For 
example, Kubal (2012: 108-20) has argued that the UK’s WRS made Poles more accepting 
of semi-lawful, deskilled, and exploitative arrangements (due to the 30-day registration and 
twelve-month continuous employment requirements). In addition, the burden and cost of 
registering appear to have prompted some movers to work without complying with the 
WRS, in unlawful, precarious arrangements (id). The WRS also increased reliance on 
employment agencies, which have been frequently exploitative, as CEE movers sought to 
secure employment before arriving in the UK (Ward et al 2005). Moreover, scholars have 
speculated that the WRS, combined with CEE workers’ frequently precarious positions, 
likely prompted UK employers to perceive CEE workers as not entirely lawful, and 
especially suitable for low-wage, exploitative arrangements (Ciupijus 2011: 546). Due to 
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such factors, Sirkeci et al (2018) suspect that the WRS contributed to CEE movers’ high 
concentration in low-pay, low-skill jobs today. 
 
ii. Incidents of Exploitation, Deskilling, and Discrimination 
Although it is difficult to determine with certainty a causative relationship between 
transitional restrictions and CEE movers’ experiences after 2011, what has been 
documented is frequent incidents of prejudice and exploitation that CEE workers (and 
especially Poles) have been experiencing in EU-15 States. Low-paid, deskilled 
employment, often in the secondary labour market has been common for CEE movers 
across EU-15 States366 (e.g., Engbersen et al 2017; McCollum and Findlay 2015; Sirkeci et 
al 2018; Verwiebe et al 2014), with very limited opportunities for upward mobility (e.g., 
Fox et al 2015; Voitchovsky 2014). Although CEE movers have increasingly also included 
those employed in high-skilled positions and those settling long-term in their host States, 
most have continued to fill low-skilled, temporary positions (Engbersen et al 2017). A 
majority of employment discrimination complaints across EU-15 States between 2010 and 
2013 were brought by CEE workers (EP Note 2014b: 48). Across EU-15 States, national 
occupational health and safety authorities have been reporting greater numbers of 
discrimination incidents against CEE than EU-15 movers (Groenendijk et al 2013: 8-9).  
 
Based on a review of statistical data, Kofman et al (2009: xi) concluded that, while all 
foreign groups experience difficulties in the UK, CEE workers appear especially prone to 
unfair treatment, harassment, and discrimination, in both the workplace and in daily 
interactions (id: xv). As further discussed in Chapter 6 (see also Appendix 1), CEE movers 
to the UK have tended to concentrate in the secondary labour market, and receive lower 
pay for comparable positions than British and EU-14 workers (Johnston et al 2015). 
Notably, although migrants’ deskilling is typically transitory and dissipates once they 
improve their linguistic ability and gain local experience (Sirkeci et al 2018: 908), CEE 
workers continue to be deskilled and suffer wage penalties when compared to BAME, 
EU-14, and white British workers, even after having been working in the UK for ten or 
more years (id: 919). French (2012) notes that employers’ reluctance to train CEE movers 
contributes to barriers in improving their human capital. This, of course, might be due to 
not only employers’ prejudices, but also the fact that CEE movers have tended to engage 
in circular migration and temporary jobs.  
 
                                                      
366 EU reports addressed in Subsection iv below also refer to similar findings. 
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Among CEE movers to the UK, Poles have had the worst economic and social outcomes 
in some respects (see Appendix 1). Poles became the most deskilled among CEE movers 
shortly after accession (Drinkwater et al 2009: 180). Their rate of return in grade and salary 
to education has continued to be among the lowest in the British labour market (Barslund 
and Busse 2014: 133-4). This is partly because 20% of Polish workers in the UK have 
college education - a rate higher than for TCNs, and at par with EU-14 movers367. 
Moreover, their frequent overqualification might be linked to post-accession economic 
challenges and increasing inequalities in Poland, which had limited job options for 
educated workers (as addressed in the preceding Chapter). Poles have also been over-
represented among CEE movers in temporary mobility, with half of those who had left 
Poland after 2004 returning within four years (OECD 2012), and approximately 10% 
returning within one year (Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2016: 399). One of the factors to 
which scholars have attributed circular migration is a mismatch between skills and 
employment opportunities abroad (Drinkwater and Garapich 2013: 3). Thus, the 
temporariness of their mobility might be motivated by their experiences of exclusion, 
disadvantage, and deskilling. In addition, Poles have been subjected to media (e.g., Cap 
2017: 67-79), popular, and political othering and attacks in the UK (e.g., Fox 2012), 
including hate crimes, both before and since the Brexit referendum (e.g., Rzepnikowska 
2019). 
 
Such experiences might be connected to the EU’s conceptualisation of CEE mobility as 
responsive to western employers’ needs in a climate of increasingly flexible labour markets 
(mentioned above). More broadly, I contend that these findings should be situated within 
the long-standing western approach towards the CEE region as unequal, which has had 
repercussions for the Eastern Enlargement process, and which might have shaped or at 
least normalised the unequal experience of mobility by CEE nationals.  
 
iii. Benefits of Mobility to CEE Nationals 
Of course, Polish and other CEE workers have also benefited economically and socially 
from mobility, and have not been completely devoid of agency. For example, even Poles 
who experience skill degradation in the UK improve their labour market potential upon 
their return to Poland (Gorny and Fihel 2013: 70-1). Moreover, Polish movers have 
exhibited agency, by straddling two cultures and modifying their migration strategies in 
                                                      
367 Polish movers to the UK have been more highly educated than Polish emigrants to other EU-15 
destinations. For example, during 2011-13, 49% of 19-24 year old Polish movers had obtained higher 
education before arriving in the UK (Okólski and Salt 2014: 26-7). 
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response to changing circumstances368 (Drinkwater and Garapich 2015). They have been 
electing to settle in the UK in greater numbers since 2010 (Erdal and Lewicki 2016), and 
many have modified their plans by applying for naturalisation or leaving the UK after the 
Brexit referendum (McGhee et al 2017). 
 
Since all whites benefit from whiteness (McIntosh 1988), Poles and other CEE movers 
have also profited from their skin colour. Being relational, whiteness must be placed 
within local hierarchies of power relations (Garner 2007b), and take account of 
intersectionality among multiple axes of differentiation within each race (Levine-Rasky 
2011). For example, CEE movers are at times able to pass in public as members of the 
dominant groups in EU-15 States. Their whiteness likely facilitates their second 
generations’ ability to join the dominant groups. It also appears to be an advantage in 
front-end jobs and the home care sector that require interacting with customers 
(Drinkwater et al 2007). More fundamentally, CEE states’ accession might have been 
facilitated by their whiteness, as the western public preferred replacing non-white 
workers—excluded through increasing EU and national restrictions on asylum and 
immigration—with CEE workers (McVeigh 2010). The theoretical implications of this will 
be addressed in more detail in Chapter 7.  
 
iv. EU Institutions’ Perspectives on CEE Movers’ Experiences 
CEE movers’ skin colour (and religion) might also explain why EU institutions tend to 
overlook evidence of their exploitation or discrimination, and why EU support for 
integration measures only targets TCNs, the Roma, Muslims, and non-white minority 
groups369. Members of the European Parliament (‘MEPs’) have brought examples of 
exploitation and discrimination faced by CEE movers to EU institutions’ attention – 
including of institutionalised, ‘blatant witch-hunt’ by western politicians (EP 2014: 172), 
work conditions resembling ‘modern-day slavery’370 (EP 2014b: 327), and EU-15 proposals 
to curb CEE nationals’ mobility and access to social benefits (e.g., EP 2014d: 106, 261; EP 
2014i: 557). In responding, EU institutions have failed to condemn such incidents as 
violations of fundamental rights. In addition to emphasising the EU’s lack of competence 
over domestic issues, they have critiqued any such discrimination only for reducing the 
potential economic benefits of mobility to the receiving States (e.g., EP 2014: 173; EP 
                                                      




370 Ciupijus (2012c) and Traser (2007: 5) reached similar conclusions regarding some CEE workers’ 
experiences in, respectively, the UK and Italy. 
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2014d: 261). As addressed in the preceding Chapter, the Commission has similarly 
overlooked racist statements made by some EU-15 representatives, implicitly tolerating 
them. Such responses have likely served to foreclose the view that mobility might have 
produced negative consequences for CEE nationals, and that racism and discrimination 
against them are as unlawful and as reprehensible as against any other group. Even if EU 
competence is lacking in such matters, EU institutions have the power to shape equality 
discourse, which has the potential to affect policies and attitudes. By failing to take 
advantage of this capability, they have helped to propagate EU-15 States’ privilege, while 
naturalising east/west inequalities and the pro-western core of the freedom of movement 
law. 
 
Some EU reports have noted that CEE movers’ experience in EU-15 States has been 
often marked by deskilled employment, poor living conditions, poverty, poor educational 
outcomes, and challenges in accessing housing, health care and other social services (e.g., 
Commission 2008e, 2008c). Yet the Commission has not recommended policy initiatives 
to address such findings. Currie (2007: 91) notes that the Commission almost appears to 
tacitly approve CEE movers’ deskilling because it has noted in the same report 
(Commission 2006b: 12-13) that (1) CEE movers tend to be highly qualified, and that (2) 
they are relieving labour shortages in low-skill sectors, such as construction, domestic 
services, and catering. Similarly, drawing on statistical data from the ILO and the OECD, 
the European Parliament concluded that CEE movers experience lesser rates of lawful 
full-time employment and greater concentration in the low-skilled sector than all other 
foreign-born workers (EP Note 2014b: 10). It did not, however, make any 
recommendations that such apparent inequalities be addressed through specific policies.  
 
EU institutions have also not devoted much attention to incidents of discrimination, 
racism, or hate crimes experienced by CEE movers. In its first post-Enlargement annual 
report on racism, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia371 noted 
that several western States had experienced increased rates of recorded racist violence and 
crimes in 2005, as compared to 2000 (EUMC 2006: 98-102). Although the report did not 
reveal victims’ demographics372, this increased hostility likely had affected the experience 
of all groups that do not belong to the domestic majorities, including CEE movers. The 
report, however, focused only on the Roma, Muslims, Travellers, Jews, and TCNs (id: 103; 
see also ENAR 2009). It did not even contemplate the possibility that CEE movers—who 
                                                      
371 An EU agency, succeeded by the Fundamental Rights Agency in 2007. 
372 Some of this might also be attributable to greater reporting and improved recording. 
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had, after all, faced much negative western public opinion at the time of accession—might 
constitute some of the victims of this increased racism. Notably, looking back on worker 
mobility during 2011-12, the Commission concluded that most victims of prejudice and 
discrimination in EU-15 States have been CEE movers, yet it failed to acknowledge a need 
for greater EU and national policy efforts to protect them (Commission, European Report 
2013: 60-2).  
 
Given the rising intolerance against CEE nationals across EU-15 States, the Commission 
(2013b: 5) has, however, supported the adoption of a new directive to encourage mobility, 
although its practical effects have been limited. Directive 2014/54373 explicitly condemns 
nationality discrimination and any unjustified restrictions on workers’ mobility (Preamble), 
and instructs Member States to ensure that recourse is available to workers experiencing 
such impediments (Article 3). Despite its symbolic value, the Directive did not create new 
substantive mobility or equality rights. Although it prompted some Member States to 
amend their existing laws374, six EU-15 States (including the UK) deemed their existing 
legislations sufficient and did not implement any changes (Commission 2018b: 2). 
Although it is still early, the Commission (id: 9-10) has acknowledged that the Directive’s 
practical impact has been limited. Moreover, in its recent report on fundamental rights, the 
Commission (2018c) has not mentioned CEE movers, despite the apparent increase in 
racist speech and hate crimes against them in the UK in the context of Brexit (as discussed 
earlier). Similarly, in a recent report on EU citizens’ rights, the Parliament (2017: 13) did 
not mention Brexit or CEE movers when acknowledging the recent ‘rise in xenophobia 
and racism in the EU’.  
 
In line with the EU’s approach, whereas all EU-15 States have mandatory nationwide 
integration measures for TCNs, they lack such measures for EU movers (Commission, 
European Report 2013: 103). Some national integration measures even explicitly exclude 
EU citizens - such as in Austria, Germany, Netherlands, and the UK (Groenendijk et al 
2014: 130-2). In the UK, although some local programmes provide advice to CEE movers, 
national integration measures only target New Commonwealth migrants and their 
descendants, refugees, and TCNs (Spencer 2011).   
 
                                                      
373 Directive 2014/54/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on measures 
facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of movement for workers, 
OJ L 128. 
374 Often through non-legislative measures to improve the functioning of equality bodies or access to 
information. 
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Arguably, CEE movers’ whiteness makes it more difficult for (predominantly white) EU 
politicians to see them as victims of racism. I suggest that the long-standing western 
discourse positioning the east on the periphery of proper Europe and the inequalities built 
into the accession process (addressed in Chapters 2-3) might also help to explain why EU 
institutions and EU-15 States have not taken a firmer stance against CEE movers’ 
experiences of inequalities.  
 
7. Conclusion 
As discussed in the preceding Chapter, inequalities built into the accession process 
reinforced Poland’s economic and political struggles at the time of the Enlargement, 
leaving many Poles with little choice but to seek employment in EU-15 States. Although 
Poles have benefited in many ways from their post-accession mobility, the above 
discussion reveals that the historical divisions between east and west continue to exist in 
the EU, as illustrated through the imposition of transitional mobility derogations, CEE 
workers’ frequent experiences of deskilling and exploitation, and the western public’s 
ongoing opposition to CEE movers. EU institutions have, for the most part, tolerated or 
facilitated (through the adoption of more restrictive legal doctrine) such chipping away of 
the right to free movement. In fact, on occasion, EU institutions have perceived CEE 
mobility as a threat to (western) civil solidarity.  
 
Both the Enlargement process and the west’s approach towards Poles’ mobility have been 
at odds with the abstract portrayals of mobility as a fundamental right and a key symbol of 
a ‘re-unification’ and a ‘return’ of the CEE region to ‘Europe’. Both have been in line, 
however, with discourse othering the east, and with the economic, pro-western core of EU 
mythologies, which I had exposed in Chapter 2. Rhetoric about free mobility, provided 
equally to benefit all EU citizens, has served to obfuscate the pro-western economic core 
of the right to free movement, and to hide the role of both the EU and EU-15 States in 
directly and indirectly limiting CEE nationals’ mobility. I argue that economic interests and 
public preferences of EU-15 States have been prioritised in both mobility discourse and 
policies, while reinforcing and naturalising CEE nationals’ second-class EU citizenship. As 
discussed in this and subsequent Chapters, EU citizenship and formal rights to freedom of 
movement and to non-discrimination have in fact not ensured CEE nationals’ freedom to 
move and reside in the west as equal EU citizens. ‘[F]ormal right to move is not sufficient 
to establish a real freedom to move’ (Carens 2013: 6), in line with CRT scholars’ 
observation about the coexistence of formal rights with inequalities and discrimination 
(Matsuda et al 1993). It remains to be seen whether the adoption of the new Pillar of 
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Social Rights, despite being a soft law instrument, indicates the EU’s interest in taking a 
stronger stance on these issues. 
 
Contemporary capitalism relies on a transnational reserve of workers375 (Foster et al 2011). 
The new intra-EU precarious class of movers can be understood as a reconfiguration of 
Marx’s concept of a ‘reserve army’ of workers (Fine and Saad-Filho 2010: 83-4)376. Despite 
the EU project’s promises and equality acquis, the Eastern Enlargement resulted in the 
creation of a mobile, flexible labour force willing to perform jobs that native western 
workers do not tolerate (Woolfson 2017). More generally, the EU project has facilitated 
the growth of this precarious class, by prioritising the three freedoms (of establishment, 
services, and mobility) over local collective bargaining agreements377. As mentioned above, 
the Commission has shown its long-standing support for an American-style, flexible, 
mobile labour market, composed of human capital which is ‘infinitely “malleable”’ and 
adaptable to changing production systems across the EU (Commission 1993: 32). This has 
been in line with initiatives in several EU-15 States—including Germany, France, and the 
UK—to weaken trade unions, deregulate businesses, and rely more on precarious labour. 
Meanwhile, incentivised by EU-15 trade and investment in the aftermath of their 
accession, CEE states—and especially Poland—had weakened their worker protections, 
pushing workers to undertake informal employment and to seek work in EU-15 States 
(Schumann and Simantke 2018). As discussed in the next two Chapters, this transnational 
landscape of inequality has been overlooked by both EU and UK equality frameworks - in 
line with CRT scholars’ observation of how the legal system ignores the actual economic 
and social inequalities faced by minorities (Delgado and Stefancic 2017). 
 
CEE movers in western Member States have perceived that ‘an East-West divide along the 
line of the Iron Curtain still exists’ to differentiate them from western Europeans and 
affect their experiences (Siklodi 2014: 140). As addressed in this Chapter, Poles and other 
CEE movers have indeed straddled belonging and exclusion from the bundle of rights that 
accrue from EU citizenship, even after transitional mobility derogations had expired. 
Although many migrant groups and minorities tend to experience social and institutional 
prejudices, and inequalities in the EU labour market378, the Eastern Enlargement and its 
                                                      
375 Regulated through migration controls, themselves invented by capitalist democracies. 
376 For example, ‘floating’ male workers, women, and children (many in casual and sub-contracted work), and 
Irish migrant labourers in the UK during the Industrial Revolution (Foster et al 2011). 
377 E.g., Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking 
Line, 11 December 2007; Case C-341/05, Laval v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 18 December 2007.  
378 As indicated by lower levels of employment, lower wages, and being over-represented in the least 
desirable jobs (EUMC 2005). 
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resultant mobility have been uniquely framed as egalitarian undertakings, as part of the 
larger benevolent EU project. Moreover, CEE movers are arguably the only Christian, 
white group to have faced such difficulties despite having had access to citizenship rights 
even before arriving in host Member States379. Citizenship, of course, does not encompass 
all socio-cultural or economic privileges, even when combined with whiteness (Jacobson 
1998). Today’s CEE movers have been bestowed EU citizenship due to western economic 
needs (and political concerns), but have not had an immediate access to all its benefits.  
TH Marshall (1950) had noted that the modern notion of citizenship – composed of civil, 
political, and social aspects – might not only coexist alongside social and economic 
inequalities, but might even create and legitimate them. Notably, citizenship scholarship 
has become problematised in this context: CEE movers are endowed with supranational 
citizenship, while their experience of the civil and social aspects of that status is lived at the 
Member State level. The distance between the often-abstract EU citizenship rights and the 
actual experience of mobility creates space for CEE movers’ marginalisation and 
racialisation. Given how hollow at times the formal right of EU citizenship has been, 
perhaps it is not surprising that the Accession Treaty is silent regarding this concept. 
Similarly, EU officials and western politicians did not address it during the process leading 
up to the Enlargement (e.g., Kok 2003). Notably, neither CEE politicians nor CEE 
scholars invoked the concept of citizenship during accession negotiations (Kochenov 
2003: 73), arguably being resigned to their incomplete access to EU citizenship rights. 
 
My discussion in this Chapter confirms the ongoing existence of multiple, intersecting 
forms of differentiation within whiteness—whether political, cultural, economic, 
subjective, or experiential—which operate in each historical context to reflect and affect 
identity and access to resources (Levine-Rasky 2011). Historically, whiteness has been 
most often questioned due to the immigration of Southern and Eastern Europeans. For 
example, a century ago, Slavic380 and Italian migrants were perceived by native-born whites 
as not quite white, and lacked full access to the privileges of the dominant group - in the 
United States (King 2002; Roediger 2005) and Australia (Shiells 2010). In the UK, the first 
law to limit immigration, the Aliens Act 1905, was an attempt to limit migration of Eastern 
European Jews, perceived as a threat to English blood (Gainer 1972). The role of ethnicity 
still matters today, at the EU level. Similarly, the significance of the dominant white 
                                                      
379 Other than colonial citizens before restrictive UK immigration legislation was implemented in the 1960s. 
380 From Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and Russia. 
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ethnicity381 had come to the foreground during the Brexit campaign, filled with concerns 
about CEE movers’ un-British culture, class, and ethnicity. Members of the privileged 
white group at a given time and place endow only those who are like themselves culturally 
and ideologically with all the structural political, cultural, and economic advantages of 
whiteness (Frankenberg 1997). As noted in Chapter 1, the arrival of CEE movers had 
disrupted white native-born Britons’ image of Britishness, even before Brexit was on the 
horizon. Britons conflate belonging with whiteness, but only of the sufficiently British 
kind – which depends on unaccented speech, British cultural practices, and visible markers 
of stereotypical British appearance and behaviour (Samaluk 2014)382.  
 
Interestingly, while promoting European mobility back in the 1960s, Robert Schuman, one 
of the EU’s founding fathers, acknowledged that it ‘is not a question of eliminating ethnic 
and political borders’ as they are ‘a historical given’ (cited in Maas 2013: 15). Instead, his 
modest aim was to ‘take away from borders their rigidity and … intransigent hostility’ (id). 
Similarly, the 1956 Spaak Report predicted that prejudices would likely impede workers’ 
mobility (Editorial Board 2014). This Chapter revealed how such borders still exist within 
the EU, impeding Poles’ access to mobility. In the next Chapter, I ask whether the right to 
equality, which has been intimately linked to the right of free movement, might also be 
removed from the EU’s foundational fundamental rights narratives when it comes to CEE 
movers. 
  
                                                      
381 Fractures can also be observed within ethnicities. For example, post-war Polish immigrants in the UK 
(mostly military personnel and political refugees) have opposed post-04 Polish ‘economic migrants’, due to 
class and ideological differences. 
382 Lately, there has been a revival of a specifically English identity, even more closely circumscribed than 
Britishness (Virdee and McGeever 2018). 
 137 




My discussion in the preceding Chapters illustrates how EU institutions and western 
Member States have approached the CEE region and its nationals unequally, through 
discourse and policies, especially those pertaining to accession and mobility. This has been 
in line with the long-standing western view of the CEE region as lesser in the hierarchy of 
Europeanness than the west. In this Chapter, I explore if similar othering permeates 
equality law and discourse. I analyse the apparent incidence of discrimination across the 
EU, what goals and assumptions underlie the adoption and application of the Race 
Equality Directive 2000/43383, and how CEE movers have been positioned in this context. 
More generally, I seek to address whether the Directive is consistent, in letter or in spirit, 
with the Eastern Enlargement process and the application of the right of free movement 
to CEE nationals. Analysing the EU’s anti-discrimination regime is important to my thesis 
because the right to equality is inextricably linked to mobility and the experience thereof. 
 
Cemented through ECJ case law384, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and institutional 
rhetoric (see Chapter 2), equality has been recognised for more than four decades as a 
fundamental right, and thus part of the foundations of the EU’s legal order. It applies not 
only to all EU policies, but also to Member State laws within the scope of EU law 
(Howard 2009a). EU institutions have long recognised that, to facilitate worker mobility 
and reap its benefit to the aggregate EU economy, the freedom of movement right must 
be supported by measures against nationality discrimination. Nationality anti-
discrimination protections, however, are insufficient to account for discrimination due to 
race or ethnicity. For one, nationality and racial groupings do not always overlap, and there 
are inter-group racial and ethnic differences between individuals belonging to the same 
nationality385. More critically, perhaps, nationality non-discrimination protections do not 
have a horizontal effect, thus formalistically implying that nationality discrimination 
committed by individuals does not exist (or is unworthy of EU laws’ protection)386. The 
Race Equality Directive expanded the principle of equal treatment to encompass racial and 
                                                      
383 Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. 
384 E.g., Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125; Case C-149/77, Defrenne v Sabena no 3 [1978] ECR 1365; Case C-292/97, 
Kjell Karlsson v Jordbruksverket [2000] ECR I-2737; Case C-144/04, Mangold v Helm [2005] ECR I-9981. 
385 The ECJ appears to have taken account of this, by defining ‘ethnic origin’ under the Race Equality 
Directive to include nationality (of EU citizens, not TCNs). See Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie 
Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia. 
386 Nationality protections also do not apply to TCNs, although that is beyond the scope of my discussion. 
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ethnic origin. Specifically, the Directive prohibits direct discrimination, indirect 
discrimination, harassment, and victimisation in various contexts, including employment, 
training, education, social protection, social advantages, and access to goods and services 
(including housing). Adopted in 2000, the Directive was to be implemented in EU-15 
States by 2003, and in the CEE Member States at the time of their accession in 2004. It 
has been interpreted by the ECJ to have a direct horizontal effect in disputes between 
individuals or private entities (as addressed below). 
 
EU institutions have repeatedly praised the Race Equality Directive as a stellar 
achievement of the EU’s long-standing efforts to protect fundamental rights. For example, 
according to the Commission, the Directive constitutes one of ‘the most advanced legal 
[equality] frameworks’ (Commission 2004: 6), and ‘the most comprehensive and far-
reaching anti-discrimination legislation to be found anywhere in the world’ (Commission 
2005: 2). Such grand narratives make it more challenging to question its objectives and 
effectiveness. As discussed in Chapter 1, CRT scholars have noted that myths—such as 
the widely-accepted rhetoric of equal opportunity, and narratives of fundamental rights—
obscure other ways of seeing, and shut out the voices of those not involved in law’s 
creation. Furthermore, formal equality law provides the impression that inequality has 
been mostly erased, thus giving even more credence to the equality rhetoric, and inhibiting 
efforts to address racism (Crenshaw 2011). This shortcoming of formal anti-discrimination 
law can be particularly observed when law is not accompanied by local mobilisation and 
grassroots organisations pressing for equality policies (Ben-Tovim 1986). Thus, to fully 
understand the meaning and impact of the Directive, I not only consider the obvious fact 
that CEE states were not involved in the Directive’s adoption as it preceded their 
accession, but also look at what interests and social power structures the equality doctrine 
might conceal or overlook, and analyse any limitations of its application - especially in the 
context of CEE or Polish movers.  
 
General critiques of EU equality law have focused on its basis in promoting economic 
competition, with little regard to the actual experience of inequalities (e.g., Mason 2010; 
Somek 2011; Stychin 2003: 78-9), leading some to call it ‘empty rhetorical gestures’ 
(Frantziou 2014). This, of course, is in line with CRT view of equality law as being 
promulgated only when the interests of the dominant and the subjugated groups converge 
(Bell 1980). Some scholars have questioned whether the Race Equality Directive has had 
much practical effect (Hepple 2004). For example, Howard (2004; 2009) suggests that it 
constitutes merely a symbolic gesture to support formal equality, promulgated to improve 
the EU’s image (in the eyes of both its Members and external polities) and to appease 
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those calling for greater equality protections. The Directive has been critiqued for having 
failed to confront racism and discrimination against long-existing subordinated groups in 
the EU, and against newly created disadvantaged groups (Jefferys 2015: 20). It has also 
been condemned for failing to address racial inequalities’ underlying causes (e.g., Mason 
2010), such as EU-wide market-driven power relations (e.g., Erel 2007; Jefferys 2015). Of 
course, such recognition would be particularly problematic given the EU project’s 
foundations and continuing market goals. Most commentators, however, had welcomed 
the Directive with optimism, and praised it for heralding the start of a new era of post-
Maastricht social law (e.g., Bell 2002; Fredman 2001). Such an outlook is in line with the 
EU’s fundamental rights narratives, addressed in Chapter 2. I hope to enrich such views 
with a more holistic analysis of how CEE movers have been situated in the EU equality 
regime—including the Directive’s legislative history, and the broader equality discourse—
and by contextualising my findings within the accession process and the right to free 
movement. 
 
I begin with a brief background discussion of the incidence and public perceptions about 
racist attitudes and discriminatory behaviours in the EU. I then consider whether CEE 
movers were included in the Directive’s legislative history, which was drafted once the 
Eastern Enlargement had become a clear possibility and adopted only four years before 
the Enlargement. In analysing the Directive’s text and its ECJ interpretation, I pay close 
attention to whether the Directive is fit to address CEE movers’ equality concerns. Next, I 
turn my attention to the Directive’s transposition process in EU-15 States, seeking to 
better understand its impact on domestic laws and its ability to address discrimination. 
Finally, I discuss how CEE nationals have been approached by the EU’s broader equality 
discourse. In the process, I explore whether there are any disconnects between the rhetoric 
of fundamental rights, equality law as adopted and written, and law as interpreted and 
applied. Throughout this Chapter, I also note any instances of tension among EU 
institutions, as well as between EU institutions and EU-15 States.  
 
My overall aim is to evaluate the Directive’s foundations and implementation, particularly 
in the context of my study group, keeping in mind that groups most in need of equality 
protections tend to be excluded from legislative and judicial processes, formal laws, and 
legal ideology, which legitimate interests of the group in power. Although the dominant 
group employs the rule of law and legal narratives to obscure law’s construction and 
hidden politics (Delgado and Stefancic 2017), EU law is particularly open to a legal realist 
analysis because of its visible political character (Möschel 2014: 86). In line with CRT and 
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CWS scholars, who re-examine historical and legal records to question the underlying 
interests and foundations of the current legal order (Harris 2013), I seek to replace 
majoritarian interpretations of EU equality law with those in line with the position and 
experiences of CEE movers. 
 
2. Attitudes, Perceptions, and Incidence of Discrimination  
 
According to Eurobarometer polls and other studies, racist attitudes have been prevalent 
for decades across the EU. For example, in 1988, more than 30% of EU citizens surveyed 
believed that there were too many people of another race or nationality in their country 
(Commission 1989: 5). In 1997, 33% of EU nationals considered themselves to be ‘very’ 
or ‘quite’ racist against immigrants (Eurobarometer 1997: 2). Similar attitudes have been 
recorded since the Directive had been transposed. For example, 42% of EU nationals 
polled in 2006 considered the presence of people from other ethnic groups as ‘a cause of 
insecurity’, and 45% felt this way in 2009 (Eurobarometer 2010a: 54). By 2012, 54% of 
those polled stated that policies promoting equality should receive less funding and should 
be assigned less importance, an increase from 49% in 2009 (Eurobarometer 2012: 12-13). 
Although such polls indicate attitudes towards not just movers or foreigners, and post-
2004 surveys include respondents in both EU-15 and CEE states, they nevertheless shed 
light on a general racist sentiment prevalent across the EU. 
 
In line with such attitude polls, many EU citizens perceive racial discrimination to be an 
ordinary part of life and the most widespread form of discrimination in the EU, 
particularly in the context of employment. For example, 64% of EU nationals surveyed in 
2007 reported that racial or ethnic discrimination is widespread in their country, a higher 
percentage than for any other ground measured (for example, 53% felt that discrimination 
due to disability is widespread, and 40% due to gender) (Eurobarometer 2007a: 9). Almost 
half of the respondents felt that racial or ethnic discrimination was more common in 2007 
than it had been in 2002 (id: 10). Sixty-two percent felt that having a different ethnic origin 
than the national majority is a disadvantage in their society - trailing only behind being 
disabled (79%), being Roma (77%), and being aged over 50 (69%)387 (id: 14). Forty-five 
percent felt that a job candidate’s belonging to racial or ethnic minority would put her ‘at a 
disadvantage’ - after poor appearance (51%), disability (49%), and age (49%), but above 
gender (22%) (id: 16). Similar results had been reported in 2008 and 2009 (Eurobarometer 
2008a; Eurobarometer 2009). More recent data continues to be in line with such findings. 
For example, ethnic discrimination was viewed as ‘widespread’ by 56% of the 26,600 
                                                      
387 Thirty-three percent felt that being a woman presents such disadvantages (Eurobarometer 2007a: 14). 
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persons surveyed across the EU in 2012 – approximately 10% more than those 
considering discrimination on the grounds of disability, sexual orientation, gender identity 
or age to be widespread (Eurobarometer 2012: 28). According to the most recent 
Eurobarometer survey on this topic, ethnic discrimination continues to be regarded as the 
most widespread form of discrimination in the EU (by 64% of respondents), followed by 
discrimination due to sexual orientation (58%), gender identity (56%), religion (50%), 
disability (50%), old age (42%) and gender (37%) (Eurobarometer 2015a: 14). Age, 
appearance, racial or ethnic origin, and (female) gender are the criteria deemed to put job 
applicants at the greatest disadvantage (according to 56%, 52%, 46%, and 27% of 
respondents, respectively) (id: 79). 
 
Surveys of ethnic minorities and migrant groups reveal similar findings. For example, 
according to the 2008 European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (‘EU-
MIDIS’)388, 30% of the 23,000 immigrant and ethnic minority group members polled 
believed that they had experienced389 racial discrimination in the past year (FRA 2009: 37-
8) - including 11% of Poles in the UK, and 26% Poles in Ireland. The lower-than-average 
perception of discrimination by Polish respondents might be attributable to their 
whiteness - which does confer them with some degree of invisibility and advantage, and 
also might make it more difficult for them to perceive their disadvantages as 
discrimination (Fox et al 2015). The lower perception of discrimination in the UK than in 
Ireland might reflect lower incidence of overt or obvious racism in the UK or the 
effectiveness of the UK’s anti-discrimination legislation, which will be addressed in the 
next Chapter.  
 
Migrants perceive being discriminated against due to their race or ethnicity in various 
settings. Overall, EU-MIDIS respondents reported discriminatory experiences to have 
occurred most often at work, when searching for work, or when searching for housing 
(FRA 2009: 118). Among Polish movers in the UK who were surveyed, 35% perceived 
that ethnic or national-origin discrimination in the UK was ‘very’ or ‘fairly widespread’, 
more than due to other protected grounds (id: 113); 70% considered their ethnicity to be a 
barrier to workplace advancement (id: 114); and 20% avoided certain places due to fearing 
discrimination (id: 126). The Commission (2006e: 4) had noted (without citing specific 
data) that statistics provided by national governments and equality bodies in 2006 
                                                      
388 The second EU-MIDIS survey, conducted in 2017, did not consider CEE movers, without explaining 
why this change was implemented since the first survey (FRA 2017). 
389 According to survey administrators, perceptions were generally confirmed by the respondents’ detailed 
recollections of discriminatory incidents. 
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confirmed that most complaints of racial discrimination before national courts and/or 
equality bodies involve employment, followed by the provision of goods, services and 
housing. EU reports do not provide a specific breakdown of complaints, in part because 
EU equality legislation does not require Member States to collect such data. Based on his 
knowledge of actual incidents of discrimination, however, the president of the European 
Network Against Racism390 considered ethnic origin to be the most frequent cause of 
discrimination in Europe (Hamman and Frank 2015).  
 
According to outcome studies, the employment setting appears to be the most common 
context in which ethnic discrimination occurs (Jefferys 2015: 18). Not belonging to the 
local majority has been shown to affect workers’ employability, the sectors in which they 
are employed, and chances of promotion (id; Heath and Cheung 2006). Studies relying on 
migrant testers conducted by the ILO in several EU-15 States391 consistently indicate that 
discrimination in recruitment is experienced by more than 30% of migrants (Makkonen 
2012: 55). Compared to natives, foreigners’ experiences in EU-15 States have been marked 
by deskilled employment; challenges in accessing housing, health care and other social 
services; poor living conditions; high risk of poverty; and poor educational outcomes for 
their children (e.g., Commission 2008e, 2008c). Empirical data indicates that CEE movers, 
and Poles especially, experience deskilling, low wages, and exploitation at work (see 
Appendix 1). According to the Commission (2013b: 12), EU movers ‘are still perceived in 
most of the EU as holding a status closer to that of third-country nationals than to that of 
national workers’. 
 
In addition to the fact that discrimination tends to be underreported392, it is likely that the 
types of evidence discussed above do not fully capture the extent of today’s racial 
discrimination, particularly in the context of my study group. In the last few decades, race-
based inequalities across the EU have moved from being direct and conspicuous to being 
more furtive (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016), and more concealed within appeals to 
patriotism, culture, and class (Erel 2007; Anderson 2013: 2). As Erel (2007: 12) notes, new 
migrations, including of CEE nationals to EU-15 States, have influenced the articulation 
of contemporary forms of racism in Europe. While distinctions between whites and non-
whites have become less publicly acceptable, salient boundaries have become more 
                                                      
390 Set up in 1998, ENAR is the only pan-European network of NGOs from all Member States. With 
financial support from the Commission, it advocates racial equality.  
391 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. 
392 Although statistics are difficult to obtain, in some Member States, fewer than 2% of discrimination 
victims take any legal action (FRA 2007: 19-39; FRA 2009: 50-52; Bell et al 2007). 
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prominent between white EU movers and white host State populations (McGinnity and 
Merove 2016).  
 
Prejudices and discrimination faced by white movers—termed by some scholars 
‘racialisation’ (Fox et al 2012a; Rzepnikowska 2019)—have been exhibited across EU-15 
States, not only through impediments to mobility (as discussed in the preceding Chapter), 
but also through exclusion from full participation in the economy, politics, and society of 
their host States. Samaluk (2014) has attributed CEE movers’ social, economic, and 
political disadvantages in EU-15 States to their incomplete whiteness, that is, their partial 
access to white privilege. Full access to white privilege in the west is limited to the 
dominant, middle (or upper) class, western white ethnicities (id) – and especially to those 
who are Christian, able-bodied, thin, heterosexual, and male (Lorde 1995; Tatum 2003: 
13). Below, I address whether the Race Equality Directive and the broader equality 
discourse appear responsive to the findings addressed in this Section. 
 
3. The Race Equality Directive  
 
A. Legislative History  
 
Discrimination has tended to be perceived by EU bodies as problematic mostly to the 
extent that it distorts the functioning of the common economic market. Hence, the EU’s 
early equality initiatives had focused on socio-economic equality only, while failing to 
address other roots of social disadvantage (Marshall 1950). Somek (2011: 65-7) argues that 
the core of all EU equality policies continues to stem from a desire to facilitate the 
functioning of the neoliberal economic market, whereas social justice issues have been 
delegated to national agendas. This brings to mind Bell’s (1980) interest convergence 
theory. Given that early mobility involved only western, mostly white workers, nationality 
and gender discrimination were addressed first. By the 1980s, EU institutions began 
acknowledging racial discrimination more – likely due to increasing migration from outside 
the EU, rising racial tensions in several EU-15 States with colonial legacies, and the 
increasing appeal of populist, right-wing political parties (Guiraudon 2009).  
 
i. The Beginning  
Since the mid-1980s, various EU institutions would issue reports and resolutions to 
express their concern about the apparent rise in racist and xenophobic attitudes in the EU 
(Commission 1997e). EU statements connected this to the increasing presence of right-
wing parties in several States and in the European Parliament393. After extreme right-wing 
                                                      
393 Especially during the 1979, 1984, and 1994 elections. 
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parties recorded considerable successes in the 1984 national elections in several States, 
most especially in France, the Parliament established a Committee of Inquiry into the rise 
of racism and fascism in Europe (EP 1985). The resultant Evrigenis Report concluded that 
xenophobia was increasing, and recommended EU-level action (id). In response, the 
Commission, Council, and the Parliament signed the Joint Declaration Against Racism and 
Xenophobia in June 1986. Stating, in general terms, the EU’s support for equality394, the 
Declaration constituted the first official acknowledgement that racism was an issue of 
concern for the EU. Activists were also pressuring EU institutions for the creation of 
measures to combat racial discrimination (Solanke 2009: 169-80) against non-European, 
non-Christian minorities (such as Turkish and Moroccan guest workers) (Bell 2002b: 68-
72). Both national and EU leaders acted with increased urgency after attacks were 
perpetrated in several Member States in the early 1990s against migrants of Jewish, 
Muslim, African, and South Asian backgrounds (Dummett 1994; Kahn et al 1995: 4). 
Despite the Parliament’s advocacy for EU-level racial equality legislation, however, the EU 
lacked competence395 to act in this field. Instead, it had to wait for the Commission’s 
decision to place such a proposal before the Council of Ministers, the EU’s main 
legislative body.  
 
Both the Commission and the Council were more hesitant to act than the Parliament was. 
After the 1986 Joint Declaration was signed, the Parliament requested the adoption of 
EU-level anti-discrimination legislation (EP 1989), but the Commission rejected it due to 
lacking competence (Commission 1988). Instead, the Commission issued a proposal for a 
non-binding resolution on racism, and urged Member States to adopt and/or enhance 
domestic racial equality laws (id). The Council (composed of Member States’ ministers) 
also questioned EU competence in this field (Bell 2002b: 61). The Parliament then 
established a second Committee of Inquiry in 1990, which culminated in the Ford Report, 
reiterating the need for EU action due to rising racism and electoral successes of the 
extreme right-wing (EP 1991). The Parliament commissioned another study in 1993, 
which resulted in the Piccoli Report (EP 1997). Again, however, the Commission and the 
Council stressed that the EU lacked competence to act (id).  
 
In addition to being framed in the context of the rise of right-wing politicians across 
western Europe, EU debates at the time continued to focus on the protection of non-
                                                      
394 OJ 1986 C 158, 25.6.1986. 
395 The EU may legislate and coordinate State policies only in areas of competence explicitly conferred on it 
by the Member States pursuant to Treaties. Furthermore, even in areas where it has competence, EU action 
may not go beyond what is necessary to achieve Treaty objectives. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri= uriserv%3Aai0020.  
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European TCNs (Bell 2002b: 66-72). Despite CEE states’ accession process being well 
underway at that time, the potential impact of the movement of CEE nationals to western 
States was overlooked396 in EU discourse. It is not clear whether this silence was due to a 
mere oversight. It is possible that (predominantly white) EU officials could not foresee or 
conceptualise any potential xenophobia against Caucasian intra-EU movers as racism. 
Such is the naturalised, homogenising power of white privilege. This silence might also 
have been due to a less benevolent motive: an unwillingness to acknowledge any potential 
discrimination against CEE nationals as deserving of anti-discrimination protections. After 
all, as addressed in Chapter 3, EU-15 States and EU institutions were clearly aware of 
east/west power differences in the context of the Enlargement and of inequalities built 
into the accession process. EU institutions also knew that EU-15 States sternly opposed 
CEE nationals’ mobility, and had acknowledged on several occasions that such mobility 
was likely to lead to experiences of prejudice and inequalities (see Chapter 4). However, 
the EU was silent on these points when contemplating adopting a racial equality measure.  
 
  ii.  The Starting Line Group 
The Parliament’s efforts were strengthened in 1991 with the creation of the Commission-
funded Starting Line Group (‘SLG’), which became the strongest EU-level advocate in 
bringing about the passage of the Race Equality Directive. Composed of more than 300 
(western) Member State and EU-level NGOs and legal experts, the SLG was dominated 
by Dutch and British legal and political activists397, including the UK’s Commission for 
Racial Equality (Evans and Givens 2010). The migrant rights organisations encompassed 
under its umbrella – including the Migration Policy Group, the Churches’ Committee for 
Migrants in Europe, Caritas Europa, and the Migrants’ Forum – were concerned with 
protecting the rights of refugees398 and migrants from outside of Europe (Dummett 1994). 
The most organised of the migrant groups, the Commission-sponsored Migrants’ 
Forum399, sought to strengthen citizenship rights of Turks and Moroccans in France and 
Germany (Geddes 2004). The SLG also included groups devoted to advocating Jewish and 
Roma causes, such as the European Jewish Information Network, Struggle Against 
Racism, and the European Roma Rights Centre (id). 
 
The SLG’s aims did not encompass CEE nationals’ treatment in western Member States. 
Most of the SLG’s constituent groups had been long-standing, and hence engaged in 
                                                      
396 As was the presence of post-1989 CEE migrants. 
397 With some from Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy (Dummett 1994). 
398 At that time, mostly from the former USSR, the former Yugoslavia, and outside of Europe. 
399 Created in 1992 as an EU consultative body. 
 146 
addressing historical domestic equality causes. Concerns over the treatment of white 
European movers were not on domestic agendas at the time, especially given their low 
numbers (as mentioned in the preceding Chapter). Moreover, migrant-advocacy groups 
comprising the SLG had failed to create EU-wide action to increase migrant inclusion, and 
instead, had settled on supporting (non-white) race-based equality (Chalmers 2001: 207). 
More generally, as Bell (2002b: 58) points out, due to their relatively small proportion of 
host State populations, migrants have tended to lack political power in the EU. Their weak 
position has been compounded by their diverse origins and interests, which makes it 
difficult to form a common platform (Geddes 2004: 341).  
To increase the political persuasiveness of their arguments, the SLG drew on market-
integration arguments, noting that the lack of racial and ethnic equality protections 
presented a barrier to workers’ mobility (Geddes 2004), their economic integration, and 
the success of the single market (Guiraudon 2009). It is possible, of course, that this was 
merely a strategic move, and that SLG activists’ real motives stemmed from fundamental 
rights concerns. Regardless, the SLG’s recommendations and legislative drafts were 
steeped in market discourse - in line with the core of the EU’s equality and fundamental 
rights rhetoric, as discussed in Chapter 2 and below. 
 
  iii.  The Drafting Process 
 
Although the Commission indicated its increasing interest in anti-discrimination measures 
by establishing the Consultative Commission on Racism and Xenophobia in 1994 (EP 
1993), it opposed the SLG’s first draft of the Directive, attributing its position to lacking 
competence. The Commission only came to embrace the SLG’s efforts after the release of 
the Kahn Report in 1995. Even with the support of the Parliament and of the 
Commission, however, the SLG’s proposals faced opposition from national politicians. 
Member States had many prior opportunities to amend the EC Treaty to endow the EU 
with competence in this field – including through the 1986 Single European Act, and the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty – but they had expressed no interest in doing so. 
 
The drafting process exposed fractures between EU institutions’ and EU-15 politicians’ 
preferences, consistent with tensions revealed during the Eastern Enlargement process 
and in the debates on free movement (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). EU-15 politicians400 
                                                      
400 Furthermore, EU-15 States disagreed with one another – especially regarding the use of statistical 
evidence, protections beyond the scope of employment, and the exception for genuine and determining 
occupational requirement (Fella and Ruzza 2013: 209-40). Such tensions reflected Member States’ unique 
pre-existing approaches to equality, local manifestations of discrimination, and domestic public attitudes (id: 
1-2).  
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effectively pressured the Parliament and the Commission to weaken some of the SLG’s 
draft proposals. For example, due to western politicians’ pressure, proposals endowing 
NGOs with standing to sue independently, permitting class actions, and enabling the 
Directive to have a direct effect401 were scrapped (Evans and Givens 2010; Tyson 2001). 
In other instances, however, EU bodies did resist EU-15 demands to dilute strength of the 
Directive’s drafts. For example, despite EU-15 opposition (Evans and Givens 2010: 226), 
the Directive requires the establishment of national equality bodies, and extends in scope 
to include access to goods, services, and education. Although EU institutions can be 
commended for withstanding to a certain degree EU-15 politicians’ insistence on 
weakening the Directive, it should be remembered that it was the SLG that was 
responsible for drafting the most innovative provisions which moved beyond the EU’s 
pre-existing anti-discrimination regime - such as increasing victims’ access to courts, and 
providing institutional support for litigants. It was also the SLG that had first proposed 
amending the EC Treaty to provide the EU with competence to regulate in this field (EP 
1993).  
 
The Directive’s drafting process also revealed some differences of opinion among 
different EU bodies. In line with my findings in earlier Chapters, the Parliament—the only 
EU institution elected through universal suffrage—was more receptive than other EU 
institutions to concerns about protecting fundamental rights. Composed of ministers of 
EU-15 States, the Council was especially inclined to lessen the Directive’s strength to 
reduce transposition costs on the Member States. For example, the Commission favoured 
making the burden of proof in indirect discrimination claims not dependent on statistical 
evidence - a position supported by most Member States, as most do not collect racial or 
ethnicity data (Tyson 2001: 203). The Council, however, sought to reduce transposition 
burdens on the Member States by allowing them the flexibility to require such evidence 
(id). Furthermore, whereas the Commission favoured requiring Member States to establish 
equality bodies, the Council opposed this (id: 204). The Council also resisted the 
Parliament’s proposal to extend the scope of the Directive to the exercise of official 
functions by any public body (including the police, and immigration, criminal, and civil 
justice authorities) (id). The Council only succumbed to extending EU competence in this 
field due to the negative effects of cross-border racism on the internal market, and due to 
the increasing EU coordination of external immigration policies (Bell 2002b: 63-72). Still, 
the Council’s opposition can be considered somewhat unexpected given that, by then, all 
                                                      
401 Although the ECJ has endowed the Directive with a direct horizontal effect, as discussed below. 
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EU-15 States had already subscribed to international anti-discrimination instruments402, 
and EU soft law measures had already induced equality law harmonisation efforts among 
some EU-15 States (EP 1997). For example, the UK had well-developed racial equality 
legislation since the 1970s, as addressed in the next Chapter. France, the Netherlands, and 
Germany were already being influenced by common-law equality provisions, and were 
developing sophisticated equality measures – including adding the concept of indirect 
discrimination, expanding personal scope of anti-discrimination law, and encompassing 
more protected characteristics (Fredman 2011). Thus, it is possible that at least some EU-
15 ministers opposed robust Directive provisions due to their sovereignty worries rather 
than due to pragmatic concerns.  
By the mid-90s, EU institutions had begun to contextualise racial equality as not merely an 
economic issue, but a fundamental rights question. Strengthened by increasing reliance on 
fundamental rights rhetoric, both the Parliament (1995a) and the Commission (1995) 
publicly announced their support for amending the EC Treaty to provide EU competence 
in this field. It is debatable, however, whether the EU was driven by a commitment to 
fundamental rights or by strategic imperatives. As Solanke (2009: 186) notes, placing racial 
equality initiatives within fundamental rights rhetoric was a tactical move by the EU to 
support its competence. As noted in Chapter 2, by that time, fundamental rights rhetoric 
had become well-propagated as the key foundational myth. Moreover, in a 1996 report, 
the Commission had noted that passing new equality legislation would serve a strategic 
purpose, by providing ‘excellent publicity’ for the EU, especially useful before upcoming 
Parliament elections (Commission 1996c: 20). Thus, the EU’s support for competence in 
this field appears not solely driven by fundamental rights concerns.  
 
The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam amended the EC Treaty to create EU competence in the 
field of anti-discrimination law beyond the already protected grounds of sex and 
nationality. Article 13403 endowed ‘the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament’, with discretionary power to 
‘take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’. Notably, the wording of this 
provision left much power to the Member States. A single Member could prevent 
unanimous Council action. Furthermore, contrary to the SLG’s recommendations, Article 
                                                      
402 Including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; European Convention of Human Rights; 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
403 Today, Article 19 TFEU. 
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13 did not possess a direct effect404. Notably, it declared that the EU should aim to combat 
racism—thus admitting the existence of racial discrimination—but did nothing to address 
it directly. The listed ground of ‘racial or ethnic origin’ is also more narrowly phrased than 
race-based grounds under several international human rights instruments405. 
After the amendment of the EC Treaty, some Member States continued to oppose EU 
legislation in this field. France and Germany were especially concerned about any 
requirements to collect racial and ethnic data, which were domestically unpopular (due to, 
respectively, the concept of laïcité 406, and Nazi atrocities) (Geddes 2004: 339). Some 
Member States also found EU legislation in this field superfluous or encroaching on their 
sovereignty (id: 343). Largely due to those two reasons, the UK was the strongest 
opponent of EU legislation in this field (Bell 2002b: 72). The change of British leadership 
in 1997, however, resulted in the new centre-left Government’s support for the Directive 
– to be consistent with domestic debates about integrating Muslims and asylees, and with 
the post-Stephen Lawrence407 political commitment to address institutional inequalities 
(Geddes 2004: 343-4). The prospect of the Eastern Enlargement and the potential arrival 
of CEE movers in the UK does not appear to have impacted the new Government’s 
position, despite the UK’s historical experience of recognising another form of anti-white 
racism, that against the Irish. 
The Commission proposed the Race Equality Directive in December 1999. It was adopted 
by the Council in June 2000 - at record speed for a directive that would require substantial 
changes to some Member States’ legislative frameworks (Tyson 2001: 201). This quick 
pace was likely to serve as a symbolic gesture against the rise of extreme right-wing parties 
across EU-15 States408 - in particular, the inclusion of Freedom Party representatives in 
Austria’s coalition government (Geddes 2004: 346-7)409. Notably, at least in part due to the 
hurried speed of the adoption process, national bureaucrats were not consulted by their 
                                                      
404 Unlike, for example, the direct effect of Article 119 (requiring equal pay between women and men). 
405 E.g., UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘any ground such as race, colour, … 
language, … national or social origin, … birth or other status’); UN International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (‘any kind such as to … 
race, colour, language, … national, ethnic or social origin, nationality, … birth or other status’); European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘any ground such as … race, colour, language, … national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, … birth or other status’). 
406 Developed during the French Revolution, this principle of secularism in public affairs is aimed at 
fostering a post-religious, colour-blind society.   
407 Discussed in the next Chapter.  
408 Given the recent rise in right-wing extremism and increasing intolerances across the EU, the Commission 
has been active once again in promoting equality measures (especially to combat antisemitism, Afro-phobia, 
and discrimination against Muslims and the Roma) (Commission 2019). 
409 The remaining fourteen Member States declared that they would not accept any official contact with the 
Austrian government if it included Freedom Party members (Geddes 2004). 
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EU representatives (Guiraudon 2009: 533). Negotiators simply phoned their respective 
domestic interlocutors for approval (id), instead of the usual practice of having proposals 
translated and sent back to all the relevant national bureaucracies for examination. EU-15 
governments’ lack of thorough analysis of the Directive might help to explain some of the 
difficulties during the Directive’s transposition process, as discussed below.  
 
Although EU institutions’ and EU-15 States’ motives for the Directive’s adoption do not 
appear to have always been consistent, one thing is certain: none of the key EU 
institutions or pan-European advocacy groups considered the treatment of white movers 
when drafting or adopting the Directive. EU-15 State politicians, also silent regarding 
intra-EU movers, appear to have been even less inspired than the EU by human rights 
rhetoric. 
B. The Law  
 
i.  The Text of the Directive  
 
The Race Equality Directive (see Appendix 2) converges labour market and fundamental 
rights justifications for prohibiting discrimination. It is framed within the EU’s respect for 
fundamental rights (Recital 1) and the universal right to equality (Recital 3). It recognises, 
however, that racial and ethnic equality is crucial to the EU’s economic objectives, such as 
achieving a high level of employment (Recital 9). Composed of nineteen articles spanning 
three pages410, the Directive provides ‘a framework for combating discrimination on the 
grounds of racial or ethnic origin, with a view of putting into effect in the Member States 
the principle of equal treatment’ (Article 1). Although States may implement broader anti-
discrimination provisions than those specified in the Directive, they are not allowed to 
reduce their pre-existing protections (Article 6).  
 
The Directive mandates that ‘there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination based on 
racial or ethnic origin’ (Article 2(1)). Direct discrimination is defined, in line with the EU’s 
approach in other equality contexts, as being ‘treated less favourably than another [person] 
is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation’ (Article 2(2)(a)). Indirect 
discrimination occurs when ‘an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would 
put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other 
persons’ (unless such a provision meets the proportionality test) (Article 2(2)(b)). 
However, a genuine and determining occupational requirement might justify 
discrimination (if it satisfies the proportionality test) (Article 4). Moreover, Member States 
                                                      
410 Together with a Preamble containing 28 Recitals, spanning two pages. 
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may elect to implement positive action, that is, ‘specific measures to prevent or 
compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin’ (Article 5). Article 2(3) 
prohibits harassment, that is, ‘unwanted conduct related to racial or ethnic origin’ which is 
undertaken ‘with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating 
an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment’. Instructions to 
discriminate (Article 2(4)) are also prohibited. Member States are also required to 
introduce measures to protect individuals from victimisation (Article 9). In the context of 
direct and indirect discrimination, the Directive follows gender equality law’s shifting of 
the burden of proof411 to the respondent once the claimant presents sufficient evidence to 
establish a presumption of discrimination (Article 8). 
 
All these prohibitions apply to both private and public sectors, including public bodies - in 
the context of both (1) the labour market (access to employment, promotion, vocational 
training, working conditions, dismissal, pay, and involvement in trade organisations), and 
(2) social protections (social security and healthcare, social advantages, education, and 
access to and supply of goods and services that are publicly available, such as housing) 
(Article 3(1)). The Directive does not apply to nationality discrimination, to the entry and 
residence rights of TCNs (Article 3(2))412, or to migration status. The law is not settled on 
whether it covers language or accent discrimination.  
The Directive’s most significant provisions are the ones that went beyond the EU’s pre-
existing equality regime, which was developed in the context of gender413. Most 
importantly, the Directive expanded the scope of legal protections - to include not only 
private, but also public sectors and public bodies414, and to encompass contexts beyond 
employment (Article 3(1)). Notably, its material scope is broader than that under the other 
Article 13 directive adopted at the same time, Directive 2000/78415. This difference in 
scope seems to indicate the importance attached to racial equality. Another one of its 
novel features is its definition of indirect discrimination (Article 2(2)(b)), which combines 
elements of the pre-existing definition under sex discrimination law416 with the ECJ’s case 
                                                      
411 Directive 97/80/EC on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex, OJ L 14, 20.1.1998. 
412 The Directive does not apply to TCNs’ nationality discrimination (although it does apply to their racial 
discrimination). See Joint Cases C-22/08, C-23/08, Vatsouras and Koupatantze v Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
[2009] OJ C 180. Thus, in some cases, nationality discrimination might be a proxy for race discrimination, yet 
escape the reach of EU law. 
413 Beginning with the Treaty of Rome. 
414 Albeit what constitutes ‘public sectors’ or ‘public bodies’ is not defined. 
415 Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation 
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, disability, age, and sexual orientation. 
416 An ‘apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice [which] disadvantages a substantially higher 
proportion of the members of one sex’, unless it is appropriate and necessary and could be justified by 
objective factors unrelated to sex. Directive 97/80, Article 2(2). 
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law on nationality discrimination417 (which does not depend on statistical evidence). 
According to Recital 15, Member States may, but are not obliged to, require that 
complainants establish indirect discrimination through statistical evidence. Since, unlike for 
gender, some States and employers do not collect data broken down by racial and ethnic 
origins, the Commission chose a definition of indirect discrimination which did not rely on 
the test of disproportion. Furthermore, for the first time, the EU mandated that Member 
States designate bodies for the promotion of equal treatment, to provide independent aid 
to victims and to publish independent research (Article 13). 
 
ii. Critique of the Directive418    
 
a. Individual Enforcement 
 
Arguably, the Directive’s greatest inherent weakness is that its enforcement mechanism is 
based on individual litigation, akin to the British equality law’s model from the 1970s. 
Private litigation based on past individual incidents of discrimination, with no possibility of 
class actions, is inefficient at addressing structural or institutional discrimination, and does 
little for disadvantaged groups’ inclusion or political empowerment. As Chalmers (2001: 
225) notes, the Directive overlooks pre-existing disadvantages faced by some groups. 
Moreover, focusing on individual wrongdoings ignores the underlying social conditions 
that contribute to disadvantage (Barnes 2016; Freeman 1978). It also encourages 
adjudicators to devalue evidence going beyond just the individual dispute before them, and 
to rely more on their own values and forms of understanding (Fitzpatrick 1987). The 
complex power relations between different ethnic groups are better appreciated through 
class actions. In the context of my study group, individual litigation does little to address 
circumstances when Poles as a group tend to be treated poorly collectively by employers 
and are disadvantaged collectively in the labour market (as addressed in the next Chapter). 
It also does not take into account negative public and media discourse, and the broader 
western discourse of othering the CEE region that embeds their experiences of 
disadvantage within a specific ideology of inequality, and which had permeated the Eastern 
Enlargement process and how mobility was afforded to CEE nationals.  
 
Moreover, individual claims place the entire burden (of initiating claims, obtaining advice, 
and paying filing fees) on individual claimants. This disadvantages Polish victims of 
discrimination since they tend to be poor, overworked (see Appendix 1), engaged in 
                                                      
417 Notably, Case C-237/94, O’Flynn. 
418 In this Section (and the next Chapter), I rely heavily on examples from the employment context because 
that is where discrimination often manifests itself, and because CEE nationals’ mobility has been largely 
motivated by employment opportunities.  
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precarious employment, and lacking access to well-organised advocacy groups or free legal 
representatives (Barnard et al 2018). Although the Directive endowed organisations with 
legal standing to support claimants or to sue on their behalf (Article 7(2)), my review of 
UK employment tribunal cases (in Chapter 6) did not reveal a single incidence of this. 
Finally, a remedial framework based on individual cases likely fails to serve as a meaningful 
deterrent to employers, and fails to provide a remedy to the whole group affected by 
discrimination (that is, to claimants’ CEE or Polish co-workers, who often tend to be 
exploited collectively in their places of employment).  
Conceptually, reliance on individual claims to address discrimination also implies that 
racist attitudes and actions are merely aberrations, and thus naturalises the status quo as 
basically fair. Racism and discrimination, however, are ordinary and prevalent (e.g., Essed 
1991; Freeman 1978; Williams 1992), as also illustrated through survey data discussed at 
the beginning of this Chapter. 
b. The Lack of Definitional Specificity 
 
The Directive leaves many key terms419, legal tests420, and Member State obligations421 
vague or undefined, placing much discretion in the hands of national lawmakers. Some of 
this vagueness stems from the function of directives. Unlike regulations, directives merely 
specify results to be attained, without dictating specific means to be employed. Moreover, 
had the Directive’s terms been more exacting, Member States might not have adopted it 
due to concerns over sovereignty and transposition burdens. Chalmers (2001: 208) also 
attributes the Directive’s vague terms to the fact that it had to accommodate diverse 
domestic political, economic, and social priorities.  
 
As very few cases under the Directive have been referred to the ECJ, the interpretation of 
many crucial provisions has been left largely within the ambit of national powers. In 
addition to giving little legal guidance, such lack of detail makes it more difficult for EU 
institutions to monitor the Directive’s effectiveness as transposed into national laws. 
Moreover, although the lack of definitional specificity might allow national equality 
regimes to better respond to their unique historical and contemporary circumstances, not 
all of which could have been taken into account when drafting the Directive, it also poses 
                                                      
419 Including racial origin, ethnic origin, indirect discrimination, legitimate aims, and proportionate aims. 
420 Including what facts may be used to establish direct and indirect discrimination, and how to evaluate 
them (Recital 15); and how to interpret genuine and determining occupational exception (Article 4). 
421 Including the enforcement of obligations under the Directive (Article 7); dissemination of information to 
victims (Article 10); promotion of social dialogue (Articles 11 and 12); and designation of equality bodies 
(Article 13). 
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risks. The general danger remains that national legislators are less likely than EU 
institutions to protect the rights of politically powerless groups which are unpopular with 
domestic voters. After all, compared to EU institutions—which have tended to suffer 
from accountability challenges (Brandsma et al 2016)—domestic policymakers tend to be 
more responsive to the interests of their electorates, and are guided by majoritarian values 
and experiences. This tendency is likely further reinforced by the fact that lawmakers tend 
to belong to ethnic majorities. They are subject to more political and social pressure than 
EU officials or ECJ judges might be, and thus more likely to be swayed by negative public 
opinion of immigrants and movers, which has been prevalent in today’s western discourse. 
National lawmakers have little to gain, yet much to lose, by seeking to protect outsider 
groups, especially those not widely recognised by domestic policy regimes as victims of 
racism. Thus, they are likely to pay little attention to movers’ rights. Even the UK’s 
equality legislation—which had served as the basis of some of the Directive’s provisions, 
and has been applauded as the most developed equality framework in Europe—includes 
some fundamental weaknesses when it comes to protecting rights of CEE movers (see 
Chapter 6).  
 
c. Racial and Ethnic Origin Grounds 
 
The protected grounds of ‘racial or ethnic origin’, not defined by the Directive, might be 
too limited in practice in the context of migrants and movers. The reality of today’s 
racisms has been complicated through globalisation and increasing mobility. On the face 
of it, the concept of racial or ethnic origin might overlook cultural racism, migration status, 
and language or accent discrimination422. Adding those factors to the Directive’s explicit 
coverage would have made it more responsive to movers’ equality needs. Moreover, 
simply being ‘foreign’ (as opposed to having a specific foreign nationality) often leads to 
disadvantage, discrimination, and prejudice (Equality and Diversity Forum 2011: 3). Being 
‘foreign’ is not protected under the Directive. Although in theory, victims could argue that 
‘foreignness’ can be brought under the ‘ethnic origin’ category, my review of UK case law 
in the next Chapter indicates that such arguments have not been relied on by claimants or 
by judges, even where there was an opportunity to do so.  
 
Finally, the Directive does not sufficiently acknowledge that the experience of inequality 
often stems not from a victim’s race or ethnicity alone, but rather, from an intersection of 
factors – such as class, gender, religion, and sexual orientation. This is problematic for 
                                                      
422 Although the ECJ has interpreted ‘racial or ethnic origin’ broadly in a recent case (see Section 3(B)iii 
below). 
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CEE movers (as well as other migrants), whose exploitation appears often facilitated by 
their ethnicity and low socio-economic status. The only mention of intersectionality in the 
Directive is in the context of gender, urging the promotion of gender equality (Recital 14). 
 
d. The Use of Comparators  
 
Constituting a substantial proportion or even the majority of some employers’ low-skill 
workforces (Ciupijus 2012c; MacKenzie and Forde 2009; EHRC 2010; Other Stakeholders 
2018)423 might also make the use of comparators more difficult for Poles. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, Poles’ practice of congregating at specific employer sites has been facilitated by 
Polish staffing agencies424, and reinforced by labour market segregation and some 
employers’ preference for Poles. Thus, it might be difficult to find an actual comparator in 
some cases. It is true that adjudicators have the flexibility to use hypothetical comparators. 
However, that approach presents risks, especially given that rigorous methodologies for 
creating hypothetical comparators require a long line of case law, not existent for post-04 
CEE movers. As my discussion in the next Chapter reveals, UK employment tribunals 
have indeed struggled with using correct comparators, especially hypothetical ones, when 
it comes to Polish claimants. UK adjudicators often appear not well versed in the unique 
experiences of Polish movers, and not familiar with the broader socio-cultural contexts 
that affect them. This is likely facilitated due to only recent academic attention to CEE 
movers’ experiences of disadvantage and discrimination, lack of advocacy initiatives on 
their behalf, and few ECJ cases addressing their experiences.  
 
If judges look at all migrant groups, all white migrants, all EU movers, or all CEE movers 
as the standard, their comparison might not reflect the specific prejudices that Polish 
workers appear to face in EU-15 States’ labour markets. For example, white immigrants 
from English-speaking countries and from (at least some) EU-15 States are privileged 
economically and culturally over CEE movers. Moreover, among CEE movers, Poles have 
faced especially high rates of deskilling in the labour market, employers’ stereotypes about 
their good work ethic (which often supports their exploitation), and widespread negative 
portrayals in media, political, and popular discourse. On the other hand, if the comparator 
trait is too limited, facts pertaining to intersectionality of Polish workers’ discrimination 
might become obscured. For example, a Polish female worker might suffer discrimination 
due to her ethnic origin, national origin, migration status, language skills, gender, and 
                                                      
423 See also cases discussed in the next Chapter. 
424 E.g., http://polish-workers.co.uk/; http://www.easypoland.co.uk/; http://zeitmann.co.uk/. Some 
recruitment agencies channel only Polish workers to specific local industries (e.g., Peacock 2009). 
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socio-economic status. Focusing solely on her ethnic origin is likely to overlook all the 
other intersecting grounds of disadvantage. More generally, the use of comparators 
supports a formal notion of equality, ignoring any existing inequalities or social 
disadvantages, and allowing for levelling down since the law is complied with as long as 
two like persons are treated alike, even if equally badly. 
 
e. Indirect Discrimination  
 
Half of the definition of indirect discrimination under the Directive explains when the 
prohibition does not apply. The definition of indirect discrimination, despite being broader 
than under previous EU (gender) equality legislation, might also be inadequate in the 
context of my study group. The ‘objective justification’ exception is not defined, and thus 
might be problematic in practice, given national policymakers’ accountability to domestic 
majorities (as addressed above). Moreover, national lawmakers are permitted not to require 
statistical evidence to establish indirect discrimination (Recital 15), and presumably may 
discourage the use of such evidence or discount its value. Although obtaining statistical 
data is often cumbersome and expensive for claimants, it often constitutes potentially key 
evidence to prove their claims. Moreover, institutional425 discrimination is more difficult to 
prove without statistical evidence. Since today’s expressions of racism have become less 
overt and, in the case of CEE movers, often cloaked in calls to nationalism or a common 




Demonstrating harassment, which requires evidence of both conduct and environment 
elements426, might also be problematic for Polish workers. The concept seems to overlook 
sporadic or less overt forms of racism. Since isolated incidents are not prohibited, 
employers might even avoid liability if perpetrating only one incident per employee, 
against multiple Polish employees, as long as such individual incidents would not create a 
generally degrading environment for all Polish workers427. Since Poles often work 
alongside many other Poles in low-skill places of employment, an employer’s harassment 
                                                      
425 For example, higher refusal rates to members of a specific group when providing public services. 
426  ‘[U]nwanted conduct related to racial or ethnic origin takes place with the purpose or effect of violating 
the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment’ (Article 2(3)). 
427 Although the ECJ has not yet explained the ‘hostile environment’ element under the Directive, an 
Advocate General opinion indicates that it refers to ongoing, long-term, collective measures from which all 
members of a certain ethnic group suffer. See Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia 
za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, Opinion of AG Kokott, 12 March 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:170, ¶¶ 1, 60, 133. 
This is in line with how the ‘hostile environment’ element has been interpreted in the context of gender 
equality, as ongoing working culture and working conditions which negatively impact women. 
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of each Pole individually can be a widespread practice, yet not necessarily actionable. Also, 
the Directive does not mention employers’ liability for harassment initiated by their 
employees or by third parties. Vicarious liability would have encouraged employers to try 
to prevent or address such incidents of harassment. Given how strong anti-immigrant and 
especially anti-CEE mover sentiment has been in some EU-15 States, notably the UK, it is 
not unlikely that employees or third parties may harass CEE workers, with impunity. 
 
g. Conceptualisation of Equality 
More fundamentally, ensuring substantive equality, and one that goes beyond economic 
rationales, is especially crucial to protecting groups which are small, disadvantaged, and not 
politically organised - such as Polish movers. It is uncertain, however, what type of equality 
the Directive envisions. Its scope and its Preamble for the first time added social inclusion 
goals to EU anti-discrimination legislation. However, labour market imperatives are also 
mentioned in its Preamble, and constitute half of its material scope (Article 3(1)).  
Moreover, both the Directive’s discourse and its legally enforceable provisions straddle 
protecting formal and ensuring substantive equality goals. By its very nature, anti-
discrimination law offers limited causes of action, and thus prefers formal to substantive 
equality (Freeman 1978). Formal equality is evident in the Directive’s title (‘implementing 
the principle of equal treatment’), its stated purpose (‘putting into effect in the Member 
States the principle of equal treatment’) (Article 1), and its definition of direct 
discrimination (being treated less favourably than another). In fact, the Directive itself 
implicitly recognises that its provisions are not sufficient to ensure ‘full equality in practice’ 
(Article 5). Allowing justifications to unlawful discrimination (Article 4) takes away from 
the Directive’s ability to attain substantive equality. Moreover, despite permitting them to 
do so, the Directive does not require Member States to take any positive action, which, as 
a derogation from the equality principle, would have to be interpreted strictly (satisfying 
the proportionality test)428.  
On the other hand, some of the Directive’s provisions go beyond notions of just formal 
equality. For example, States are permitted to implement positive action ‘with a view of 
ensuring full equality in practice’ (Article 5). Moreover, its definition of harassment is 
based on unwanted conduct with the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity 
(Article 2(3)). Its definition of indirect discrimination is broader that it has been before 
(Article 2(2)(b)), and considers unequal effects of neutral practices, that is, the results of 
                                                      
428 Case 222/84, Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651. 
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equal treatment. On the balance, however, the Directive is not unequivocal in its 
approach, which detracts from its symbolic and practical strengths. 
One wonders whether the Directive’s uncertain stance and weaknesses in some of its 
provisions stem not only from the practical constrains involved in its adoption (discussed 
above), but also from the complicated western approach towards curbing racism. 
Fitzpatrick (1987) has noted that racism is fundamental to the creation of European 
identity and of western liberal equality notions. After all, the roots of anti-discrimination 
law in the west stem from inequalities experienced by non-white colonial subjects, 
perceived as inherently lesser than white (western) Europeans. Hence, racism has been 
integral to the creation of modern anti-discrimination law, which, in order to operate and 
gain its legitimacy, requires some groups to be excluded by the polity. If anti-
discrimination law were to more earnestly eliminate racism, its liberal aspirations would 
lose some of their imperative. Thus, the Directive imposes limits on private and public 
ability to engage in racist behaviour, but does not prohibit it altogether, even if the 
complete elimination of racism were in the service of fundamental rights or an efficient 
labour market, its two stated goals.  
Despite such limitations of the Directive, I am not prepared to adopt a critical legal studies 
(‘CLS’) outlook on rights (Kennedy 2014; Tushnet 2011; Unger 1983). It is true that, in 
addition to several other shortcomings (addressed above), the Directive’s focus on 
individual incidents of discrimination tends to be ineffectual, and does not create space for 
coalition building that class actions facilitate. Several of its provisions seem especially ill 
suited for protecting the rights of small, poorly-organised groups lacking political power, 
such as CEE movers. However, the Directive does hold some hope – notably, by moving 
beyond just the employment field and the private sector, and by including indirect 
discrimination. Moreover, its oftentimes vague definitions create space for national 
policymakers to offer better protections than what the Directive’s terms provide. Although 
some CLS theorists see vagueness as debilitating, my analysis in the next Chapter of how 
the transposed Directive has been applied in the UK indicates that it has some potential 
for improving the protection of rights of marginalised groups. Albeit that potential might 
not always get utilised by national adjudicators, the Directive offers a starting point. 
Notably, the Directive does not dismiss the concept of race as essentialist, as CLS 
adherents tend to do. Instead, it merely dismisses the notion of separate human races 
(Recital 6). Furthermore, one should keep in mind that the Directive constitutes the EU’s 
first effort at addressing racial and ethnic equality. As the evolutions of domestic race 
equality measures (such as in the UK) and of the EU’s own equality laws (such as in the 
 159 
context of gender) illustrate, there is only space for improvement. In line with CRT 
scholars, I see the Directive’s transformative potential, especially given that it prompted 
some Member States to adopt racial equality protections for the very first time. Ultimately, 
however, law alone cannot bring about change in this area. Instead, equality directives 
need to be accompanied by a western cultural shift and a transformation in westerners’ 
attitudes429, so that the CEE region and its nationals are no longer positioned as inferior. 
 
iii. ECJ Interpretation 
 
National courts have not referred many cases pertaining to the Directive to the ECJ. This 
is possibly due to well-developed equality legislation in some States, or due to a desire to 
preserve national sovereignty in this area. As of this date, there have been too few ECJ 
cases to thoroughly evaluate the Court’s approach towards the Directive’s provisions430. 
For example, the ECJ has not yet had the opportunity to address its clauses regarding 
harassment, positive action, or victimisation431. More generally, the ECJ has not heard as 
many equality cases as proceedings in other fields. For example, only 23 out of 173 cases 
heard by the ECJ between 2004 and 2012 had addressed equality rights (Schiek 2012: 116). 
This leaves some questions unanswered as of this date, and necessitates that my analysis 
relies more heavily on the Directive’s legislative history, its text, and the broader EU 
equality discourse. Given that the Directive’s legislative history (discussed above) and the 
EU’s equality discourse (discussed below) focus on the protection of long-standing 
national minorities and non-European migrants, it seems unlikely that the ECJ will 
interpret the Directive to robustly protect the rights of post-04 CEE movers. 
 
Although in the last decade, the ECJ has begun to give more weight to social rights, and 
more value to substantive equality discourse (Schiek 2012: 211), the Court has traditionally 
favoured economic freedoms over equality or human rights432. The Directive itself does 
little to advance substantive equality, as addressed above. So far, the ECJ has not 
mentioned whether it envisions the Directive as advancing equal opportunities or 
substantive equality. Of course, it is debatable whether equality of opportunity (as opposed 
to of results) can ever ensure substantive equality, given that it does not provide market 
                                                      
429 Change can be brought about only through the confluence of law, cultural attitudes, and self-
transformation (Chimni 2013). 
430 As of April 2019, there have been 6 ECJ judgments pertaining to the Race Equality Directive. Similarly, 
the ECJ’s opportunity to interpret Directive 2000/78 has been limited so far, except for age discrimination. 
431 The only case so far that mentions victimisation under the Directive does not engage with it substantively. 
See Joined Cases F-106/13 and F-25/14, DD v FRA, ECLI:EU:F:2015:118. 
432 As illustrated, for example, by its decisions in the context of the right to free movement, discussed in the 
preceding Chapter. 
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corrections (such as access to adequate housing or good education), but instead simply 
seeks to equalise access to hierarchical distinctions (Somek 2011: 189; see also Marshall 
1950). Due to the EU’s limited competence, its equality laws cannot be expected to 
provide market corrections, which remain within Member States’ scope of responsibility433. 
Furthermore, ECJ interpretations of both the Race Equality Directive and its companion 
legislation, Employment Equality Directive 2000/78, have drawn heavily on gender 
equality law (O’Cinneide 2012: 6), which has had strong roots in promoting economic 
competition. 
 
So far, the ECJ’s limited jurisprudence in this field has been mixed. On some occasions, 
the Court has drawn on fundamental rights narratives to provide broad interpretation to 
the Directive and its companion legislation, Directive 2000/78. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
such narratives situate EU equality rights as derived from international human rights law, 
and from the constitutional traditions of the Member States434. In CHEZ Razpredelenie 
Bulgaria435, the Court ruled that the Directive has a direct horizontal effect436, due to racial 
equality’s being a general EU principle under the Charter of Fundamental Rights437 (which 
was incorporated into EU law in 2009, pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty). Moreover, its 
decisions indicate that the Directive should not be read in a narrow or excessively 
formalistic manner. For example, in Firma Feryn438, the ECJ deemed an employer’s public 
statement that it will not recruit ‘immigrants’ sufficient to create a presumption of direct 
discrimination. The absence of an identifiable complainant (the suit was brought by a 
Belgian equality NGO) was not an obstacle to the finding of discrimination. Notably, 
although it was possible to interpret the statement at issue as nationality discrimination 
(excluded from the Directive’s scope), the ECJ included it within its understanding of 
‘racial origin’. Similarly, in CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria, the Court defined ‘ethnic origin’ 
under the Directive broadly – to include shared nationality439, language, culture, or 
                                                      
433 Thus, in the next Chapter, I consider whether the UK has made any attempts to achieve substantive 
equality. 
434 E.g., Case C-144/04, Mangold v Helm [2005] ECR I-9981; Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci v Swedex 
GmbH & Co KG [2010] ECR I-365. 
435 Case C- 83/14, EU:C 2015:480. 
436 Although EU directives do not have a horizontal effect, the ECJ has endowed them with this effect in the 
equality field, starting with the grounds of sex (C-152/84, Marshall v Southampton and South-West 
Hampshire Area Health Authority, ECLI:EU:C:1986:84; Case 43-75, Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de 
navigation aérienne Sabena, ECLI:EU:C:1976:56), and age (C-144/04, Mangold; C-555/07 Kücükdeveci). 
437 ‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, 
language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, 
birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited’ (CFR, Art 21(1)). 
438 Case C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV [2008] 
ECR I-5187. 
439 But this does not apply to TCNs. 
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background440. This is in line with modern forms of racism441, which have increasingly 
relied on markers such as different cultural practices or language. Finally, in Meister442, the 
Court drew an inference unfavourable to the respondent, which is not specified by the 
Directive’s text. Despite satisfactory qualifications, Ms Meister was not invited for a job 
interview. The employer refused to provide her the file of the person who was appointed 
to that position. Although the Court ruled that, because of the reversal of the burden of 
proof, the claimant was not entitled to this information, it also held that an adverse 
inference may be made against a respondent who refuses to make such disclosure (in 
either direct or indirect discrimination claims). Of course, CRT scholars argue that judicial 
application of anti-discrimination law occasionally offers a sense of resolution to make law 
appear effective, thereby legitimating existing unequal social conditions (e.g., Delgado and 
Stefancic 2017).  
 
That view might hold some credence given that other ECJ interpretations have narrowed 
the Directive’s ability to protect victims of discrimination. For example, in Runevič-
Vardyn443, the ECJ limited the Directive’s application to public bodies, by holding that it 
did not cover the performance of public functions which do not involve the provision of a 
‘service’. Entering names on civil status certificates was found not to constitute access to 
or supply of service available to the public, and hence beyond the Directive’s scope. 
Furthermore, in Bulicke444, the Court specified a rather low threshold for national 
discrimination sanctions to be considered sufficiently ‘effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive’, in compliance with Article 15 of the Directive. Sanctions must simply fulfil the 
principles of: equivalence (may not be less favourable than those governing similar 
domestic actions); effectiveness (must not render the exercise of EU rights ‘practically 
impossible or excessively difficult’); and non-regression (in relation to national measures 
which existed before the Directive’s transposition). 
 
The ECJ’s interpretation of indirect discrimination under the Race Equality Directive and 
Directive 2000/78 has been mixed in terms of expanding or narrowing the scope of 
equality rights. For example, in CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria, the Court defined ‘particular 
disadvantage’ broadly, to include not only ‘serious, obvious or particularly significant cases 
                                                      
440 Case C- 83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria. 
441 The ECJ has also noted that discrimination due to one’s ethnic origin constitutes ‘racial’ discrimination, 
implying that one is not less condemnable or unlawful than the other. Case C-668/15, Jyske Finans A/S v 
Ligebehandlingsnævnet, 1 Dec 2016. 
442 Case C-415/10, Galina Meister v Speech Design Carrier Systems GmbH, 19 April 2012. 
443 Runevič-Vardyn v Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės administracija [2011] ECR I- 3787. 
444 Case C-246/09, Bulicke v Deutsche Büro Service GmbH, 8 July 2010.  
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of inequality’, but also practices where ‘it is particularly persons of a given racial or ethnic 
origin who are at a disadvantage’445. Thus, indirect discrimination might be found when a 
national measure, albeit formulated in neutral terms, ‘works to the disadvantage of far 
more persons possessing the protected characteristic than persons not possessing it’446. In 
Tyrolean Airways, however, the ECJ limited actionable terms in a collective agreement to 
only those which are either ‘inextricably’ or ‘indirectly’ linked to a protected ground. 
Terms that merely might disadvantage some members of a protected group were found 
insufficient to support a claim of indirect discrimination447. Instead, a difference in 
treatment must affect a particular protected group or clearly differentiate such a group 
based on a protected ground. Moreover, according to Jyske Finans, to determine whether a 
claimant had suffered ‘unfavourable treatment’, it is necessary to perform not merely a 
general abstract comparison, but ‘a specific concrete comparison, in the light of the 
favourable treatment in question’448. Hence, the Court found permissible a lender’s 
practice which required a customer whose driving licence listed a non-EU country of birth 
to produce additional identification449. Similarly, in Maniero, the Court found no indirect 
discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin where a national private foundation granted 
scholarships to promote legal research or study abroad only to applicants who had passed 
a legal examination in that State450. 
 
Some other ECJ interpretations of Directive 2000/78451 might also be instructive. Notably, 
ECJ applications of Directive 2000/78 in age-discrimination cases have extended victims’ 
rights. In Petersen452, for example, the Court ruled that a national law imposing a mandatory 
retirement age of 68 on public health-care system dentists was not proportionate to the 
goal of protecting patients from incompetent dentists because it did not apply to dentists 
in the private sector. On the other hand, if its aim were to preserve public finances, it 
might pass the proportionality test (although that remained for national courts to 
determine). In Prigge453, the ECJ ruled that a collective agreement provision mandating 
                                                      
445 Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria, ¶¶ 99-100. 
446 Id., ¶ 101. 
447 Case C-132/11, Tyrolean Airways Tiroler Luftfahrt Gesellschaft mbH v Betriebsrat Bord der Tyrolean 
Airways Tiroler Luftfahrt Gesellschaft mbH, 7 June 2012. 
448 Case C‑668/15, Jyske Finans, 6 April 2017, ¶ 32. 
449 Id. 
450 Case C-457/17, Heiko Jonny Maniero v Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes e. V., 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:912. 
451 Both Directive 2000/78 and the Race Equality Directive were adopted at the same time, both pursuant to 
the new Article 13, both include similar language, and both tend to be addressed collectively in EU legal 
discourse. 
452 Case C-341/09, Petersen v Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den Bezirk Westfalen-Lippe [2010] 
ECR I-47.  
453 Case C-447/09, Prigge v Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 13 Sept 2011.  
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pilots’ retirement at 60 (allegedly to avoid accidents) constituted discrimination. More 
specifically, the Court noted that, although the possession of a particular physical trait 
could constitute a ‘genuine and determining occupational requirement’, this age limit was 
not necessary, given that national and international regulations tended to set pilots’ 
mandatory retirement age at 65.  
 
4. Transposition of the Directive by EU-15 States  
 
A. Problem Areas 
 
The Directive’s transposition process produced confusion and delays in EU-15 States. In 
addition to the typical transposition challenges stemming from the inherent ambiguities of 
directives’ shell structures and from sovereignty issues, delays were caused by the pre-
existence of national equality legislations in most Member States. Divergent national 
equality models reflected domestic race relations (Guiraudon 2009: 529). In fact, to this 
day, there is no consensus among politicians or scholars from various Member States as to 
what racial equality means in principle or in practice (Lefranc 2009: 1854). Furthermore, 
the Directive’s material scope was much wider than that of most pre-existing national 
measures - even when compared to the UK (as discussed in the next Chapter), which had 
the most well-developed equality law in the EU, and which had influenced the drafting of 
the Race Equality Directive (Solanke 2009: 164-90). Not surprisingly, provisions that had 
presented the most transposition difficulty were the ones that introduced legal concepts 
(such as indirect discrimination), and applied legal tools (such as shifting burden of proof) 
which had not been part of all national legal frameworks (Guiraudon 2009). Moreover, the 
Directive’s rushed adoption process, many ambiguous terms, and its delegation of much 
discretion to the Member States (discussed above) left States with little transposition 
guidance. In fact, a decade after its transposition, some Member States have continued to 
express concerns about the lack of clarity regarding some of the Directive’s terms, such as 
those pertaining to indirect discrimination and to the burden of proof (Commission 2014c: 
8-9). 
 
Due to such challenges and the fact that the Directive’s transposition was not an 
important item on the political agendas of most EU-15 States (Howard 2004: 151), only 
the UK and two other Member States transposed it on time, by July 2003. The 
Commission was active in pushing along the transposition process. It invoked 
infringement procedures in 2004, which resulted in non-compliance cases against Austria, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, and Luxembourg being referred to the ECJ. The Court found 
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them all in breach of their Treaty obligations for not having transposed the Directive fully 
(Commission 2006e: 4). 
 
Additional problems were encountered after transposition. Member States tended to fall 
into two camps in their transposition approach: those that questioned the Directive’s 
provisions and had lengthy national debates (especially in France and Germany), and those 
that quickly copied and pasted its provisions (such as Italy and Spain) to avoid political 
confrontation (Guiraudon 2009: 536). Both methods resulted in errors in defining the 
Directive’s key terms and scope454. This led the Commission to launch infringement 
proceedings in 2005-07 against 25 Member States455 (Commission 2014c: 3). In 2007—
when all EU-15 States had finally transposed the Directive—the Commission sent 
reasoned opinions (second stage of infringement procedures456) to fourteen States, 
including the UK and seven other EU-15 States (Commission 2009d: 7). The most 
common errors in national legislations included: limiting the scope to employment only; 
incorrectly defining indirect discrimination, and harassment; and narrowing the provisions 
to help victims (such as on shifting the burden of proof, and associations’ ability to engage 
in legal proceedings) (id: 18). Ultimately, all Member States modified their legislations in 
accordance with the Directive. 
 
Despite instituting these infringement actions, the Commission has praised the overall 
transposition process, attributing any transposition difficulties to ‘the novelty’ of the 
Directive (Commission 2006e: 2) rather than to any shortcomings by the Member States. 
After closing all its infringement proceedings, the Commission also applauded Member 
States for their ‘unprecedented commitment’ to prioritising anti-discrimination measures 
(Commission 2009d: 3). More recently, although the Commission did acknowledge that 
the transposed national legislations had not produced a significant increase in court 
proceedings, it tried to minimise finding fault with national equality laws, and instead, 
attributed this to generic issues with underreporting and accessing justice (Commission 
2014c: 5). The Commission’s consistent praise of Member States’ implementation of the 
                                                      
454 Most frequent errors included: incorrect definitions of direct, indirect discrimination, or harassment; 
excessively wide exceptions; cumbersome enforcement mechanisms (Commission 2006e); narrow scope; and 
limiting equality associations’ power to help victims (Commission Press Release 2007). 
455 All except Luxembourg, Bulgaria, and Croatia. 
456 When the Commission uncovers that a Member State had failed to correctly transpose a directive on 
time, it launches a formal infringement procedure (TFEU, Articles 258-260). First, the Commission sends a 
formal notice to request an explanation. Next, it issues a reasoned opinion, asking the State to revise national 
law. If the Member State does not respond within specified time, the Commission refers the matter to the 
ECJ. Upon finding infringement of EU law, the Court orders the State to comply with its ruling, a process 
overseen by the Commission. If the State does not comply, the Commission may refer the case back to the 
ECJ, typically asking the Court to impose financial penalties (id., Article 260(2)). See https://ec.europa.eu/ 
info/law/law-making-process/applying-eu-law/infringement-procedure_en. 
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Directive is in line with its overall fundamental rights rhetoric. The European Parliament 
has been more critical, however. It noted ‘with concern, the unsatisfactory state of 
implementation’ of the Directive, particularly in terms of Member States’ failures to 
provide adequate information to potential victims and training to judges and lawyers (EP 
2005: ¶ 11). This is in line with the EU institutions’ approach during the drafting process 
(discussed above) - with the Commission being more accommodating than the Parliament 
of Member States’ concerns. Unfortunately, the lack of consistent institutional pressure by 
EU bodies is likely to reduce the potential of the Directive to improve domestic equality 
laws. 
 
B. The Directive’s Impact on EU-15 States’ Equality Frameworks  
 
All the Member States, including even those with well-developed pre-existing equality 
laws, had to change their national laws to comply with the Directive. Some even 
implemented whole new legislative acts (Commission 2006e: 3). In addition, several States 
amended their legislation to provide greater protections than under the Directive (FRA 
2013: 5). Even in the UK, where the pre-existing equality framework was looked upon for 
inspiration when drafting the Directive, definitions of indirect discrimination and 
harassment had to be amended, as did burden of proof provisions (as discussed in the next 
Chapter). Although some scholars (e.g., Guiraudon 2009) caution against drawing a causal 
relationship between the Directive and domestic equality regime changes, if nothing else, 
the Directive provided symbolic value, promoted domestic policy discussions, and 
discouraged regression.  
 
Moreover, the ECJ’s interpretations of the Race Equality Directive (and of Directive 
2000/78) have had an influence on national equality frameworks – through national 
courts’ direct application of ECJ jurisprudence, by affecting national understandings of the 
equality framework, and by shaping equality discourse. In Germany, for example, the 
ECJ’s jurisprudence in this field has generated a large amount of academic and political 
controversy regarding the Court’s authority457. This has resulted in a higher volume of 
                                                      
457 Especially the ECJ’s power to order national legislation to be set aside in disputes between private parties, 
and its ability to rely on general equality principles (as opposed to specific directive provisions) to set aside 
national laws. 
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referrals to the ECJ than from other States458, and in ongoing substantial revisions to 
German legislation459 (O’Cinneide 2012: 7-8).  
 
More broadly, the ECJ’s equality jurisprudence has been influencing the evolution of 
national policies, even if national legislators do not always explicitly acknowledge this 
when introducing reforms. For example, after Mangold, the Belgian Minister for Labour 
prompted social partners to remove references to age in collective agreements. Similarly, in 
the UK, after Coleman included ‘associative discrimination’460 within the prohibition of 
direct discrimination (under Directive 2000/78), the Equality Act 2010 (Sections 13 and 
26) was amended to reflect this across all grounds protected under Directives 2000/43 and 
2000/78. As more cases become referred to the ECJ, it is likely that the influence of its 
Article 13 jurisprudence will expand.  
 
Despite such apparent influence of the Directive and ECJ jurisprudence on national 
equality frameworks, it is not clear how much impact EU equality law has had on actual 
incidents of discrimination. According to the Fundamental Rights Agency (‘FRA’), the EU 
body specifically tasked with collecting and analysing data on fundamental rights, the 
Directive has brought about little improvement in tackling racial discrimination. This has 
been attributed to transposition errors, victims’ lack of awareness, high costs of bringing 
claims, insufficient remedies, and fear of victimisation (FRA 2010; FRA 2012). FRA’s 
review of the Directive a decade after its transposition concluded that ‘discrimination 
remains part of the daily experience of too many Europeans’ (FRA 2013: 3). 
 
The apparent lack of the Directive’s effectiveness has been especially noticeable in the 
employment context. Research conducted in Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Italy, and the UK 
within the first two years after its transposition found that discrimination at work against 
ethnic and national minorities was widespread, and that trade unions tended not to rely on 
transposed Directive provisions to challenge it461 (Jefferys 2007). More generally, a recent 
meta-analysis of 43 studies concluded that EU anti-discrimination directives do not appear 
to have decreased discriminatory practices in employment (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016). 
                                                      
458 E.g., Case C-341/09 Petersen; Case C‑246/09, Bulicke; Case C-147/08, Römer v Freie und Hansestadt 
Hamburg, 10 May 2011; C-447/09, Prigge; Case C-297/10, Hennigs v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt/ Land Berlin v 
Mai, 8 September 2011; Case C‑415/10, Meister. Most of these address age discrimination. 
459 For example, in Mangold, the ECJ found German law endowing older fixed-term workers with fewer 
protections than younger ones to constitute age discrimination, contrary to Directive 2000/78. This resulted 
in changes to the German Labour Code. 
460 Against an individual who lacks protected characteristics, because of his association with another person 
who has a protected characteristic. 
461 Largely due to lack of awareness and their focus on more traditional labour issues such as pay and 
pensions. 
 167 
Some of the surveys mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, and in the next Chapter, 
similarly indicate that racism and discrimination are still prevalent. As I have addressed 
earlier, law can only do so much. But the Directive offers a step in the right direction, and 
creates opportunities for national adjudicators to improve marginalised groups’ access to 
equality. Of course, forms of discrimination that are made unlawful might give advocates 
and commentators false comfort that discrimination is being tackled. Thus, it becomes 
more difficult to recognise forms of disadvantage or inequality which do not fit the closely 
delineated causes of action (Crenshaw and Peller 1995), further complicated by the fact 
that racist attitudes and behaviours are often covert and difficult to identify. 
 
In addition to the fact that some of the Directive’s provisions are unfit for protecting 
white movers (as discussed earlier), CEE movers’ whiteness might impede the 
effectiveness of racial equality provisions when applied to them. Some western civil society 
members assume that racial anti-discrimination laws apply to non-whites and non-
Christians only, and that whites cannot be victims of racism462. This outlook dilutes 
equality policies’ deterrent value. This erroneous view has even been adopted by some 
white victims of racism and discrimination (Fox et al 2015), likely decreasing their reliance 
on equality law. The oversight of CEE movers in the Directive’s legislative history 
(discussed above), and in the broader EU equality discourse (addressed below) might have 
only served to reinforce this climate. As Frankenberg (1997) theorised, members of the 
privileged (white) group assume that whiteness is homogeneous, making anti-white 
discrimination more difficult to perceive and acknowledge. Some more recent CRT 
scholarship, however, has begun to recognise fractures within whiteness (Levine-Rasky 
2013), and prejudices and discrimination faced by whites not belonging to the norm – for 
example, those of lower socio-economic status463 (e.g., Pruitt 2015). CEE movers’ 
experiences of discrimination, and the tendency of both discourse and theory to overlook 
their disadvantage call for the need to study additional fractures within whiteness – for 
example, differences based on migration status or foreignness, as placed within 
transnational economic and political power differentials. The fact that CEE movers are 
white and have access to EU citizenship does not mean that they ‘cannot be in need of 





                                                      
462 E.g., https://inews.co.uk/opinion/columnists/theres-no-thing-racism-white-people/; 
https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/dear-white-people-please-stop-pretending-reverse-racism-is-real. 
463 Class, however, tends to be excluded from western equality protections. 
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5. Equality Discourse 
 
A. Discourse at the Time of the Enlargement 
 
As discussed above, the Directive’s legislative history had overlooked equality rights of 
CEE nationals already present in EU-15 States, and had ignored their anticipated post-
accession mobility. During the Enlargement process, no mention was made about their 
human rights. Soon after the Enlargement, EU institutions had continued to overlook new 
EU citizens’ equality rights, and instead emphasised that anti-discrimination measures in 
an enlarged EU should focus on long-standing national minorities, non-Christians, TCNs, 
and stateless persons.  
 
For example, in its 2005 Resolution on the Protection of Minorities and Anti-
Discrimination Policies in an Enlarged Europe, the Parliament mentioned CEE movers in 
only three out of 63 paragraphs, noting that, like all foreign groups, they should be 
integrated into host communities (EP 2005 ¶¶ 41-43). When addressing discrimination 
against ‘recent immigrants’, the Parliament referred only to TCNs (id: ¶ 43). Similarly, in a 
section of its 2004 Green Paper: Equality and Non-Discrimination in an Enlarged 
European Union, titled ‘Dealing with issues linked to the enlargement of the EU’, the 
Commission only addressed the need to protect long-standing national minorities, the 
Roma, Jews, and Muslims in CEE states (Commission 2004). In its 2005 ‘Non-
Discrimination and Equal Opportunities for All’ strategy, despite acknowledging that the 
2000 equality directives are insufficient to address ‘multifaceted and deep-rooted patterns 
of inequality’, the Commission (2005: 2) only mentioned the Roma and long-standing 
national minorities, and was silent about CEE movers. This is despite the fact that, in the 
first year after the Enlargement, significant numbers of CEE nationals had already moved 
to EU-15 States, including more than a million Poles (Krywult-Albańska 2012: 74). As 
with the Racial Equality Directive’s legislative history, it is not clear if this absence reflects 
(predominantly white) EU officials’ inability to recognise degrees of whiteness and racism 
against Caucasians or their unwillingness to deem any potential discrimination against 
CEE nationals as deserving of anti-discrimination protections. The latter explanation 
would be in line with the inferiorising and othering discourse discussed in the preceding 
Chapters. 
 
Furthermore, despite frequently noting that equality is an essential component of the EU’s 
respect for fundamental rights (discussed in Chapter 2) and mentioning non-economic 
goals in the Directive, in the context of the Eastern Enlargement, EU institutions had 
linked equality measures to economic imperatives only. For example, in the Green Paper: 
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Equality and Non-Discrimination in an Enlarged European Union, the Commission noted 
the significance of anti-discrimination policies to the EU’s long-term economic growth 
(Commission 2004: 11) and to the integration of migrants in the labour market (id: 12). 
This echoes the EU’s economic goals behind the Enlargement, and its 2000 Lisbon 
Agenda464.  
 
Of course, attributing discourse to EU politicians’ actual motivations is not a 
straightforward task. EU discourse connecting equality measures to economic benefits 
might have been in part strategic - to make equality initiatives more appealing to some 
Member States. It is possible that some EU politicians might have been driven by human 
rights rationales when pushing the EU’s equality agenda. Nevertheless, embedding equality 
measures within discourse focused on market imperatives, while overlooking CEE 
movers, likely has had long-term repercussions on my study group’s access to equality 
rights and on their experience of mobility.  
B. Recent EU Reports  
 
Recent EU reports have continued to reinforce EU discourse that overlooks the 
experience of CEE movers, and of white outsider groups more generally (except for long-
standing minorities in CEE states). In its reports monitoring the implementation of the 
Race Equality Directive, the Commission has continued to emphasise the need to protect 
rights of the Roma (e.g., Commission 2009d, 2014c). When addressing migration and anti-
discrimination measures more broadly, both the Commission and the European 
Parliament have focused on protecting TCNs and long-standing national minorities 
(especially Jews, Muslims, and the Roma) (e.g., Commission 2008a; EP 2005). Even after 
the Brexit referendum and the associated spike in violence against CEE movers in the UK, 
EU institutions have continued to emphasise racism directed against TCNs and the Roma 
only (e.g., Commission 2016c). Notably, on the rare occasion when acknowledging that 
intra-EU movers, and especially CEE workers, are prone to suffer discrimination in 
employment, access to social benefits, and access to housing, the Commission (2013b: 98-
99) has not tied this observation to the need for more detailed studies of movers’ 
experiences or for equality programmes to target them. The most recent reports (e.g., 
Commission 2017, 2018a, 2018d, 2019) have continued to focus on equality initiatives for 
refugees, the Roma, Jews, Muslims, Africans, and vulnerable groups (children, the 
disabled, and women), with no mention of intra-EU movers.  
                                                      
464 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201107/20110718ATT24270/ 
20110718ATT24270EN.pdf. Subsequently incorporated into Europe 2020 Agenda. 
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Reports by EU agencies and EU-sponsored groups have similarly continued to ignore 
CEE movers, despite noting that migrants are particularly susceptible to discrimination 
(e.g., FRA 2012, 2013, 2014, 2018b). Notably, the FRA’s 2016 report focused on the 
refugee crisis (FRA 2016) and did not mention CEE movers, despite challenges they had 
faced in the context of the Brexit referendum. The FRA’s 2018 report devoted to EU 
citizen’s rights noted that EU movers experience discrimination in accessing employment, 
housing, banking services, and education (FRA 2018: 50), but did not mention the need 
for their greater equality protections. Similarly, the most recent annual report by the largest 
pan-European anti-racism NGO, ENAR (2017), has ignored intra-EU movers, focusing 




The Race Equality Directive was drafted by pre-2004 EU institutions, and reflects EU-15 
States’ economic and political concerns. Although it moved beyond pre-existing EU 
equality doctrine, several of the Directive’s provisions tend to be weak. In addition to 
having failed to consider power relations among mobile workers (Erel 2007), the Directive 
appears especially unfit for protecting the rights of CEE movers. As transposed into EU-
15 laws, the Directive has widened the scope of anti-discrimination laws across the EU, 
but appears to have had little impact on addressing discrimination, despite the continuing 
prevalence of racism and discrimination across the EU. Although, given the function of 
framework directives and the scope of EU’s competence465, the Directive arguably could 
not have accomplished much more than it has, the EU could be taking greater account of 
CEE movers’ racialisation and experience of discrimination through its equality discourse.  
 
CEE movers’ interests have been overlooked or silenced, however - in the Directive’s 
legislative history, broader EU equality discourse, and soft law measures. This is consistent 
with how western and EU politicians have approached the CEE region through othering 
rhetoric, disadvantageous Enlargement policies, and unequal access to the free movement 
right, discussed in the preceding Chapters. In the process, CEE movers’ status as second-
class EU citizens has been naturalised, entrenching inequalities and fractures within 
whiteness. Overall, the right to equality—like the right to free movement, to which it has 
been intimately linked—has been limited in practice, and indicates a schism between EU 
ideals and actual policies. The EU’s fundamental rights rhetoric and derivative equality 
                                                      
465 More generally, EU governance is more akin to administrative than constitutional rule; the EU has limited 
methods for ensuring Member State compliance; and it cannot enforce values (Adams et al 2017). 
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myths (addressed in Chapter 2) might prompt us to more easily overlook this schism. Such 
mythologies, however, have also had a beneficial effect, as EU institutions relied on them 
when pushing through the adoption of this Directive. 
 
As noted by CRT scholars, widespread prevalence of racism and discrimination can exist 
despite formal prohibitions against discrimination (Bell 1992; Matsuda et al 1993). In fact, 
formal law can even tacitly sanction certain types of inequalities by ignoring them 
(Delgado and Stefancic 2017). Overlooking CEE movers’ experiences of discrimination in 
the Directive’s legislative history and discourse might facilitate such silencing. It remains to 
be seen, however, how the ECJ jurisprudence continues to develop in this area.  
 
Despite such shortcomings in the Directive’s provisions and in the EU’s equality 
discourse, in the next Chapter, I explore how it has been transposed and actually applied in 
the context of my study group in the UK. Due to the EU’s historical competence 
limitations in this field, and the Directive’s having left much discretion to the Member 
States, it is up to them to protect movers. In line with CRT scholars who value the 
potential of legal rights to bring about equality (Harris 2013), I next look to whether the 
transposed equality doctrine can in fact make at least some of the Directive’s 








As my analysis in the previous Chapter indicated, the Race Equality Directive and the 
broader EU equality discourse have tended to overlook CEE nationals’ concerns, and 
have disregarded east-west power differentials in such movers’ experience of inequality. In 
this Chapter, I focus on the equality regime in the UK, trying to situate CEE workers 
within it, to get a sense of what their experience of mobility has meant in terms of their 
access to domestic equality rights. 
 
The UK has been considered a leader in anti-discrimination law development in Europe 
(Fella and Ruzza 2013: 1-31), including in prohibiting racial discrimination (Wintemute 
2016). The current anti-discrimination legislation, the Equality Act 2010 (‘EqA2010’) has 
been deemed ‘a major landmark in the long struggle for equal rights’ – in large part due to 
extending and harmonising the UK’s prior concepts of discrimination, and extending 
positive duties on public authorities (Hepple 2014: 1). Moreover, more research regarding 
discrimination has been conducted in the UK than in other EU-15 States (Wrench and 
Solomos 1993). However, racism and discrimination are still prevalent in the UK, and the 
British public has consistently opposed immigration (see Chapter 4, Section 1B). For 
example, according to the 2013 British Social Attitudes survey466, 77% of respondents 
preferred immigration to be reduced (either ‘a little’ or ‘a lot’); 40% felt that the UK’s 
cultural life is undermined by migrants; and 55% felt that they damage the economy. 
Notably, 55% of those who felt that migrants enrich the UK’s economy or cultural life 
nevertheless desired a reduction in immigration467. Since the Brexit referendum, public 
attitudes appear to have become slightly less negative towards migrants, although the 
majority of the public still expresses concerns about immigration. According to a recent 
survey, 19% of UK respondents would feel uncomfortable if an immigrant lived next door 
to them; and 34% felt negative towards immigrants468 (EHRC 2018: 30).  
 
My aim below is to explore how Polish movers in the UK experience discrimination and 
how anti-discrimination law responds to it, which has become further complicated due to 
the Brexit referendum and the anticipated post-Brexit immigration regime. This is 
important to address not only due to ethical concerns, but also given the continuing 
significance of east-to-west migration within the EU. Although scholars have addressed 
                                                      
466 See http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/38108/immigration-bsa31.pdf, 1, 5. 
467 Id., 3, 5. 
468 Behind negative attitudes only towards LGBT individuals. 
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incidents of disadvantage (e.g., Ciupijus 2012c; Drinkwater et al 2009), employment 
exploitation (see Appendix 1), racism (e.g., Fox et al 2012a; Rzepnikowska 2019; Sime et al 
2017), and discrimination (e.g., Johns 2013) experienced by Poles in the UK, and how 
Poles have approached the British legal system (e.g. Kubal 2012; Griffiths 2017), few have 
noted how anti-discrimination law addresses discrimination against Poles. Barnard (2014), 
Barnard and Ludlow (2016), and Barnard et al (2018) have discussed statistical data about 
CEE nationals’ claims before the employment tribunals and explored why so few CEE 
movers enforce their rights, but have not closely analysed specific tribunal decisions 
regarding claims brought by Poles. Moreover, critical scholars have noted traces of 
postcolonial and imperialist attitudes in today’s xeno-racist approach towards new 
immigrants, based on cultural and economic differences (Rattansi 2007), but have not 
situated Poles, or CEE movers more generally, within the UK’s equality regime.  
 
Voices of CRT scholars have been notably absent from discussions about white migrants. 
This framework has much to offer to my study, however. In line with CRT analytical 
approaches, I focus on the underlying interests and benefits that are being served by the 
existing legal regimes (Harris 2013), seeking to replace majoritarian interpretations with 
those in line with the perceptions and experience of my study group. Moreover, I question 
the underlying definitions and foundations of the current equality framework and legal 
reasoning (Delgado and Stefancic 2017) when it comes to discrimination against Poles. To 
fully understand the meaning and impact of anti-discrimination law, one must also look at 
how it relates to underlying social relations and the broader political climate, and how it is 
interpreted and enforced (Crenshaw 2011).  
 
Below, I begin with some historical background on the UK’s conceptual approach towards 
race relations and migration. Next, I address Poles’ migration to the UK, noting their 
reception and positioning in the labour market, and seek to situate them within the UK’s 
equality regime. After explaining the Race Equality Directive’s transposition in the UK, I 
look closely at the EqA2010, including its legislative history, substantive and procedural 
provisions, and notable weaknesses, before moving onto an analysis of some recent racial 
discrimination claims brought by Poles in the employment context. I focus on the 
employment field due to its importance to Poles469, because discrimination often manifests 
itself in the labour market, and because labour market outcomes are closely connected to 
equality in other fields and constitute a significant method of assessing minorities’ 
                                                      
469 Moreover, the freedom of movement right continues to be tied to movers’ economic activity (as 
discussed in Chapter 4). 
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integration. I note any challenges that might be unique to Polish workers when relying on 
anti-discrimination legislation. More broadly, I consider whether the UK’s equality regime 
is capable of taking into account Polish movers’ position as racialised whites, and if so, 
whether it does do so. In the conclusion, I reflect on the implications of my analysis for 
the post-Brexit UK, for the continuation of the EU project, and for the right of free 
movement. I also explore what role whiteness might play in my findings, as I seek to 
determine whether CRT and CWS frameworks can accommodate Polish movers’ 
experiences.  
 
2. The UK’s Historical Approach to Race Relations and Migration  
 
The 2013 Home Office ‘Go Home’ Campaign naturalised informal exclusion of all 
immigrants and other groups deemed to be outsiders to the British polity. This sentiment 
was further exhibited during the Brexit campaign and the referendum’s aftermath. But the 
ongoing tensions between migration and racism have a long history in the UK. Driven by 
labour needs, each wave of immigration revealed that the UK public was antagonistic 
towards immigrants. In the 1950s, public and political debates about (non-white) 
immigration and about ‘race relations’ became inextricably linked (Solomos 1989: 70-3). 
Whenever each wave of post-war labour migration reached sufficiently large numbers 
(especially during economic downturns) to provoke public concerns over their alleged 
threat to the UK’s welfare system, labour market, and social cohesion, racist political 
parties would gain popularity, and policies would be adopted to curb (non-white) 
immigration (Panayi 2010: 308-19; see also Erel et al 2016). To address existing470 and to 
prevent471 further violent responses–by both disgruntled white Britons, and newcomers 
frustrated by their exclusion472—equality473 and integration measures would also be 
adopted (Solomos 2003: 80-1). Both the Conservative and Labour parties have historically 
supported this approach (Solomos 1989a). 
 
For example, as New Commonwealth migration began to increase substantially after 
1948474, lobby groups475 formed to advocate for their protection from overt discrimination. 
After several unsuccessful bills and the 1958 race riots, the restrictive Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act was adopted in 1962476, and the Government committed to legislate 
                                                      
470 Racial riots had triggered RRA1965 and the 2000 equality legislation (Solanke 2009). 
471 Akin to racial tensions and violence that had erupted in the United States in the 1960s. 
472 Especially well-documented in housing, employment, and education (Brown 1984; MacEwen 1995b). 
473 British common law did not provide effective protections against racial discrimination. 
474 Amounting to approximately 1 million by 1965. 
475 Including Campaign Against Racial Discrimination, and Movement for Colonial Freedom. 
476 Which had imposed limitations on Caribbean and Indian immigrants’ entry. 
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against racial discrimination in public places (Labour Party 1964), and to combine equality 
measures with increased immigration controls (Home Office 1965). Meant to protect 
public order (Hepple 1969: 249), Race Relations Act 1965 (‘RRA65’) outlawed 
discrimination on the grounds of ‘colour, race, or ethnic or national origin’ in places of 
‘public resort’ (such as public houses, theatres, and restaurants) (Section 1). It also 
prohibited race-based restrictions on the transfer of tenancies (Section 5), and incitement 
to racial hatred (Section 6). RRA65 created the Race Relations Board, with a conciliatory 
role (Section 2), and imposed fines and criminal penalties (Section 6). It suffered from 
numerous weaknesses, however. Notably, it did not apply to many places commonly 
considered to be places of public resort, and did not apply to the Crown and its 
employees. Victims lacked direct access to redress, and instead required the Board’s 
referral of claims to the Attorney General, who could then institute civil actions (Section 
3). Also during this period, the goal of integration477 became part of race relations 
discourse, reflecting the official recognition that the New Commonwealth migrants had 
settled in the UK permanently and should be incorporated into the UK’s employment, 
education, health, and political spheres (Hamman and Frank 2015). 
 
Overall, RRA65 proved ineffective (Hepple 1969: 50-1). The same year that the National 
Front was founded, Political and Economic Planning’s (1967) survey revealed that racial 
discrimination was widespread against New Commonwealth migrants and their children. 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968478 was accompanied by the passage of Race 
Relations Act 1968 (‘RRA68’), which forbade discrimination on account of colour, race, 
ethnic origin, and national origin (Section 1(1)) in employment, housing, the provision of 
goods or facilities, and public services (Sections 2-5). This constituted the earliest 
prohibition of racial discrimination in employment among EU-15 States (Bell 2002b: 158). 
The Act also created the Community Relations Commission to improve relations between 
people of different colour (Section 25). Like the Race Relations Board, it was tasked with 
promoting equality of opportunity479 for BAME groups. Although the Act addressed some 
                                                      
477 The effectiveness of integration measures, especially immigrant-specific ones (Saggar and Somerville 
2012), has often been questioned (e.g., Craig 2015). 
478 Denying citizenship rights and restricting entry of black and Asian Commonwealth citizens, while largely 
allowing white migration. 
479 The adoption of gender equality legislation helped to move the legal framework towards equality of 
opportunity – for example, by including the concept of indirect discrimination, and permitting positive 
action. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act 1970; the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. The phrase ‘equal opportunity’ 
gained prominence in the 1970s. For example, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 had set up the Equal 
Opportunities Commission. It is not clear, of course, how useful the concept of equal opportunity is in 
practice. Although scholars have infused it with some strength, to encompass both procedural and 
substantive components (e.g. Fredman and Spencer 2003: 46; see also Equalities Review 2007: 5; Hepple 
2014: 29), it has not been defined by legislators. The non-binding guidance provided by the CRE’s 2005 
Code of Practice (CRE 2005) and by the EHRC’s (2011) Employment Statutory Code of Practice simply 
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of the shortcomings of RRA65, it still left much to be desired, and focused only on formal 
equality and integration. For example, its definition of discrimination prohibited 
segregation (Section 1(2)), and hence made any positive action difficult. Due to business 
and trade union pressures (Hepple 1969), the Act included a defence employers could 
assert when accused of discrimination - that employee selection in hiring and work 
assignments was based on preserving or securing a reasonable balance of persons of 
different racial groups (Section 8(2)). Moreover, the Act did not apply to private live-in 
landlords, home owners selling their property without using estate agents, and places of 
employment with up to 25 employees (Section 8(1)(a)). According to Sivanandan (1976), 
RRA68 did not seek ‘to chastise the wicked or to effect justice for the blacks’, but to 
change attitudes and thus facilitate integration of New Commonwealth immigrants and 
their progeny.  
 
Further immigration limitations followed in 1969 and 1971480. Reports by the Political 
Economic Planning think-tank highlighted that discrimination continued to be widespread 
and that the number of successful race discrimination complaints was consistently low 
(Anwar et al 2000: 6). The early 1970s were also plagued by worsening relations between 
the police and immigrants (Dale and Cole 1999). By the mid-70s, the Home Office 
acknowledged that the Government needed to play a greater role in addressing 
accumulated disadvantage experienced by former colonial subjects. Thereafter, several 
policy initiatives were premised on providing equal access to employment, housing, 
education, and social services for BAME groups (as well as women) (Solomos 1989a). The 
1975 White Paper on Racial Discrimination called for strengthened equality legislation to 
protect New Commonwealth immigrants settled in the UK (Home Office 1975: 31), 
combined with curbing their future influx - in order to ‘deal with the problems of race 
relations’ (id: 1). Moreover, the Government’s desire to harmonise racial and sex anti-
discrimination laws (Sooben 1990) prompted the passage of Race Relations Act 1976 
(‘RRA76’), which, for the first time, prohibited indirect discrimination (Section 1(1)(b)), 
                                                      
reiterate statutory provisions, making the concept appear more symbolic than practical. Although some 
direct forms of discrimination have decreased over time, empirical studies of the impact of equal opportunity 
policies have consistently indicated their low levels of effectiveness - attributed to factors such as lack of 
awareness, vestiges of historical discrimination, and BAME communities’ continued underrepresentation 
among political leadership (e.g., Ouseley 1984; Solomos 1989a; Wrench and Madood 2000). This had lead 
some scholars to conclude that equal opportunities policies are ‘virtually irrelevant for those ethnic 
minorities who are found in the lowest paid, least protected and most precarious sectors of employment’ 
(Wrench and Madood 2000: 2). More generally, Crenshaw (2011) has argued that, like formal equality law, 
rhetoric of equal opportunity gives the false impression that inequality has been erased, thus inhibiting 
efforts to address racism.  
480 Nationality rules became more restrictive, eventually providing the right to reside only to holders of 
British passports issued in the UK (MacEwen 1995b). 
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victimisation, and the facilitation of discrimination (Section 2), and provided victims with 
the ability to seek direct redress (before industrial tribunals and courts) (Part VIII). 
Compensation for indirect discrimination, however, could be awarded only if an 
intentional act was proven (Section 57(3)). Moreover, only a requirement or condition 
could give rise to indirect discrimination (Section 1(1)(b)); a preference could not. RRA76 
also expanded the scope of anti-discrimination law to include both public and private 
sectors in the context of education, housing, employment, and the provision of goods, 
services, and facilities (Parts II and III).  
 
Notably, prompted by Ealing London Borough Council v Race Relations Board, the first anti-
discrimination case to have reached the High Court, RRA76 added ‘nationality’ to the 
definition of ‘race’ (Section 3(1)). Ealing Council had twice refused housing eligibility to a 
Pole who had resided in the UK for more than two decades because he was not a British 
national. Following procedural requirements under RRA68, the Race Relations Board filed 
a complaint on his behalf. The Queen’s Bench Division481 found that he had suffered 
discrimination due to his ‘national origin’482 (protected under RRA68). The House of 
Lords483 disagreed, linking his treatment to his ‘nationality’484 (not recognised as ‘race’ 
under RRA68). This straightforward linguistic analysis prompted widespread academic 
criticism for ignoring substantive equality (e.g., Hucker 1975; Lustgarten 1979). Indeed, the 
decision had left considerable protection loopholes. For example, a respondent could 
argue that her unequal treatment of a black immigrant was not due to his race, but rather, 
due to his foreign citizenship. To address this, RRA76 added ‘nationality’ to the definition 
of ‘race’. 
 
RRA76 also combined the functions of the Race Relations Board and the Community 
Relations Commission into the Commission for Racial Equality (‘CRE’), which was to 
provide free support to victims, promote equality of opportunity, investigate patterns of 
discrimination, and issue non-discrimination notices (Part VII). The CRE was active in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s in investigating employment discrimination of BAME workers. 
Its power was curbed by the courts485, however, which were concerned with protecting 
employers’ rather than workers’ rights (Dickens 2007). By the late 1980s, the CRE began 
moving away from enforcement and towards promulgating and advising about best 
practices (Solomos 2003: 86-7). As the Government’s inquiry into the 1981 Brixton riots 
                                                      
481 [1971] 1 QB 309. 
482 An ineradicable trait received at birth, due to ancestry. 
483 [1971] UKHL 3. 
484 Commonly equated with citizenship. 
485 E.g., Re Prestige Group plc [1984] IRLR 166. 
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revealed, RRA76 had failed to produce a significant impact on racial discrimination 
(Brown 2018: 8).  
 
Prompted by the 1999 Macpherson inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence, the 
2000 Race Relations Amendment Act sought to address institutional discrimination faced 
by second-generation non-white immigrants, and included (albeit, limited) initiatives for 
increasing their social inclusion. It extended the ban on discrimination to public authorities 
(Section 1), and imposed a positive duty on specified public authorities486 (Section 2), 
signalling a step towards a more pre-emptive and transformative equality (Hepple 2010: 
13).  
 
Each set of these equality and immigration measures served to legitimate white privilege, 
by seeking to reduce disadvantaged groups’ (potentially violent) discontent, while 
responding to (predominantly white) native Britons’ desire to reduce immigration and its 
potentially negative economic and social repercussions. Moreover, the British race 
relations approach has been privileging business interests: immigration controls have been 
tied to labour needs, and anti-discrimination law has afforded workers only limited 
protections from exploitation, while facilitating free-market competition487. Notably, 
RRA68 was praised for decreasing the ‘economic waste’ of BAME workers’ potential 
economic contributions (Home Office 1975: 2). This approach fits perfectly with Derrick 
Bell’s (1980) interest convergence theory, which postulates that policies to improve the 
lives of disadvantaged groups are adopted only when they serve the interests of the 
privileged elite.  
 
3. Poles in the UK 
 
The first significant Polish immigration to the UK took place during and after WWII, 
accompanied by the establishment of Polish government-in-exile in London. Under the 
1947 Polish Resettlement Act, some 200,000 Polish soldiers received assistance in settling 
in the UK (Parutis 2011a). Moreover, between 1947 and 1950, displaced Poles, Latvians, 
and Ukrainians who had been in labour camps arrived under the UK’s European 
Voluntary Workers scheme, created to cover labour shortages in low-paid, unskilled work 
(McDowell 2009). Some Poles also entered as post-war refugees (Lebedeva 2000). The 
1951 census recorded 152,000 Poles (Okólski and Salt 2014: 12).  
 
                                                      
486 To consider the need to eliminate discrimination, while promoting equality of opportunity and good 
relations in carrying out their functions. 
487 Arguably, the origins of all equality measures in western Europe fall at the intersection of post-war human 
rights concerns and free market agendas (Hepple 2014: 23). 
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Emigration was severely curtailed under Communism, albeit small numbers managed to 
escape Poland, some settling in the UK. The 1981 census recorded 88,000488 individuals 
born in Poland (id: 12). Prompted by the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, 
several thousand asylum applicants trickled into the UK – mostly well-educated political 
dissidents (Düvell 2004). The fall of Communism in 1989 ended restrictions on Poles’ 
ability to leave Poland, although entry to the EU (including the UK) was controlled 
through visa requirements. Hence, Polish migration to the UK at that time included 
significant numbers of visa over-stayers and undocumented migrants (Jordan and Düvell 
2002: 41-2). Poles also entered pursuant to the 1991 Europe Agreement, which permitted 
them to establish businesses in the EU. By 2004, approximately 100,000 documented 
Polish-born persons lived in the UK, and an unknown number of undocumented Poles 
(Gilpin et al 2006).  
 
Poles’ pre-04 presence seems to have gone largely unnoticed, and garnered little public, 
media, or political attention. My research did not uncover any scholarly or media reports 
(in English or Polish) on disadvantage, racism, or discrimination encountered by Poles in 
the UK before the Enlargement. Although not methodologically rigorous, my review of 
pre-04 UK cases mentioning ‘polish’ or ‘Poland’ and ‘discrimination’ produced only a 
handful of results, all regarding denied asylum applications (mostly by Polish Roma). 
Although throughout the UK’s history, even white migrants have faced some hostility 
(Panayi 2010), pre-04 Polish migrants appear to have escaped much antagonism. This is 
likely because they arrived in insignificant numbers, sought to integrate489, did not 
concentrate heavily in lower-skilled employment (Drinkwater et al 2009), and tended to 
settle in multicultural urban areas. 
 
A. CEE Movers’ Reception in the UK 
 
After the Eastern Enlargement, Poles began to move to the UK in larger numbers. By 
2016, the approximately 900,000 Poles in the UK resulted in Polish becoming the most 
common language after English490. They have dispersed widely throughout the UK, and 
have tended to undertake deskilled employment (as addressed below). Many have not 
expressed much interest in integrating – arguably in part due to their large numbers491, and 
due to their frequently circular migration (enabled by the freedom of movement right and 
cheap transportation). Their social relations have been challenging. Some studies indicate 
                                                      
488 Presumably, some of the post-war arrivals had passed away since the 1951 census. 
489 In part because going back to Communist Poland would have resulted in being prosecuted for defecting. 
490 Followed by Punjabi, Urdu, Bengali, Gujarati, Arabic, French, Chinese, and Portuguese (ONS 2013). 
491 Prompting the establishment of Polish enclaves. 
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that these newcomers have not been accepted by the post-war Polish community due to 
being perceived as low-class (e.g., Garapich 2012). They have also been engaged in 
economic competition among themselves (id), and have faced racism and discrimination 
by Britons (as discussed below).  
 
Recent CEE movers have been subjected to racialisation. The British media, and public 
and political discourses have ascribed negative ethnic-based identities to CEE movers, 
perhaps most noticeably in the context of the Brexit referendum. Although the concept of 
racialisation emerged in the context of New Commonwealth labour immigration (Miles 
and Brow 1989: 99-101), scholars (e.g., Jackson 1992; Solomos 1989) have extended it to 
the general arena of culturally constructed difference, including of CEE movers (e.g., Fox 
et al 2012a). According to Gilroy (2006), EU movers are automatically racialised and 
approached through the category of race in the UK simply because they are foreign.  
 
Racialisation of some white groups goes hand in hand with reinforcing white privilege of 
the dominant group. As CRT scholars have pointed out, the benefits of white privilege 
accrue most fully to those who represent the norm at a given time and place (e.g., Tatum 
2003). In the UK, the (white) British norm is closely circumscribed. For some white 
Britons, the word ‘immigrant’ conjures up images of unwelcomed spongers diluting British 
stock, including CEE movers (Garner 2007b: 160; see also Halej 2014; Levine-Rasky 2013: 
31; Lewis 2005). The dominant white group in the UK actively constructs and reproduces 
its white privilege while excluding CEE movers - through everyday discourse, politics, 
economy, and culture. This of course serves as a contemporary example of how, as a time- 
and place-specific malleable construct, white privilege has not been available historically to 
all phenotypical whites, as addressed in Chapter 1.   
 
CEE movers’ racialisation has been accompanied by overt expressions of racism against 
them. Although much media attention has been devoted to racial hatred directed towards 
Poles in the aftermath of the June 2016 Brexit referendum (e.g., Travis 2017), everyday 
racism preceded the referendum – including hateful graffiti, threats, bullying, assaults, 
refusals to provide services, and property destruction (e.g., Johns 2014: 102; McDevitt 
2014)492. Moreover, various qualitative studies indicate that CEE movers had been 
experiencing discrimination in everyday interactions (Lopez Rodriguez 2010; Johns 2013c; 
Rzepnikowska 2019; Sime et al 2017), the labour market (e.g., Parutis 2011: 270–72; 
Appendix 1), and the housing market (e.g., Kofman et al 2009: 93-106), long before the 
                                                      
492 See also http://www.irr.org.uk/news/eastern-european-workers-under-attack/. 
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referendum. Rzepnikowska (2019) argues that the racism observed after the referendum 
builds upon hostilities CEE nationals have been facing in the UK since the Enlargement.  
 
In the weeks following the referendum vote, there was a significant rise in hate crimes493 - 
including several fatal assaults (Rzepnikowska 2019). Although all EU nationals as well as 
BAME members were targeted as outsiders (Travis 2017; Virdee and McGeever 2018), 
CEE movers (and especially Poles) appear to have been the primary victims (Weaver and 
Laville 2016). Expressions of racism against Poles and other CEE nationals have 
continued since then. For example, in 2017, an Oxfordshire fishery had put up a sign 
warning ‘NO Polish or Eastern Bloc Fishermen Allowed. No Children or Dogs’ (Kentish 
2017) – reminiscent of the post-war ‘No Irish. No Blacks. No Dogs’ signs. Incidentally, a 
law firm specialising in representing CEE movers has noted that ‘Many Eastern-European 
people are suffering the same pattern of discrimination that was suffered by many Black 
people … after the Second World War’494. Although it is not possible to compare CEE 
movers’ experiences to the historical (and contemporary495) positioning of Blacks, the 
statement nevertheless attests to the fact that CEE movers’ experiences have been far 
removed from the EU’s promises of equality. 
 
B. The Government’s Approach Towards CEE Movers 
 
It is true that the Government had largely left CEE immigration to be shaped by market 
forces496 and by migrants’ agency. To the extent that the UK’s hands were not tied by EU 
membership, however, its policies have negatively targeted CEE movers, more so than 
other immigrants. As addressed in Chapter 4, the UK did impose indirect transitional 
restrictions on CEE nationals’ right to mobility. Currie (2007, 2008) had speculated that 
these restrictions might produce negative long-term consequences for CEE workers - by 
encouraging them to take on low-skill, precarious jobs, and by prompting employers to 
perceive them as not entirely lawful and hence exploitable. The transitional period might 
indeed have had a lasting impact on CEE workers. Recent studies (see Appendix 1) 
indicate their poor labour market outcomes and experiences of exploitation. Employers 
continue to be uncertain about Bulgarian and Romanian workers’ right to work in the UK. 
For example, Oxford’s personnel website has a special tab explaining that restrictions no 
                                                      
493 Reported hate crimes rose by 57% in the four days following the referendum. National Police Chiefs’ 
Council data indicated a 49% rise during the final week of July, when compared with the previous year. See 
also discussion in Section 1(B), Chapter 4. 
494 See http://net-solicitors.co.uk/employment-law/help-for-employees/discrimination/discrimination-
against-eastern-european-people/. 
495 E.g., Wood et al 2009. 
496 For example, half of CEE workers who arrived in 2004 had left by 2009 (Sumption and Somerville 2010: 
18), at least some due to the economic recession. 
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longer apply to them497. In addition, employment agencies and the broader migration 
industry that procured CEE workers during the WRS period likely continue to approach 
them in the same way as they did before, as flexible workers desperate to secure 
employment. Some British employers expect them to tolerate deskilled jobs and poor 
working conditions (Ruhs and Anderson 2010; Parutis 2011). Moreover, even though the 
WRS for CEE nationals had ended in 2011 (and in 2014 for Bulgarians and Romanians), 
its effects have continued because past noncompliance with the scheme can be used to 
justify refusal of residence right in the UK498.  
 
In addition to the negative effects of the WRS, other policies have been implemented 
against CEE movers. For example, the police, immigration authorities, and other 
governmental agencies have unlawfully detained and attempted to remove homeless CEE 
movers499 (even if they were employed or had permanent residency rights) (Burnett 
2016)500. More generally, limitations on EU movers’ access to welfare benefits were 
imposed in 2013 and 2014 (see n 350). And, of course, post-Brexit immigration policy will 
reduce the rights of most EU nationals, according to the December 2018 White Paper on 
‘The UK’s future skills-based immigration system’ (‘2018 White Paper’) (HM Gov’t 2018).  
 
But the Government’s role in facilitating antagonism towards CEE nationals goes beyond 
its official policies501. The broader political rhetoric has situated EU movers—and CEE 
nationals especially—as unwanted outsiders. Although prior waves of immigrants had 
faced public and right-wing opposition in the UK (Winder 2005), Burnett (2016) argues 
that today’s antagonism towards movers has been widespread even within mainstream 
political culture. Since at least the early 2000s, integration arguments—touted not only by 
the far right, but also embraced by the liberal left—have targeted new immigrants from the 
CEE region (e.g., Kundnani 2004) as threatening to British identity (Phillips 2004). 
Mainstream political figures, including some from the left, have blamed CEE movers for 
the UK’s current social and economic problems. For example, in 2010, Labour Minister 
Ed Balls stated that post-04 CEE workers had negatively impacted Britons’ wages and 
                                                      
497 See https://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/personnel/permits/employbrn/. 
498 See https://gcnchambers.co.uk/worker-registration-scheme-found-unlawful/. In 2017, the Court of 
Appeal found the WRS’s extension from 2009 until 2011 to have been disproportionate and contrary to EU 
law. See Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Gubeladze [2017] EWCA Civ 1751. The Supreme 
Court’s decision is pending. 
499 This practice was ruled to constitute an unlawful impediment to the free movement right. See Case 
CO/1440/2017, R (On the Application of Gureckis and others) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2017] EWHC 3298. 
500 Some long-term residents and UK citizens of New Commonwealth background have recently faced 
similarly hostile treatment, as the Windrush scandal revealed.  
501 Further reinforced by the media’s propagation of racist attitudes towards CEE movers (e.g., Drzewiecka 
2014; Grzymalska-Kazlowska 2017: 257; Spigelman 2013). 
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employment conditions (Balls 2010), an assertion contradicted by empirical studies (e.g., 
Wadsworth et al 2016). Former MP Phil Woolas had bemoaned the ‘disruptive effects’ of 
the Eastern Enlargement on British public services (Daily Telegraph 2009). Following 
Tony Blair’s (2004) earlier example, David Cameron (2014) specifically pointed to Poles as 
the reason for his 2013 proposals to curb EU movers’ access to welfare benefits502. When 
such limitations were imposed in 2014, no MP spoke out against them.  
 
More generally, the Government has been propagating anti-immigrant ideology and 
policies, likely creating a climate where all those with traces of foreignness503 can be 
demonised. Government policy statements since 2010 have encouraged various agencies 
to profile all foreigners’ backgrounds and immigration status (Burnett 2016: 89-90). 
Moreover, provisions under the Asylum and Immigration Acts 1996 (Section 8) and 2006 
(Section 15) encourage employers to check all job applicants’ eligibility for employment in 
the UK. This likely negatively impacts all migrants’ employment (Kofman et al 2009), by 
embedding antagonism towards immigrants within ‘common sense racism’, propagated 
through a political consensus (Grayson 2013). This approach continues to be in force 
today504, as do the 2014 provisions that landlords must check prospective tenants’ 
immigration status505. Violating either provisions results in substantial fines (up to £10,000) 
for employers or landlords. Of course, EU nationals do not have paper proof of 
employment eligibility or of their official immigration status (unless they already possess 
permanent residency). More generally, the 2013 Home Office ‘Go Home’ campaign, 
officially meant to target undocumented immigrants, contributed to the creation of a racist 
political culture where all immigrants became scapegoats for public discontent (Grayson 
2013). Rzepnikowska (2019) attributes post-referendum racism against Poles to such long-
standing policies positioning all migrants as outsiders and parasites. 
 
It is popularly assumed that racist incidents stem from an inherent racism of poor white 
Britons or from middle-class antagonism (Garner 2012), while the role of political elites in 
this process has been given less attention (Rzepnikowska 2019: 70). My discussion above 
indicates that the Government has had a role to play in propagating a climate of 
                                                      
502 ‘It’s wrong that someone from Poland, who comes here, who works hard and I am absolutely all in 
favour of that — but I don’t think we should be paying child benefit’. 
503 The British public rarely differentiates between refugees, migrants, and movers (McKay and Winkelmann-
Gleed 2005). Thus, policies and discourse targeting one group likely contribute to a negative climate against 
all foreigners. 
504 See https://www.gov.uk/employee-immigration-employment-status. 
505 See https://www.gov.uk/landlord-immigration-check. ACAS (2012) recommends that ‘employers … 
make sure that all applicants provide adequate documentation that they are allowed to work in the UK … 
regardless of where they come from’.  
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antagonism against CEE workers. Sivanandan (2001) has argued that the State is at the 
root of modern British racism. To divert attention from this fact, Government statements 
condemning post-referendum racist incidents and incendiary media reports have 
consistently placed the blame on individual perpetrators (Burnett 2016). This is in line with 
CRT scholars’ observation of how racism is portrayed as individual aberrations, while the 
role of the political elite remains concealed (Delgado and Stefancic 2017).  
 
Several MPs have brought post-Brexit incidents targeting Poles to the attention of 
Parliament. For example, they have reported Poles’ being stopped at the border when 
entering the UK, being incorrectly denied naturalisation applications, and being bullied and 
attacked506. After pressure from Labour ministers and the EU citizens’ rights campaign 
‘the3million’, the Equalities Office announced in September 2017 that it would examine 
discrimination against CEE and other EU citizens in the UK. This is the first Government 
initiative to look specifically at racism and discrimination directed at EU movers. As CRT 
scholars have pointed out, incidents of racism and discrimination easily coexist with 
formal anti-discrimination protections (Crenshaw 2011). It has taken the Government 
many years to acknowledge this in the context of movers. 
 
C. Polish Movers’ Positioning in the Labour Market 
 
The employment context presents an especially rich setting to study Poles’ disadvantage 
and discrimination. Ethnic discrimination in Europe happens most commonly in access to 
and treatment at work (Jefferys 2015). Labour market outcomes are key measures of 
integration with majority society, and have been used to gauge disadvantage through 
exclusion. Employment is critical to promoting equality: an unequal ability to benefit from 
the labour market has automatic consequences for social, educational, and health 
inequalities. Employment has served as the main pull factor for Polish movers to the UK 
(Drinkwater et al 2009; Düvell 2004a). Poles have had the highest employment rates in the 
UK, higher than of white Britons and of other immigrant groups (ONS 2014, 2018). High 
rates of access to employment, however, are not synonymous with equality or integration. 
Rather, it is the quality of employment and the ability to equally benefit from work that are 
better indicators of inclusion. Notably, all the post-04 cases of CEE nationals’ 
discrimination that my research uncovered pertain to the employment context (discussed 
below).  
 
                                                      




Although studies of CEE migrants’ experiences in the UK labour market before 2004 have 
been generally lacking507, significant scholarly attention has been devoted to documenting 
their outcomes since the Enlargement (see Appendix 1)508. An analysis of various large-
scale data sets revealed that, whereas non-EU migrants and EU-14 movers have had 
employment patterns resembling those of British workers, post-04 CEE workers have 
tended to take up low-skill jobs (especially in manufacturing, distribution, construction, 
and hospitality) (Drinkwater et al 2009; ONS 2016; Sumption and Somerville 2010). 
Employers providing 3D (dirty, dangerous, and dull) jobs have been especially keen to 
employ them (Favell 2008). Annual Population Survey data indicates that CEE movers 
have experienced significantly higher deskilling in the UK labour market and lower returns 
on their education than other immigrants (Sirkeci et al 2018; Sumption and Somerville 
2010). Moreover, this deskilling effect has not been just temporary, unlike for other 
migrant groups, as CEE movers have tended to stay in low-skill jobs (Sirkeci et al 2018). 
They appear to suffer a wage penalty not only when compared to British workers, but also 
when compared to other migrants509, even in studies controlling for human capital 
differences (including education, experience, and language) (e.g., Drinkwater et al 2006: 
16), and for the poor transferability of foreign educational credentials (e.g., Cook et al 
2010). For example, during 2004-09, CEE movers earned 12.5% less than Britons, while 
the average non-EU immigrants and EU-14 workers earned more than British workers 
(Sumption and Somerville 2010: 16). Among CEE workers, Poles have fared particularly 
poorly under some of these indicators (e.g., Drinkwater et al 2009; Eade et al 2007).  
 
Qualitative research similarly indicates CEE movers’ disadvantaged position in the labour 
market. In a study of more than 30 CEE workers in a northern British city, Cook et al 
(2010) documented widespread deskilling, with employers unwilling to recognise their 
qualifications and experience from countries of origin. Moreover, supervisors (none of 
whom were of CEE background510) tended to ignore CEE workers’ complaints (id). A 
review of research evidence undertaken by Kofman et al (2009: 75-92) concluded that 
CEE movers frequently face racial harassment by supervisors and co-workers, and 
experience exploitation (including lower wages, advance fees to secure jobs, lack of 
contracts, and illegal deductions by gangmasters). Surveys and interviews with CEE 
workers have revealed similar findings (e.g., Anderson et al 2008; Ciupijus 2012b), 
                                                      
507 But see Anderson et al (2006) (finding frequent deskilling and exploitation of CEE migrants already 
working in the UK on the eve of the Enlargement). 
508 See also Section 6(C)(ii) in Chapter 4. 
509 Post-04 Polish movers’ labour outcomes have also been worse than those of pre-04 Polish immigrants – 
in terms of earnings (Drinkwater et al 2009) and returns from education (Eade et al 2007). 
510 Managerial positions tend to be dominated by Britons and white western immigrants (Parutis 2011). 
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especially after the 2008 economic downturn (e.g., EEAC 2013; Johns 2013). Their 
vulnerability is often increased through housing tied to their employment (Phillimore et al 
2008511; see also Anderson et al 2008). Some CEE nationals have even been trafficked into 
the UK, put into debt bondage and forced labour, in circumstances considered modern-
day slavery (Lawrence, 2012; K Harris 2013). Such treatment prompted a predominantly 
Polish workforce at a repackaging plant in northern England to liken their place of 
employment to a ‘labour camp’ (Ciupijus 2012c). Although analogies to Nazi atrocities are 
an exaggeration, labour exploitation of recent CEE workers appears somewhat common, 
especially in low-skill jobs. Interviews with the Labour Exploitation Advisory Group 
representatives working with vulnerable workers suggest that post-referendum 
uncertainties and an increase in anti-immigrant hostility are likely to have amplified all 
migrant workers’ exploitation (France 2017). The post-Brexit regime will likely further 
increase inequalities and exploitation experienced by at least some groups of immigrants 
(as discussed below). 
 
D. How CEE Movers Differ from Other Migrants 
 
It is true that many foreign-born groups tend to experience racism, inequalities, 
exploitation, and discrimination in the UK (e.g., Kofman et al 2009; EHRC 2016), 
especially those who are low-skilled or employed via employment agencies or gangmasters 
(CAB 2005; EHRC 2010, 2012). This has likely been further fostered by the media and 
right-wing politicians, and the British public’s anti-foreign sentiment. CEE workers, 
however, appear to experience some unique challenges when compared to other 
disadvantaged groups (see generally Appendix 1). They have been overrepresented in 
agency workforces compared to other immigrant groups (French 2012; Sumption and 
Sommerville 2010: 18-19)512, with approximately half of CEE workers obtaining 
employment through agencies during 2004-09 (Jones 2014). Agency employment has been 
associated with greater rates of exploitation – such as being paid below statutory wage 
rates, physical and verbal abuse, unlawful pay deductions, denial of statutory breaks and 
access to toilets, lack of health and safety protections, and sexual harassment (EHRC 2010; 
Kofman et al 2009). At least some employment agencies have been documented to treat 
CEE workers more poorly than other workers, and to encourage employers to do the 
same (Pemberton and Stevens 2010). Moreover, an exploitative migration industry has 
                                                      
511 Including in caravans, sheds, and greenhouses. 
512 A significant number of non-EU workers rely on work visas, tied to specific employers in skilled 
occupations, and hence do not use agencies. 
 187 
developed to especially target Poles (Garapich 2008; Jones 2014)513. Such problems are 
likely amplified in rural areas, due to the lack of support services and many employment 
options. 
 
Moreover, CEE workers have been increasingly preferred by at least some UK employers 
to fill shortages in low-skill jobs. While the Equality Acts 2006 and 2010 were being 
adopted, greater immigration controls were implemented, including the points system that 
in effect prevents low-skill immigrants from outside the EU514. Encouraged by 
employment agencies’ marketing of CEE, and especially Polish, workers as willing to 
accept any work arrangements, for less pay than others (Jones 2014), some British 
employers have indicated a preference for them over other migrants515 (e.g., MacKenzie 
and Forde 2009a). A survey of its members led the British Chambers of Commerce to 
praise CEE workers’ good work ‘attitude’ (Senior European Experts Group 2013).  
 
As Wu (2003) had observed, in the context of the ‘model minority’ stereotype of far-east 
Asians in the United States, superficially positive stereotypes can mask disadvantage and 
justify inequalities. Indeed, some British employers praise CEE movers as more tolerant of 
poor employment conditions, more productive and flexible, more compliant (MacKenzie 
and Forde 2009a; McKay 2009; Parutis 2011; Ruhs and Anderson 2010; Wills et al 2009: 
95-9), and more amenable to working in isolated rural areas than other workers (Sumption 
and Somerville 2010: 24). MacKenzie and Forde’s (2009a) case study of a Yorkshire glass 
packaging plant employing large numbers of Polish (as well as Baltic) workers indicates 
how some employers seek them as part of a hiring strategy to target exploitable, vulnerable 
workers with low labour market power. Ciupijus (2012a: 59) concluded that ‘it is not work 
ethic but lower wages, the ease of firing, and [lower] social capital’ that make CEE movers 
appealing to employers as ‘good’ workers. This view of CEE workers is likely facilitated by 
and reinforces their media, political, and public racialisation as cheap, temporary menial 
labourers. This broader employment context, aided by contemporary transnational market 
forces (addressed in Chapter 4), has been overlooked by UK adjudicators and the British 
equality discourse (as explained below) - in line with CRT scholars’ observation of how the 
                                                      
513 In addition, some Poles have been targeted by fraudsters posing as employment agents (Republic of 
Poland 2012). 
514 It privileges skilled, wealthy, entrepreneurial, and temporary workers. A migration cap was also imposed 
limiting non-EU workers to those with specific skills. By 2013, non-EU workers had to have graduate-level 
education to be able to work in the UK. See https://www.gov.uk/browse/visas-immigration/work-visas; 
Home Office (2006).  
515 In the 1970s and 80s, 3D employers similarly appreciated Asian workers (Jackson 1992), and more 
recently, those from the former Yugoslavia and Albanians (e.g., MacKenzie and Forde 2009a). 
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legal system does not consider the actual economic and social inequalities faced by 
minority groups (Delgado and Stefancic 2017). 
 
i.  The Role of Whiteness 
  
CEE movers’ whiteness has complicated their experiences of disadvantage and racism. 
Historically, whiteness has not protected them from racialisation and racism in the UK. 
For example, in the 1910s, Edward Troup, Undersecretary of State, asserted that ‘aliens 
from Eastern Europe’ were lowering British workers’ wages, and that ‘their habits had a 
demoralising effect’ (Cohen 2006: 71). In 1924, his successor, John Pedder, discriminated 
against naturalisation applications filed by ‘Slavs … and other races from Central and 
Eastern parts of Europe’516. Perceived as fundamentally ‘different from the British people’, 
those from the CEE region were contrasted with ‘the Latin, Teuton and Scandinavian 
races’, who share ‘a certain kinship with British races … with the life and habits of this 
country and are easily assimilated’517. Dyer (1997: 41-80) has noted inherent distinctions 
between the whiteness of the English, Anglo-Saxons and North Europeans, and that of 
Southern and Eastern Europeans. According to Anderson (2013: 45), CEE movers 
present a ‘degenerate’ whiteness, ‘contingent and degraded’.  This type of whiteness does 
not exempt them from the effects of racism (Fox et al 2012a: 681). 
 
Of course, their whiteness has bestowed some advantages on CEE movers. Poles can go 
unnoticed in public spaces due to the lack of phenotypical differences with white Britons. 
Griffiths (2017) attributes ‘civilised’ interactions she had observed between Poles and 
Britons in a small English town at least in part to Poles’ skin colour. Of course, their 
invisibility dissipates once they speak or exhibit markers of Polishness, such as shopping at 
Polish shops, using Polish satellite dishes, or having Polish car registration plates. Their 
whiteness can also make them more employable. For example, after WWII, displaced CEE 
persons benefited from the UK immigration policy preferences to fill domestic and 
unskilled posts (Fox 2013; McDowell 2009). Today, employers also sometimes prefer CEE 
nationals due to their whiteness (Parutis 2011) - especially as care workers518 or where they 
interact with British customers519 (Ciupijus 2012a; Pemberton and Stevens 2010). But once 
again, CEE movers have been used to populate predominantly 3D and low-skill jobs, 
especially since the 2006 managed migration strategy has been phasing out non-EU low-
                                                      
516 Minute by Sir John Pedder, 28 May 1924, HO 45/24765/432156/17. 
517 Id. 
518 CEE and other migrant care workers often face racism and discrimination at work (Stevens et al 2012). 
519 More generally, Favell (2008) argues that the European public is more comfortable with CEE than non-
white or non-Christian labour migrants. 
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skill workers (Home Office 2006). Since under the proposed post-Brexit immigration 
policies (to be likely in effect until a review in 2025), temporary, low-skill EU workers will 
have access to the UK’s labour market without needing to secure employment beforehand, 
it is not unlikely that CEE nationals will continue populating such positions. After Brexit, 
however, they will also likely be competing with non-EU nationals520, which will likely 
drive all low-skill migrants’ wages down and increase their vulnerabilities.  
 
Poles’ whiteness can also make racism or discrimination against them go unacknowledged. 
It can stand as a barrier to official and public recognition of race-based harassment and 
violence perpetrated against them. At least some white Britons appear more comfortable 
directing explicit criticism against white than non-white migrants (Lewis 2005); and some 
members of the public assume that the concepts of racism and discrimination only apply 
to non-white victims (Tan 2014). For example, a jury had found that an assault against a 
Polish mover that caused him severe head injuries did not constitute a hate crime, despite 
the fact that the perpetrator had used phrases such as ‘Polish bastard’ (Scotsman 2007). 
Some police officers have questioned whether CEE movers deserve the same protections 
as visible minorities (Johns 2014: 101). Poles appear aware of this mistaken assumption, or 
perhaps even subscribe to it themselves. For example, a Polish participant in a qualitative 
study of 89 CEE movers’ experiences in a northern English city remarked that ‘English 
people are scared of black people. Black people can take you to court and say that you are 
racist. You don’t have this problem with Poles, so Polish people are now on the end’ 
(Cook et al 2010: 62).  
 
More generally, CEE movers have been absent from public debates, political discourse, 
and conceptual approaches towards equality and discrimination (as addressed below). 
Racism against them is also often attributed to cultural, xeno-based antagonism (e.g., 
Sivanandan 2001), implying that it is somehow less condemnable than phenotype-based 
racism. According to Rattansi (2007: 95-8), pretending that antagonism towards these new 
immigrants is not proper racism makes it more dangerous than the older, overt forms of 
racism. Furthermore, while law and legal discourse have addressed the more violent and 
more obvious forms of race-based wrongs, they tend to lack the vocabulary to tackle 
wrongs that appear culturally-based (Delgado and Stefancic 2017). 
  
Post-04 CEE movers’ degenerate whiteness has also pointed to new fractures within racial 
hierarchies. Albeit not always based on correct premises, Poles perceive being 
                                                      
520 It is not yet clear which non-EU countries will be designated as ‘low-risk’ and hence eligible for this entry 
route. 
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disadvantaged in comparison to both white British and BAME workers (Cook et al 2010). 
For example, a Polish participant in a study concluded that ‘it would have been better if I 
was black, I mean, if I was from Africa, because people would stop treating me as an 
intruder …, and they feel guilty about those from Africa because of the history, because 
they have to make it up to them’ (Rzepnikowska 2019: 72). Such views have been 
accompanied by Poles’ emphasis on their whiteness (and Europeanness) to improve their 
positioning within the UK’s racial hierarchy (Fox et al 2015). This approach is reminiscent 
of how certain Caucasian immigrants521 to the United States a century ago asserted their 
whiteness, and expressed antipathy towards non-whites to move up on the scale of racial 
hierarchy (Ignatiev 2008; Roediger 2002). Such attitudes also reflect Poles’ own racism: 
they expect their whiteness to automatically protect them from disadvantage suffered by 
BAME groups. At the same time, Poles are resented by other Caucasian groups. In Cook 
et al’s (2010) study, Slovak and Roma workers felt disadvantaged compared to Poles due 
to the latter’s large presence and the availability of service providers catering to them. My 
review of cases (described below) confirmed such tensions between racial and ethnic 
groups. As Samaluk (2014) has noted, there is need for a more nuanced look at CEE 
movers’ positioning within the UK’s hierarchy of privilege, looking beyond the traditional 
black-white paradigm. 
 
E. Situating CEE Movers Within the UK’s Equality Framework  
 
Despite their documented disadvantage and experiences of racism, CEE movers have 
been absent from official equality and race relations discourse. For example, the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission’s522 (‘EHRC’) most recent, 300-page long Employment 
Statutory Code of Practice mentioned white migrants only once, in an illustrative example 
of employer’s indirect discrimination of seasonal workers (EHRC 2011a). My review 
indicates that publications posted between 2008 and 2017 on the equality policy tab of the 
official UK Government website (www.gov.uk) made no mention of migrants or white 
ethnic groups. The lengthy publication presented by the Equalities Office (2008b) to the 
Parliament during the Equality Act 2010’s consultation period made no mention of 
immigrants, despite being drafted after consulting two migrant groups523. Moreover, by 
noting that ‘if you are from an ethnic minority you are a fifth less likely to find work than 
if you are white’ (Equalities Office 2008a: 18), the Equalities Office approached ‘ethnic 
                                                      
521 Including the Irish, and Eastern and Southern Europeans. 
522 As with CRE’s Codes of Practice, its Codes and other pronouncements are not legally binding, although 
adjudicators may refer to them. 
523 The Migrants’ Rights Network (working for a rights-based approach to migration), and the Joint Council 
for the Welfare of Immigrants (campaigning for justice in immigration, nationality, and refugee policies). 
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minority’ and white groups as mutually exclusive, thus implicitly overlooking whites’ 
heterogeneity524. The final report of the Equalities Review (2007: 5) did acknowledge that 
equality policies should target groups not traditionally emphasised by anti-discrimination 
measures, but only referred to British working-class whites. The 170+ page report did not 
devote any attention to CEE movers. After the Equality Act 2010 was passed, its 200+ 
page Explanatory Notes (2010) did not mention migrants, movers, or non-UK nationals. 
This is likely reinforced by, and reflected in the fact that empirical studies of economic 
outcomes and markers of social inclusion tend to lump all whites together525. 
 
Government-sponsored advice groups have only taken minimal notice of CEE workers’ 
discrimination. None of the resources available on the Equality Advisory and Support 
Service526 website refer to discrimination suffered by white ethnic minorities, migrants, or 
foreigners. Among all the information posted on the ACAS website527, only one mentions 
CEE workers. A short ‘workplace snippet’ for those employing migrants notes that 
employers should treat them the same as British workers, and should protect them from 
‘exploitation, discrimination and harassment’ (ACAS 2012a). This acknowledgement is 
likely due to the fact that, as an employment claims conciliation service, ACAS is exposed 
to many reports of CEE workers’ discrimination.  
 
Moreover, (white) EU movers have been ignored by integration and equal opportunities 
discourse and measures. No national integration measures have addressed white groups’ 
needs528. What national and local integration measures529 do exist have been overlooking 
recent immigrants530, and have instead focused on the treatment of long-standing 
minorities in public services and private markets (Saggar and Somerville 2012: 2) - 
especially blacks and Asians (e.g., Cantle 2001; Commission on Integration and Cohesion 
2007531; London Councils 2017; Social Integration Commission 2014). In its newest 
                                                      
524 Even if white migrants do not appear disadvantaged in their access to employment (as discussed earlier). 
525 Similarly, the Irish have traditionally been overlooked in race discrimination studies. For example, Hood’s 
(1992) seminal study of the role of race in sentencing considered only Asian, Black, and White racial 
categories.  
526 See http://www.equalityadvisoryservice.com/app/answers/list. 
527 See http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=608. 
528 Although there have been some discussions about integrating (typically UK-born) Gypsies and Travellers. 
E.g., Gypsy and Traveller Communities (Housing, Planning and Education) Bill 2017-19 (failed to progress 
through the House of Lords). 
529 Typically focused on strengthening a sense of British identity, improving outcomes in education and 
employment, and increasing community cohesion (Saggar and Somerville 2012). 
530 Except for refugees. See Home Office (2005). 
531 Notably, the Commission on Integration and Cohesion report focused on native Britons’ integration 
issues, concerns which ‘sit alongside the flow of EU citizens from Eastern Europe’ (¶ 1.5, emphasis added), 
and pointed how CEE nationals tend to see the UK ‘as an attractive place to visit and work but perhaps not 
always a new “home”’ (¶ 1.6). Thus, CEE movers were portrayed as short-term workers, not part of the 
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pronouncement on integration, the Government focused on integrating BAME groups 
and women, and on countering extremism, through mostly local initiatives (Home Office 
2018a). It also noted that, rather than relying on policy measures, recent immigrants 
should take it upon themselves to integrate into British society (id: 35-42532). Similarly, 
CEE movers have not featured in the UK’s equal opportunities framework. Governmental 
data collection also tends to overlook them. CEE movers’ exclusion from such discourses 
and policies (whatever their level of effectiveness) normalises their experience of 
inequalities.  
 
This oversight has been critiqued by scholars. For example, after noting that new migrants 
are commonly not considered to be ‘racial groups’ for purposes of policies mandated by 
the Equality Act and under CRE guidance notes, the Institute for Public Policy Research 
recommended that race relations encompass CEE movers (Rutter and Latorre 2009: 45-6). 
Similarly, an independent report prepared for the EHRC, after its 2009 migration summit, 
did point to inequalities experienced by CEE movers, and recommended that their (and 
their children’s) access to equality be better supported (Sumption and Somerville 2010: 45-
6). Since then, however, there has been little change in equality, integration, or equal 
opportunities discourse or policies.  
 
CEE movers’ absence from equality discourse and policies is likely due, at least in part, to 
a much shorter history of disadvantage and discrimination in the UK than BAME 
individuals and women. I contend that this absence might also be attributable to the fact 
that their arrival does not fit the UK’s historical race relations paradigm (discussed above). 
Unlike some earlier migration waves, CEE movers have often engaged in temporary 
migration, are privileged in some ways due to whiteness, and have been largely ignored by 
migrant advocacy organisations. Moreover, whereas New Commonwealth migrants and 
the Irish have at times engaged in violent conflict (often as a response to violent racism 
against them), CEE movers have not done so. It is also possible that the Government has 
felt a lesser sense of responsibility towards all EU movers – due to their relatively 
privileged position among migrants (as white EU citizens), and now, due to their status 
being in flux after the Brexit referendum.  
 
Unfortunately, race-based wrongs cannot be effectively addressed if they are absent from 
legal discourse (Crenshaw 2011). Groups that are absent from discourse might be more 
                                                      
British polity. Moreover, the report noted CEE movers’ otherness by suggesting that recent EU migrants be 
provided welcome packs ‘that cover behaviours, norms etc’ (¶ 5.24).  
532 This resembles the ECJ’s reasoning in Gusa (see Chapter 4, Section5(A)). 
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easily overlooked when adjudicators apply anti-discrimination provisions (even if they are 
included under a simple, doctrinal reading of such measures). In today’s British equality 
discourse, whiteness typically533 appears homogeneous and invisible, normalised as 
privileged534. This reproduces white privilege accruing to those who fit the white British 
norm, while silencing marginalised and racialised whites, and legitimising existing social 
structures and class relations.  
 
It remains to be seen how the post-Brexit nature of CEE nationals’ settlement and 
migration will affect the equality framework’s approach towards them. According to the 
2018 White Paper, the post-Brexit immigration regime (in effect until at least 2025) will 
create three routes for lawful presence in the UK: (1) settled EU nationals, (2) highly-
skilled workers (uncapped) tied to specific employer sponsors, and (3) low-skill, temporary 
labourers535 (uncapped) who may enter as jobseekers on twelve-month visas, with a 
cooling-off period of a further twelve months, and no eligibility for public benefits. It is 
possible that those who will lawfully settle (or at least their progeny) will eventually 
become incorporated into the British norm and hence less in need of equality protections. 
It is not clear if the UK will continue being an appealing destination for CEE nationals 
after Brexit - especially since they will continue having access to employment throughout 
the EU, and will have to compete with non-EU migrants in the UK (whose entry will 
likely be facilitated by post-Brexit policies). For those CEE workers who will arrive after 
Brexit, it will be more likely as temporary labourers rather than as skilled workers, due to 
the greater ease of gaining entry under the former category. Some temporary labourers 
might also remain unlawfully after their twelve-month visas expire. Thus, a significant 
portion of post-Brexit CEE workers is likely to be engaged as temporary (some possibly 
undocumented) low-skill workers, groups lacking political power and typically not eliciting 
much Governmental protection. Highly-skilled EU workers will likely comprise too small 
and too privileged a group to be encompassed by equality discourse. 
 
Although CEE movers’ presence does not fit the UK’s historical equality paradigm, it 
appears to follow the traditional British approach to migration control. As with New 
Commonwealth migrants, the entry of CEE workers has been driven by British employers’ 
                                                      
533 With the notable exception of the progressive socio-economic duty, intended to respond to the 
disadvantage of the white British working class (discussed below). 
534 Unless fractured by protected characteristics such as gender, sexual orientation, or disability. 
535 This category was created because ‘[e]mployers have to some extent become reliant on lower skilled 
workers from the EU for certain jobs’ (HM Gov’t 2018 ¶ 25), especially in construction and social care (¶ 
26), fields often populated by Poles and other CEE workers. This route will be available to persons from 
‘low-risk’ countries – including the EU (summary point 6; ¶5.1), and beyond. 
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demand for flexible, fungible, low-paid workers. For a decade after the Eastern 
Enlargement, the UK did not need to impose direct immigration limitations on their entry 
since it was directly responsive to employment opportunities. Due to their low reliance on 
the public purse (reinforced through policies curbing their access to benefits) and high 
rates of employment, CEE movers have been contributing to the UK’s economy. The 
Government has not needed to ensure their equality rights to reap these economic 
contributions. If anything, their exploitation at work and insufficient protections by the 
anti-discrimination framework (as addressed below) have reduced business costs.  
 
As with post-war New Commonwealth migration, however, CEE movers’ presence had 
reached a point prompting public and political outcry, and bringing about increased 
immigration controls (or at least the UK’s ability to do so536) through withdrawing from 
the EU. The post-Brexit immigration policy proposal, however, differs from policies 
restricting New Commonwealth immigration in the 1960s and 1970s. The 2018 White 
Paper seems to encourage (uncapped) temporary low-skill migration, much of which will 
likely be from the CEE region. Thus, the new immigration framework continues to cater 
to business needs for an exploitable, revolving reserve army of cheap labour (see n 535). 
Whereas by the 1970s, large numbers of New Commonwealth migrants had settled in the 
UK, it is uncertain how many CEE movers will rely on the settlement scheme. Hence, 
employers are in need (at least for the time being) of a continued entry route for low-skill 
workers. Notably, unlike New Commonwealth migrants, post-Brexit low-skill workers will 
be unable to settle in the UK and unable to access most social benefits. 
 
4. Post-04 Equality Laws 
 
Today’s racial equality legislation is the seventh such statute in five decades. Although 
frequent changes might indicate legislative initiative and hold promise of improvement, 
they also suggest the continued prevalence of discrimination and racial exclusion. 
Moreover, the constant need to improve legislation indicates that previous measures have 
been ineffective. All the equality laws discussed below were introduced by the Labour 
Party. 
 
A. Transposition of the Race Equality Directive 
 
The Directive’s transposition, required by July 2003 in EU-15 States, was met with little 
opposition within British political and legal spheres (O’Cinneide 2012). By then, the UK 
                                                      
536 The 2018 White Paper does not immediately seek to curb immigration, at least not until a policy review in 
2025. 
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already had a well-developed anti-discrimination framework537. The business establishment 
did express some concerns, however. In response, the Government emphasised that 
equality protections would increase productivity (Cabinet Office 2001: iii) and would not 
impose ‘unnecessary burdens’ on businesses (id: vi).  
 
The Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 implemented the Directive 
by making changes to RRA76. Thus, the UK avoided a much lengthier—and likely more 
controversial—transposition through comprehensive reforms. In line with the Directive, 
the UK provided new definitions of indirect discrimination and harassment; and shifted 
the burden of proof to make it easier for victims to prove discrimination. In its 2007 
reasoned opinion, however, the European Commission found fault with the UK’s 
definition of indirect discrimination and its lack of transparency regarding remedies 
available to victims (Commission 2009d). By the end of 2007, those sections were revised, 
and the Commission concluded its infringement procedure. Although UK policymakers 
and judges rarely explicitly refer to the Directive538, its transposition also prevented any 
regression in the UK’s equality regime (Meer 2017).  
 
B. The Equality Act 2006  
 
The Directive, along with other EU anti-discrimination measures, also prompted the 
adoption of a single UK equality act (Meer 2010). After more than a decade of calls for 
consolidating all UK anti-discrimination legislation into one act (id), the Equality Act 2006 
(‘EqA2006’) was implemented to prohibit discrimination due to age, disability, gender, 
gender reassignment, race, and sexual orientation (Section 10(2)). It also added a new 
protected ground of religion or belief (Part 2), and imposed a duty on public authorities to 
promote equality of opportunity between women and men (Section 84). Moreover, it was 
accompanied by the creation of the EHRC (Part 1), one of Europe’s largest human rights 
bodies, which combined three pre-existing equality bodies539. At the same time, greater 
immigration controls were being imposed (on non-EU migrants), including the points 







                                                      
537 Moreover, the UK assumed that the ECJ would interpret the Directive similarly to its analysis of gender 
equality legislation, so the UK transposed it in line with how it had transposed gender equality laws 
(O’Cinneide 2012). 
538 Possibly because they perceive UK policies as the most advanced in Europe (Fella and Ruzza 2013). 
539 CRE; Equal Opportunities Commission; and Disability Rights Commission. 
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C. The Equality Act 2010     
 
i. Background and Legislative History 
 
In 2005, Tony Blair commissioned the most extensive UK review of equality since the 
1970s (Discrimination Law Review 2007). The independent Equalities Review was to 
conduct a wide-ranging examination of inequalities in the UK and of the role of social 
policy. Moreover, the Discrimination Law Review was to undertake a review of all existing 
discrimination legislation, and to bring forward proposals for a more effective equality 
framework. Both Reviews reported in 2007, followed by a year-long consultation process. 
 
Harriet Harman, the then Minister for Women and Equalities, presented the Equality Bill 
in 2009. After much scrutiny by the Parliament, the Bill became law in April 2010. 
Although one of the last measures under the Labour government, it had ultimately 
received cross-party support. Implemented in stages, the new law consolidated and 
clarified nine major pieces of anti-discrimination legislation540, close to 100 statutory 
instruments, and more than 2,500 pages of guidance and codes of practice developed over 
more than four decades (Equalities Office 2008a). Composed of 218 Sections, the 
EqA2010 is more detailed than previous equality legislations541. Notably, it increased 
protections by allowing limited positive action and limited collective remedies in 
employment claims, permitting reliance on hypothetical comparators, and prohibiting 
associative and perceived discriminations. The Act’s most innovative provisions, however, 
were not brought into force by the Conservatives, due to being too cumbersome for 
business, as addressed below.  
 
The adoption of the EqA2010 followed thirteen years542 of lobbying by human rights and 
equality groups (Hepple 2014: 11-16). During this process, migrant voices were not heard. 
There were no lobbying efforts by migrant or white ethnic minority groups during the 
adoption of the EqA2010 (or of preceding anti-discrimination laws) (Bell 2015). My review 
of all Commons and Lords debates surrounding the EqA2010 revealed that migrants (or 
movers) were never mentioned. Moreover, they were also not mentioned in any 
Parliamentary discussions between 2004 and 2010 that referred to the concepts of 
                                                      
540 Equal Pay Act 1970; Sex Discrimination Act 1975; RRA76; Disability Discrimination Act 1995; 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003; Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003; Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006; EqA2006, Part 2; Equality Act (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2007. 
541 For example, EqA2006 was composed of 95 Sections.  
542 The delay is also attributable to waiting for TEU Article 13 Directives to be adopted, and for the EHRC 
to become well-established (Hepple 2014: 5). 
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‘discrimination’ or ‘inequality’. Instead, Parliamentary deliberations had focused on BAME 
groups, and had tended to lump whites into one (allegedly privileged) group543.  
 
ii. Socio-economic Duty  
 
The Government’s recognition of the relationship between inequalities and socio-
economic class was brought to the foreground in its 1999 White Paper ‘Opportunity for 
All: Tackling Poverty and Social Exclusion’ (DSS 1999). The Department of Social 
Security concluded that the Government should address poverty, consider its role in 
creating and perpetuating inequalities, and provide all persons with equal opportunities 
regardless of their economic or social background (id). Moreover, during the adoption of 
the EqA2010, the Equalities Review’s final report (2007: 5) acknowledged that equality 
policies should target groups not traditionally emphasised by anti-discrimination measures, 
such as poor whites. Poverty had been documented to facilitate a ‘cascade of disadvantage’ 
(id: 47). Notably, interactions between poverty and inequalities in housing, education, 
employment, and healthcare were well documented by that time (e.g., Hills et al 2009: 11). 
Furthermore, it was well known that economic inequalities between different ethnic 
groups, and between different social classes544 had been increasing over time in the UK 
(National Equality Panel 2010: 38-40). 
 
Having been introduced by Labour’s Harriet Harman545, and passed by both Houses of 
Parliament, Section 1 of the Bill that became the EqA2010 sought to ‘reduce the gap 
between rich and poor’, and to ensure ‘that public bodies systematically and strategically 
take account of people who are poor and clearly disadvantaged’546. In addition to its 
symbolically progressive value, the provision required specified public bodies547 to have 
due regard in their decision-making to ‘reduc[ing] the inequalities of outcome which result 
from socio-economic disadvantage’ (Section 1(1)). Thus, public policies were to seek to 
reduce inequalities in education, health, and housing stemming from socio-economic 
disadvantage (Explanatory Notes 2010). This duty applied to all groups regardless of 




544 As well as between women and men. 
545 Hence, it was commonly known as ‘Harman law’. 
546 House of Lords Debates, 15 December 2009, col 1407. 
547 Including Minister of the Crown; most Government departments; county, district, and borough councils; 
health and social care authorities; and police and crime commissioner. 
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race548. In supporting this provision, Labour emphasised that socio-economic legislation is 
a key to promoting fairness549. 
 
The Conservative Party550 had opposed this part of the Bill from the time of its 
introduction, arguing that discrimination remedies are fundamentally different from 
solutions to socio-economic disadvantage551. Similarly, the Conservatives-led Coalition 
Government which came to power in 2010 adamantly resisted it. Conservative politicians 
had called this provision ‘political window dressing’552, ‘left-wing tosh’553, ‘gesture politics’ 
inherently incapable of solving inequality554, and ‘socialism in one clause’555. Labour 
dismissed such criticisms as motivated by ‘ideology, politics and prejudice’556. The 
Coalition Government ultimately scrapped the socio-economic duty in 2013 - driven by its 
goals to cut down public expenditures, lessen administrative burdens on businesses 
(Hepple 2014: 227-8; Meer 2017), and support the free market by reducing worker 
protections557.  
 
My research indicates that political debates surrounding the socio-economic duty ignored 
migrants (and movers), likely facilitated by the lack of migrant lobbying efforts. The 1999 
White Paper referred to immigrants only once, in the context of providing second-
generation students with extra language support (DSS 1999: 53). In advocating for the 
imposition of the socio-economic duty, Labour politicians drew attention to inequalities 
experienced by poor white Britons and well-established BAME groups (including Muslims, 
Travellers, Jews, Dalit558, and Afro-Caribbeans)559. New migrants and Christian white 
ethnic groups were ignored. This oversight occurred despite the fact that the National 
Equality Panel (2010: 132), established by Labour Government in 2008, had noted that 
migration status plays a role in disadvantage, even for EU movers.  
 
                                                      
548 Thus, it would also likely diminish white Britons’ criticism that anti-discrimination law favours BAME 
groups. 
549 Fiona Mactaggart, Hansard Report, 18 Nov 2010, vol 518. 
550 Including Theresa May (at the time, the Home Secretary, and Minister for Women and Equalities). 
551 Public Bill Committee (Equality Bill), 5th sitting, 11 June 2009, col 129. 
552 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, Hansard Report, House of Lords 18 Nov 2010, vol 722. 
553 Peter Bone (Wellingborough), Hansard Report, 18 Nov 2010, vol 518. 
554 Baroness Verma, Hansard Report, House of Lords 18 Nov 2010, vol 722. 
555 Baroness Royall of Blaisdon, Hansard Report, House of Lords 18 Nov 2010, vol 722. 
556 Id. 
557 The Coalition Government also supported deregulation through Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013, Section 65 (deleting from the EqA2010 employers’ duty to prevent harassment by third parties); 
introducing fees for filing employment claims, and disempowering EHRC to its core functions. 
558 The lowest Indian caste. 
559 E.g., Baroness Thornton, Hansard Report, House of Lords 18 Nov 2010, vol 722. 
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The socio-economic duty proposal had recognised the role of (lower) class in resulting 
from and reinforcing the experience of disadvantage and discrimination. Including poor 
(British) whites in such debates indicated a rare acknowledgment by those in power that 
some whites have incomplete access to white privilege. Albeit stemming from the 
American context, Pruitt (2015a) has noted nuanced intersections between white-skin 
privilege and socio-economic disadvantage. According to Sivanandan (2001: 2), ‘poverty is 
the new Black’. That is, low socio-economic status rather than skin colour per se serves as 
a marker of disadvantage and racism. Thus, Sivanandan drew attention to racism against 
‘impoverished strangers even if they are white’, such as CEE asylum seekers before the fall 
of Communism (Fekete 2009: 20). Moreover, Fekete (2001) argues that, in post-Cold War 
Europe, it is the CEE region’s poverty that has enabled western racism against CEE 
nationals to become naturalised.  
 
In the UK, post-04 CEE movers have been concentrated in low-paid employment and 
have experienced racism, disadvantage, and discrimination. They have also been subjected 
by some white Britons to class-inspired discourse about physical appearance, lifestyle, type 
of work, poverty, and cultural practices (Moore 2013a). Through such class-based 
racialisation, recent CEE workers have been positioned as not white enough to be 
accepted into the (white) British way of life560 (id; Fox et al 2012a; Lewis 2005). Aware of 
their precarious status within British class and race hierarchies, Polish workers themselves 
have emphasised both their whiteness and their alleged middle-class status, to position 
themselves higher on the British hierarchies of privilege (Fox et al 2015). Unfortunately, 
scrapping of the socio-economic duty provision overlooks such nuances in the experience 
of inequality, and legitimates existing social and class structures. 
.   
That being said, one should not get distracted by race-versus-class debates — regarding 
which is more implicated in social injustices (Pruitt 2015a). Instead, it is the various 
intersecting fractures within whiteness (or other colours) and within class that affect the 
experience of equality. All CEE movers have been affected by anti-CEE sentiment, and 
some middle-class CEE movers (such as the medical doctor claimant in Michalak, 
discussed below) have been victims of discrimination. Ultimately, it is poor Britons’ and 
CEE movers’ lack of voice in the promulgation of laws and in legal discourse that 
entrenches their disadvantage. During debates on the socio-economic duty, one Labour 
MP had remarked that all ‘honourable Members [of Parliament] are in a position of 
immense privilege, and it is generally the case that laws and regulations are made by the 
                                                      
560 Especially in rural areas, considered quintessentially British. 
 200 
privileged and imposed on the disadvantaged. Therefore, how can the Minister argue 
against a requirement to consider the interests of those in our society who do not have a 
voice?’561. This reflects CRT scholars’ view that those in power use laws to propagate their 
own privilege, while continuing to disadvantage all others (Delgado and Stefancic 2017). 
Notably, the MP making this observation was of Nigerian heritage, reinforcing CRT 
scholars’ emphasis on the need for coalition building among all disempowered groups. 
 
iii. Key Provisions of the Equality Act 2010 
 
The Equality Act 2010 continues to apply the definition of ‘race’ as initially formulated 
under RRA76, to encompass ‘colour, nationality, and ethnic562 or national origin’ (Section 
9(1)). Poles (and other CEE national groups) fall under these protected grounds. ‘Colour’ 
includes, for example, ‘being black or white’ (Explanatory Notes 2010: 16). Movers retain 
their nationalities563 from their countries of origin, which also typically determines their 
‘national origin’564. Whites’ protection due to their specific national origins has been 
recognised since the Irish became widely acknowledged in the UK as having a vulnerable 
national origin.  
 
In the context of employment, discrimination is prohibited in hiring, employment terms, 
promotions, transfers, training opportunities, and dismissal (Section 39). Hence, in theory 
at least, persons of all races are to be integrated into the labour market and provided equal 
opportunities once hired. To function as a comparator, an employee must be employed by 
the same employer (at the same or different location) and under the same terms as the 
claimant (Section 79). Contract workers are also protected (Section 41), as are jobseekers 
relying on employment agencies (Section 55). Those provisions benefit recent CEE 
movers since many of them are employed by agencies. The extent to which the EqA2010 
protects self-employed persons is uncertain, however565, following a 2011 Supreme Court 
decision566. The scope of the Act extends beyond the employment field, to also include the 






                                                      
561 Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central), Hansard Report, 18 Nov 2010, vol 518. 
562 Ethnic origin refers to groups with shared history and culture, which perceive themselves and are 
perceived by others as separate communities, such as Sikhs or Irish Travellers (EHRC 2011a: 37-38). 
563 Citizenship or membership in a nation, through birth or naturalisation (id). 
564 Connection to a nation through birth or ancestry (id). 
565 Except for those expressly covered by the legislation (for example, partners in firms or barristers). 
566 Jivraj v Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40. 
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a. Direct Discrimination 
 
‘A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A 
treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others’ (Section 13(1)). This definition 
is closely in line with the definition under the Race Equality Directive (Article 2(2)(a)). 
Race need not have been the main cause, as long as it was ‘an effective cause’ of the 
conduct complained of567. There must be no material differences between claimant’s and 
comparators’ circumstances (Section 23).  The respondent’s motive for discriminating is 
not relevant568. Thus, even discriminating due to an unconscious prejudice is unlawful. The 
fact that the respondent might share the same race as the victim is also not relevant 
(Section 24). Although an inference of discrimination cannot be drawn from the mere fact 
that an employer has treated an employee who has a protected characteristic unfairly or 
unreasonably569, courts must scrutinise particularly carefully situations in which only the 
claimant was affected by such treatment570. To infer discrimination, adjudicators must 
consider each allegation before them individually, and also adopt a holistic approach571. 
Direct discrimination can be based on respondent’s perception, however incorrect, that 
the victim had a protected trait572. This might protect workers if their employers do not 
accurately differentiate between their specific ethnicities yet discriminate against them, as 
illustrated by some of the cases discussed below. There is no defence to direct 
discrimination based on race. 
 
b. Indirect Discrimination 
 
‘A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or 
practice [(‘PCP’)] which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic 
of B’s’ (Section 19(1)). Courts have traditionally interpreted the concept of PCP broadly573. 
A PCP is discriminatory if  
 
(a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the 
characteristic,  
(b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a 
particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share 
it,  
(c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and  
                                                      
567 Wreczycka v Care In Style Limited, ET East London, Case 3200984/2017, 7 March 2018. 
568 R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2 AC 728, Supreme Court. 
569 Glasgow City Council v Zafar [1998] ICR 120. 
570 Kowalewska-Zietek v Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, EAT, Case 0269/15. 
571 Ayodele v Citylink Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1913. 
572 Law Society v Bahl [2004] EWCA Civ 1070. 
573 Including, for example, subjective decisions, vague recruitment criteria, and word-of-mouth recruitment. 
See British Airways plc v Starmer [2005] IRLR 862, EAT. 
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(d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim 
(Section 19(2)).  
 
Unlike direct discrimination, indirect discrimination does not require a causal link between 
the victim’s race and the disadvantageous treatment, but it does require a causal link 
between the PCP and the disadvantage suffered574. In determining a ‘particular 
disadvantage’, a pool of hypothetical comparators may be used (Section 19(2)(b)). 
National, regional, or employer-specific statistics may be used as evidence (EHRC 2011a: 
62-5), but are not required, and do not constitute conclusive proof by themselves 
(McColgan 2017: 38-9). Strict scrutiny575 is applied when evaluating the justification 
defence (Section 19(2)(d)), that is, the respondent must prove that it had considered other, 
less discriminatory means when formulating the PCP at issue.  
 
This formulation of indirect discrimination under the EqA2010 has been praised for 
attempting ‘to level the playing field’ by allowing adjudicators to scrutinise facially neutral 
actions which in practice disadvantage people with protected characteristics576. However, it 
has lesser potential to achieve substantive equality than the Directive’s definition of 
indirect discrimination. Whereas under EU law, indirect discrimination may be found 
when only one person was put at a disadvantage577, the EqA2010 requires evidence that 
the PCP disadvantages the group sharing the claimant’s protected characteristic (Section 
19(2)(b); see also McColgan 2011: 36-7). Moreover, the UK’s definition of justification 
refers to ‘a proportionate means’ of achieving a legitimate aim (Section 19(2)(d)), whereas 
under the Directive, the means must be both ‘appropriate and necessary’ (Article 2(2)(b)).  
 
Both the Directive and the EqA2010 rely on comparator groups, which supports a formal 
approach to equality (that likes should be treated alike), allowing for levelling down and 
ignoring social inequalities. Moreover, appropriate use of hypothetical comparators 
requires taking account of societal inequalities, and a long line of cases to develop rigorous 
methodology. This appears problematic for CEE movers, whose widespread racialisation 
has been normalised in the UK, and who have not been addressed by a long line of 
jurisprudence. Although the requirement that the group to which the claimant belongs 
suffer disadvantage (Section 19(2)(b)) appears to create space for adjudicators to consider 
                                                      
574 Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] UKSC 27. 
575 R (On the Application of Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] IRLR 934, Court of Appeal. 
576 Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2012] EqLR 594, ¶ 17 (Lady Hale). 
577 Under the Directive, indirect discrimination occurs ‘where an apparently neutral’ PCP ‘would put persons 
of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons,’ unless that PCP ‘is 
objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’ 
(Article 2(2)(b)). 
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broader power relations and specific groups’ racialisation, the lack of relevant national and 
regional statistics makes such analysis challenging in the context of non-BAME groups. 
Moreover, in line with popular and political discourse (discussed above), adjudicators 
might lack sufficient sensitivity to acknowledge Poles’ widespread racialisation, experiences 
of disadvantage, lack of integration, and lack of access to equal opportunities - factors 
which might support Poles’ arguments about their group’s ‘particular disadvantage’. My 
review of more than two hundred Polish claimants’ cases revealed only one successful 
claim of indirect discrimination578, out of only five such claims asserted.  
 
c. Language Rules  
 
The Equality Act makes no mention of language or accent discrimination. Case law, 
however, has been developed to determine when English-only rules in the workplace are 
discriminatory. Such rules are likely unlawful if applied to casual conversations between 
employees, in social areas, or during break times (EHRC 2012). If a blanket English-only 
rule operates during the performance of work duties, however, it might be lawful if it 
constitutes a proportionate method for achieving a legitimate aim – such as to ensure good 
work performance or good work relations (by not making others feel excluded) (EHRC 
2012), or to fulfil health and safety obligations (EHRC 2011a: 251). However, even in such 
situations, an occasional comment by one employee to another in a different language will 
likely be permitted (and therefore a complete ban may be disproportionate) (CIPD 2013: 
22). A co-worker’s complaint about feeling excluded by others’ private conversations in a 
different language might constitute a sufficient reason to forbid such conversations, 
especially if they appear to have been intended to exclude or to create a hostile 
environment579. Given the widespread antipathy towards Poles in the UK—by some 
Britons, and by some non-Polish CEE workers (Garapich 2012)—it is possible that some 
workers might be overly sensitive to feeling excluded by Polish speakers, especially if Poles 
constitute the majority of their co-workers (Anderson et al 2008; Ciupijus 2012c; EHRC 
2010; Jiang 2013; MacKenzie and Forde 2009a). English-only rules that are unlawful 







                                                      
578 Kosik v Montgomery Transport, discussed below. 
579 Griffin v Hyder Brothers Ltd, ET Case 2406224/2011, 25 April 2012. 
580 Moreover, targeting specific foreign-language speakers or only specific languages might constitute direct 




‘A person (A) harasses another (B) if— (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a 
relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of— (i) 
violating B’s dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or 
offensive environment for B (Section 26(1)). ‘Conduct’ has been interpreted broadly, to 
include written, oral, and physical actions (such as gestures or images)581. A single act may 
be significant enough to create a hostile environment582 if its effects are of longer 
duration583. No comparator is needed, and the unwanted conduct does not have to be 
directed at the claimant. In determining whether the conduct at issue had the purpose or 
effect of violating claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating or hostile environment, 
each of the following must be taken into account: (a) the claimant’s perceptions; (b) all the 
facts of the case; and (c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have had that effect 
(Section 26(4)). It appears that an adjudicator would be more inclined to find for Polish 
claimants based on this test if the broader context of Poles’ racialisation in the UK were 
taken into account. Given how normalised their racialisation has become in public and 
political discourse, however, that appears unlikely in practice. Moreover, the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal (‘EAT’) has warned against encouraging ‘a culture of hypersensitivity’, 
noting that ‘not every racially slanted adverse comment or conduct may constitute the 
violation of a person's dignity’, especially if they are unintended584 or cause only ‘minor 
upsets’585.  
 
Although it does not encompass employer’s liability for acts committed by co-workers or 
by third parties, harassment constitutes a broader offense under the EqA2010 than under 
the Directive, which requires both a violation of dignity and the creation of a hostile 
environment (Article 2(3)). The breath of this provision under the EqA2010 can likely be 
attributed to the fact that British pre-transposition judicial interpretations of harassment 
(stemming from gender equality laws) had been wide, and the UK was afraid of violating 







                                                      
581 See https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/law-and-courts/discrimination/what-are-the-different-types-of-
discrimination/harassment/. 
582 Weeks v Newham College of Further Education [2012] UKEAT/0630/11/ZT. 
583 Quality Solicitors, UKEAT/0105/14/RN. 
584 Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal [2009] IRLR 336, EAT/0458/08, ¶ 22. 




‘A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because— (a) B 
does a protected act, or (b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act586’ 
(Section 27(1)). A treatment amounts to a detriment if a reasonable worker would or might 
take the view that, in all the circumstances, it was to her or his detriment587. As with the 
test for harassment, it is not clear whether the ‘reasonable person’ standard accounts for 
the wider climate of Poles’ disadvantage and racialisation. There is no need to show a less 
favourable treatment. Doing the protected act need not be the only cause, but must be a 
significant cause, of the detrimental treatment588. The Directive’s definition of 
victimisation is vague, but appears more limited, as it instructs national regimes to protect 
‘individuals from any adverse treatment or adverse consequence’ due to a protected act 
(Article 9). 
 
f. Burden of Proof 
 
In line with the Directive’s burden of proof provisions (Article 8), the EqA2010 extended 
reversal of the burden of proof to all discrimination claims, including race-based589. Thus, 
if the claimant presents facts from which a court could conclude that the respondent had 
contravened a provision of the EqA2010, and if the respondent fails to offer a non-
discriminatory explanation, the court must conclude that the alleged contravention 
occurred (Section 136). First, the claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, 
facts from which a reasonable court could properly conclude, based on all the evidence 
(including the respondent’s explanation) that the respondent had committed a proscribed 
act590. The court must carefully link any findings of discrimination to specific facts591. If the 
claimant satisfies this stage, the burden shifts to the respondent to prove, on the balance 
of probabilities, that the treatment ‘was in no sense whatsoever’ due to race. Courts expect 
‘cogent evidence’ (Hepple 2014: 204) that race was ‘not any part’ of the reason for the 
treatment592. This two-stage test need not be applied in a mechanical way593 (especially 
when dealing with hypothetical comparators), as long as the court focuses on determining 
why the respondent treated the claimant as she did. This provides adjudicators some 
flexibility to make the burden more or less challenging.  
                                                      
586 Bringing proceedings, providing information related to proceedings, or alleging a violation (in good faith) 
under the Act (Section 27(2)).  
587 Shamoon v Chief Constable of the RUC [2013] ICR 337 (House of Lords). 
588 Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [2000] 1 AC 501, ¶¶ 19 and 34. 
589 Under previous legislation, burden of proof was not reversed in race discrimination or victimisation cases. 
590 Madarassy v Nomura International Plc [2007] EWCA Civ 33. 
591 Efobi v Royal Mail Group Ltd, UKEAT/0203/16. 
592 Prasil v Orchard House Foods, 3400534/2014, ET Cambridge, 12 April 2018. 
593 Khan v Home Office [2008] All ER (D) 323, Court of Appeal. 
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g. Enforcement and Remedies 
 
Whatever contribution successive anti-discrimination laws have made, discrimination 
claims continue to be challenging for the victims to prove, even when claimants are 
represented. Complaints of race discrimination appear to be the least likely to succeed of 
all discrimination claims (McColgan 2017: 70-2). For example, of the race discrimination 
claims brought under the EqA2010 in 2011-12, 3% were successful at full hearing, 6% 
dismissed at preliminary hearings, 17% unsuccessful at full hearing, and 74% settled or 
withdrawn (Ministry of Justice 2013). In 2015-16, 5% of race discrimination claims were 
successful at full hearing, 23% dismissed at preliminary hearings, 18% unsuccessful at full 
hearing, 21% withdrawn and 33% settled (McColgan 2017: 72). These statistics are 
consistent with outcomes under the EqA2006594.  
 
Although there are no ethnicity-specific statistics, CEE movers as a group file significantly 
fewer ET claims than would be expected based on their relative numbers in the UK595 
(Barnard and Ludlow 2016). Based on a sample of 46 ET claims filed by CEE workers 
between 2010 and 2012, CEE claimants appear as likely to fail altogether as to succeed (in 
whole or partially) (id: 19)596. Of the 13 race discrimination claims (id: 12), only one was 
successful (id: 20). This success rate, of approximately 8%, is higher than average, although 
due to the small sample size, it is difficult to make a meaningful comparison.   
 
Remedies under the EqA2010 appear driven by economic concerns, rather than by 
integration or equal opportunities goals. Enforcement mechanisms remain focused on 
aggrieved individuals, and no class actions are permitted597. The introduction of 
representative actions was considered by an advisory body (Equalities Office 2008a)598. It 
was opposed by business interests, however, due to allegedly increasing legal costs for 
companies, an assessment with which the Discrimination Law Review (2007: 122) had 
agreed. 
 
                                                      
594 In 2009-10, for example, 3% were successful at full hearing, 5% dismissed at preliminary hearings, 15% 
unsuccessful at full hearing 30% withdrawn, and 38% formally settled (McColgan 2011: 144). 
595 For example, during 2010-12, they filed 1,548 ET claims, whereas they would have been expected to file 
approximately 12,000 claims based on their population (Barnard and Ludlow 2016). 
596 This of course overlooks how claimants might have benefited from settled or withdrawn cases. 
597 Although the EHRC may investigate potential violations and issue non-binding compliance notices 
(specifying actions required to ensure conformity with the legislation). 
598 And was recommended by the European Commission in 2013. 
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The main remedy available under the EqA2010 is monetary damages. This includes 
compensation for financial loss (typically, loss of earnings)599, damages for injury to 
feelings600 (which may be awarded even if no other damages are awarded), and aggravated 
or exemplary damages601 (Section 119). In indirect discrimination claims, if the respondent 
proves that discrimination was unintentional, damages may only be awarded if the court 
considers it ‘just and equitable’ to do so (EHRC 2011a: 67). Since it is easier for the 
respondent to prove lack of her intent rather than for the claimant to prove the existence 
of such intent, this approach benefits respondents. There is no upper limit on the amount 
of damages that can be awarded602, but in practice they typically range between £1,500 and 
£10,000. In 2010-13, for example, the median award by Employment Tribunals (‘ET’) was 
less than £10,000 (with race discrimination awards being a little bit below this amount) 
(EOR 2010: 11, 16). In 2015-16, the median award in race discrimination claims was 
£13,760 (McColgan 2017: 76). Most successful discrimination cases appear to result in at 
least an award for injury to feelings.  
 
Courts lack the power to order victims’ hiring or reinstatement in employment 
discrimination cases603. Non-financial remedies include declarations (clarifying claimant’s 
and respondent’s rights and responsibilities), and recommendations (requiring respondent 
to take certain actions to reduce the adverse effects of discrimination on the claimant) 
(Sections 116 and 124). Both have been rarely used604. To lessen alleged burdens on 
businesses, Deregulation Act 2015 repealed the ET’s initial ability to make wider 
recommendations aimed at reducing the effects of discrimination not only on the claimant, 
but also on other employees of the respondent. Wider recommendations would have 
greatly benefited exploited and racialised workers, such as Polish low-skill workers, who 





                                                      
599 In Michalak v The Mid Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust (2011), the ET awarded a record-breaking £4.5m 
(of which over £1m was for loss of earnings, and £666,000 for loss of pension) in a sex and race 
discrimination claim. The award was based on unusual circumstances, however: a hospital’s concerted 
campaign to dismiss a consultant physician, causing her psychiatric illness which made it impossible for her 
to work again as a doctor. 
600 Courts have set Vento bands for guidance in awarding damages for injury to feelings. The lowest band 
spans £800-£8,400, with higher bands for more serious cases. During 2010-13, the median award for injury 
to feelings was £5,000 (with racial discrimination claims falling at £4,000-£4,500) (EOR 2014: Tbl 2). 
601 When the respondent has behaved in a malicious or oppressive manner. They are rarely awarded. 
602 Marshall v Southampton and South West Area Health Authority (No 2) [1993] IRLR 445. 
603 Unlike in unfair dismissal cases. 
604 For example, in 2013, ETs made recommendations in 30 cases (8 of which related to individual claimants 
only) (EOR 2014: 11). If the employer fails to comply with a recommendation, the ET may award additional 
compensation (Section 124(7)).  
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D. General Critique of the Equality Act   
 
Scholars have praised the EqA2010 for increasing anti-discrimination protections (e.g., 
Connolly 2011) and elevating the equality principle as a fundamental human right (Hepple 
2014: 229). Specifically, Hepple (2010: 21) argues that streamlining, public-sector duty, and 
permissible positive action provisions represent the core of the new approach to 
transformative equality. Substantive equality goals are reflected in the Act’s definitions of 
harassment, which includes conduct with the purpose or effect of violating dignity (Section 
26(1)), and indirect discrimination, which considers unequal results of neutral practices 
(Section 19(2)(b)). Its text also mentions advancing equality of opportunity (Preamble; 
Section 149). Moreover, the Explanatory Notes (2010) emphasise that positive action is to 
advance equality of opportunity, and my review of MP statements at the time of the Act’s 
adoption indicates legislators’ concern with both equal treatment and equal opportunity. 
Moreover, despite opposing the imposition of the socio-economic duty, the Coalition 
Government described the concept of equality as inherently connected to real 
opportunities605. Likewise, Labour politicians consider the core of equality to comprise 
both equal treatment and equal opportunity606.  
 
However, the EqA2010 fails to step beyond some of the key weaknesses of the Directive 
and in some provisions merely follows its minimum requirements. Although the EqA2010 
is an improvement over previous UK legislation, it has not transformed the equality field. 
The Act mentions neither human nor fundamental rights. Although it refers to equal 
opportunities, that concept has not been clearly defined by anti-discrimination law. The 
public-sector duty contains exceptions, such as in the exercise of immigration and 
nationality functions (Schedule 18), and does not give rise to enforceable private rights. 
Formal equality is evident in the Act’s definition of direct discrimination, which focuses on 
equal treatment (Section 13(1)), and in allowing justification to indirect discrimination 
(Section 19(1)(d)). Notably, the Act did not implement proposals made by the Cambridge 
Review and by many activists that every employer with more than ten employees should 
be required to conduct periodic employment and pay-equity reviews to determine whether 
members of disadvantaged groups have access to fair participation and equal pay. Overall, 
many of the Act’s provisions offer formal protections—divorced from equal opportunities 
or integration goals—that do not accurately reflect the reality of discrimination, especially 
when it comes to migrants or poor claimants, such as many CEE movers. 
                                                      
605 E.g., Baroness Verma, Hansard Report, House of Lords 18 Nov 2010, vol 722; Lord Lester of Herne 
Hill, Hansard Report, id. 
606 E.g., Baroness Royall of Blaisdon, Hansard Report, id. 
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More fundamentally, the British anti-discrimination framework is not capable of ensuring 
substantive equality because it overlooks intersectionality, does not impose positive duties, 
and provides for individual remedies only. Notably, it conceals economic prerogatives. MP 
statements at the time of the adoption of the EqA2010 mentioned its anticipated 
economic benefits607. During the Act’s consultation process, the Equalities Office (2008a) 
pointed out the overarching economic core of the UK’s equalities framework. Even 
concepts that sound far removed from economic goals are nevertheless intertwined with 
economic concerns. For example, the notion of equal opportunities has been premised on 
eliminating barriers to free competition between individuals (Solomos 1989a), and the first 
proposal for the imposition of socio-economic duty noted that injustice and poverty are 
‘economically foolish’ (DSS 1999: vii). At the same time, the widespread rhetoric of equal 
opportunity serves to conceal such economic interests behind equality law, obscuring law’s 
politics in the service of capitalism and the economically privileged class. 
 
i. Individual Enforcement 
 
The agency enforcement model, initiated with the creation of the CRE pursuant to 
RRA76, acknowledged the need to address structural or institutional discrimination where 
no individual victims may be in a position to bring a complaint, and highlighted the role 
that the State should perform in tackling discrimination608. The current legislation, 
however, contains no provision permitting organisations to engage in proceedings on 
behalf of complainants. Although the Work and Pensions Committee (2009) had 
recommended allowing representative actions by bodies such as trade unions or the 
EHRC, the proposal never came to fruition due to business lobby pressure. Moreover, 
current legislation removed the EHRC’s ability under the EqA2006 to apply for 
injunctions even if no identifiable victims had been identified.  
 
For anti-discrimination law to approach protecting substantive equality, it needs to provide 
collective rights and collective remedies (Lacey 1998). Redress based on individual claims 
has many drawbacks. It is difficult for low-paid employees to have access to sufficient 
resources to pursue claims (especially with legal representation). Workers such as many 
Polish movers are especially disadvantaged due to frequently engaging in precarious 
employment (McDowell et al 2009; Parutis 2011a), with long working hours, and irregular 
shifts with little advance scheduling notice (MacKenzie and Forde 2009a; Bernard et al 
                                                      
607 Baroness Garden of Frognal, Hansard Report, House of Lords, 26 Apr 2011, col WA39. 
608 In practice, however, enforcement under pre-2010 legislation was mainly undertaken by individual victims 
(Dickens 2007).  
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2018; see also Appendix 1). CEE workers also tend to lack access to advocacy groups or 
free legal representatives (Bernard et al 2018). Moreover, the amount of damages awarded 
through individual claims is unlikely to have a deterrent effect on larger employers, even if 
they repeatedly609 exploit and discriminate against many CEE movers. With no class 
actions, and no penalty for organisations found to repeatedly discriminate, the EqA2010 
prioritises employer interests rather than penalising or deterring discrimination against 
workers. It illustrates interest convergence, by being consistent with market capitalism and 
protecting the elite’s economic privilege.  
 
Conceptually, individual-based approach does not fit the reality of inequality by failing to 
acknowledge that racism has been a normalised part of many groups’ conditions of 
employment. Evidence that goes beyond individual claims—such as of Poles’ widespread 
disadvantage and racialisation—is infrequently used and given only little weight under this 
approach. As Freeman (1978) argued in the context of US Supreme Court anti-
discrimination cases, equality law is inherently ineffective due to approaching inequality 
from the perpetrator’s perspective. Although at the time of his analysis, victims had to 
prove perpetrator’s intention to discriminate, many of his observations still apply today in 
the Anglo-American context610. Fundamentally, the EqA2010 only takes account of what 
specific respondents have done to individual claimants, and only if the allegations happen 
to fall within the small number of closely delineated causes of action. Discrimination is 
divorced from its social context and framed as rare incidents of individual aberration only, 
which is far from reality. The law overlooks pre-existing disadvantages faced by some 
groups, and ignores the underlying social conditions that contribute to that disadvantage611. 
Moreover, focusing on the facts of individual disputes encourages adjudicators to rely 
more on their own values and forms of conceptualising social relations (Fitzpatrick 1987), 
thus preserving the status quo. 
 
ii.  Other Procedural Hurdles 
 
Claims under the EqA2010 must be brought before courts within six months (Section 
118), and before ETs within three months (Section 123) of occurrence of the relevant 
act612. Such short time limits likely have a significant impact on anyone who is not familiar 
                                                      
609 Certain organisations have been repeatedly subject to discrimination proceedings (McColgan 2011: 153). 
610 In fact, later scholarship, by Freeman (1990) himself and others (e.g., Barnes 2016), notes that these 
shortcomings of anti-discrimination law have continued. 
611 The solution Freeman (1978) proposed was to address the social conditions implicated in discrimination, 
such as poverty. Unfortunately, underlying conditions related to inequalities have not been successfully 
addressed in the UK in the context of BAME groups, and are even more unlikely to be addressed in the 
context of CEE movers given their transient nature and uncertain post-Brexit status. 
612 In their discretion, courts may allow late claims if to do so would be ‘just and equitable’. 
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with the legal system or has poor language skills. But they appear especially detrimental to 
migrants such as Poles, who often engage in circular, temporary migration. My analysis of 
cases brought by Poles indicates that some had failed to timely prosecute their claims due 
to traveling back to Poland or due to changing their temporary employment or housing 
options. Furthermore, Polish movers tend to work longer hours than other groups, and 
some rely on employer-provided accommodations far removed from their employment 
sites (Pawlak 2012; Ciupijus 2012b; Appendix 1), which further complicates their ability to 
meet short deadlines.  
 
Moreover, claimant fees were introduced in July 2013 in employment cases (£1,200 for 
filing a claim, and £1,600 for appeals). This resulted in a reduction in filings of 
approximately 75%, without producing a change in claimants’ success rates613 (McColgan 
2017: 10). This hurdle would have more heavily impacted poorer workers, and particularly 
those who had little incentive to assert their rights (such as those taking on temporary jobs 
or engaging in circular migration). The imposition of these fees was ruled unlawful in 
2017614. 
iii. Overlooking Intersectionality 
 
A significant weakness of the UK’s equality law stems from its single-axis model of 
discrimination615 which overlooks intersectionality. The concept of intersectionality stems 
from black feminists’ work demonstrating that black women’s experience of structural 
subjugation cannot be captured accurately by looking at race or gender dimensions 
separately (e.g., Crenshaw 1989; hooks 1982; Lourde 1983). Instead, various axes of 
differentiation and marginalisation intersect through interlocking systems of power (Brah 
and Phoenix 2004: 76). Although intersectionality has most frequently been applied to 
characteristics such as gender, (non-white) race, religion, and class, recent scholarship has 
expanded it to additional axes of subjugation (e.g., Viruell-Fuentes et al 2012). Notably, 
Levine-Rasky (2011) points out the importance of being foreign, immigrant, or of non-
majoritarian ethnic origin in the experience of disadvantage, when intersecting with 
whiteness or middle classness.  
 
Some British adjudicators appear aware of the importance of intersectionality. In Hewage v 
Grampian Health Board, the Supreme Court accepted ET findings of direct discrimination 
                                                      
613 Indicating that many of the claims which were not filed had merit. 
614 R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51. Claimants get fees paid between 2013 and 2017 
refunded. 
615 Likely reinforced by advocacy groups’ tendency to focus on single protected characteristics. 
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on grounds of sex and race, without requiring it to identify separate facts to support each 
claim616. Thus, the two grounds were approached as combined. Moreover, the EAT has 
upheld617 a finding of indirect discrimination based on combined sex and national origin 
discrimination when a foreign-born soldier who was a single mother was disciplined for 
absences due to childcare difficulties. The EAT noted that ‘the nature of discrimination is 
such that it cannot always be sensibly compartmentalised into discrete categories’. A few 
tribunal decisions under predecessor equality legislation also recognised intersectional 
discrimination (based on gender and race)618, although higher courts were less open to 
such arguments619.  
 
The EqA2010, however, does not account for the role of socio-economic status (as 
discussed above) or for intersectionality of various protected characteristics in the 
experience of discrimination. For example, direct discrimination is based on unfavourable 
treatment due to ‘a protected characteristic’ (Section 13(1), emphasis added). Although 
some bill proposals had included combining multiple grounds (Equalities Office 2008a), 
and academics supported an intersectional approach, the Discrimination Law Review 
(2007: 123) and the business lobby opposed it due to being too burdensome for businesses 
(Meer 2017). Thus, the limited ‘combined discrimination’ provision was included in the 
final bill. Claims could be brought on the grounds of two protected characteristics, each of 
which had to be proven separately (Section 14(3))620. The provision applied only to direct 
discrimination, and a claim of direct discrimination could not be combined with a claim of 
indirect discrimination. The Government attributed this narrow scope to avoiding 
‘unnecessarily complicating’ the law (Equalities Office 2009: ¶ 4.6). This provision was 
ultimately not implemented by the Coalition Government, which deemed it too costly 
(Osborne 2011).  
 
Law’s failure to address intersectional discrimination makes it more difficult, and 
sometimes impossible, for victims to obtain remedy (Equalities Office 2009). Without 
recognising intersectionality, equality law makes it easier for respondents to avoid 
liability621. By forcing complainants to choose only one form of discrimination to pursue, it 
might also create a hierarchy of discrimination grounds. Critically, it does not reflect the 
                                                      
616 [2012] UKSC 37, 25 July 2012. 
617 Ministry of Defence v DeBique [2010] IRLR 471, EAT, 12 October 2009. 
618 E.g., Mackie v G & N Car Sales Ltd t/a Britannia Motor Co [2004] ET/1806128/03; Bahl v Law Society, 
ET Watford, 4 July 2001. 
619 E.g., Law Society v Bahl [2003] UKEAT 1056_01_3107; Bahl v Law Society [2004] EWCA Civ 1070. 
620 Thus, failing to account for ‘the synergy inherent in intersectionality’ (Solanke 2011: 336). 
621 For example, an employer might avoid liability when being sued by a black female applicant, by 
presenting evidence that he hires both black people and women. 
 213 
lived experience of discrimination. For example, discrimination experienced by Poles who 
happen to have additional protected traits (such as being disabled or female) is unlikely to 
be captured. For many CEE workers, their exploitation and discrimination stems from an 
intersection of ethnicity and low socio-economic status. Moreover, other characteristics 
that impact the experience of inequality—such as lacking social and cultural capital, and 
lacking political power—get overlooked entirely by law. After post-Brexit immigration 
policies will become implemented, it is likely that intersectionality will continue to play a 
significant role in CEE migrants’ experience of inequality, especially in terms of their 
education, socio-economic class, and migration status. 
 
iv. Limited Scope  
 
The legal system is not equipped to redress many race-based wrongs because it does not 
have the vocabulary to do so (Crenshaw 2011). The material scope of the EqA2010 
tolerates racism in most of the private sphere. Fundamentally, anti-discrimination law 
implies that only racism covered by the legislation is unacceptable enough to warrant 
political intervention622 (Fitzpatrick 1987). This, of course, is problematic in societies 
where racism is prevalent. It is also troublesome for Poles (and CEE movers more 
generally), given how widespread their exploitation and racialisation have been.  
 
Moreover, although ‘race’ encompasses ethnic origin, national origin, and nationality, and 
thus begins to reflect the fact that colour-based groups are not homogeneous, this 
definition of ‘race’ might not always suffice to reflect migrants’ complicated experience of 
racism and disadvantage. Although all immigrants fall under one or more of these 
protected race characteristics, the discrimination they suffer is not always tied specifically 
to such categories. Notably, the EqA2010 does not protect having migrant (or mover) 
status, or being a foreigner, and the law is not settled on how it applies to language or 
accent discrimination. Poor treatment due to birth abroad (without a specific national 
origin being mentioned) does not constitute discrimination. The Act also overlooks 
cultural racism. Thus, respondents’ poor treatment of CEE claimants due to their general 
foreignness or immigrant background, without specifying their national origin or 
nationality, might not be covered by anti-discrimination legislation, especially if 
adjudicators apply the concept of ‘race’ in an inflexible way. The EHRC (2016a) has noted 
that these gaps leave migrant workers vulnerable to discrimination. 
 
                                                      
622 Praises of anti-discrimination law’s effectiveness further undermine the reprehensibility of forms of 
racism not prohibited by law.  
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Notably, EAT decisions reached in the context of non-Polish claimants indicate that the 
protected grounds under the EqA2010 might not be sufficient to address exploited 
migrants’ discrimination. For example, in Nikolova v M & P Enterprises London Ltd623, the 
EAT attributed a Bulgarian claimant’s exploitation as a full-time cleaner at a budget hotel 
to her economic vulnerability rather than her race. All other full-time cleaners were also 
Bulgarian, and all were similarly exploited. The ET had ignored the claimant’s suggestion 
to rely on a hypothetical British comparator, and instead referred to exploited part-time 
receptionists of BAME backgrounds. Notably, the ET expounded that: 
 
many other nationalities seeking work in the UK have poor English, and many 
from Eastern Europe … will … accept low waged work which is still better than 
can be found at home. The fact that the respondent mainly employed Bulgarians is 
likely to result from word of mouth recruitment, rather than selecting Bulgarians 
because of their economic vulnerability … Economically rational employers … 
tak[e] advantage of whomever they can find who will accept less than the 
minimum wage rate, or poor safety standards ... This may include people with race 
as a protected characteristic, but also many without. Further, there may be many 
non-English nationals, or those for whom English is not a first language, who are 
not in the group prepared to take low paid work in poor conditions (¶ 87). 
 
The EAT dismissed the claimant’s appeal on the grounds that the ET had focused on 
irrelevant facts (the respondent’s recruitment practices and lack of intention) and had 
relied on materially different actual comparators. Her appeal was allowed, however, 
because the ET had failed to address whether a hypothetical comparator would have been 
subjected to the same treatment, and failed to apply the correct burden of proof. After 
acknowledging that the ET had made comparator observations implicitly and ‘en passant’, 
and that its reasoning (in the above quoted paragraph) was ‘somewhat discursive’ and 
‘elliptical’, the EAT nevertheless found it sufficiently detailed. The EAT sought to bolster 
its decision by itself relying on irrelevant facts - that this respondent was willing to exploit 
any vulnerable employees (including two British receptionists624, and a Greek cleaner hired 
to replace the claimant).  
 
The outcome in Nikolova indicates that discrimination might be more difficult for 
claimants to prove if an exploitative employer predominantly recruits workers of one 
national origin or similarly exploits workers of various national backgrounds, both of 
which might be taken as evidence of a lack of ill will. Moreover, the spurious analysis—
based on irrelevant facts, and a poor application of the comparator standard—indicates 
                                                      
623 UKEAT/0293/15/DM, 4 February 2016. 
624 These were not correct comparators because they worked on Sundays only, performed cleaning duties 
only in addition to their receptionist duties, and there is no indication that they were exploited like full-time 
Bulgarian cleaners. 
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not only liberties that adjudicators can take with legal reasoning, but also the inadequacy of 
anti-discrimination protections. It points to the fact that intersectionality and/or socio-
economic duty provisions would have been helpful in making anti-discrimination law 
more in tune with the reality of discrimination.  
 
Nikolova also suggests that equality law could be strengthened by adding more protected 
grounds, such as foreignness, migration status, or economic vulnerability. Two recent 
Supreme Court cases heard together, Taiwo v Olaigbe and Onu v Akwiwu625 also illustrate this 
point. Both claimants were Nigerian, in the UK pursuant to domestic worker visas which 
tied their residence to their abusive employers. The ET dismissed their race discrimination 
claims upon finding that their mistreatment was due to their ‘vulnerable migrant worker’ 
status, rather than their nationality. The Court of Appeal similarly noted that ‘immigration 
status’ should not be equated with ‘nationality’ for the purposes of the EqA2010. The 
Supreme Court agreed, ruling that their abuse was not due to their nationality, but rather 
due to their ‘vulnerability as a particular kind of migrant worker’. Resembling the 
reasoning in Nikolova, the Supreme Court also noted that many other non-British workers 
are not vulnerable and would not have been abused the same way. Of course, such 
persons are not comparators, so it is difficult to understand the utility of this observation. 
In Taiwo and Onu, claimants were even more vulnerable than in Nikolova since they did not 
have access to the British (and EU) labour markets.  
 
As both Nikolova and Taiwo and Onu indicate, exploitation sometimes stems from 
migration status or from associated economic vulnerability, which are not covered under 
the definition of ‘race’. Hepple (2014: 217) has critiqued the EqA2010 for not including 
additional characteristics that are addressed by international human rights instruments, 
such as social origin, language, being born abroad, being an immigrant, or being foreign. 
Such expanded grounds might become especially important once CEE nationals’ 
migration status becomes more splintered by post-Brexit legislation. It remains to be seen 
if post Brexit, vulnerabilities of EU workers who engage in either (1) high-skilled 
employment tied to specific sponsors or (2) low-skill, temporary employment will be taken 
into account by the legal regime.  
 
5. Poles’ Discrimination Claims in the Employment Context  
 
There are no official statistics on employment claims brought by CEE nationals. 
Moreover, the limited research that exists indicates that CEE nationals file fewer 
                                                      
625 [2016] UKSC 31, 22 June 2016. 
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employment cases, but more race discrimination claims than would be expected based on 
their population. Barnard’s (2014) search of EAT judgments between 2005 and 2012 
identified only 13 appeals brought by CEE claimants (mostly Poles). Barnard’s and 
Ludlow’s (2016) manual search of ET judgments between 2010 and 2013 also indicated 
low levels of enforcement by CEE claimants (mostly Poles). During that time, CEE 
nationals filed approximately 200 cases (0.06% of all cases filed), which is 85% less than 
would be expected based on their population size626. Barnard et al (2018: 236-41) attribute 
these low levels of enforcement to their migration motivations (typically temporary, 
focused on maximising income), their home legal cultures (with a weak sense of workers’ 
rights, and avoidance of authorities), and practical obstacles (frequent precarious 
employment627, and little access to information or free legal advice). The most frequent 
claims brought by CEE employees were for unpaid wages, unfair dismissal, race 
discrimination, and notice pay, in that order (id). Claimants tended to speak little English 
and work in low-skill jobs (id). The most overrepresented claims, compared to nation-wide 
data, were for race discrimination (11% of CEE workers’ claims, compared to 2% by all 
claimants), and minimum wage (1.7% of CEE claims, compared to 0.2% by all claimants) 
(id). Only 10% of CEE claimants in their study had legal representation (compared to the 
national average of 60%), and none were represented by trade unions628 (id).  
 
Based on the available studies, it is difficult to determine how well CEE claimants fare 
compared to other types of ET claimants. Of the 46 ET cases filed by CEE claimants 
during 2010-12 which were analysed by Barnard and Ludlow (2016: 19), 28% lost all their 
claims, 20% won all their claims, and 20% succeeded partially. It is not clear whether these 
relatively high success rates are attributable to the fact that CEE claimants decide to bring 
claims only if they are relatively strong, they experience actionable discrimination often, or 
adjudicators are sympathetic to their claims. Barnard and Ludlow (id: 22-4) concluded that 
ETs tend to express sympathy towards CEE claimants, sometimes even exercising 
discretion in their favour when they speak little or no English. Out of the thirteen race-
discrimination claims in their study, however, only one was successful629 (id: 20). Thus, 
proving race discrimination claims appears especially challenging for CEE nationals. 
Although their pool of cases is too small to make a meaningful comparison, this low 
                                                      
626 Similarly, Poles tend not to report being crime victims - in part due to language difficulties and fear of 
reprisal (Griffiths 2017). Kubal (2012) found that Poles generally avoid interacting with the authorities, in 
part due to their experience of governmental corruption under Communism. It remains to be seen whether 
the post-referendum climate of mistrust has further increased this reluctance. 
627 Precarious CEE workers often erroneously think that they cannot sue their employers, fear reprisal from 
employment agencies, and fear losing employer-provided housing (Barnard et al 2018: 241-3). 
628 CEE movers tend to work in industries with few trade unions. 
629 The most successful claims were for unpaid wages, and unpaid holiday pay. 
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success rate is in line with the low success rates of race discrimination claims generally 
(e.g., Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 2014, Table 5.2). 
 
Unlike the above studies, I wanted to focus on only race discrimination claims, particularly 
by Polish claimants, and to perform a close qualitative analysis of such tribunal 
decisions630. All reported Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, and EAT decisions are 
available on Lexis. I searched Lexis for all cases mentioning ‘Equality Act’ (or its 
predecessor legislation) and ‘polish’ or ‘Poland’631, which produced 140 cases, all in the 
employment context. I then searched the Government’s website dedicated to EAT 
decisions632 (covering cases since December 2015) containing ‘polish’ (20 decisions), or 
‘Poland’ (9 decisions, with some overlap between the two sets). I also reviewed all EAT 
decisions available on the British and Irish Legal Information Institute’s (‘BAILII’) website 
(listing post-1976 cases)633 that mentioned ‘polish race discrimination’ (30 decisions), or 
‘Poland race discrimination’ (14 decisions, with some overlap between the two sets).  
 
To account for EAT decisions where claimants’ Polish national origin might not have 
been mentioned, I then reviewed the following: (1) all EAT decisions on Lexis that 
mention ‘race discrimination’ (90 results); (2) all cases under the category of ‘race 
discrimination’ on the Government’s dedicated EAT website634 (68 decisions); and (3) all 
728 EAT decisions classified under ‘race discrimination’ on the Judiciary’s website for 
EAT decisions635 (which includes decisions since 1999). When reviewing all these 
decisions, I was able to identify most, if not all, Polish claimants because Polish names are 
unique and I am a native Polish speaker. These searches did not produce any cases 
additional to the ones I had found by including ‘polish’ or ‘Poland’ in my search terms. 
This is not surprising given that adjudicators refer to national origins when deciding racial 
discrimination claims at hearings. 
 
The relatively small number of EAT decisions I located is attributable to the fact that the 
EAT hears appeals only on points of law636, and therefore intervenes only if an ET had 
failed to apply the correct legal test or to address all relevant facts, or had considered 
irrelevant facts637.  
                                                      
630 All case law searches described in this Section are current as of April 2019. 
631 I also performed identical searches for the remaining CEE states. Each produced a few cases at most. 
632 See https://www.gov.uk/employment-appeal-tribunal-decisions. 
633 See http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/. 
634 See https://www.gov.uk/employment-appeal-tribunal-decisions. 
635 See http://employmentappeals.decisions.tribunals.gov.uk//Public/Search.aspx. 
636 Employment Tribunals Act 1996, Section 21(1). 
637 Gbidi v Edwards, UKEAT/0024/18/OO, 25 September 2018, ¶ 26. 
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Unlike EAT decisions, ET rulings are not binding. However, they are important to legal 
research because they apply anti-discrimination law in a highly predictable way -  due to 
the ET’s specialised training and its large number of decisions (Discrimination Law 
Review 2007: 120). Moreover, ET decisions tend to engage in detailed factual analysis, 
much more so than EAT decisions. Thus, they help to highlight the types of claims being 
brought by Poles and their factual circumstances, and indicate how ETs approach specific 
legal or factual issues prevalent in the context of Polish claimants. 
 
Public access to ET cases is not comprehensive. Most ET claims get disposed without a 
hearing638. Of the cases that get heard, ET decisions are not systematically reported, and 
are not included in Industrial Case Reports or Industrial Relations Law Reports. BAILII 
reports ET cases from 2011-13 and since 2015639. I skimmed all 1337 ‘race discrimination’ 
cases on BAILII, and identified 61 as likely brought by Polish claimants. (Notably, 30 of 
those were withdrawn by claimants640, some of which might have been settled privately.) 
ET decisions published since February 2017 are also available on a dedicated Government 
website641. I searched that repository for all cases classified under race discrimination, 
which mentioned ‘polish’ (61 decisions), or ‘Poland’ (30 decisions, with some overlap)642. I 
was able to identify a few additional cases, despite some overlap with the BAILII 
repository. Furthermore, by searching online for news reports about discrimination against 
Poles, I identified a few more significant ET cases relevant to my analysis which were not 
reported. I found some of those decisions posted online by private websites.  
 
For some of the cases on which I rely in this Chapter, I was able to find EAT decisions, 
but not the related ET decisions. Some of the decisions I found were formulaic and short 
(especially when claims were being withdrawn), while others addressed only procedural 
issues or did not mention relevant facts. Hence, they were of little use to my qualitative 
analysis.  
 
                                                      
638 In 2011-12, for example, out of 4,800 race discrimination claims filed with ETs, 1,400 were withdrawn, 
1,700 successfully conciliated by ACAS pursuant to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (and 
hence not reported), and 400 struck out at hearing (Ministry of Justice 2013). An analysis of all ET claims 
disposed of during 1981-2010 indicates that as many as 80% were dismissed on technical grounds, 
withdrawn, or settled (Latreille 2017: 7). 
639 See http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKET/. 
640 This appears to constitute a relatively high proportion of claims when compared to some nationwide 
statistics. For example, 16% of all ET claims were withdrawn by claimants in the first quarter of 2018 
(Ministry of Justice 2018: 8). The small sample size, however, impedes drawing a meaningful comparison. 
641 See https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions. 
642 Searching for all decisions under the ‘race discrimination’ category produced more than 2,500 results. 
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Of course, the cases I found might not be representative of all racial discrimination claims 
brought by Poles in the employment context. My data set is under-inclusive643. I did not 
have access to all post-04 ET decisions644. Moreover, I might have missed cases where 
claimants’ Polish origin was not mentioned645 yet their surnames were not stereotypically 
Polish or had been changed (for example, after marriage). Thus, the results of my analysis 
below are not generalisable. They are useful, however, in carrying out an exploratory 
analysis of issues critical to my research questions, which have so far remained greatly 
under-researched - such as identifying any unique challenges Polish claimants might face, 
and exploring the discourse on which adjudicators rely in their context.  
 
A. Direct Discrimination Claims 
 
All four EAT decisions in direct-discrimination claims brought by Poles which I found 
were reached in favour of claimants, because the ET had made errors of law. For example, 
in Mirek v Graysons Automotive Services646,  the ET had struck out four of the claimant’s six 
allegations which he had argued were part of a continuous act. The EAT remitted the case, 
after finding that the ET had applied an incorrect legal test (the higher burden of proof for 
findings of fact, rather than the lower burden applicable at preliminary hearings647). In 
Stefanko v Maritime Hotel Ltd648, the EAT ruled that the ET had made numerous errors in 
dismissing the discrimination claim – including failing to set out or apply burden of proof 
and direct discrimination provisions, and to address all potentially relevant allegations. In 
both Szmidt v AC Produce Imports Limited649 and Gbidi v Edwards650, the EAT remitted claims 
in favour of the claimants regarding their applications for extensions of time, after 
concluding that the ET had failed to address all the key elements of the ‘just and equitable’ 
test. Notably, in three of the above four cases (all other than Szmidt), the EAT 
recommended that the case be remitted before a different ET adjudicator, to ensure 
fairness in the proceedings. Based on this small sample, although it is difficult to decipher 
                                                      
643 It is unlikely that my data set is over-inclusive by including cases by second- or later generation Poles (not 
part of my study group) because adjudicators tend to refer to claimants’ migration status and language skills 
when issuing decisions after hearings. 
644 Cases decided between 2008 and 2010 which are reported are only available through a physical search at 
the ET register located in Bury St Edmunds. Pre-2008 decisions are archived and not available to the public. 
645 Although this appears to be the case only with short decisions, such as dismissals after claims get 
withdrawn. 
646 UKEAT/0198/18/RN, 22 November 2018. 
647 Allegations are struck out only if directly contradicted by undisputed evidence provided by respondent. 
648 UKEAT/0024/18/OO, 25 September 2018. 
649 UKEAT/0291/14/MC, 9 January 2015. 
650 UKEAT/0146/14/DM, 22 August 2014. 
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how the EAT would address the underlying factual allegations651, the EAT appears to 
enforce scrupulous application of relevant legal tests.  
 
My review of ET decisions indicates that it is easier for Poles’ direct discrimination claims 
to succeed if they are (1) employed in skilled or managerial positions, (2) do not have CEE 
co-workers (especially comparable ones), and (3) successfully assert additional claims or 
present evidence of a pattern of mistreatment. Pro-claimant decisions also tend to result 
from the ET’s correct application of the two-step burden of proof and correct use of 
comparators (often hypothetical). Both these tests often appear clumsily or even 
incorrectly applied. Not surprisingly, being represented by counsel is also helpful (although 
not necessary). Given these observations, asserting successful direct discrimination claims 
appears difficult for all poor and migrant workers. Recent Polish movers likely find it 
especially challenging because they concentrate in low-skill positions, and are often 
surrounded by predominantly other Polish (or CEE) workers (as addressed earlier). Since 
adjudicators also appear to apply the burden of proof provisions inconsistently, the 
outcomes of Poles’ cases might also depend on subjective factors - whether individual 
adjudicators support the anti-Polish political climate or feel sympathy towards them. 
 
For example, in Krupa v B&M Retail Ltd652, witnesses confirmed that a Polish warehouse 
cleaner’s British line manager urinated on the toilet floor right after he had asked her to 
clean it (which was not part of her duties). The manager did not offer an explanation, but 
instead blankly denied claimant’s allegations. He also argued that he could not be liable 
because he knew that the claimant was somewhere from the CEE region, but had not 
realised that she was Polish. The ET found direct discrimination (in addition to 
harassment and victimisation, based on additional facts) because the manager would not 
have treated non-Polish employees, especially British ones, this way. The ET inferred a 
causal link between his actions and the claimant’s race based on a holistic fact analysis – 
specifically, because it was not the claimant’s duty to clean toilets, they had been cleaned 
an hour earlier, and the manager dirtied the floor immediately after she had finished 
cleaning. 
 
Similarly, in finding for the claimant in Besz v Multi Packaging Solutions Limited653, the ET 
relied on an appropriate hypothetical comparator and found the respondent liable for 
                                                      
651 Given the EAT’s jurisdiction, it tends not to engage at length with claimants’ discrimination allegations, 
unless multiple factual errors form the basis of an appeal. 
652 No 2400660/2016, ET Liverpool, 28 March 2017. 
653 No 2602118/2016, ET Nottingham, 26 September 2017. 
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another infraction (harassment). Moreover, the Polish warehouse worker’s arguments were 
strengthened by the fact that he could demonstrate a pattern of racially-based 
mistreatment by his British line manager, who had made three derogatory statements to 
the claimant654 and one to his co-worker655. The ET concluded that, although personal 
animus might have motivated this treatment, it had an underlying racial element because 
the respondent provided no explanation to show that the treatment had nothing to do 
with the claimant’s race, and because he would not have treated a British worker this way. 
Moreover, the ET correctly rejected as irrelevant the respondent’s argument that he did 
not treat all Polish or CEE workers in an equally hostile manner656. 
 
Nazarczyk v T J Morris Limited657 illustrates that, when ETs apply the hypothetical 
comparator test correctly, even a single comment can support direct discrimination claims. 
In response to a Polish warehouse worker’s request that his daughter’s shift coincide with 
his so that he could walk her home at night, an English supervisor responded along the 
lines of ‘If you do not like it pack yourself and your family up and go back to Poland’. The 
respondent argued that he would have treated a hypothetical British worker the same - for 
example, suggesting that his daughter go back to Bath if she were from there and did not 
feel safe in Liverpool. The ET dismissed that proposed comparator scenario because it did 
not have the same racial connotation. Instead, a comparable situation would have been to 
say something like ‘if you do not like it here go back to Poland’ to a hypothetical British 
worker. This illustrates how challenging it sometimes is to determine the correct 
comparator in racial claims based on national origin or nationality. Of course, adjudicators 
have the option not to use comparators, and instead focus on the question of why a 
claimant was subjected to the treatment at issue.  
 
A finding of direct discrimination can also be based on a long-standing pattern of less 
overtly negative treatment, especially when combined with an inference of discriminatory 
attitudes among those in managerial and disciplinary positions. In Michalak v The Mid 
Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust658, a Polish medical consultant provided evidence of a secret 
campaign by the management team, which spanned six years and included 22 instances of 
harassment and false allegations, culminating in her unwarranted dismissal. As a result, she 
was diagnosed with a chronic personality change, making it unlikely that she would work 
                                                      
654 Including, ‘after Brexit I will vote to send you back to Poland’. 
655 ‘I hope it’s a one way ticket’, while the claimant was in Poland. 
656 Some ETs, however, consider such arguments in finding against claimants (for example, in Grzyb v Lidl, 
and Kozakiewicz v Futon Ltd, addressed below). 
657 No 2401275/2017, ET Liverpool, 10 August 2017. 
658 No 1808465/2007, ET Leeds, 14 June 2010. 
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again as a doctor. In secret meetings, her managers had referred to her Polish origin, and 
had questioned her competence due to her Polish medical training. The respondents did 
not offer any satisfactory explanations and failed to show that their behaviour was in no 
way tainted by race (although the predominant cause of discrimination was determined to 
have been her gender). Without relying on a comparator, the ET found the respondents 
liable for direct discrimination (as well as sex discrimination, and unfair dismissal). The ET 
inferred that senior managers held discriminatory attitudes because they were all white 
Britons, despite the fact that half of the consultant body had BAME backgrounds. Such 
reasoning illustrates tribunals’ flexibility in inferring discriminatory attitudes. Although the 
same inference could have been drawn in many of the cases which I had reviewed, this is 
the only decision in which I observed it. Perhaps this is attributable to the fact that Ms 
Michalak was highly skilled, which would suggest the importance of claimants’ class to ET 
outcomes. 
 
Other ET cases I reviewed similarly indicate that it is easier for Poles to support their 
direct discrimination claims if they are employed in semi- or highly-skilled positions, not 
populated by other Polish or CEE workers. For example, in Procek v Oakford Farms Ltd659, 
unlike all the other farm managers (all British, serving as actual comparators), the Polish 
claimant was not paid at the same rate, was not given the correct job title or recognition, 
and had his qualifications questioned. Although not based on very strong evidence, the ET 
inferred a causal link between this treatment and his race because he was not permitted to 
attend English classes and was forced to cancel holidays on short notice. The respondent 
could not provide an adequate explanation that this treatment was in no sense due to his 
race. Similarly, in Ruda v TEi Ltd660, the ET found direct discrimination where a Polish 
quality assurance engineer was repeatedly called ‘Borat’ over a period of four weeks. Other 
employees (none of whom were from the CEE region) had been given nicknames 
associated with their personal characteristics rather than with their national origins. As in 
Nazarczyk (mentioned above), Ruda illustrates complications that might arise when using 
even a hypothetical comparator in cases of verbal discrimination. The ET reasoned that 
somebody who shared all of the claimant’s other characteristics but who was not from 
Poland or the CEE region would not have been called ‘Borat’. Of course, since the 
                                                      
659 ET Liverpool, 2009. Although this case was decided under EqA2006, I included it in my analysis because 
direct discrimination law has not changed significantly since then. See also https://www.cheshire-live.co.uk/ 
news/chester-cheshire-news/egg-suppliers-oakford-farms-ltd-5221456. 
660 No 1807582/10, ET Leeds, 23 August 2011. 
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satirical character of Borat661 is based on an amalgamation of CEE and Balkan traits and 
languages, it would have been nonsensical to call a Dane that, for example. 
 
My review of cases indicates that it is common for Polish claimants to have numerous 
Polish co-workers, especially when employed in low-skill positions. In such circumstances, 
they appear to have higher rates of success if they can prove a pattern of very poor 
treatment, and if they are represented by counsel. In Obieglo v David Leslie Fruits662, for 
example, two Polish seasonal strawberry pickers won their direct discrimination claim after 
the ET found that the respondent would not have treated (hypothetical) Scottish workers 
the same way. Its 200 farm workers (mostly Poles, Czechs, and Slovakians) were all 
underpaid and housed on site in converted metal containers with no running water, and 
with access to only 12 showers663. After the claimants complained about this treatment to 
their manager, they were escorted off the premises by the police. The analysis in Obieglo is 
not in line with EAT decision in Nikolova664. After all, Obieglo claimants made no allegations 
about any race-based statements, and could have easily been found to be simply 
‘economically vulnerable’ in accordance with Nikolova. Adjudicators clearly have much 
flexibility when inferring causal links between adverse treatment and race, and their 
decisions are not consistent. Of course, since ET decisions are not binding, any leniency or 
goodwill ETs might exhibit towards Polish workers has little impact beyond the individual 
claimants concerned. 
 
On the other hand, Polish workers tend to lose their direct discrimination claims when 
they are not aided by legal representatives, and when ETs do not strictly follow applicable 
legal tests – especially when their reasoning hinges on incorrect analyses of actual 
comparators or on the (irrelevant) fact that other Polish workers appear to have good 
relations with respondents. For example, in Prasil v Orchard House Foods665, Polish and 
Slovakian food production operatives, both with excellent work records, were dismissed 
for taking unauthorised breaks. Most of their co-workers were Polish; one-third British; 
and the rest from other CEE states. Claimants proposed several actual comparators, all 
Britons who had not been dismissed following incidents of gross misconduct, but the ET 
deemed them all too dissimilar. This indicates how difficult it might be for Polish 
                                                      
661 Created and performed by the British comedian Sacha Baron Cohen since the 1990s. 
662 ET Dundee, 2010. See also http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/tayside_and_central/ 
8605038.stm. 
663 Following a newspaper investigation, David Leslie Fruits Ltd became the first company in Scotland 
prosecuted under the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act, and was fined £500 for using an unlicensed gangmaster. 
(It is questionable whether a fine in that amount can serve as a deterrent for large companies.) 
664 See Section 4(D)(iv) above. 
665 No 3400534/2014, ET Cambridge, 12 April 2018. 
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claimants to use actual comparators given that their co-workers (especially in low-skill 
occupations) tend to be Polish or from other CEE states.  
 
To justify finding against Polish claimants, some ETs point to their Polish co-workers who 
appear to be treated decently. For example, in Skrzydlo v CRC Recruitment Ltd666, when a 
Polish warehouse worker informed her employment agency that she was pregnant, she 
stopped being offered work consistently. After finding the actual British comparator 
proposed by the claimant too dissimilar, the ET relied on an incorrect actual comparator 
(another Polish worker who continued working for the same agency while pregnant, albeit 
under materially different circumstances - employed at another client’s, and under different 
conditions). The ET improperly reasoned that this indicated that nationality played no part 
in the claimant’s treatment. Similarly, in Grzyb v Lidl667, where a Polish cashier was 
suspended by a manager for failing to scan one of his co-worker’s purchases, the ET noted 
that there had been no complaints against that manager from the many other Polish 
employees he had supervised668. The ET also dismissed the claimant’s proposed actual 
comparators, both black, after deeming their circumstances materially different than the 
claimant’s.  
 
Working for respondents who employ mostly non-British workers can make proving 
direct discrimination more difficult. For example, in Matuzewicz v 2 Sisters Food Group Ltd669, 
a Polish food production worker complained of being subjected to poor treatment and 
verbal abuse. The ET dismissed her concerns, with little factual or legal analysis. For 
example, the ET mentioned the element of detriment only once, and did not address less 
favourable treatment. The ET also pointed out that the respondent employed ‘a multi 
racial workforce which get along well, have a joke with each other and swear in each 
other’s languages’, overlooking the fact that similar swear words carry different 
connotations in different languages. Finally, the ET determined that had the claimant’s 
allegations been even partly accurate, her co-workers would have contacted the employer’s 
third-party whistle blowing line. This is not only legally irrelevant, but also insensitive to 
the reality of exploited migrant workers’ circumstances. Many are hesitant to complain, 
even by using what appear to be anonymous methods. Similarly, in Kozakiewicz v Futon 
Ltd670, in finding for respondents, the ET noted their ‘nationally and racially diverse 
                                                      
666 No 3400728/2016, ET Cambridge, 3 April 2018. 
667 No 2600945/2016, ET Leicester, November 2017. 
668 See also Bouzir v Country Style Foods Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1519, 8 December 2011, where the hiring of 
several Latvians while the Latvian claimant was declined a job offer prompted the ET to dismiss her 
discrimination claim. 
669 No 2500043/17, ET North Shields, 10 August 2017. 
670 No 2600264/2017, ET Nottingham, 12 December 2017. 
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workforce’, which included many Poles (some as managers at other locations). Hence, the 
ET found it unproblematic that a British manager had refused to recruit additional Poles 
because she did not want to turn the establishment into an ‘all-Polish’ store. Likewise, in 
dismissing direct-discrimination claims in Juszczyk v Kettle Produce Ltd671 and Dzierzanowski v 
Cranswick Country Foods Plc672, the ETs noted that the respective respondents’ workforces 
included 45% CEE nationals and 55% Polish nationals, although this is not legally 
relevant. 
 
In line with such ET patterns of reasoning, respondents appear to emphasise the fact that 
they employ many non-British workers. For example, in Bujna v Sandfields Farms Ltd673, 
when a Polish produce packer alleged that she and her Polish colleagues were treated less 
favourably than Lithuanian workers, the respondent pointed that it had a good reputation 
with employees of various nationalities, and that it treated all its employees similarly. Thus, 
an exploitative employer’s poor treatment of all its workers, of various racial backgrounds, 
can make it more difficult for claimants to prove discrimination. Unfortunately, it is not 
uncommon for Poles to work for such employers. 
 
The cases discussed above illustrate how difficult it is to support direct discrimination 
claims, in part due to ET inconsistency and discretion when inferring causation between 
poor treatment and race, and when addressing comparators. Those without resources and 
foresight to hire legal representatives seem to struggle more in asserting their claims. This 
of course impacts poor workers and immigrants especially. Having many Polish co-
workers is a double-edged sword for Polish claimants: some ETs incorrectly rely on this as 
evidence of a lack of discrimination (especially when others do not complain of 
mistreatment), while other ETs apply levelling-down and incorrectly rely on other 
exploited Polish workers as comparators. It is also possible for respondents to simply 
argue that their approach towards Polish claimants is motivated not by race but by their 
‘economic vulnerability’ – a common condition given how many Poles are deskilled and 
employed in low-paid, temporary positions.  
 
Notably, at least some ETs (mentioned above) that rule in favour of Polish claimants 
approach all CEE workers as fundamentally similarly poorly treated. For example, in Besz, 
the ET noted in passing that the respondent may not have treated all workers ‘of either 
                                                      
671 No S/4103971/2016, ET Dundee, 2 March 2017, ¶ 42. 
672 No 1808685/2018, ET Hull, 22 March 2019, ¶¶ 32, 50. 
673 ET Birmingham, 2014. See also https://www.redditchadvertiser.co.uk/news/11660379.polish-produce-
packer-loses-race-discrimination-and-harassment-claim/. 
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Polish or eastern European origin in an equally hostile manner’; and in Ruda, the ET 
reasoned that a hypothetical comparator ‘who was neither from Poland nor perceived of 
Eastern European origin’ would not have been treated the same way as the claimant. In 
Mirek, employer’s incorrect assumption that a Polish claimant was Romanian was 
sufficient to support a direct discrimination claim. This might indicate some adjudicators’ 
awareness that all post-04 CEE groups are prone to exploitation and racialisation in the 
UK.   
 
B. Indirect Discrimination Claims 
 
Indirect discrimination claims have been generally more difficult to prove than direct 
discrimination claims, even before the Supreme Court’s 2017 imposition of an additional 
element for claimants to prove (the reason why the specific PCP had disadvantaged them). 
This difficulty likely stems in no small part from the fact that employers can assert a 
defence, and that claimants must present evidence of not only their own, but also their 
group’s disadvantage.  
 
My research uncovered only one successful indirect discrimination claim (among fifteen), 
Kosik v Montgomery Transport674. The claimant, whose lorry had tipped over during a delivery, 
argued that all Polish workers at the haulage company675 were treated more poorly than 
their British co-workers, by being given older, more accident-prone vehicles. The ET 
agreed. The claimant was represented by counsel, with the support of his trade union. 
Many low-skill Polish workers are likely in a weaker position than Mr Kosik since they 
tend to be employed alongside predominantly other Polish or CEE workers (Ciupijus 
2012c; MacKenzie and Forde 2009; EHRC 2010; Other Stakeholders 2018)676, in non-
unionised industries, by employers who similarly exploit all workers (Barnard 2014). 
Moreover, it might be difficult for Polish claimants to provide evidence of their group’s 
disadvantage at the hands of specific employers since many Polish employees are 
temporary, and some appear unwilling to provide statements or share information to 
support claimants - presumably due to fear of employer reprisals or due to co-ethnic 






                                                      
674 ET Manchester, 2015. See also https://www.lep.co.uk/news/crime/lorry-driver-awarded-15-000-after-
discrimination-case-upheld-1-7178302. 
675 Employing mostly British and Polish workers. 
676 E.g., Prasil v Orchard House Foods Ltd (discussed earlier) - 50% Polish employees; 25% Latvian. 
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C. Language-Bar Claims 
 
In the language-bar cases I found, English-only rules677 have been rare. Instead, Polish 
claimants tend to get singled out for speaking Polish, and hence are often able to assert 
direct discrimination or harassment claims. As indicated by the cases discussed below—
and in line with EHRC (2012) research—their claims appear more likely to succeed where 
such prohibitions extend to casual conversations not part of work duties or where other 
foreign-born workers are permitted to speak their native language at work.  
 
Dziedziak v Future Electronics Ltd678 represents the first time that a language bar was found 
to support a claim of direct, as opposed to indirect, discrimination. After a non-Polish 
colleague complained that she felt distracted by a Polish asset manager’s work-related 
conversation in Polish, a supervisor instructed her not to speak ‘in her own language’. The 
employer had no general English-only policy. Other foreign-language speakers who had 
not been reprimanded for using their native language served as actual comparators. The 
respondent offered no explanation. In finding for the claimant, the ET ruled that being 
forbidden from speaking one’s own language was intrinsically linked to one’s nationality.  
 
Direct discrimination claims tend to be challenging to prove in the language context, 
however. Notably, in Dziedziak, the ET pointed that the claim would have failed had the 
claimant been told specifically not to speak Polish (presumably because this could apply to 
non-Poles who speak Polish679) or to speak only English (since that would apply to 
workers of any race). Either of such statements would have lacked the necessary causal 
link to her race. Thus, Dziedziak illustrates how a simple rephrasing of the respondent’s 
instruction would have offered an easy way to avoid liability for direct discrimination.  
 
Of course, instructions not to speak a specific language might constitute harassment. For 
example, in Exec Catering Ltd v Kaczynska680, the ET found harassment when a Polish café 
worker was told by her manager not to speak Polish to her Polish co-workers. The 
employer did not have a general language rule. The EAT agreed with this finding681. 
                                                      
677 Which might support indirect discrimination claims. 
678 UKEAT/0270/11/ZT, 28 February 2012 (EAT upheld the finding of discrimination because the 
employer failed to offer a non-discriminatory explanation). 
679 I am not convinced by this reasoning. When a Pole is instructed not to speak Polish, that is intrinsically 
tied to her nationality. Moreover, there is a great difference between instructing a Pole not to speak Polish 
and similarly prohibiting a non-Pole for whom Polish is a second language to which she lacks any emotional 
attachment.  
680 UKEAT/0182/13/JOJ, 31 January 2014. 
681 Although the EAT remitted the case back to the ET for reconsideration because it had failed to explicitly 
address whether the act of harassment had continued even after the claimant had remained as the only 
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Similarly, in Jurga v Lavendale Montessori Ltd682, a Polish teacher and other Polish staff were 
repeatedly told by a supervisor not to speak Polish, even outside work duties, after another 
teacher had complained about feeling excluded. Italian workers were not given comparable 
instructions. The ET considered this harassment because, although the respondent had a 
blanket rule that only English should be spoken in a formal work setting, the claimant and 
other Poles were singled out, reprimanded individually, and instructed not to speak Polish 
even during break times.  
 
Some employers appear to have learned from such cases to limit the scope within which 
they impose language rules. For example, a warning to Polish workers at a Lidl shop that 
they would be dismissed for speaking Polish (even during break times or to customers 
who only speak Polish) prompted press criticism and threats of litigation. Lidl then revised 
its policy, permitting the use of foreign languages with customers who do not speak 
English and during break times, as long as others are not excluded683. Of course, given the 
widespread public antipathy towards Poles (by both Britons and other CEE workers), it is 
not unfathomable that non-Polish co-workers might be especially prone to feeling 
excluded by conversations in Polish. 
 
D. Harassment Claims 
 
Harassment claims brought by Polish workers indicate that the ET tends to be more 
supportive of such claims than the EAT is. Both, however, display much latitude when 
applying statutory test elements (especially in determining a causal connection to race, and 
the reasonable person standard).  
 
In Kowalewska-Zietek v Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust684, the EAT agreed 
with the ET’s findings against the claimant, a Polish neurologist (represented by a QC). 
After the respondent received some complaints from patients and registrars about the 
claimant, her responsibilities were reduced. In a personnel report, her supervisor then 
questioned her training in Poland. In dismissing her claim, the ET emphasised that ‘any 
stereotypical assumption in the report was about the quality of Polish training, not about 
Poles themselves’. The tribunal’s reasoning focused on the fact that these comments 
would not have been made had the claimant trained in Britain, but would have been made 
had a British doctor been trained in Poland. Although this reasoning is not entirely 
                                                      
Polish-speaking employee for five months before her resignation This was relevant to whether the complaint 
was timely. 
682 No 3302379/2012, ET Watford, 30 September 2013. 
683 See https://www.fifetoday.co.uk/news/lidl-polish-gate-inquiry-1-3602954. 
684 UKEAT/0269/15/JOJ, 21 January 2016. 
 229 
convincing and is irrelevant to the legal test for harassment, the EAT concluded that the 
ET had performed sufficient factual analysis and dismissed her appeal. 
 
In Quality Solicitors v Tunstall685, the ET similarly failed to apply the statutory test for 
harassment, albeit finding for the claimant, a Polish paralegal who had overheard her boss 
telling a potential client that ‘she is Polish but very nice’. The respondent claimed that he 
had stated ‘she is Polish and very nice’. The ET concluded that, regardless of the exact 
phrase used, her race should have been irrelevant to her introduction to a client, and its 
mention was patronising. The EAT ruled that the ET had failed to perform statutory 
harassment analysis. Notably, instead of remitting the case to the ET, as is the usual 
practice, the EAT set aside the finding of harassment because it was based on a single 
remark, made in the context of ‘encouraging’ a client to be assisted by this paralegal. The 
EAT overlooked the fact that this ‘encouragement’ is exactly what had made the remark 
patronising, based on an assumption that the client would not want the claimant working 
on his case due to some prejudice against Poles.  
 
In the above two cases, the EAT’s approach to statutory analysis has been inconsistent. In 
Quality Solicitors, the ET did not explicitly address the reasonableness of the claimant’s 
reaction, and had combined two separate elements of the statutory test, to conclude that 
the comment had made the claimant feel humiliated and degraded (rather than stating 
whether the effect of respondent’s conduct (1) violated her dignity or (2) created a 
degrading or humiliating environment). This error was sufficient for the EAT to set aside 
the ET’s findings. On the other hand, in Kowalewska-Zietek, where the ET did not apply 
facts to the statutory test at all, the EAT did not find its analysis inadequate. In both cases, 
of course, the result was the same: claimants were unsuccessful. One wonders whether the 
EAT’s fickle approach towards legal analysis in these two cases was driven by its views 
about the substance of the claims, its subjective opinions, or a poor grasp of the applicable 
legal doctrine. 
 
ET decisions also appear inconsistent. They appear to find harassment more readily if they 
correctly and diligently apply statutory provisions. One wonders whether the rigour of 
their analysis depends on a sympathetic predisposition towards specific claimants or on the 
underlying claims’ strength. Successful harassment claims have also tended to include 
additional successful claims, such as in Besz and Krupa (discussed above). On the other 
hand, when dismissing a harassment claim in Matuzewicz (also discussed above), the ET did 
                                                      
685 UKEAT/0105/14/RN, 28 July 2014. 
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not apply statutory elements of harassment. Instead, the ET attributed the claimant’s poor 
treatment to her being too sensitive, ‘obstinate and opinionated’. It is difficult to imagine 
such unnecessary descriptions to be applied to claimants (especially males) of other races.  
 
E. Victimisation Claims 
 
Despite containing straightforward statutory elements, victimisation claims do not appear 
asserted often by Poles. In my review, I found only one successful victimisation claim, 
among only a handful of such claims being asserted. In Krupa (discussed above), the ET 
found the respondent liable for victimisation when dismissing a warehouse cleaner after 
she had sent three emails to the company’s CEO to complain about management’s 
breaches of their legal obligations, including its poor treatment of Polish workers. The 
respondent argued that the claimant had been dismissed due to her poor skill set, being 
costly (as an agency employee), and being ‘obstructive’ and ‘annoying’ (¶ 55.4). The ET 
noted that there was no evidence of her poor skill set, and no explanation as to why she, as 
opposed to other agency employees, was too costly. After applying all elements of the 
statutory test, the ET inferred that her protected disclosures had a material effect on her 
dismissal because the respondent had found her ‘annoying’ and a ‘nuisance’ at least in part 
due to her grievances. In Matuzewicz (discussed earlier), on the other hand, the ET found 
that the claimant had not been subjected to a detriment when she was asked once by her 
supervisor whether she had already resigned (after she had stated that she would be doing 
so).  
 
The low number of victimisation claims that I found is somewhat surprising given that my 
review of all ET decisions available on Gov.uk686 indicates that, among more than 2,500 
decisions classified under ‘race discrimination’ published since February 2017, over 400 
included a mention of victimisation (compared to 500 decisions mentioning direct 
discrimination, 100 indirect discrimination, and 500 harassment). It is possible that Poles 
(at least the ones without legal representation) are not as familiar with the concept of 
victimisation as with other race-based claims, especially since it does not constitute a 
separate claim under Polish equality law687. Moreover, my review of cases indicated that 
many Poles tend not to complain about their poor treatment until the time when they 
resign or get dismissed. Thus, if they sever all ties with their employer at that point, they 
might not be subsequently placed at a detriment688. 
                                                      
686 See https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions. 
687 See https://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/18569. 
688 An example of a post-termination detriment, however, would be respondent’s refusal to provide a 
reference letter for the employee. 
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F. Procedural and Practical Hurdles 
 
Discrimination claims are generally not easy to prove, especially given that discrimination 
law has been becoming more complex. Respondents possess most of the evidence, and 
typically have better access to legal representation. All claimants who are poor, not familiar 
with the British legal system, or not proficient at English are especially disadvantaged. 
Moreover, many victims of race discrimination hesitate to seek legal redress – due to 
doubting that they will be believed or fearing retaliation (McColgan 2017: 69).  
 
Such hurdles are likely exacerbated in Polish workers’ cases. They are often employed in 
temporary and precarious arrangements (McDowell et al 2009; Parutis 2011a), which 
generally tend to be associated with exploitation and discrimination (Dickens and Meardi 
2017). In five of the nineteen ET cases discussed at length above, the claimants689 engaged 
in precarious employment: Obieglo and his co-claimant were seasonal fruit pickers; 
Skrzydlo and Matuzewicz were employed through agencies; Grzyb had a 10-hour contract; 
and Kaczynska worked variable hours. Generally, those employed in low-skill jobs tend to 
be overworked and focused on their day-to-day survival. Moreover, Polish and other CEE 
movers have often engaged in circular migration (White 2016a). A sense of being transient 
can make the burden of racist subjugation easier to bear. All this has likely made Poles less 
invested in asserting their rights – further complicated because employment discrimination 
claims do not get resolved quickly690. Poles’ tendency to mistrust the authorities (Kubal 
2012) and be submissive as employees (Parutis 2011) likely facilitates their hesitance to file 
claims. Of course, those who work semi-lawfully avoid making any complaints.  
 
Of the more than two hundred discrimination cases brought by Polish claimants that I had 
reviewed, about a quarter were dismissed because they were out of time. Some were 
untimely due to claimants’ having received incorrect advice of the Polish migration 
industry or of Polish friends. Polish movers have been documented to rely for advice on 
the migration industry rather than on traditional sources such as churches, voluntary 
groups, and advocacy networks (Garapich 2008). Comprised of largely unregulated 
immigration, financial, travel, and recruitment agents and advisors, communication 
businesses, ethnic media, and ethnic food shops (id), this migration industry is profit 
driven691, and not always well informed about the legal regime. Furthermore, Polish 
                                                      
689 Additional claimants in the cases I address in this Chapter might also have engaged in flexible 
employment, although this determination cannot be made due to insufficient information in the ET record.  
690 For example, in 2012-13, it took an average of 30 weeks (the longest of any ET claims) for race 
discrimination claimants to receive a final decision (Courts and Tribunals Service 2014: 3). 
691 Sometimes operated by organised crime groups. 
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workers’ tendency to work surrounded by other Poles, whom they tend to mistrust692 
(Garapich 2008), likely does little to facilitate their knowledge of worker rights or ET 
procedures.  
 
Some ETs have shown leniency towards Polish claimants by extending filing deadlines in 
the interest of justice. For example, in Grzondziela v St Barnabus and St Paul COE School693, 
missing a filling deadline by one week was excused by the ET due to the claimant’s 
language difficulties and absences from the UK. In Ruda (discussed above), the ET went as 
far as to permit a three-year delay in filing claims. The ET attributed this leniency to the 
claimant’s unfamiliarity and ‘degree of vulnerability’ with respect to British working 
practices. Given that the claimant was an engineering supervisor and knew English, one 
wonders whether the ET’s tolerance represents an outlier or was caused by the strength of 
the claimant’s underlying arguments694, or perhaps by the adjudicator’s partiality. It is 
possible that some adjudicators are sympathetic towards all exploited workers, or that 
some consider—if only informally—the broader societal racialisation and disadvantage 
that Polish movers have faced as a group. Moreover, adjudicators’ efforts to at least 
occasionally offer the illusion of resolution and fairness legitimate existing social 
conditions and the legal status quo (Freeman 1978), facilitating this transnational reserve 
army of workers supporting British capitalism. In most of the cases I reviewed, however, 
the ETs were less sympathetic to Polish claimants. The EAT appears to simply demand 
that the ET applies the correct legal standard (just and equitable) to Polish claimants’ 
requests for extension of time, as indicated in Gbidi and Szmidt (discussed above). 
 
Overall, Polish claimants do not appear to fare well when asserting discrimination claims. 
Notably, it is difficult to imagine that tribunals would so easily dismiss some of the 
treatment experienced by unsuccessful Polish claimants—such as in Kozakiewicz695 or 
Quality Solicitors696 (discussed above)—had it been directed against BAME workers697.  
                                                      
692 Garapich (2008: 747) argues that the (indirect) transitional mobility restrictions and the consequent 
illegality of many Polish workers contributed to their insecurity, and increased their mistrust of other Poles. 
For example, they are known to report each other to immigration officials and to sell fictitious employment 
leads. 
693 No 2401724/2016, ET Manchester, 23 November 2017. 
694 Successful harassment and direct discrimination claims based on Borat comments. 
695 Refusing to recruit additional Poles to avoid turning an establishment into an ‘all-Polish’ store. 
696 ‘She is Polish but very nice’. 
697 It is difficult to make direct comparisons of ET claims brought by Poles with claims brought by BAME 
claimants. My data includes gaps (addressed earlier). Moreover, some national statistical measurements rely 
on information provided by claimants themselves (Barnard and Ludlow 2016); a high number of claims are 
settled or withdrawn (for example, 43% were settled through ACAS, 15% privately settled, and 20% 
withdrawn in 2012 (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 2014, Table 5.2)); and it is difficult to 
compare such factually-intensive claims. What the available data does indicate, however, is that Blacks are 
overrepresented among ET claimants compared to their population size. For example, in 2012, Blacks 
constituted 2% of the population of the UK, yet 7% of ET claimants (id: Table 8.3). Moreover, Blacks’ 
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Moreover, in all eleven of the cases discussed at length in this Chapter in which claimants 
were issued compensation, ETs have tended to make below-average awards. With the 
exception of Michalak, where the record-breaking £4.5m award698 could be attributed to 
the unusual factual circumstances (discussed earlier), the highest amount awarded was 
close to £15,000 in Kosik (indirect discrimination), followed by £7,000 in Jurga (harassment 
and victimisation). The awards in all the other cases were between £1,500 and £4,500 – far 
below the 2010-13 median of approximately £10,000, and the 2015-16 median exceeding 
£13,000 in race discrimination cases (discussed earlier). Since ETs have much discretion in 
awarding damages, especially for injury to feelings, it is not clear why these awards appear 
relatively low. One wonders if it is because of Polish claimants’ low-paid, deskilled 
positions, their frequent lack of legal representation, or the ET’s belief that they are 
somehow not deserving of more. 
 
6. Conclusion   
 
Labour needs two decades ago prompted the UK to support CEE states’ accession and 
their nationals’ immigration699. As CEE nationals, and especially Poles, became more and 
more visible here, they provoked opposition, leading to incidents of racism, and 
eventually, contributing to the outcome of the Brexit referendum. Moreover, they are 
embedded within anti-Polish (and anti-CEE) public, media, and political rhetoric, and 
within the Government’s general anti-immigrant discourse. As my analysis in this Chapter 
reveals, their experiences of discrimination, disadvantage, and racialisation, and their 
unique positioning in the British hierarchies of privilege have been overlooked by equality 
discourse, and inadequately addressed by statutory anti-discrimination provisions, in line 
                                                      
success rate before the ET appears somewhat lower than of whites or Asians. For example, in 2012, Blacks 
comprised 5% of all claimants successful before the ET (id: Table 8.2), while constituting 7% of all claimants 
(id: Table 8.3); whites comprised 84% of all successful claimants (id: Table 8.2), while constituting 82% of 
claimants (id: Table 8.3); and Asians comprised 8% of all successful claimants (id: Table 8.2), while 
constituting 7% of claimants (id: Table 8.3). Notably, while 69% of white claimants in 2012 perceived that 
the ET had given each party a fair chance to make their case, only 46% of Black and 59% of Asian claimants 
felt that way (id: Table 7.10). At the same time, 37% of Black, 28% of Asian, and 20% of white claimants felt 
that the ET was favourable to employers (id).  
When looking specifically at race discrimination claims before the ET, 10% were successful in 2012 (id, 
Table 5.2), whereas Barnard and Ludlow’s (2016) study indicated CEE claimants’ 8% success rate during 
2010-12. Their study, however, was based on only 13 race discrimination claims (which included only one 
successful claim), so a meaningful comparison is difficult to make. Blacks appear proportionally 
overrepresented in race discrimination claims. For example, in 2012, 73% of claimants in race discrimination 
cases were white, 11% were Asian, and 12% were Black (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
2014, Table 8.1), contrasted with their share of the UK population of 90%, 6%, and 2%, respectively (id, 
Table 8.3). 
698 Close to half of this amount was due to a tax gross up. The actual award comprised mostly of lost past 
and future income and pension (more than £1.8m), £30,000 for injury to feelings, and £4,000 in exemplary 
damages.  
699 Albeit temporarily indirectly restricted, as addressed in Chapter 4. 
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with how they have been overlooked by the EU equality framework (discussed in the 
preceding Chapter).  
 
Some scholars have argued that any Member State that desires to make real progress in 
combating discrimination must go beyond the requirements of the Directive700  (e.g., 
Makkonen 2012). Although it is an improvement over earlier legislations, the British racial 
equality framework has not gone much beyond the Directive’s protections, however, and 
does little to advance substantive equality. Notably, the statutory definition of ‘racial or 
ethnic origin’ under the EqA2010 is not always sufficient in practice when it comes to 
protecting the rights of migrants or movers. It is true that ‘race’ under the Act includes 
both nationality and national origin, and white movers are covered by these protections. 
Often, however, the reason for discrimination is due to a victim’s being migrant, being 
foreign, or—in the case of my study group—having generic Eastern European origin (as 
opposed to specifically Polish origin). If courts define ‘race’ in an inflexible way, such cases 
might be beyond the grasp of equality law. 
 
Moreover, shortcomings of anti-discrimination measures appear compounded when 
adjudicators apply legal provisions in the context of Polish claimants. This is in part due to 
adjudicators’ unpredictable and inconsistent grasp of the legal doctrine, facilitated by some 
statutory elements’ not being well defined. Interpretive leeway, of course, also permits 
adjudicators to be flexible in their application of the law to benefit claimants, but ET and 
EAT adjudicators do not appear to have frequently taken advantage of this in the context 
of Polish claimants. Although I have not found consistent evidence of their preferring 
employers’ over Polish workers’ interests, their unfavourable decisions often rely on a 
careless application of statutory provisions, especially at the ET level. It is not clear 
whether this reflects their poor grasp of the doctrine or their majoritarian values and 
experiences. Moreover, Polish low-skill movers’ tendency to often work with many, if not 
predominantly, Polish and CEE workers for exploitative employers presents some unique 
challenges in asserting their equality rights, which are not shared by all migrants or all 
socio-economically disadvantaged groups. Specifically, this makes it more difficult to find 
comparators who are treated more favourably, and some adjudicators appear to consider 
having many Polish co-workers as evidence of employers’ lack of discrimination.  
 
This inadequate attention of the British equality law and discourse to the experiences of 
my study group might be attributable to the fact that Polish movers do not fit the UK’s 
                                                      
700 Due to some of the weaknesses of the Directive discussed in the previous Chapter. 
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traditional approach towards race relations and migration. Historically, increasing racism 
against immigrants and their permanent701 settlement had prompted both immigration 
restrictions and greater equality protections. CEE movers have complicated this dynamic. 
Although the Brexit referendum promised to curb their numbers (a promise which 
appears abandoned—at least in the near future—according to the 2018 White Paper), no 
attention has been devoted to the equality framework’s responsiveness to their 
experiences. Notably, protecting white movers’ equality has not had much to contribute to 
the dominant group’s interests, especially since they have not engaged in overt conflict 
with other groups, many have been temporary, they have made significant economic 
contributions despite (or due to) inadequate equality protections, and their influx has been 
decreasing since the referendum702.  
 
It remains to be seen how the legal regime will protect their rights after Brexit, and 
whether post-Brexit CEE migration will affect the British definition of whiteness. Those 
who will rely on the settled scheme will likely be more prone to integrating and eventually 
joining the British polity. Since they will likely be incorporated into the white norm, it is 
likely that policymakers will overlook their equality needs. The incorporation of CEE 
immigrants into the dominant group in the United States a century ago (Roediger 1991) 
did not prompt greater attention to protecting their equality rights. High-skilled CEE 
migrants will likely constitute a small group, and their education and socio-economic status 
might alleviate their racialisation to a certain degree, although as some of the cases 
discussed above indicate, even high-skilled CEE movers have been subjected to 
discrimination. The largest group of post-Brexit immigrants will likely be low-skill, 
temporary workers (from the EU and other countries to be designated as ‘low-risk’). It is 
unlikely that British policymakers will have much interest in securing their rights. The 
labour market will rely on a churn of these temporary workers with few rights (much fewer 
than EU movers have had)703, who will likely be concentrated in exploitative, precarious 
employment. Without specific policies devoted to their equality, integration, and equal 
opportunities, employers will be able to reap greater economic benefits from their 
presence. Thus, whereas the post-Brexit equality regime704 is unlikely to become more 
                                                      
701 Although at first after their mass immigration, BAME groups were also overlooked by equality discourse 
and policies. 
702 E.g., https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/25/surge-in-poles-leaving-uk-since-brexit-vote-
fuels-net-migration-drop (relying on ONS data). 
703 They will not be able to bring dependants, access public benefits, extend their visas beyond the one-year 
period, or transition to other visa types. 
704 Although after Brexit, the Government will have the power to repeal equality laws transposing the Race 
Equality Directive, it is unlikely that British equality laws will change much given how well-developed they 
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responsive to CEE nationals’ needs, their racialisation might change. This will likely 
depend on whether the current climate of anti-CEE antagonism—steeped in long-
standing western European discourse (addressed in Chapter 2) and in policies naturalising 
inequalities between east and west (addressed in Chapters 3 and 4)—will continue or 
diminish after Brexit. This will in part depend on whether low-skill CEE migrants will 
continue having a noticeable presence in the UK. It is also possible that the likely post-
Brexit influx of non-white (low-skill and high-skill) workers will provide the British public 
with a new target for antagonism. Of course, different outlets of racism are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. 
 
Although I subscribe to CRT scholars’ belief in the potential of law to fight subordination 
(Williams 1992), that potential is never complete – either through statutory law or its 
judicial application. Any anti-discrimination law reflects compromises between various 
political and social groups, and the concept of equality is broader than just making 
discrimination unlawful. The socio-economic duty and its removal had acknowledged as 
much. I am not prepared, however, to adopt some CLS scholars’ view that law lacks any 
utility705. After all, some Polish claimants are successful before the ET. Moreover, the 
current framework’s potential in the context of my study group could be improved 
through some simple reforms. To start with, policymakers and adjudicators should take 
account of CEE movers’ experiences. Equality policy initiatives need to be supported by 
more detailed studies of such groups’ experience of inequality, disadvantage, and 
discrimination in various interconnected fields (including housing, education, criminal 
justice, and access to health care and social services), and by better monitoring. There is a 
general lack of detailed data collection about migrants (EHRC 2016), especially white ones. 
The UK’s approach to ethnic monitoring, developed in the 1970s and 1980s, has tended to 
overlook non-BAME groups (Kofman et al 2009: ix), at best separating non-British whites 
into Irish, Gypsy/Traveller, and ‘other whites’ groupings706. For example, the British 
Crime Survey categorises victims only as Asian, Black, Mixed, White, or Other. Even the 
2009 CRE proposals to expand equality monitoring subsumed all whites into one category 
(id: 62). 
 
                                                      
were before the Directive. Moreover, after the UK leaves the EU, discrimination will still be challengeable 
under the Human Rights Act 1998, and in the European Court of Human Rights. 
705 Such nihilistic approach to rights is also internally inconsistent with the CLS argument that law is 
powerful enough to sustain the oppressive status quo. 
706 E.g., ONS (2011). Asians, on the other hand, are split into Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, and 
Other Asian categories (id). 
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My analysis here illustrates the malleability and usefulness of CWS and CRT frameworks 
to the study of marginalised whites such as intra-EU movers from poorer to richer 
Member States. Although CRT scholarship has tended to overlook non-racial causes of 
inequalities, fractures within whiteness, and the global backdrop of mobility and 
transnational capitalism, CRT tenets can accommodate the position of Polish movers and 
racialised whites more generally. In line with CRT tenets (e.g., Crenshaw and Peller 1995; 
Delgado and Stefancic 2017; Matsuda et al 1993; Williams 1992), the discussion of my 
study group confirms how prevalent and naturalised racism is, and how some inequalities 
are overlooked or tacitly sanctioned by formal concepts of equality, which support the 
interests of those in the position of power. 
 
The study of the position of Polish and CEE movers within host State equality 
frameworks also has implications for the EU project. Freedom of movement is not free 
without better national responses to movers’ racialisation and discrimination. Having 
enabled CEE workers’ mobility and enacted the Race Equality Directive, the EU has 
stepped back from paying attention to what happens to the actual movers in host States. 
Although its competence in affecting equality of outcomes is very limited, the EU does 
have the power to shape discourse, monitor inequalities, implement initiatives to support 
movers’ equality, and point out shortcomings in how national equality regimes have 
approached movers. It has largely remained silent707, however, even refraining from 
condemning post-referendum CEE movers’ experiences of racism which have been 
brought to its attention708. The EU should play a greater role in this area, particularly since 
CEE mobility will continue to EU-14 States, which have also experienced anti-CEE 
sentiment (as addressed in Chapter 5).  
  
                                                      
707 Unlike EU bodies, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI 2016: 74) has 
bemoaned Eastern Europeans’ low labour market outcomes, condemned scaremongering by UKIP and 
Conservative MPs for contributing to public xenophobia (id: 17), and recommended that integration 
measures target CEE movers (id: 35). 
708 For example, the 2017 Country Report on Non-Discrimination in the UK, prepared by the European 
Network of Legal Experts in Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination, noted the post-referendum increase 
in anti-EU migrant hostility (McColgan 2017: 5). 
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Chapter 7:  Conclusions 
 
1. My Findings 
 
The significance of contemporary mobility to notions of race and equality has come to the 
foreground during the Trump-and-Brexit era, which has exemplified that not only 
blackness, but also whiteness carries great political, legal, and social importance. 
Naturalised into invisibility, whiteness embodies historically contingent and evolving 
power relations, embedded within specific social and geographical locations. Polish 
movers to the UK provided an opportunity to study how both the EU and the UK 
equality frameworks delineate grades of whiteness, and how they approach the experience 
of inequality and discrimination by whites who do not belong to the dominant ethnic 
group.  
 
On the basis of my research, it is difficult to reconcile the EU’s fundamental rights 
narratives and the UK’s emphasis on equal opportunities and integration, with Polish 
movers’ experience of mobility - including the initial freedom of movement derogations; 
frequent deskilling and exploitation in the labour market; and racialisation by the media, 
politicians and the public, both before and in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum. 
Despite the plethora of economic, cultural, and sociological studies of Poles’ mobility, 
explorations of how anti-discrimination law and equality discourse approach them have 
been rare. Scholars have also not taken a sufficiently holistic look at their mobility, by 
failing to adequately situate their experiences within the broader context of the EU 
integration project. Moreover, despite its highly relevant focus on the intersection of law, 
race, and power, CRT has been greatly underutilised in this context. My thesis begins to 
address these gaps. 
 
Chapter 2 set the background to the way in which the EU equality regime, the enlargement 
project, and Poles’ mobility have been embedded in a certain set of values and ideologies. 
Although EU founders had at first equated the EU project with economic goals, it became 
infused by the late 1970s with an abstract story of a progressive, benevolent, and inevitable 
integration project based on respect for fundamental rights. I argued that this EU rhetoric 
contains inherent tensions, often overlooked by scholars: fundamental rights narratives 
retain an underlying economic core, with economic initiatives being inextricably tied to the 
concepts of freedom and equality, and to the process of enlargements. Moreover, my 
study revealed that foundational EU narratives have tended to focus on—even after the 
fall of the Iron Curtain—Europe’s western thinkers, western myths, and accomplishments 
of its western Member States. With its political foundations in EU-15 States, it is not 
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surprising that at first the EU had envisioned itself as a western project. Once the Eastern 
Enlargement was on the horizon, however, and since then, EU rhetoric should have 
become more inclusive, especially given its emphasis on inclusivity, diversity, and equality. 
It has not. I argued that this reflects a conceptual hierarchy of Europeanness in EU 
discourse and institutions, with EU-15 States having served as a synecdoche for the entire 
‘Europe’ and the entire EU, and the CEE region having been pushed to the periphery. In 
the process, CEE nationals have been othered, reinforcing historical east-west power 
differentials.  
 
My conclusions about the economic, pro-western core of EU mythologies were in line 
with my analysis of the Eastern Enlargement process in Chapter 3. I claimed that the EU 
had misused its bargaining power, starting in the 1980s, to shape the Enlargement policies 
so as to economically benefit western financial institutions and EU-15 States, while 
ignoring the interests of the acceding states and facilitating growing economic inequalities 
in Poland. This political, legal, and economic process was complemented by EU rhetoric 
which has tended to other the CEE region as being in need of civilising through 
westernisation. At odds with fundamental rights narratives, both accession policies and 
discourse have normalised Poland’s status as a second-class Member, on the periphery of 
the dominant (western) EU group. 
 
Chapter 4 traced the inequalities built into the Enlargement process to post-accession 
mobility derogations and the recently increasing willingness by EU institutions to limit 
CEE workers’ access to mobility, thereby creating hierarchies of EU citizenship and of 
whiteness within the EU. My research revealed that EU institutions had disapproved of 
post-accession mobility derogations only for limiting economic benefits to host States, and 
did not find any conceptual or legal difficulties with transitional arrangements. Similarly, 
EU institutions have been critiquing incidents of post-enlargement discrimination against 
CEE workers in EU-15 States primarily because of their negative economic consequences 
for western States. More generally, I argued that economic interests of EU-15 States have 
predominated in both mobility discourse and policies. These approaches have been at 
odds with the abstract portrayals of mobility as a key fundamental right and a key symbol 
of ‘returning’ the CEE region back to ‘Europe’; yet are in line with the economic, pro-
western core of EU mythologies, which I had exposed in Chapter 2.  
 
In Chapter 5, I explored how the right to equality, which has been intimately linked to the 
right of free movement, reflects western economic and political concerns and is far 
removed from the EU’s fundamental rights narratives. Several of the Race Equality 
 240 
Directive’s key provisions have been weak, and especially unfit for protecting CEE 
movers’ rights. Although, given the function of framework directives and the scope of the 
EU’s competence, the Directive arguably could not have accomplished much more than it 
has, the EU’s conceptualisation and contextualisation of the equality right has been 
overlooking CEE movers’ interests. My research indicated that the Directive’s legislative 
history and the broader equality discourse and soft law measures have been devoid of any 
concerns about the rights of white intra-EU movers, such as CEE nationals. This helps to 
naturalise their status as second-class EU citizens, entrenching fractures within whiteness. 
 
In line with what I argue to be the core of the EU’s equality law, I contended in Chapter 6 
that CEE movers’ experiences of discrimination and racialisation709, and their unique 
positioning within the UK’s hierarchies of privilege and disadvantage, have been 
overlooked by the British equality discourse and inadequately addressed by the Equality 
Act. Although the UK’s equality framework is less overtly connected to economic goals 
than the EU’s agenda, the Equality Act has not gone much beyond the Race Equality 
Directive’s protections, and its ineffectiveness appears compounded when it comes to 
protecting the rights of Polish movers. Moreover, although my review of EAT and ET 
cases was not comprehensive, it suggests that Polish low-skilled workers might face some 
challenges in asserting their equality rights due to frequently working with predominantly 
Polish or other CEE movers. Although, due to the flexibility of some of the Equality Act’s 
provisions, adjudicators are afforded some leeway to take a holistic view of Poles’ 
racialisation and its impact on their work experiences, my review indicated that tribunals 
have not often taken advantage of this.  
 
As my research revealed, the historical hierarchy (addressed in Chapter 1) positioning the 
west as superior and the east as unable to be fully ‘European’ can still be observed today in 
how the CEE region and its nationals have been approached under EU and UK policies 
and discourse. Whereas generally, cleavage between EU ideals and the reality of its policies 
has been attributed to the EU’s limited competence and its inability to enforce its values710 
or to ensure Member State compliance (e.g., Kochenov 2017), I propose that the EU 
project itself has been founded on and propagates a reality that differentiates between the 
west and the east, benefiting the former. This has had repercussions on inequalities built 
into the Eastern Enlargement process and on CEE nationals’ unequal experience of 
                                                      
709 Although incidents of racialisation and discrimination discussed in this thesis might not equally impact all 
Polish workers in the UK, my findings provide insights into how recent Polish movers as a group have been 
positioned within the equality regime.  
710 Although the ECJ has attempted to treat some values—such as freedom and equality—as legal rules 
(Kochenov 2017). 
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mobility711. By contextualising Poles’ mobility within both historical and contemporary 
transnational power dynamics, I was able to arrive at a more nuanced picture of today’s 
micro-level ethnic power relations which are shaping the boundaries of whiteness. It is 
true that all migrants face challenges, especially at first, but CEE movers have been unique: 
the overall EU project has been framed as egalitarian, and, unlike most historical migrant 
groups712, movers have been endowed with residence and employment rights. It is also 
true that the general shortcoming of both the EU and UK equality frameworks are not 
specific to Polish movers or marginalised whites. However, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 
6, the frameworks appear especially unfit for CEE movers, and arguably Poles in 
particular. 
 
I am not arguing that the Directive or the EqA2010 necessarily stem from bad intentions. 
However, even if new laws are made in good faith, they are created within the confines of 
pre-existing discourses and frameworks defined by those in power – unless, of course, they 
try to radically break away from the past, which neither the Directive nor the EqA2010 
did. That being said, even though law can never address all race-based wrongs and 
individual litigation-focused enforcement model has a limited capacity to address structural 
disadvantage, both frameworks do offer space to be more inclusive by leaving some 
flexibility to adjudicators, such as when creating hypothetical comparators or attributing 
respondent’s actions to claimant’s race. How can these opportunities actually materialise? 
Such change would likely need to be prompted by a confluence of political, economic, and 
cultural shifts, as well as by better organised action by CEE interest groups, to make both 
adjudicators and the public more critical of inequalities and challenges experienced by 
CEE movers. 
 
My research also explored the role of legal myths in contemporary EU and UK law. As 
Fitzpatrick (1992) expounds, the legitimation of contemporary law relies heavily on myths, 
which portray it as universal, progressive, and stable yet responsive to changing societal 
needs. This thesis illuminates how both the EU integration project, and EU and UK 
equality measures have been in fact embedded in such myths. Notably, Fitzpatrick (id) 
points to the significant role of othering in the mythology underlying modern law. It is 
through the otherness of the primitive and non-western that the occident’s legal structures 
are created as modern and praiseworthy (id). Colonialism has been the extreme example of 
this project, with modern western structures having been applied to redeem those 
                                                      
711 Similarly, the EU’s relations with the Global South reveal north-south inequalities. 
712 With the notable exception of New Commonwealth migrants to the UK. 
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perceived as savages (id). I would argue that the west’s ongoing relationship with the CEE 
region, with many markers of coloniality (addressed below), reflects and reinforces such a 
construction of western law. 
 
Of course, the relationship between policies and myths is rarely straightforward, as my 
analysis reveals. Certainly, it appears that at times myths drive policies. For example, the 
ECJ examines all Commission initiatives for compliance with fundamental rights; and the 
Eastern Enlargement has been attributed by some scholars to western politicians’ 
rhetorical entrapment after having portrayed the EU as a pan-European undertaking 
(Schimmelfennig 2001). At other times, policies appear to drive or at least intensify myths. 
For example, I found that integration myths intensified on the eve of the Eastern 
Enlargement.  
 
The complex relationship between myths and policies is complicated due to the 
inconsistencies of both, as my study revealed. For starters, laws can be inconsistent. For 
example, mobility derogations in the Accession Treaty were at odds with the freedom of 
movement acquis713. In the UK, well-developed equality law coexisted with the WRS and 
the right-to-reside test, and would have been further called into question through 
Cameron’s New Settlement with the EU. Law is less self-contained, universal, 
autonomous, or coherent than we would like to believe in order to support the legitimacy 
of the rule of law (Fitzpatrick 1992: 1-12; 2003). Similarly, myths are internally 
inconsistent. Fitzpatrick (2003) has noted how myths of law’s coherence, completeness, 
and autarky are constantly in tension with the myth that law is responsive to changing 
social circumstances. In the context of my research, both EU and UK equality narratives 
contain both types of myths. Moreover, EU fundamental rights and equality narratives 
coexist with narratives othering the CEE region, sometimes even in the same documents. 
Finally, there is an obvious gap between myths and policies at times. For example, mobility 
has been deemed a fundamental right, yet has been limited under both EU and Member 
State laws. Similarly, British pro-mobility and equality rhetoric were accompanied by the 
imposition of the WRS and the right-to-reside test to access social benefits. Such 
inconsistencies complicate the relationship between myths and policies, making it difficult 
to decipher which causes which. But does the precise relationship between them even 
matter? Myth continues to be central to modern law (Fitzpatrick 1992). Crucially, what my 
research illuminated is that myths and legal frameworks appear to work in tandem to affect 
the social reality of CEE movers’ experiences of mobility and equality. 
                                                      
713 And hence of questionable lawfulness under EU law. 
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2. Theoretical Implications 
 
A. Critical Race Theory 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, although CRT began as a progressive movement in American 
legal scholarship, scholars have noted its applicability to analyses of international law (e.g., 
Douzinas and Gearey 2005; Goldberg 2006; Tuitt 2004; Valdes et al 2002) and EU law714 
(Möschel 2014; Solanke 2009). Moreover, Heinze (2008) argues that, in order to maintain 
CRT’s credibility, it should be applied more to both international and non-US domestic 
laws715. CRT’s great contribution to analyses of non-US laws stems from its potential to (1) 
offer a new critique of the actual norms and practices involved in drafting and applying 
such laws, and (2) illuminate (and eventually redress) inequalities experienced by 
disadvantaged groups beyond the US, as I have attempted to do in this thesis. The CRT 
framework is particularly applicable to the EU, due to EU law’s inherently political nature. 
That is, its core purpose has been to service the common market, and a plethora of 
political texts exists to justify its policies. Both these factors make EU law very amenable 
to CRT analysis, which seeks to uncover hidden assumption and power hierarchies behind 
laws and legal discourse. Notably, there is some overlap between the EU equality 
framework and CRT outlook - for example, both broadly condemn all practices of 
discrimination and segregation; and both oppose the notion of distinct races. Furthermore, 
a big advantage of applying CRT to EU law stems from the fact that such critique has the 
potential to illuminate and affect the experience of equality by persons in many Member 
States. 
  
My analysis demonstrates that CRT has much to offer to the study of inequalities and anti-
discrimination law in Europe. For example, I argue that both EU and UK equality 
frameworks emphasise individual rights, overlook structural disadvantages, and perpetuate 
existing power structures, while obfuscating the State’s role in propagating inequalities. My 
study confirmed that both legal discourse and laws lack the vocabulary to address many 
race-based wrongs. Myths perpetuate existing power structures and laws’ hidden interests - 
by making laws appear neutral and benevolent, and sufficient to ensure equality. For 
example, EU institutions employed rhetoric of benevolence to help explain the imposition 
of mobility restrictions on CEE workers, justifying them as necessary to prevent brain 
drain and labour shortages in CEE countries. Thus, CRT can still generate new insights 
                                                      
714 Although legal scholars have not applied it in the context of CEE movers. 
715 Heinze (2008) bemoans CRT scholars’ general tendency to either ignore non-US laws or to offer only 
formalist, approving reading of such laws, which he attributes to the fact that foreign laws do not affect US 
law. 
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into how law and society operate in the context of racism and subordination, and provides 
a flexible framework from which to examine today’s racisms and racialisations (Hylton 
2009).  
 
Notably, modern axes of disadvantage and inequality in the UK have been splintering and 
increasing in complexity, calling into question the traditional approaches of CRT and CWS 
scholars, which have been based on the binary of privileged whites versus disadvantaged 
non-whites. As a time- and place-specific construct, whiteness has outward and inward 
fractures (Levine-Rasky 2013), which allows for a variety of experiences of oppression 
(Garner 2007b). For example, tensions have been observed between New Commonwealth 
and CEE nationals (Namusoke 2016). As indicated in the context of Brexit and studies 
cited at the beginning of Chapter 6, white Britons have opposed CEE nationals716. 
Moreover, my review of discrimination cases filed by Poles also revealed additional inter-
and intra-group tensions, in need of greater scholarly attention. On some occasions, Poles 
appear racist towards non-white co-workers717, which is reminiscent of how Slavic workers 
a century ago in the United States sided with the capitalist local class to oppose black 
workers, in order to partake more fully of white privilege (Roediger 1991). Moreover, 
some respondents in the cases I found were Polish or CEE nationals718. This is in line with 
Barnard and Ludlow’s (2016) study which revealed a high number of ET claims brought 
by CEE claimants against CEE respondents. Such contestation likely reflects intra-CEE 
competition for work, exacerbated by the increasingly precarious employment 
environment in the UK, which will likely become even more challenging for low-skill 
migrant workers after Brexit.  
 
Understanding the role of whiteness in equality, racism, and power structures has always 
been a component of CRT (see Chapter 1). CWS scholars have noted the increasing 
significance of fractures and fluidity within whiteness (e.g., Bonnett 1998; Levine-Rasky 
2013), exemplified for example through the racialisation of and inequalities experienced by 
CEE nationals in EU-15 States (e.g., Fox et al 2012a; Garner 2006). As my analysis 
confirmed, a more nuanced application of CWS in Europe can be very helpful to legal 
analyses of EU and UK law in the context of contemporary mobility. Whiteness of the 
                                                      
716 Ironically, Britons’ opposition to immigration of all races – whether from outside the EU or from the 
CEE region – has been used by some researchers as evidence of Britons’ colour blindness (Burnett 2014), as 
if absolving them of racist tendencies. 
717 E.g., Paulose v Synergy Health UK Ltd, No 2401298/2016, ET Manchester, 1 March 2017; Tesfaye v 
Tower Transit Ltd, No 3200766/2016, ET London East, 20 July 2017. 
718 E.g., Warda v Familijny Continental Food Ltd, No 3324202/2016, ET Reading, 7 February 2017; Zieba v 
Polish Shop 4 U Ltd, No 2403415/2017, ET Liverpool, 13 November 2017; Swierczynska v Kaprys Polish 
Deli, No 3400199/2017, ET Bury St Edmunds, 21 February 2018. 
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(western) dominant group has been actively constructed and reproduced by excluding and 
racialising white CEE movers through discourse, laws, and economic, political, and 
cultural structures. Reproducing the black/white binary, the term ‘white privilege’ 
incorrectly implies that all whites are privileged, and overlooks the role of class and 
ethnicity, not only within countries but also transnationally. By exposing internal divisions 
within the white race and deconstructing the concept of white privilege, my work also 
helps to subvert it, taking a step towards undermining racism.  
 
According to Said’s (1983) traveling theory concept719, theories and ideas can be 
invigorated by new contexts in which they are applied. By testing the limitations of CRT 
and CWS in the context of my study group, I hope to strengthen both these theoretical 
frameworks. Ultimately, I seek to expand critical approaches to the study of anti-
discrimination law, especially in the context of groups that do not fall into the black/white 
binary. According to Grosfoguel et al (2015: 636), the definition of racism should be 
broadened to include ‘global hierarchy of human superiority and inferiority’ produced 
politically, culturally and economically. My discussion has also illustrated the continuing 
salience of historical practices and discourses in contemporary power hierarchies and the 
experience of racism.  
 
B. Postcolonial Theory 
 
Throughout this thesis, my analysis has also drawn upon postcolonial theory. There is 
certainly much conceptual overlap between CRT and postcolonial theory. Both mistrust 
the dominant language of law and legal discourse; resist exploited and racialised groups’ 
subjugation; and are committed to a contextual analysis of law which rejects liberal 
legalism and notions of legal objectivity and neutrality (Delgado 2007)720. In fact, although 
his focus has been on domestic minorities in the United States, Delgado argues that 
postcolonial theory can reinvigorate CRT analyses of subordination (id). Moreover, 
Mahmud (1999: 1246) has encouraged CRT scholars to draw specifically upon postcolonial 
analyses of how race has been historically constructed in Europe. Moreover, CRT-like 
themes have been applied in postcolonial analyses (e.g., Eze 2007; Fanon 1988; Fitzpatrick 
1987), and whiteness studies in Europe have been rooted in ideas of postcoloniality (e.g., 
Nayak 2007; Ponzanesi and Blaagaard 2013). 
 
                                                      
719 CRT scholars have applied traveling theory when expanding CRT to non-legal disciplines in the United 
States (e.g., Carbado 2011), and to analyses in continental Europe (e.g., Knapp 2005; Möschel 2014). 
720 These goals are also shared with other critical legal approaches, including feminist legal theory.  
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Much postcolonial critique, including that by TWAIL721 scholars (e.g., Anghie 2007; 
Chimni 2013), has been devoted to the west’s historical subjugation (legal, economic, 
political) of large parts of the world deemed as pre-modern and uncivilised (e.g., 
Chakrabarty 2000; Fanon 1988; Said 1983; Spivak 1999), and to the effect this has had on 
western colonisers’ cultures (e.g., Jonsson and Hansen 2018). Such analyses have tended to 
focus on colonial discourses and practices of subjugation, and on their contemporary 
legacies of subordination. Although much attention has been devoted to the Global 
North’s and West’s imperialism of the Global South and the far East, historical intra-
European relations have also been subjected to postcolonial critique - such as English 
colonialism of Celts, German assertions of hegemony over Central Europe, and Spanish 
colonialism in the eastern Mediterranean (Mahmud 2007). Today’s globalism, fuelled by 
neoliberal economics, can be seen as a continuance of western imperialism, albeit without 
actual colonies (Fitzpatrick 2001). Most notably for the purposes of my thesis, scholars 
have pointed out that colonialism is still a part of Europe internally722 – through the west’s 
imposition of the acquis and the othering discourse employed during the Eastern 
Enlargement process (Böröcz and Kovacs 2001; Engel-Di Mauro 2006), and the ongoing 
western political antagonism towards CEE workers and their labour market exploitation 
(Kinnvall 2016).  
 
In line with postcolonial methods, I have sought to position myself with the outlook and 
experiences of a subjugated group723, while interrogating western practices that other and 
inferiorise them. My analysis revealed that links can be drawn between the colonial-like 
EU integration project and the disadvantage and racialisation experienced by CEE movers. 
For example, the CEE region has been silenced and differentiated through EU myths, 
unequal accession policies, transitional mobility restrictions, and recent ECJ case law 
which diminishes access to mobility of workers from poorer parts of the EU. I have 
argued in this thesis that such colonial processes—embedded within the long-standing 
western approach of othering the east—have shaped, at least in part, post-accession 
dynamics of inequality and racialisation of mobile Poles in EU-15 States. Since one of the 
goals of this thesis has been to critique CRT, however, I have more consistently relied on 




                                                      
721 ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’ scholars critique international law for facilitating the 
continuing subordination of the non-western world. 
722 Non-western states have been noted to practice a ‘poor people’s colonialism’, directed against minorities 
therein, such as Iraq’s treatment of Kurds (Vanly 1993).  
723 Facilitated by my own Polish upbringing. 
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3. A Path Forward  
 
A. Future Research 
 
Although parts of my examination focused on Poland and Poles only, some of my findings 
have broader implications for and pose questions about how legal rules and institutional 
discourse define equality and the reality of race when it comes to marginalised whites. In 
particular, critical qualitative and quantitative analyses724 should be performed regarding 
how other CEE movers in the UK—especially Bulgarians and Romanians725—fare in the 
context of equality discourse and policies. Moreover, intra-EU white movers have been 
the targets of recent anti-immigrant rhetoric across western Member States, not just in the 
UK (Bell 2015). Hence, the experience of equality by Poles and other CEE movers in EU-
14 States needs to be addressed in more detail. This is imperative given that freedom of 
movement to those States will not cease, and might even intensify, after Brexit. 
 
My research also raises questions, mentioned in Chapter 6, about how the post-Brexit 
splintering of CEE migration into three statuses will affect the British equality regime and 
the definition of whiteness. Notably, the low-skill, short-term route is intended to facilitate 
employers’ continued reliance on (predominantly white) EU workers (HM Gov’t 2018: 25-
6)726. Both future UK equality policies and the public racialisation of CEE nationals will 
likely depend in part on whether the current climate of anti-CEE antagonism—steeped in 
long-standing western European discourse and policies naturalising inequalities between 
east and west—continues or diminishes after Brexit. Post-Brexit immigration and equality 
policies will pose these, and many additional interesting questions. 
 
Some issues that arose during my research complicate my findings, and demand further 
study. I do not discount the importance of the material and economic foundations of race 
and power relations, and have noted them throughout this dissertation. For one thing, 
Poles’ experience of inequalities related to the accession process, mobility, and 
employment in the UK has also been affected by Poland’s and Poles’ relative economic 
disadvantage as compared to EU-15 States and nationals. Certainly, racism and the 
                                                      
724 And audit studies, to ascertain any inequalities in access to employment (Banerjee and Duflo 2017; Wood 
et al 2009). 
725 EU-2 nationals have been understudied despite appearing especially racialised and disadvantaged among 
recent intra-EU movers (e.g., Appendix 1; Datta 2011; Fox et al 2015; Genova 2017; Sobis et al 2016; 
Wemyss and Cassidy 2017; see also survey findings mentioned in Chapter 4, Section 1B). Although some 
studies have lumped Bulgaria and Romania together, in part because they acceded to the EU at the same 
time, I acknowledge their distinct histories and experiences, including the frequent media and public 
conflation of Romanians with the Roma. 
726 Reminiscent of the post-war European Voluntary Workers scheme, created to cover labour shortages in 
low-paid, unskilled work (McDowell 2009). 
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concept of race cannot be fully addressed without also paying attention to the role of 
capitalism and economic exploitation, class, and other forms of oppression (Valdes et al 
2002). CRT scholars’ attention to intersectionality acknowledges the role of class in racial 
subjugation (Möschel 2014: 116). In fact, CRT scholars have called for greater attention to 
theorising class and other factors behind subordination (e.g., Carbado 2011; Delgado and 
Stefancic 2017; Guinier 2002; Harris 1990), further developed by ClassCrit theorists727 (e.g., 
Grahn-Farley 2008; Mutua 2008). Both the policies and discourse that I have analysed in 
this thesis, however, overlook the role of class and of intersectionality, thus reducing the 
ability of the legal framework to protect equality rights.  
 
As my findings indicate, Poles’ mobility experience might be best understood through the 
intersection of (1) their group’s economic status within EU-wide hierarchies, and (2) the 
western conceptualisation of the CEE region as somehow ethnically not belonging to 
‘Europe’ and not being properly white. It is not their class alone, however, that can explain 
their experience of inequalities. Notably, other poor non-CEE Member States—such as 
Portugal or Greece— and their nationals do not appear to have elicited as much 
opposition or exclusionary discourse, historically or today. Moreover, as my review of 
employment discrimination claims filed by Poles indicated, even high-skill, middle-class 
Polish workers can be targets of racial discrimination due to being perceived as inherently 
lesser because of their Polishness. Thus, it is the various intersecting fractures within 
whiteness and within class that affect the experience of inequality and discrimination. 
Future research, as well as legal instruments, should take account of this. 
 
B. Policy Consequences 
 
CRT analytical framework’s ultimate goal is to transform and redeem law to fight 
subordination (Williams 1992). Western laws, legal myths, and legal discourse (Fitzpatrick 
2013; Fowler 1996; Sorel 2004; Tuitt 2004; Unger 1983) contain resistant elements on 
which excluded groups can draw in order to resist the existing power structures and to 
facilitate their equality and inclusion. For example, both the Race Equality Directive and 
the Equality Act do provide some flexibility to address a variety of manifestations of 
discrimination. And EU rhetoric did occasionally include references to the Eastern 
Enlargement as a ‘re-unification’ of Europe, while both EU and UK equality discourses 
focus on meritocracy, integration, and equal opportunities. Poles have begun to rely on 
such resistant elements. For example, they have been pressuring EU institutions to include 
in EU discourse references to Stalinist crimes against the CEE region (Littoz-Monne 
                                                      
727 Albeit ClassCrits have tended to focus on the class position of Afro-Americans only. 
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2013). In 2015, Poles protested in front of Westminster to draw attention to incidents of 
their discrimination, and wrote a letter to Theresa May in 2018 to promote their post-
Brexit rights728. But they need to demonstrate more agency—for example, by bringing 
more cases before employment tribunals—to better fulfil any redemptive qualities that the 
existing legal frameworks contain.  
 
To better reflect the nature of discrimination and racism, both formal laws and related 
policies need to take account of contemporary demographic changes, transnational 
contexts, and intersectionality. Adjudicators should situate individual claimants’ 
experiences within employers’ patterns of exploiting CEE workers and within their 
widespread racialisation729. Legislators also have a role to play – by setting a more 
responsive framework for courts to follow, and contributing to a more inclusive equality 
discourse. More nuanced data collection, indicating national origins of claimants enforcing 
EqA2010 provisions, would help to support such efforts. Moreover, the media and 
educators should engage in more responsible debates about migration and equality, 
especially now that those issues are in a state of flux due to the Brexit process. Only then 
can legal discourse and equality policies become more responsive to all members of the 
polity, and thus be better able to facilitate meaningful democracies and fulfil the promise 
of the EU project. 
 
What role should, or even can, the EU play in making the experience of EU citizenship 
more meaningful for CEE movers in EU-14 States? EU governance, of course, is limited 
and more akin to administrative than constitutional rule, which defines the parameters of 
what integration can achieve and its legal character (Lindseth 2017). Despite the fact that 
its equality laws are mere frameworks, however, the EU does create equality discourse and 
EU-level anti-racism initiatives, and monitors Member States’ application of equality law. 
Moreover, ECJ case law affects Member States’ interpretations of equality law. Although 
its centrist provisions refer to business goals, the new Pillar of Social Rights and its 
anticipated legislative measures do hold some promise in increasing the EU’s role in this 
field. Thus, there is certainly space for EU institutions to get more involved in addressing 
racism and inequality experienced by CEE movers. But is there an argument to be made 
that, despite its limited competence and Member State sovereignty in the context of social 
policies, the EU should be more involved in protecting movers’ rights? Arguably, the EU 
                                                      
728 See https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/aug/07/poles-in-the-uk-urge-may-to-protect-them-
from-a-no-deal-brexit. 
729 I am not discounting politically-driven problems of social inequality or economic exploitation, which 
affect the experience of all non-privileged groups, and which need to be addressed through policy initiatives. 
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has some moral responsibility here, having endowed movers with EU citizenship and 
having enabled their mobility. However, what would the EU’s greater involvement in 
protecting movers’ equality rights in host States imply for the EU project? And how could 
it be accomplished without redefining its relationship with its Member States and its core 
values, recently further complicated due to Brexit? Researchers should tackle these 
questions. More generally, critical scholars should devote greater attention to the impact 
on CEE nationals of EU policies and ECJ cases pertaining to mobility and equality, 
especially in light of recent Member States’ restrictions on movers’ access to social rights.  
 
Even if law is incapable of addressing many race-based wrongs and legal discourse is 
unenforceable, the promise of the EU project as well as a moral compulsion dictate that 
we try to make both laws and discourse more inclusive and responsive to contemporary 
varieties of racism - imperative more than ever in today’s Brexit era. Only then will the EU 







ACAS (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service) (2012) Checking your workforce is 
legal: How to avoid employing ‘visa abusers’, 
http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=3902 
 
ACAS (2012a) Migrant Workers: Your responsibilities as an employer, 
http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=3702 
 
Adams, Maurice et al (2017) Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Idealism and 
Realism (Cambridge: CUP) 
 
Adinolfi, Adelina (2005) Free Movement and Access to Work of Citizens of the New 
Member States: The Transitional Measures, Common Market Law Review 42: 469-98 
 
Aldaz-Carroll, Enrique et al (2018) Why are Poles unimpressed with Poland’s economic 




Aliverti, Ana (2015) Enlisting the public in the policing of immigration, British Journal of 
Criminology 55(2): 215-30 
 
Allen, William (2016) A Decade of Immigration in the British Press (Oxford University: 
Migration Observatory) 
 
Alvarez-Plata, Patricia et al (2003) Potential Migration from Central and Eastern Europe 
into the EU-15: An Update – Report for the European Commission, https://www.diw.de 
/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/41211/report_european_commission_20040218.pdf 
 
Anderson, Benedict (2006) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism (New York: Verso) 
 
Anderson, Bridget (2013) Us and Them?: The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control 
(Oxford: OUP) 
 
Anderson, Bridget (2017) Towards a new politics of migration?, Ethnic and Racial Studies 
40(9): 1527-37 
 
Anderson, Bridget et al (2006) Fair enough? Central and East European migrants in 
low-wage employment in the UK (Oxford University: COMPAS) 
 
Anderson, Bridget et al (2008) New EU Members? Migrant Workers’ Challenges and 
Opportunities to UK Trades Unions: a Polish and Lithuanian Case Study (Oxford 
University: COMPAS) 
 
Anghie, Antony (2007) Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(Cambridge: CUP) 
 
Anwar, Muhammad et al (eds) (2000) Introduction, in Muhammad Anwar et al (eds) From 
Legislation to Integration? Race Relations in Britain 1-23 (London: Palgrave Macmillan) 
 
 252 
Arnesen, Eric (2001) Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination, International Labor and 
Working-Class History 60: 3-32 
 
Ash, Timothy Garton (1990) The Magic Lantern: The Revolutions of ’89 Witnessed in 
Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (New York: Random House) 
 
Aston, Jane et al (2006) The Experience of Claimants in Race Discrimination Employment 
Tribunal Cases, Employment Relations Research Series No 55 (London: Department of 
Trade and Industry) 
 
Baas, Timo and Herbert Brücker (2011) EU Eastern Enlargement: The Benefits from 
Integration and Free Labour Movement, CESifo DICE Report 2: 44-51 
 
Babić, Mile (2007) Globalization as the Negation of the Other, Forum Bosnae 39: 7-17 
 
Bachman, Bart (2016) Diminishing Solidarity: Polish Attitudes toward the European 
Migration and Refugee Crisis, 16 June (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute) 
 
Balibar, Etienne (1991) Racism and Nationalism, in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel 
Wallerstein (eds) Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities 37-68 (London: Verso) 
 
Balls, Ed (2010) We were wrong to let so many eastern Europeans in Britain, Observer, 6 
June  
 
Banakar, Reza and Max Travers (eds) (2005) Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research 
(London: Hart Publishing) 
 
Banerjee, Abhijit Vinayak and Esther Duflo (eds) (2017) Handbook of Field Experiments, 
vol 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier) 
 
Barker, Martin (1981) The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe 
(London: Junction Books) 
 
Barnard, Bruce (2000) EU Enlargement: Continent Could be Unified by the End of the 
Decade, Europe 397: 16-19 
 
Barnard, Catherine (2013) The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (Oxford: 
OUP) 
 
Barnard, Catherine (2014) Enforcement of Employment Rights by Migrant Workers in the 
UK: The Case of EU-8 Nationals, in Cathryn Costello and Mark Freedland (eds) Migrants 
at Work (Oxford: OUP) 
 
Barnard, Catherine and Amy Ludlow (2016) Enforcement of employment rights by EU-8 
workers in Employment Tribunals, Industrial Law Journal 45(1): 1-28 
 
Barnard, Catherine and Sarah Fraser Butlin (2018) Free Movement vs. Fair Movement: 
Brexit and Managed Migration, Common Market Law Review 55: 203-26  
 
Barnard, Catherine et al (2018) Beyond Employment Tribunals: Enforcement of 
Employment Rights by EU-8 Migrant Workers, Industrial Law Journal 47(2): 226-62 
 
 253 
Barnes, Mario L (2016) “The More Things Change . . .”: New Moves for Legitimizing 
Racial Discrimination in a “Post-Race” World, Minnesota Law Review 100(5): 2043 - 2102 
 
Barslund, Mikkel and Matthias Busse (2014) Labour Mobility in the EU: Dynamics, 
Patterns and Policies, Intereconomics 49(3): 116-158, http://archive.intereconomics.eu/ 
year/2014/3/labour-mobility-in-the-eu-dynamics-patterns-and-policies/ 
 
BBC (2005) Visegrad Four want EU Countries to Abolish Transition Periods, BBC 
Worldwide Limited, 22 April 
 
Beach, Richard et al (2009) Exploring the “Critical” in Critical Content Analysis of 
Children’s Literature, National Reading Conference Yearbook 58: 129-43 
 
Beetham, David (2013) The Legitimation of Power (London: Palgrave Macmillan) 
 
Behr, Hartmut (2007) The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? EU 
Accession Politics Viewed from a Historical Comparative Perspective, European Journal 
of International Relations 13(2): 239-62 
 
Behr, Hartmut (2012) EUrope – History, Violence and ‘Peripheries’, Review of European 
Studies 4(3): 7-17 
 
Belka, Marek (2013) How Poland’s Membership Helped Transform its Economy 
(Washington, DC: Group of Thirty) 
 
Bell, Derrick A (1980) Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, Harvard Law Review 93: 518-33 
 
Bell, Derrick A (1992) Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism (New 
York: Basic Books) 
 
Bell, Mark (2002) Beyond European Labour Law? Reflections on the EU Racial Equality 
Directive, European Law Journal 8(3): 384–99 
 
Bell, Mark (2002b) Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (Oxford: OUP) 
 
Bell, Mark (2009) Racism and equality in the European Union (Oxford: OUP) 
 
Bell, Mark and Sara Kjellstrand (eds) (2004) Critical review of academic literature relating 
to the EU directives discrimination directives to combat discrimination (Brussels: 
European Commission) 
 
Bell, Mark et al (2007) Developing Anti-Discrimination Law in Europe: The 25 Member 
States Compared (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities) 
 
Bell, Stephanie (2015) Conference Presentation: The relationship between the European 
Race Equality Directive and the 2010 Equality Act, The Equality Act 2010: Five-Years On, 





Bennoune, Karima (2012) Productive Tensions: Women’s NGOs, the ‘Mainstream’ 
Human Rights Movement, and International Lawmaking, in Cecilia M Bailliet (ed) Non-
State Actors, Soft Law and Protective Regimes: From the Margins 125-50 (Cambridge: 
CUP)  
 
Ben-Tovim, Gideon et al (1986) A political analysis of local struggles for race equality, in 
Rex John and Mason David (eds) Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations 131–52 
(Cambridge: CUP)  
 
Bettio, Francesca et al (eds) (2013) Gender and the European Labour Market (London: 
Routledge) 
 
Bhambra, Gurminder K (2017) The current crisis of Europe: Refugees, colonialism, and 
the limits of cosmopolitanism, European Law Journal 23: 395–405 
 
BIA (Border and Immigration Agency) (2007) Accession Monitoring Report, May 2004 – 




Bienkov, Adam (2013) Nigel Farage: Romanians want to move to a ‘civilised country’, 
Politics, 6 September 
 
Blair, Tony (2004) Speech to the Confederation of British Industry on Migration, 27 April, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/apr/27/immigrationpolicy.speeches 
 
Błaszczak, Dawid (2012) Polska - Unia Europejska. Polacy - Europejczycy. Integracja 
Polski z Unią Europejską w opinii społeczeństwa polskiego [Poland – European Union. 
Poles – Europeans. Public Opinion on Poland’s Integration with the European Union], 
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych [Yearbook of Social Studies] 4(40): 73-99 
 
Blazyca, George and Marek Kolkiewicz (1999) Poland and the EU: Internal disputes, 
domestic politics and accession, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 
15(4): 131-43 
 
Blazyca, George and Ryszard Rapacki (eds) (1991) Poland into the 1990s: Economy and 
Society in Transition (London: Pinter Publishers) 
 
Blinder, Scott and Lindsay Richards (2018) UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: 
Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern (Oxford University: Migration Observatory) 
 
Bobek, Michael (2007) The Binding Force of Babel: The Enforcement of EC Law 
Unpublished in the Languages of the New Member States, Law Working Paper 2007/06 
(Florence: EUI) 
 
Bobiński, Krzysztof (2006) Dealing with the Legacy of Totalitarianism—a Task for the 
European Union, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 2006(1): 77-84  
 
Boeri, Tito and Herbert Brücker (2005) Why Are Europeans so Tough on Migrants?, 
Economic Policy 20(44): 629-703 
 
Boeri, Tito et al (2002) Who is Afraid of the Big Enlargement?, CEPR-fRDB Policy Paper 
No 7, http://faculty.london.edu/rportes/enlargetext.pdf  
 255 
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo (2003) Racism Without Racist: Color-Blind Racism and the 
Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States (New York: Rowman and Littlefield) 
 
Bonnett, Alastair (1998) How the British working class became white: the symbolic 
(re)formation of racialized capitalism, Journal of Historical Sociology 11(3): 316-40 
 
Bonnett, Alastair (2000) White Identities: Historical and International Perspectives 
(London: Prentice Hall) 
 
Bonnett, Alastair (2008) Whiteness and the west, in Claire Dwyer and Caroline Bressey 
(eds) New Geographies of Race and Racism 17-28 (Aldershot: Ashgate) 
 
Böröcz, József (2001) Introduction: Empire and Coloniality in the “Eastern Enlargement” 
of the European Union, in József Böröcz and Melinda Kovacs (eds) Empire’s New 
Clothes: Unveiling EU Enlargement 4-50 (Shropshire: Central Europe Review) 
 
Böröcz, József (2001b) The Fox and the Raven: The European Union and Hungary 
Negotiate the Margins of Europe, in Jozsef Böröcz and Melinda Kovacs (eds) (2001) 
Empire’s New Clothes: Unveiling EU Enlargement 51-110 (Shropshire: Central Europe 
Review) 
 
Böröcz, József and Melinda Kovacs (eds) (2001) Empire’s New Clothes: Unveiling EU 
Enlargement (Shropshire: Central Europe Review) 
 
Botterill, Katherine (2011) Mobility & Immobility in the EU: Experiences of Young Polish 
People Living in the UK, Studia Migracyjne - Przegląd Polonijny [Migration Studies – 
Polish Review] 2011(6): 47-70 
 
Bouchard, Gerald (ed) (2013) National Myths: Constructed Past, Contested Present (New 
York: Routledge) 
 
Brah, Avtar and Ann Phoenix (2004). Ain’t I a woman? Revisiting intersectionality, Journal 
of International Women’s Studies 5(3): 75-86 
 
Brandsma, Gijs Jan et al (2016) Accountability in the post-Lisbon European Union, 
International Review of Administrative Sciences 82(4): 621–37 
 
Brown, Colin (1984) Black and White Britain: The Third PSI Survey (London: Policy 
Studies Institute) 
 
Brown, Jennifer (2018) Briefing Paper 8360: An Early History of British Race Relations 
Legislation (House of Commons) 
 
Brubaker, Rogers (1998) Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism, in John 
Hall (ed) The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism 272-306 
(Cambridge: CUP)  
 
Brugmans, Hendrik (1970) L’idée européenne 1920-1970 (Bruges: De Tempel)  
 
Bryman, Alan (2004) Social Research Methods (New York: OUP) 
 
 256 
Brzeziński, Michał et al (2011) Growing Inequalities and Their Impacts on Poland, 
http://gini-research.org/system/uploads/450/original/Poland.pdf?1370090614 
(University of Amsterdam: GINI) 
 
Buchowski, Michał (2006) The Specter of Orientalism in Europe: From Exotic Other to 
Stigmatized Brother, Anthropological Quarterly 79(3): 463-82 
 
Budnik, Malgorzata (2012) Notes in Contemporary Emigration of Poles (2004-2008), 
Poland-Polonia Review 3: 199-216 
 
Buras, Piotr (2017) Europe and its Discontents: Poland’s Collision Course with the 




Burnett, Jon (2014) Selling the Tolerant Nation, 11 December (London: Institute of Race 
Relations), http://www.irr.org.uk/news/selling-the-tolerant-nation/ 
 
Burnett, Jon (2016) Racial Violence and the Brexit State, Race & Class 58(4): 85-97 
 
Burrell, Kathy (ed) (2012) Polish Migration to the UK in the ‘New’ European Union: After 
2004 (Farnham: Ashgate) 
 
Burrell, Kathy et al (2018) Brexit, Race and migration, Environment and Planning C: 
Politics and Space, 0(0): 1-38, DOI: 10.1177/0263774X18811923e 
 
Byrne, David (2003) Speech: Food Safety - Completion of Farm to Fork Approach, 27 
June, Brussels, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-03-329_en.htm 
 
Byrska, Monika (2004) The Unfinished Enlargement: Report on Free Movement of People 
in EU-25 (Brussels: European Citizen Action Service) 
 
CAB (Citizens Advice Bureau) (2005) Evidence Briefing: Home from home? Experiences 




Cabinet Office (2001) Consultation Paper: Towards Equality and Diversity – 
Implementing the Employment and Race Directives 
 




Cameron, David (2014) Andrew Marr’s Interview with David Cameron, BBC1, 5 January, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AA9oSfOjFlo 
 
Cancedda, Alessandra et al (2011) The mid-term Evaluation of PROGRESS (Rotterdam: 
ECORYS) 
 
Canetta, Emanuela et al (2014) Annual report on labour mobility (Network Statistics 
FMSSFE, European Commission), 
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=13484&langId=en 
 257 
Cantle, Ted (2001) Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team 
(London: Home Office), http://tedcantle.co.uk/pdf/communitycohesion%20 
cantlereport.pdf 
 
Cap, Piotr (2017) Immigration and Anti-migration Discourses: The Early Rhetoric of 
Brexit, in Piotr Cap, The Language of Fear: Communicating Threat in Public Discourse 
67-79 (London: Palgrave Macmillan) 
 
Carbado, Devon (2011) Afterword, Critical What What?, Connecticut Law Review 43: 
1619-23 
 
Carens, Joseph H (2013) Foreword, in Willem Mass (ed) Democratic Citizenship and the 
Free Movement of People 5-8 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff) 
 
Carrera, Sergio (2005) What Does Free Movement Mean in Theory and Practice in an 
Enlarged EU?, European Law Journal 11(6): 699-721 
 
Castles, Stephen (2010) Understanding Global Migration: A Social Transformation 
Perspective, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36(10): 1565-86 
 
Castles, Stephen and Mark Miller (2009) The Age of Migration: International Population 
Movements in the Modern World (New York: Guilford Press) 
 
Ca’Zorzi, Michele and Roberto De Santis (2004) The Eastward Enlargement of the 
European Union, RSCAS Working Paper 2004/31 (Florence: EUI) 
 
CBOS (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej [Centre for Public Opinion Research]) (1999) 
Na drodze do Unii Europejskiej – Komunikat z badan [On the Road to the European 
Union – Research Communication] (Warsaw), 
https://www.cbos.pl/PL/szukaj/szukaj.php 
 
CBOS (2014a) Polish Public Opinion: Opinions about Market Economy, March 
(Warsaw), https://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2014/03_2014.pdf  
 
CBOS (2014b) Polish Public Opinion: 10 Years of Poland’s Membership in the European 
Union, April (Warsaw), https://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2014/ 
04_2014.pdf 
 
CBOS (2017) Polish Public Opinion: Opinions about membership in the European 
Union in Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, August (Warsaw), 
https://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2017/08_2017.pdf 
 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh (2000) Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 
 
Chalmers, Damian (2001) The mistakes of the good European?, in Sandra Fredman et al 
(eds) Discrimination and human rights: the case of racism 193–250 (Oxford: OUP)  
 
Chalmers, Damian et al (2014) European Union Law: Text and Materials (Cambridge: 
CUP) 
 
Chimni, BS (2013) Speech - Global Futures: Fragments of a Vision, Keynote Address at 
the Osgoode Hall Law School Forum on Law, Culture, Critique, 11 May (Toronto) 
 258 
 
Chmielewska, Iza (2015) Transfery z tytulu pracy Polakow za granica w swietle badan NBP 
[Work Transfers of Poles Abroad, in light of NBP Studies], Materialy i Studia No 314 
(Warsaw: Instytut Ekonomiczny) 
 
Chodakiewicz, Marek Jan et al (eds) (2003) Poland’s Transformation: A Work in Progress 
(Charlottesville, VA: Leopolis Press) 
 
Chopin, Isabelle and Jan Niessen (eds) (2002) Combating Racial and Ethnic 
Discrimination: Taking the European Legislative Agenda Further (Brussels: Migration 




Chwalba, Andrzej (2011) Europa Środkowa w drodze do NATO i Unii Europejskiej 
[Central Europe on the road to NATO and the EU], Przegląd Polsko-Polonijny 2011(1): 
15-26 
 
Cianciara, Agnieszka (2013) Polish Business Lobbying in the EU 2004–2009: Examining 
the Patterns of Influence, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 14(1): 63-79 
 
CIPD (Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development) (2013) The State of Migration: 
Employing Migrant Workers, March (London), https://www.cipd.co.uk/Images/the-
state-of-migration-employing-migrant-workers_2012_tcm18-10702.pdf 
 
Cirtautas, Arista Maria (1997) The Polish Solidarity Movement: Revolution, Democracy 
and Natural Rights (New York: Routledge) 
 
Ciupijus, Zinovijus (2010) Ethical Pitfalls of Temporary Labour Migration: A Critical 
Review of Issues, Business Ethics 97: 9-18 
 
Ciupijus, Zinovijus (2011) Mobile central eastern Europeans in Britain: successful 
European Union citizens and disadvantaged labour migrants?, Work, Employment and 
Society 25(3): 540–50 
 
Ciupijus, Zinovijus (2012a) Making Sense of Their Own Mobile Identities in Internally 
Borderless Europe: Europeans, Poles, Bread Migrants, Catholics, Annales Univ 
Paedagogicase Cracoviensis Studia Sociologica IV(2): 56-71 
 
Ciupijus, Zinovijus (2012b) EU Citizens or Eastern European Labour Migrants? The 
Peculiar Case of Central Eastern Europeans in Britain, Politeja 2/3: 29-46 
 
Ciupijus, Zinovijus (2012c) Talking about ‘Labour Camps’ in post-2004 Europe: Lived 
Experiences of Work, Transnational Mobility and Exploitation among Central Eastern 
European Migrants, EMECON 1: 1-12, http://www.emecon.eu/current-issue/1-2012/ 
zinovijus-ciupijus/ 
 
Clarke, Jessica (2013) Inferring Desire, Duke Law Journal 63(3): 525-635 
 
Cohen, Barbara (2004) Remedies and sanctions for discrimination in working life under 
the EC anti-discrimination directives, in Janet Cormack (ed) Discrimination in Working 
Life: Remedies and Enforcement (Brussels: Migration Policy Group), 
http://www.equineteurope.org/IMG/pdf/EN_-_Discrimination_in_Working_Life.pdf 
 259 
Cohen, Robin (2006) Migration and its Enemies: Global Capital, Migrant Labour and the 
Nation-State (Farnham: Ashgate) 
 
Commission (1961) Fourth General Report on the Activities of the Community, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/30807/1/67557_EEC_4th.pdf 
 
Commission (1988) Communication from the Commission to the Council on the fight 
against racism and xenophobia, OJ 1988 C 214/32, 29.6.88 
 
Commission (1989) Survey: Racism, Xenophobia and Intolerance in Europe (Brussels: 
DG Information, Communication, Culture) 
 
Commission (1991) Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) amending Regulation (EEC) 
N° 1408/71 or the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to 
self-employed persons, and to members of their families moving within the Community 
and Regulation (EEC) N° 574/72 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation 
(EEC) N° 1408/71, COM(91) 528 final  
 
Commission (1992) Report - Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement, Submitted to the 
Lisbon European Council of 26 and 27 June 1992 and annexed to the Presidency’s 




Commission (1993) Green Paper: European Social Policy – Options for the Union, 
COM/93/551 final, 17.11.93 (‘Green Paper 17.11.1993’) 
 
Commission (1994) The Demographic Situation of the European Union - 1994 Report /* 
COM/94/595 final 
 
Commission (1994b) Bulletin of the European Union 6.1994, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/65210/1/BUL387.pdf  
 
Commission (1995) Communication from the Commission on racism, xenophobia and 
anti-semitism and Proposal for a Council Decision designating 1997 as European Year 
against Racism, COM(95) 653, 13.12.95 
 
Commission (1995) White Paper: Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe for Integration Into the Internal Market of the Union, COM(95) 163 final, 
03.05.95 (Brussels) (‘1995 White Paper’) 
 
Commission (1996) Europe… Questions and Answers: How Does the European Union 
Work? (Brussels), http://aei.pitt.edu/15091/1/MOVE-HOWDOESTHEEUROPEAN 
UNIONWORK-1996_1.pdf 
 
Commission (1996c) Legal Instruments to combat Racism and Xenophobia, V/6188/97 
(Brussels) 
 
Commission (1997) Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for 
Membership of the European Union, DOC/97/16, 15.07.97 
 
 260 
Commission (1997a) Building Europe Together, 1957-1997 Treaties of Rome: 40 Years of 
Peace and Cooperation, https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/ 
publication/1e91d34c-80c3-11e6-b076-01aa75ed71a1 
 
Commission (1997c) Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union, COM(97) 2000, 
15.07.1997 (‘Agenda 2000’) 
 
Commission (1997d) Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation (EEC) 
No 1408/71 as regards its extension to nationals of third countries, COM(97) 561 final OJ 
1988 C 6/15 
 
Commission (1997e) The European institutions in the fight against racism: selected 
texts (Luxembourg), https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/ 
publication/0871f77b-bb5c-4df0-8023-50cad322eba2/language-en 
 
Commission (1998) Regular Report on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession, COM(98) 
701 final (‘1998 Regular Report’)  
 
Commission (1999) Communication from the Commission - Countering racism, 
xenophobia and anti-semitism in the candidate countries, COM(1999) 256, 26.05.1999 
 
Commission (1999a) Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, COM(1999) 566, 
25.11.1999 
 
Commission (2000) European Mobility Forum – A New Employee Mobility, Information 
Service, 11 May  
 
Commission (2000) Regular Report on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession, COM(2000) 
709 final, 8.11.2000 (‘2000 Regular Report’) 
 
Commission (2001) Making a success of enlargement - Strategy Paper and Report of the 
European Commission on the progress towards accession by each of the candidate 
countries, COM/2001/0700 final, 13.11.2001 
 
Commission (2001) European Report - EU Enlargement: Negotiations Move Ahead on 
Labour and Capital, 2 June (‘European Report 2001’) 
 
Commission (2001) Information Note: The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of 
Enlargement, 6 March (‘Info Note’) 
 
Commission (2001) Regular Report on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession, 13.11.2001, 
SEC(2001) 1752 (‘2001 Regular Report’) 
 
Commission (2001) Enlargement Papers: Progress towards meeting economic criteria for 
accession – the assessment from the 2001 Regular Report, No 6, November (Brussels: DG 
for Economic and Financial Affairs) (‘Enlargement Paper 2001’) 
 
Commission (2001a) The European Union: Still Enlarging (Luxembourg: Office for 




Commission (2001b) Enlargement Papers: The economic impact of enlargement, No 4, 




Commission (2001c) Information Note to the European Council on a Mid-Term Review 
of the Implementation of the Enlargement Strategy, COM(2001) 0553 final 
 
Commission (2002) The European Social Dialogue, a Force for Innovation and Change, 
COM(2002) 341 
 
Commission (2002) Strategy Paper: Towards the Enlarged Union, COM(2002) 700 final, 
9.10.2002 (‘Towards the Enlarged Union’) 
 
Commission (2002) Enlargement Papers: Main Results of the April 2002 Fiscal 
Notifications Presented by the Candidate Countries, No 13, November (Brussels: DG for 
Economic and Financial Affairs) (‘Enlargement Paper 2002’) 
 




Commission (2002b) EURES Activity Report 2000-2001: Towards an Integrated 
European Labour Market: the Contribution of EURES, COM(2002) 0533 final 
 
Commission (2002c) Action Plan on Skills and Mobility, COM(2002) 72, 13.02.2002  
 
Commission (2003) Key Structural Challenges in the Acceding Countries: The integration 
of the acceding countries into the Community’s economic policy co-ordination processes, 
No 4, July (Brussels: DG for Economic and Financial Affairs) (‘Key Structural Challenges 
2003’) 
 
Commission (2003a) Enlargement of the European Union: An Historic Opportunity 
(Brussels: Enlargement DG), https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/archives/pdf/historic_opportunity_2003_en.pdf 
 
Commission (2003b) More unity and more diversity: The European Union’s Biggest 
Enlargement (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities) 
 
Commission (2003c) Comprehensive monitoring report of the European Commission on 
the state of preparedness for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, COM(2003) 0675 final 
Commission (2004) Green Paper - Equality and non-discrimination for all in an enlarged 
EU, COM(2004) 379 final, 28.05.2004 
  
Commission (2004b) Europlus: Come and Visit the Countries Wishing to Join the 
European Union!, https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ 
ab0ae68a-1efe-42ad-8ccf-28ffde568aa0 
 
Commission (2004c) Communication: Making citizenship Work - fostering European 
culture and diversity through programmes for Youth, Culture, Audiovisual and Civic 
Participation, COM(2004) 0154 final 
 262 
Commission (2005) Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: Non-Discrimination and Equal Opportunities for All—A Framework Strategy, 
COM(2005) 224, 1.6.2005 
 
Commission (2006) Green Paper: Modernising Labour Law to Meet the Challenges of the 
21st Century, COM(2006) 708 final, 22.11.2006 
 
Commission (2006) EU Enlargement – 20 Myths and Facts about Enlargement (Brussels: 
DG for Enlargement), https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication 
/0c9d9c2a-7e25-4e79-bd82-8dd1a14407d5/language-en (‘Enlargement Myths and Facts’) 
 
Commission (2006b) Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements Set Out 
in the 2003 Accession Treaty (period 1 May 2004-30 April 2006), COM(2006) 48 final, 
8.2.2006 
 
Commission (2006c) Enlargement, Two Years After – An Economic Success, COM(2006) 
200 final, 3.5.2006 
 
Commission (2006e) The application of Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or 
ethnic origin, COM(2006) 643 final, 30.10.2006 
 
Commission (2006f) Decision 2006/33/EC of 20 January 2006 establishing a high-level 
advisory group on social integration of ethnic minorities and their full participation in the 
labour market, OJ L 21, 25.01.2006 
 
Commission (2007) Understanding Enlargement — The European Union’s enlargement 
policy (Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities) 
 
Commission (2007) European Report on the Free Movement of Workers in Europe in 
2006 (Part I), https://ec.europa.eu/social/keyDocuments.jsp?type=0&policyArea=25& 
subCategory=475&country=0&year=0&advSearchKey=consolidated+report&mode=adv
ancedSubmit&langId=en (‘European Report 2006’) 
 




Commission (2007b) Press Release: High Level Group on the Social Integration of Ethnic 
Minorities and their Full Participation in the Labour Market, MEMO/07/536, 3.12.2007 
 
Commission (2007c) Ethnic Minorities in the Labour Market: An Urgent Call for Better 
Social Inclusion - Report of the High Level Advisory Group of Experts on the Social 
Integration of Ethnic Minorities and their Full Participation in the Labour Market 
(Brussels), https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=766&langId=en 
 
Commission (2007d) Press Release: The Race Equality Directive, Memo 7/257, 
27.06.2007 
 
Commission (2008) Key Messages from the Employment in Europe 2008 Report, 
COM(2008) 758 final, 18.11.2008 
 
 263 
Commission (2008a) Communication Accompanying Document to the Communication 
from the Commission: Preparing the Next Steps in Border Managements in the European 
Union – Impact Assessment, COM(2008) 69 final, 13.02.08  
 
Commission (2008b) Fifth Report on Citizenship of the Union (1 May 2004 – 30 June 
2007), COM(2008) 85 final, 15.2.2008 
 
Commission (2008c) Report on the First Phase (1 January 2007 – 31 December 2008) of 
the Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2005 Accession Treaty and as Requested 
According to the Transitional Arrangement set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty, 
COM(2008) 765 final, 18.11.2008 
 
Commission (2008d) Overview of Main Activities Undertaken under Employment 
Incentive Measures Programme, SEC(2008) 1939, 30.5.2008 
 
Commission (2008e) Employment in Europe 2008 (Brussels: DG for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities), 
ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=681&langId=en  
 




Commission (2009) Staff working document - Impact Assessment - Accompanying 
document to the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions - Combating HIV/AIDS in the European Union and neighbouring countries 
2009 -2013, COM(2009) 569 final 
 
Commission (2009b) Communication from the Commission: on guidance for better 
transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, COM(2009) 313 final 
 
Commission (2009c) Five Years of an Enlarged EU – Economic Achievements and 
Challenges, COM(2009) 79 final, 20.2.2009 
 
Commission (2009d) EU action against discrimination Activity report 2007-08 (Brussels: 




Commission (2010) Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions - Proposal for the Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2010, 
COM(2010) 25 final  
 
Commission (2010a) EU Citizenship Report 2010: Dismantling the Obstacles to EU 
Citizens’ Rights, COM(2010) 602, 27.10.2010 
 
Commission (2011) Annual Report 2011 on the European Union's development and 
external assistance policies and their implementation in 2010, SEC(2011) 0880 final, 
6.07.2011 
 264 
Commission (2011a) Special Eurobarometer 363: Internal Market – Awareness, 
Perceptions, and Impacts, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/ 
archives/ebs/ebs_363_en.pdf 
 
Commission (2011b) EURES Activity Report 2006-2008, COM(2010) 731 final, 9.3.2011 
 
Commission (2011c) PROGRESS in action: The EU programme for employment and 
social solidarity 2007-2013 (Luxembourg), 
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?langId=en&docId=7123& 
 
Commission (2012) A Union of Law: from Paris to Lisbon: Tracing the Treaties of the 
European Union (Brussels: Consilium), 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30388/qc3111407enc.pdf 
 
Commission (2012b) The EU: What would it mean for me? Four Stories, Four People 




Commission (2012c) Staff Working Document: Towards a Job-Rich Recovery, 
SWD(2012) 90 final, 18.4.2012 
 
Commission (2013) The European Union Explained: Enlargement – Extending European 
Values and Standards to more Countries, https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-
detail/-/publication/6b289b12-ad64-462d-9b35-645f211db8d6/language-en 
 
Commission (2013) European Report on the Free Movement of Workers in Europe in 
2011-2012, ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=10443&langId=en (‘European Report 
2013’) 
 
Commission (2013) Free Movement of EU Citizens and their Families: Five Actions to 
Make a Difference, COM(2013) 837 final, 25.11.2013 (‘Five Actions 2013’) 
 
Commission (2013b) Impact Assessment Accompanying the Document Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Measures Facilitating the Exercise of Rights 
Conferred in Workers in the Context of Freedom of Movement for Workers, COM(2013) 
236 final, 26.4.2013 
 




Commission (2014) 25 Years After the Fall of the Iron Curtain: The state of integration of 
East and West in the European Union, EUR 26678 (Luxembourg), 
https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy_reviews/east-west_integration. 
pdf (‘25 Years After Fall 2014’) 
 





Commission (2014b) Impact Assessment Accompanying the Document Proposal for a 
Regulation on a European Network of Employment Services, Workers’ Access to Mobility 
Services and the Further Integration of Labour Markets, COM(2014) 6 final, 17.1.2014 
 
Commission (2014c) Joint Report on the application of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 
29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective 
of racial or ethnic origin (‘Racial Equality Directive’) and of Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment 
in employment and occupation (‘Employment Equality Directive’) COM(2014) 02 final , 
17.1.2014 
 
Commission (2016) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 96/71/EC, COM(2016) 128 final, 08.03.2016 
 
Commission (2016b) Declaration of the European Commission on the Safeguard 
Mechanism referred to in paragraph 2(b) of Section D of the Decision of the Heads of 
State or Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning a New Settlement 
for the United Kingdom within the European Union, Annex VI to the European Council 
conclusions of 18–19 February, EUCO 1/16, CO EUR 1, CONCL 1 
 
Commission (2016c) Staff Working Document on the Application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in 2015 Accompanying the document Report from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2016) 265 final, 19.05.2016 
 
Commission (2017) 2016 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, COM(2017) 239 final, 18.5.2017 
 
Commission (2018) Your Social Security Rights in Denmark, 
ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=13746&langId=en 
 
Commission (2018a) 2017 Annual Report on the Application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, COM(2018) 396 final, 4.6.2018 
 
Commission (2018b) Report from the Commission on the implementation of Directive 
2014/54/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on 
measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom 
of movement for workers, COM(2018) 789 final, 4.12.2018 
 
Commission (2018c) Staff Working Document on the Application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in 2017 Accompanying the document Report from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions 2017 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, SWD(2018) 304 final, 4.6.2018 
 
Commission (2018d) Report on the interim evaluation of the implementation of the 
Rights, Equality, and Citizenship Programme, COM(2018) 508 final, 29.6.2018 
 
Commission (2019) Staff Working Document - Countering racism and xenophobia in the 
EU: fostering a society where pluralism, tolerance and non-discrimination prevail, 
SWD(2019) 110 final, 15.3.2019 
 
 266 
Commission (undated) Guide for National Administrators - The Transitional 
Arrangements for the Free Movement of Workers from the New Member States 
Following Enlargement of the European Union on 1 May 2004, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
social/BlobServlet?docId=144&langId=en (‘Commission Guide’) 
 
Commission (undated b) Free Movement – EU Nationals, 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=457  
 




Coniglio, Nicola Daniele and Jan Brzozowski (2018) Migration and development at home: 
Bitter or sweet return? Evidence from Poland, European Urban and Regional Studies 
25(1): 85-100 
 
Connolly, Michael (2011) Discrimination Law (Toronto: Thomson Reuters) 
 
Cook, Joanne et al (2011) The Experiences of Accession 8 Migrants in England: 
Motivations, Work and Agency, International Migration 49(2): 54–79 
 
Copsey, Nathaniel and Karolina Pomorska (2010) Poland’s power and influence in the 
European Union: The case of its eastern policy, Comparative European Politics 8(3): 304–
26 
 
Cordell, Karl (ed) (2000) Poland and the European Union (London: Routledge) 
 
Coulter, Steve (2018) Skill Formation, Immigration and European Integration: The Politics 
of the UK Growth Model, New Political Economy 23(2): 208-22 
 
Council (1995) Resolution on the Fight against Racism and Xenophobia in the fields of 
Employment and Social Affairs, OJ 1995 C 296/13 
 
Council (1999a) Resolution on the 1999 Employment Guidelines, OJ 1999 C69/2 
 
Council (2000) Decision 2000/750/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a Community 
action programme to combat discrimination (2001-2006), OJ 2000 L303, 2.12.2000 
 
Council (2006) The European Parliament and Council Decision 1672/2006/EC of 24 
October 2006 establishing a community programme for Employment and Social Solidarity 
– Progress, OJ 2006 L315, 15.11.2006 
 
Council (2009) Europe: Giving Shape to an Idea (London: Anthem Press) 
 
Council (2011) Publication of an amendment application pursuant to Article 6(2) of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and 
designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs, OJ C 119, 16.4.2011 
 
Council (2016a) ‘I/A’ Item Note, Proposal for a Council Decision establishing a 
Multiannual Framework for the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights for 




Courts and Tribunals Service (2014) Making a Claim to an Employment Tribunal, T420 
(London)  
 
Coutts, Stephen (2018) The Absence of Integration and the Responsibilisation of Union 
Citizenship, European Papers 3(2): 761-80 
 
Craig, Gary (2015) Migration and integration: A local and experiential perspective, IRiS 




Craig, Paul and Gráinne de Búrca (2015) EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (Oxford: 
OUP) 
 
CRE (Commission for Racial Equality) (1992) Annual Report 1991 (London) 
 




Crenshaw, Kimberlé (1989) Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: a black 
feminist critique of anti-discrimination doctrine, feminist theory, and anti-racist policies, 
University of Chicago Legal Forum 140: 139-67 
 
Crenshaw, Kimberlé (2011) Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, German Law Journal 12(1): 
247-84 
 
Crenshaw, Kimberlé et al (eds) (1995) Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that 
Formed the Movement (New York: The New Press) 
 
Currie, Samantha (2007) De-Skilled and Devalued: The Labour Market Experience of 
Polish Migrants in the UK Following EU Enlargement, International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 23(1): 83–116  
 
Currie, Samantha (2008) Migration, Work and Citizenship in the Enlarged European 
Union (Farnham: Ashgate) 
 
Currie, Samantha (2009) Challenging the UK rules on the rights of EU8 workers, Journal 
of Social Welfare and Family Law 31(1): 47-58  
 
Dach, Zofia (ed) (1999) Kontrowersje wokół korzyści i kosztów integracji Polski z Unią 
Europejską [Controversies Regarding Costs and Benefits from Poland’s integration with 
the European Union] (Chrzanów: WSPiM) 
 
Daily Telegraph (2009) Phil Woolas admits government got it wrong over eastern 
European immigration, 13 May 
 
Dale, Gareth and Mike Cole (eds) (1999) The European Union and Migrant Labour 
(Oxford: Berg) 
 
Dale, Gareth and Nadine El-Enany (2013) The Limits of Social Europe: EU Law and the 
Ordoliberal Agenda, German Law Journal 14(5): 613-49 
 
 268 
dal Pozzo, Francesco Rossi (2013) Citizenship rights and freedom of movement in the 
European Union (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer)  
 
Datta, Kavita (2011) Last hired and first fired? The impact of the economic downturn on 
low‐paid Bulgarian migrant workers in London, Journal of International Development 23: 
565-82 
 
DCLG (Department of Communities and Local Government) (2012) Creating the 
Conditions for Integration (London), www.communities.gov.uk/documents/ 
communities/pdf/2092103.pdf 
 
Dearden, Lizzie (2016) UK student stabbed in neck for speaking Polish describes brutal 
post-Brexit assault in Telford, Independent, 20 September 
 
Debusscher, Petra (2015) Gender Equality Policies in the European Union: Economic 
Integration and Feminist Transnational Advocacy, International Journal of Gender Studies 
4(8): 1-19 
 
Delgado, Richard (2007) Rodrigo’s Corrido: Race, Postcolonial Theory, and U.S. Civil 
Rights, Vanderbilt Law Review 60: 1691-1745 
 
Delgado, Richard (2011) Rodrigo’s reconsideration: Intersectionality and the future of 
critical race theory, Iowa Law Review 96: 1247-88 
 
Delgado, Richard and Jean Stefancic (eds) (1997) Critical White Studies: Looking Behind 
the Mirror (Philadelphia: Temple University Press) 
 
Delgado, Richard and Jean Stefancic (2017) Critical Race Theory (New York: NYU Press)   
 
Della Sala, Vincent (2013) Myth and the Postnational Polity: The case of the European 
Union, in Gérard Bouchard (ed) Whither National Myths? Reflections on the Present and 
Future of National Myths 157-172 (New York: Routledge) 
 
Dempsey, Judy (2001) EU Setback for Poland, Financial Times News Digest, 12 
December 
 
Dennison, James and Andrew Geddes (2018) Brexit and the perils of ‘Europeanised’ 
migration, Journal of European Public Policy 25(8): 1137-53  
 




Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2014) Findings from the Survey of 




De Rougemont, Denis (1966) The Idea of Europe (New York: Macmillan) 
 
De Witte, Bruno et al (eds) (2017) Between Flexibility and Disintegration: The Trajectory 
of Differentiation in EU Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) 
 
 269 
D’Haussonville, Jean (2003) The Accession Process: Is the Current Enlargement the Best 
Prepared in the History of the Union?, Pouvoirs: Revue francaise d'etudes 
constitutionnelles et politiques 2003(106): 5-39  
 
Dickens, Linda (2007) The Road is Long: Thirty Years of Equality Legislation in Britain, 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 45(3): 463–94 
 
Dickens, Linda and Guglielmo Meardi (eds) (2017) Labour Market Exploitation: Emerging 
Empirical Evidence, Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations No 108 (Warwick Business 
School) 
 
Dimitrova, Antoaneta and Mark Rhinard (2005) The power of norms in the transposition 
of EU directive, European Integration Online Papers 9(16), 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2005-016.pdf 
 
Discrimination Law Review (2007) A Framework for Fairness: Proposals for a 
Single Equality Bill for Great Britain - A Consultation Paper (London: Department for 
Communities and Local Government), https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/2012 
0919212654/http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/corporate/pdf/325332.pdf 
 
Doherty, Michael (2016) Through the Looking Glass: Brexit, Free Movement and the 
Future, King’s Law Journal 27(3): 375-86  
 
Dølvik, Jon and Jelle Visser (2009) Free movement, equal treatment and workers’ rights: 
can the European Union solve its trilemma of fundamental principles?, Industrial 
Relations Journal 40(6): 491–509 
 
Dougan, Michael (2004) A Spectre is Haunting Europe… Freedom of Movement of 
Persons and the Eastern Enlargement, in Chrisophe Hillion (ed) EU Enlargement: A Legal 
Approach 111-41 (Oxford: Hart) 
 
Dougan, Michael (2013) The Bubble that Burst: Exploring the Legitimacy of the Case Law 
on the Free Movement of Union Citizens, in Maurice Adams et al (eds) Judging Europe’s 
Judges: The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice 127–54 
(Oxford: Hart) 
 
Douglas-Scott, Sionaidh (1998) The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU: 
Reinforcing the European Identity?, in Peter Fitzpatrick and James Bergeron (eds) 
Europe’s Other: European Law Between Modernity and Postmodernity 131-56 
(Aldershot: Ashgate) 
 
Douzinas, Costas and Adam Gearey (2005) Critical Jurisprudence: The Political 
Philosophy of Justice (Oxford: Hart) 
 
Dowty, Alan (1987) Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on the Freedom of 
Movement (New Haven: Yale University Press) 
 
Drinkwater, Stephen and Michał Garapich (2013) Migration Plans and Strategies of Recent 
Polish Migrants to England and Wales: Do They Have Any and How Do They Change, 




Drinkwater, Stephen and Michał Garapich (2015) Migration Strategies of Polish Migrants: 
Do They Have Any at All?, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41(12): 1909-31 
 
Drinkwater, Stephen et al (2006) Poles Apart? EU Enlargement and the Labour Market 
Outcomes if Immigrants in the UK, IZA Discussion Paper No 2410 (Bonn: Institute for 
the Study of Labor), http://ftp.iza.org/dp2410.pdf 
 
Drinkwater, Stephen et al (2009) Poles Apart? Enlargement and the Labour Market 
Outcomes of Immigrants in the United Kingdom, International Migration 47(1): 161-90 
 
Drzewiecka, Jolanta (2014) Intra-European Union Migration: More Rights for Migrant EU 
Citizens?, Communication Currents 9(4), https://www.natcom.org/communication-
currents/intra-european-union-migration-more-rights-migrant-eu-citizens 
 
Drzewiecka, Jolanta et al (2014b) Rescaling the State and Disciplining Workers in 
Discourses on EU Polish Migration in UK Newspapers, Critical Studies in Media 
Communication 31(5): 410-25  
 
DSS (Department of Social Security) (1999) Opportunity for All: Tackling Poverty and 




Duffy, Bobby and Tom Frere-Smith (2014) Perceptions and Reality: Public Attitudes to 




Dummett, Ann (1994) The Starting Line: A Proposal for A Draft Council Directive 
Concerning the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, New Community 20(3): 530-38 
 
Dustmann, Christian and Tommaso Frattini (2014) The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to 
the UK, The Economic Journal 124 (November): F593–F643 
 
Dustmann, Christian and Ian Preston (2018) Free Movement, Open Borders and the 
Global Gains from Labor Mobility (UCL: CReAM), http://academia-engelberg.ch/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/EngelbergDialogues_Dustman_Forum.pdf 
 
Dustmann, Christian et al (2003) The impact of EU enlargement on migration Flows, 
Home Office Online Report 25/03 (London: Research Development and Statistics 
Directorate), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpb21/reports/HomeOffice25_03.pdf 
 
Dustmann, Christian et al (2008) Educational Achievement and Ethnicity in Compulsory 
Schooling, Discussion Paper Series CDP No 12/08 (London: Centre for Research and 
Analysis of Migration), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.625. 
5189&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
 
Düvell, Franck (2004) Polish undocumented immigrants, regular high-skilled workers and 
entrepreneurs in the UK, Migration Paper 54 (Warsaw University Institute for Social 
Studies), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11869955.pdf 
 
Düvell, Franck (2004a) Highly Skilled, Self-Employed and Illegal Immigrants from Poland 
in United Kingdom, Working Paper 4 (Warsaw: Centre for Migration Studies) 
 271 
Dyer, Richard (1997) White: Essays on Race and Culture (London: Routledge) 
 
Eade, John et al (2007) Class and Ethnicity - Polish Migrants in London: Full Research 
Report (University of Surrey: CRONEM), https://www.surrey.ac.uk/cronem/files/ 
POLISH_FINAL_RESEARCH_REPORT_WEB.pdf 
 
Economic Bulletin (2004) The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: Clear 
Challenges, Unjustified Fears, 41(6): 189-98  
 
The Economist (2013) Come On Try Getting Excited: The Poles sound diffident about 
what should be a historic moment, 5 June, https://www.economist.com/europe/2003/ 
06/05/come-on-try-getting-excited  
 
ECRI (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance) (2016) ECRI Report on 
the United Kingdom, 4 October (Strasbourg: Council of Europe), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5836d07c7.html 
 
Editorial Board (2014) The Free Movement of Persons in the European Union: Salvaging 
the Dream while Explaining the Nightmare, Common Market Law Review 51: 729-40  
 
EEAC (East European Advice Centre) (2013) East Europeans in London:  A Peer Led 
Study of the Issues Faced by East Europeans in London Relating Housing, Employment, 
Household Income and Support Needs (London), http://www.eerc.org.uk/wordpress/ 
wp-content/uploads/2017/07/East-Europeans-in-London-December-2013.pdf 
 
EE&SC (European Economic and Social Committee) (1991) Opinion on EC Relations 
with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 91/C 339/12, 31.12.91 
  
EE&SC (1992) Opinion on Immigration Policy, 92/C 40/104, 17.02.92 
  
EE&SC (1998) Opinion on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: A European initiative in electronic commerce, OJ C 19 
 
EE&SC (1999) Opinion on the role and contribution of civil society organisations in the 
building of Europe, OJ C 329  
 
EE&SC (2000a) Opinion on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions – Towards a European Research Area, 2000/C 204/16 
 
EE&SC (2001) Opinion on Freedom of Movement for Workers in the Single Market 
(Single Market Observatory), 2001/C 155/10, 29.5.2001 
 
EE&SC (2014) 10th Anniversary of the EU Enlargement, 
https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/resources/docs/qe-02-14-519-en-n.pdf 
 
EHRC (Equality and Human Rights Commission) (2010) Report: Inquiry into recruitment 
and employment in the meat and poultry processing sector (London), 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/meat_inquiry_report.pdf  
 
EHRC (2011a) Employment Statutory Code of Practice (London), 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/employercode.pdf 
 272 
EHRC (2012) Recruitment and employment in the meat and poultry processing industry: 




EHRC (2016) Is England Fairer? The State of Equality and Human Rights 2016 (London), 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/is-england-fairer-2016.pdf 
 




EHRC (2018) Research Report 119, Developing a national barometer of prejudice and 
discrimination in Britain (London), https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/ 
default/files/national-barometer-of-prejudice-and-discrimination-in-britain.pdf 
 
EIB (European Investment Bank) (2008) 50 Years of the EIB (pamphlet) 
 




Ekiert, Grzegorz and Jan Kubik (2004) Rebellious civil society popular protest and 
democratic consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press) 
 
Elo, Satu et al (2014) Qualitative Content Analysis: A Focus on Trustworthiness, SAGE 
Open Jan-March 2014: 1-10 
 
ENAR (European Network Against Racism) (2007) Fact Sheet 36: Report on the High 
Level Advisory Group of Experts on the Social Integration of Ethnic Minorities and their 
Full Participation on the Labour Market, April (Brussels), http://edz.bib.uni-mannheim.de 
/daten/edzk/gdj/07/social_ integration_ethnicminorities_en.pdf 
 
ENAR (2009) The social and employment dimensions of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy for 
growth and jobs: what are the opportunities for monitoring and improving the situation of 
migrants and ethnic minorities? (Brussels) 
 
ENAR (2015) Annual Report 2015,  
https://www.enar eu.org/IMG/pdf/annualreport_2015_final-2.pdf 
 
ENAR (2017) Annual Report 2017,  
https://www.enar-eu.org/IMG/pdf/annualreport_2017_final.pdf 
 
Engbersen, Godfried (2001) The unanticipated consequences of panopticon Europe: 
Residence strategies of illegal immigrants, in Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke 
(eds) Controlling a New Migration World 222-46 (London: Routledge)  
 
Engbersen, Godfried et al (2017) The intra-EU mobility regime: Differentiation, 
stratification and contradictions, Migration Studies 5(3): 337–55 
 
Engel-Di Mauro, Salvatore (ed) (2006) The European’s Burden: Global Imperialism in EU 
Expansion (New York: Peter Lang) 
 
 273 
EOR (Equal Opportunities Review) (2010) Issue 201, July 
 
EOR (2014) Issue 249, July  
 




EP (1985) Committee of Inquiry into the rise of fascism and racism in Europe 
(Luxembourg), http://aei.pitt.edu/49120/1/A9067.pdf (‘Evrigenis Report’) 
 
EP (1988) Battling for the Union – Altiero Spinelli, https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/ 
evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_1_tarihce/Battling_for_the_Union.pdf  
 
EP (1989) Resolution on the Joint Declaration against racism and xenophobia and an 
action programme by the Council of Ministers, OJC 69/12, 13.2.89. 
 
EP (1991) Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Racism and Xenophobia 
(Luxembourg), http://aei.pitt.edu/3128/1/3128.pdf 
 
EP (1992) Written Questions with Answer, OJ C 281, 29.10.1992 
 
EP (1993) Resolution on racism, xenophobia, and antisemitism, OJ 1993 C 342/19, 
20.12.1993 
 
EP (1995) Minutes of the Sitting of Friday, 22 September 1995, OJ C 269, 16.10.1995, 
191–236 
 
EP (1995a) Resolution of the European Parliament on racism, xenophobia and anti-
semitism of 26 October 1995, Annex 3, OJC 308/140, 20.11.95 
 
EP (1997) European Union Anti-Discrimination Policy: From Equal Opportunities 
Between Women and Men to Combating Racism, Directorate-General for Research, 
Working Document, Public Liberties Series, LIBE 102 EN, December, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/workingpapers/libe/102/text1_en.htm#N_3_ 
 
EP (2005) Resolution on the Protection of Minorities and Anti-Discrimination Policies in 
an Enlarged Europe, OJ 2005 C 124 E/405, 25.5.2006 
 
EP (2006) Resolution on the Transitional Arrangements Restricting the Free Movement of 
Workers on EU Labour Markets, 2006/2036 INI, C 293 E/230, 2.12.2006 
 
EP (2007a) Resolution of 13 December 2007 on combating the rise of extremism in 
Europe, OJEU C 323 E/494 
 
EP (2009) Resolution of 14 January 2009 on the situation of fundamental rights in the 
European Union 2004-2008 (2007/2145(INI)), OJEU C 46 E/48 
 
EP (2013) Written Questions with Answers, 2013/C 180 E/01, 26.6.2013 
 
EP (2013a) Written questions with Answers, OJ C 301E, 17.10.2013 
 
EP (2013b) Written Questions with Answers, 2013/C 241 E/01, 22.08.2013 
 274 
EP (2013c) Written Questions with Answers, 2013/C 182 E/01, 27.06.2013 
 
EP (2013d) Written Questions 19.6.12 
 
EP (2013e) Written Questions, 2013/C 320 E/01, 6.11.13  
 
EP (2013f) Written Questions with Answers, 2013/C 105 E/01, 11.4.2013 
 
EP (2013g) Written Questions, 2013/C 75 E/01, 14.3.13 
 
EP (2013h) Written Questions with Answers, OJC 130E, 7.5.2013 
 
EP (2014) Written Questions with Answers, 2014/C 179/01, 12.6.2014, Questions E- 
009726/13 and E-009848/13 
 
EP (2014b) Discrimination of Migrant Workers at the Workplace: Note for the EMPL 
Committee (Brussels: DG for Internal Policies), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
RegData/etudes/note/join/2014/518768/IPOL-EMPL_NT%282014%29518768_ 
EN.pdf (‘EP Note 2014b’) 
 
EP (2014b) Written Questions with Answers, 2014/C 65 E/01, 5.3.2014 
 
EP (2014c) Written Questions with Answers, 2014/C 41 E/01, 12.2.2014 
 
EP (2014d) Written Questions with Answers, 2014/C 279/01, 22.8.2014 
 
EP (2014e) Written Questions with Answers, 2014/C 86 E/01, 25.3.2014 
 
EP (2014f) Written Questions with Answers, 2014/C 218/01, 10.7.2014 
 
EP (2014g) Written Questions with Answers, OJ C 377, 23.10.2014 
 
EP (2014h) Written Questions with Answers, OJC 331, 23.9.2013 
 
EP (2014i) Written Questions with Answers, 2014/C 206/01, 2.7.2014 
 
EP (2014j) Written Questions with Answer, OJ C 35E, 6.2.2014 
 
EP (2017) European Parliament resolution of 12 December 2017 on the EU Citizenship 
Report 2017: Strengthening Citizens’ Rights in a Union of Democratic Change, OJ C 369, 
11.10.2018 
 
EP Written Questions with Answers, OJ C 281, 29.10.1992, 1–61 (‘EP Written Questions 
29.10.1992’) 
 
EP Written Questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given 
by a European Union institution, OJ C 75E, 14.3.2013, 1–322 (‘EP Written Questions 
14.3.2013’) 
 
EP Written Questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given 




EP Written Questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given 
by a European Union institution, 2013/C 203 E/01, 17.07.2013 (‘EP Written Questions 
17.07.2013’) 
 
EP Written Questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given 
by a European Union institution, 2013/C 220 E/01, 1.8.2013 (‘EP Written Questions 
1.8.2013’) 
 
EP Written Questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given 
by a European Union institution, OJ C 228E, 7.8.2013, 1–297 (‘EP Written Questions 
7.8.2013’) 
 
EP Written Questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given 
by a European Union institution, 2013/C 340 E/01, 21.11.2013, 1-629 (‘EP Written 
Questions 21.11.2013’) 
 
EP Written Questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given 
by a European Union institution, OJ C 347E, 28.11.2013, 1–623 (‘EP Written Questions 
28.11.2013’) 
 
EP Written Questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given 
by a European Union institution, OJ C 40E, 11.2.2014, 1–636 (‘EP Written Questions 
11.2.2014’) 
 
EP Written Questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given 
by a European Union institution, 2014/C 41 E/01, 12.02.2014 (‘EP Written Questions 
12.02.2014’) 
 
EP Written Questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given 
by a European Union institution, OJ C 80E, 19.3.2014, 1–618 (‘EP Written Questions 
19.3.2014’) 
 
EP Written Questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given 
by a European Union institution, OJ C 206, 2.7.2014, 1–629 (‘EP Written Questions 
2.7.2014’) 
 
EP Written Questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given 
by a European Union institution, OJ C 229, 17.7.2014, 1-310 (‘EP Written Questions 
17.7.2014’) 
 
EP Written Questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given 
by a European Union institution, OJ C 279, 22.08.2014 (‘EP Written Questions 
22.08.2014’) 
 
EP Written Questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given 
by a European Union institution, OJ C 377, 23.10.2014, 1–277 (‘EP Written Questions 
23.10.2014’) 
 





Equalities Office (2008b) The Equality Bill – Government Response to the Consultation, 
Cm 7454 (London), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/238707/7454.pdf 
 
Equalities Office (2009) Equality Bill: Assessing the impact of a multiple discrimination 









Equality and Diversity Forum (2011) Refugees, Migrants and the Equality Act 2010: A 
Briefing for Public Authorities (London), https://www.equallyours.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/EDF-Briefing_Public-Authorities_Web_draft-32.pdf 
 
Erdal, Marta Bivand and Aleksandra Lewicki (2016) Moving citizens: citizenship practices 
among Polish migrants in Norway and the United Kingdom, Social Identities 22(1): 112-
28 
 
Erel, Umut (2007) Racism and anti-racism in Europe: a critical analysis of concepts and 
frameworks, Transfer 13(3): 359–75 
 
Erel, Umut, Karim Murji and Zaki Nahaboo (2016) Understanding the Contemporary 
Race–Migration Nexus, Ethnic and Racial Studies 39(8): 1339-60 
 
Essed, Philomena (1991) Understanding Everyday Racism: An Interdisciplinary Theory 
(London: SAGE) 
 
EU (European Union) (2014) How the European Union Works – Your Guide to the EU 
Institutions (Brussels), https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/ 
publication/ 9a6a89dc-4ed7-4bb9-a9f7-53d7f1fb1dae 
 




EUI (European University Institute) (1977) 1st Jean Monnet Lecture, Europe’s Present 
Challenge and Future Opportunity, 27 October   
 
EUI (1983) 6th Jean Monnet Lecture, Towards the European Union, 13 June   
 
EUI (1984) 7th Jean Monnet Lecture, European Union or Decline: To be or not to be, 24 May  
 
EUI (1985) 8th Jean Monnet Lecture, European Union: One Character in Search of an Author, 
23 November  
 
EUI (1986) 9th Jean Monnet Lecture, The Single Act and Europe: A Moment of Truth, 21 
November   
 
 277 
EUI (1990) 13th Monnet Lecture, The Crisis of the Societies in the East and the Return to a 
Common Europe, 23 November   
 
EUI (1992) 15th Jean Monnet Lecture, The Future of Europe, 5 November  
 
EUI (1995) 17th Jean Monnet Lecture, The European Union – A Stage of Transition, 10 
February 
 
EUI (1996) 19th Jean Monnet Lecture, The European Economy between Global Markets and 
Internal Challenges, 28 November 
 
EUI (2006) 25th Jean Monnet Lecture, Uniting in Peace: The Role of Law in the European Union, 
31 March  
 
EUMC (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia) (2002) Migrants, 
Minorities and Employment in the United Kingdom: Exclusion, Discrimination, and Anti-
Discrimination, RAXEN 3 Report by the Commission for Racial Equality (London) 
 
EUMC (2005) Racism and Xenophobia in the EU Member States - trends, developments 




EUMC (2005a) Activities of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 
Annual Report 2004/2005 – Part 1 (Luxembourg), 
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ar05p1en.pdf 
 
EUMC (2006) The Annual Report on the Situation regarding Racism and Xenophobia in 
the Member States of the EU, https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/85974a7d-a096-4146-8824-6832db92528f/language-en 
 
EU Observer (2003) Acceding states warned over slow take-up of rules, 1 May, 
https://euobserver.com/enlargement/11070 
 
EU Observer (2016) Poland to push for ‘radical’ new EU treaty, 28 June, 
https://euobserver.com/institutional/134070 
Eurobarometer (1986) Public Opinion in the European Community, December, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb26/eb26_en.pdf 
 
Eurobarometer (1991) Public Opinion in the EC, June, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb35/eb35_en.pdf 
 
Eurobarometer (1997) Opinion Poll no 47.1, First Results Presented at the Closing 
Conference of the European Year Against Racism, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_113_en.pdf 
 
Eurobarometer (1998) Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 8: Public Opinion about the 
European Union - Ten Countries’ Survey, March, https://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-
data-service/survey-series/central-eastern-eb/study-profiles/ce-eb-8/  
 




Eurobarometer (2003) Public Opinion in the EU, Spring, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb59/eb59_rapport_final_en.pdf 
 
Eurobarometer (2003a) Public Opinion in the European Union, Report No 58, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb58/eb58_en.pdf  
 




Eurobarometer (2004) Eurobarometer Spring 2004, Public Opinion in the European 
Union, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/eb61_en.pdf 
 
Eurobarometer (2007) Eurobarometer 67, Public Opinion in the European Union, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67_en.pdf 
 




Eurobarometer (2008) Special Eurobarometer 296: Discrimination in the European 
Union: Perceptions, Experiences and Attitudes, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/ 
publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_296_en.pdf 
 
Eurobarometer (2008a) Flash Eurobarometer 232: Discrimination in the European Union 
- Perceptions and experiences of discrimination in the areas of housing, healthcare, 
education, and when buying products or using services, http://ec.europa.eu 
/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/flash/fl_232_en.pdf 
 
Eurobarometer (2009) Special Eurobarometer 317: Discrimination in the EU in 2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_317_en.pdf 
 




Eurobarometer (2010a) Standard Eurobarometer 71, Future of Europe, http://ec.europa. 
eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb713_future_europe.pdf 
 
Eurobarometer (2011) Special Eurobarometer 75.1: The European Ombudsman, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2011/ombudsman/rapport_en.pdf 
(‘Special Eurobarometer 2011’) 
 
Eurobarometer (2011a) Special Eurobarometer: Internal market: Awareness, perceptions, 
and impacts, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ 
ebs/ebs_363_en.pdf (‘Special Eurobarometer 2011a’) 
 
Eurobarometer (2012) Special Eurobarometer 393: Discrimination in the EU in 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_393_en.pdf 
 








Eurobarometer (2015a) Special Eurobarometer 437: Discrimination in the EU in 2015, 
http://www.equineteurope.org/IMG/pdf/ebs_437_sum_en.pdf 
 
Eurobarometer (2018) Special Eurobarometer 471: Fairness, Inequality, and 
Intergenerational Mobility, https://observatoriodasdesigualdade.files.wordpress.com/ 
2018/04/fairness-inequality-and-intergenerational-mobility.pdf 
 




European Council (1993) Conclusions of the Presidency, Copenhagen, 21-22 June, 
Bulletin of the European Communities, No 6/1993, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/1443/1/Copenhagen_june_1993.pdf 
 
European Council (1997) Conclusions of the Presidency, Luxembourg, 12-13 December, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/43332/1/LUXEMBOURG_EUROPEAN_COUNCIL.pdf 
 
European Council (1999) Conclusions of the Presidency, Helsinki, 10-11 December, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/43338/1/Helsinki_1999.pdf  
 
European Council (2016) Presidency Conclusions, 18-19 February, EUCO 1/16, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21787/0216-euco-conclusions.pdf 
 
European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field (2006) European 
Anti-Discrimination Law Review, Issue 4, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/ 
files/lawrev4_en.pdf  
 
Eurostat (2004) News release: GDP per capita in new Member States ranges from 42% of 
EU25 average in Latvia to 83% in Cyprus, 3 June 2004, www.europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_STAT-04-73_en.pdf 
 
Eurostat (2012) Migration and migrant population statistics 2010 
 
Eurostat (2018) Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national 
level, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_gind&lang=en 
 
Evans, Rhonda and Terri E Givens (2010) Re-Engineering Legal Opportunity Structures 
in the European Union? The Starting Line Group and the Politics of the Racial Equality 
Directive, Journal of Common Market Studies 48(2): 221-41 
 
Explanatory Notes (2010) Equality Act 2010, Revised Edition (London), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpgaen_20100015_en.pdf 
 
Eze, Emmanuel C (ed) (2007) Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell) 
 
Fanon, Frantz (1988) Black Skin, White Masks (London: Pluto Press) 
 
 280 
Farage, Nigel (2016) Speech, UKIP Conference, Llandudno, 27 February, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35679384 
 
Farkas, Orsolya and Olga Rymkevitch (2004) Immigration and the Free Movement of 
Workers after Enlargement: Contrasting Choices, International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations 20(3): 369–97 
 
Favell, Adrian (2008) The new face of East-West migration in Europe, Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies 34(5): 701–16 
 
Favell, Adrian and Randall Hansen (2002) Markets against Politics: migration, EU 
enlargement and the idea of Europe, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28(4): 581-
601  
 
Fekete, Liz (2001) The Emergence of Xeno-Racism, Race and Class 43(2): 23-40 
 
Fekete, Liz (2009) A Suitable Enemy: Racism, Migration and Islamophobia in Europe 
(London: Pluto) 
 
Fekete, Liz and Frances Webber (1994) Inside Racist Europe (London: Institute of Race 
Relations) 
 
Fella, Stefano and Carlo Ruzza (eds) (2013) Anti-Racist Movements in the EU (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan) 
 
Fic, Tatiana et al (2011) Labour mobility within the EU - The impact of enlargement and 
the functioning of the transitional arrangements, Study commissioned by the Directorate-
General for Employment, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities (London: National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research), http://www.niesr.ac.uk/sites/default/files/ 
publications/050811_152043.pdf 
 
Fihel, Agnieszka et al (2015) Free movement of workers and transitional arrangements: 
lessons from the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (University of Warsaw: Centre of Migration 
Research), https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=14000&langId=en 
 
Filimonau, Viachaslau and Mirosław Mika (2017) Return labour migration: an exploratory 
study of Polish migrant workers from the UK hospitality industry, Current Issues in 
Tourism, DOI: 10.1080/13683500.2017.1280778 
 
Findlay, Allan and David McCollom (2011) Trends in A8 migration to the UK during the 
recession, Population Trends 145: 73-85 
 
Fine, Ben and Alfredo Saad-Filho (2010) Marx’s Capital (London: Pluto) 
 
Fitzpatrick, Peter (1987) Racism and the Innocence of Law, Journal of Law and Society 
14(1): 119-32 
 
Fitzpatrick, Peter (1992) The Mythology of Modern Law (New York: Routledge) 
 
Fitzpatrick, Peter (2001) Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge: CUP) 
 
Fitzpatrick, Peter (2003) ‘Gods would be needed . . . ’: American Empire and the Rule of 
(International) Law, Leiden Journal of International Law 16: 429–66 
 281 
Fitzpatrick, Peter (2013) The revolutionary past: Decolonizing Law and Human Rights, 
Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito 5(2): 97-105 
 
Fitzpatrick, Peter and James Bergeron (eds) (1998) Europe’s Other: European Law 
Between Modernity and Postmodernity (Ashgate: Aldershot) 
 
Flash Eurobarometer (2013) Flash Eurobarometer 365, February, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_365_en.pdf 
 
Ford, Robert (2011) Acceptable and Unacceptable Immigrants: How Opposition to 
Immigration in Britain is Affected by Migrants’ Region of Origin, Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 37(7): 1017-37 
 
Foster, John Bellamy et al (2011) The Global Reserve Army of Labor and the New 
Imperialism, Monthly Review 63(6): 1-25 
 
Foster, Laura (2014) The Making and Unmaking of Patent Ownership: Technicalities, 
Materialities, and Subjectivities, Political and Legal Anthropology Review 39(1): 127-43 
 
Foster, Nigel (2017) Foster on EU Law (Oxford: OUP) 
 
Fowler, Roger (1996) Linguistic Criticism (Oxford: OUP) 
 
Fox, Jon (2012) The Experience of East European Migrants in the UK Suggests That 
There is Racism Towards Newcomers Regardless of Racial Difference, LSE Blogs: 
European Politics and Policy, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/22/rascism-
migrants/ 
  
Fox, Jon (2013) The Uses of Racism: Whitewashing New Europeans in the UK, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 36(11): 1871–89 
 
Fox, Jon et al (2012a) The Racialization of the New European Migration to the UK, 
Sociology 46(4): 680-95 
 
Fox, Jon et al (2015) Denying Discrimination: Status, ‘Race’, and the Whitening of 
Britain's New Europeans, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41(5): 729–48 
 
FRA (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) (2007) Report on Racism and 
Xenophobia in the Member States of the EU (Vienna), https://fra.europa.eu/en/ 
publication/2011/annual-report-2007-report-racism-and-xenophobia-member-states-eu 
 
FRA (2009) EU-MIDIS: European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey: Main 
Results Report (Vienna), https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2012/european-union-
minorities-and-discrimination-survey-main-results-report 
 












FRA (2013) Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the 
situation of equality in the European Union 10 years on from initial implementation of the 
equality directives (Luxembourg), https://fra.europa.eu/en/opinion/2013/fra-opinion-
situation-equality-european-union-10-years-initial-implementation-equality 
 




FRA (2016) Fundamental Rights Report 2016 (Luxembourg), 
https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2016/fundamental-rights-report-2016 
 
FRA (2017) Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS 
II), https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/eumidis-ii-main-results 
 
FRA (2018) Making EU citizens’ rights a reality: national courts enforcing freedom of 
movement and related rights, August, https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/free-
movement 
 
FRA (2018b) Handbook on European non-discrimination law – 2018 edition, March, 
https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/handbook-european-law-non-discrimination 
 
France, Bridie (2017) Lost in Transition: Brexit & Labour Exploitation, Position Paper 
(London: Labour Exploitation Advisory Group), https://labourexploitation.org/ 
publications/lost-transition-brexit-labour-exploitation 
 
Frank, Andre Gunder (2006) The Soviet Union and Me, in Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro (ed) 
The European’s Burden: Global Imperialism in EU Expansion 97-126 (New York: Peter 
Lang) 
 
Frankenberg, Ruth (1993) White Women, Race Matters (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press) 
 
Frankenberg, Ruth (ed) (1997) Displacing Whiteness: Essays in Social and Cultural 
Criticism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press) 
 




Fredericks, Bronwyn (2009) The epistemology that maintains white race privilege, power 
and control of indigenous studies and indigenous peoples’ participation in universities, 
Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association eJournal 5(1): 1-12, 
https://eprints.qut.edu.au/26717/2/26717.pdf  
 
Fredman, Sandra (2001) Equality: A New Generation? Industrial Law Journal 30(2): 145–
68 
 
Fredman, Sandra (2011) Discrimination Law (Oxford: OUP) 
 283 
Fredman, Sandra and Sarah Spencer (eds) (2003) Age as an Equality Issue (Oxford: Hart) 
 
Freeman, Alan David (1978) Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, Minnesota Law 
Review 62(6): 1049-119  
 
Freeman, Alan David (1990) Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, Tulane Law 
Review 64(6): 1407-42  
 
French, Steve (2012) Beyond ESOL? Assessing the Propensity of East European Migrant 
Workers to Undertake Further and Higher Education, Research in Post-Compulsory 
Education 17(1): 125-42 
 
Gainer, Bernard (1972) The Alien Invasion: The Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905 
(London: Heinemann Educational Books) 
 
Galgóczi, Béla et al (2011) Intra-EU labour migration: flows, effects and policy responses, 




Garapich, Michał (2007) Odyssean Refugees, Migrants and Power – Construction of 
‘Other’ Within the Polish ‘Community’ in the UK, in Deborah Reed-Danahay and 
Caroline Brettel (eds) Immigration and Citizenship in Europe and the U.S.: 
Anthropological Perspectives (Rutgers University Press), https://www.surrey.ac.uk/ 
cronem/files/Odyssean_Reffuges_Migrants_and_Power.pdf 
 
Garapich, Michał (2008) The Migration Industry and Civil Society:  Polish Immigrants in 
the United Kingdom Before and After EU Enlargement, Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 34(5): 735-52 
 
Garapich, Michał (2012) Between cooperation and hostility – constructions of ethnicity 
and social class among Polish migrants in London, Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae 
Cracoviensis Studia Sociologica IV(2): 31-45 
 
Garapich, Michał (2016) Breaking borders, changing structures – transnationalism of 
migrants from Poland as anti-state resistance, Social Identities 22(1): 95-111 
 
García, San Juanita (2017) Bridging critical race theory and migration: Moving beyond 
assimilation theories, Sociology Compass 11(6): 1-10 
 
Garland, Jon and Neil Chakraborti (2006) ‘Race’, Space and Place: Examining Identity and 
Cultures of Exclusion in Rural England, Ethnicities 6(2): 159-77 
 
Garner, Steve (2003) Racism in the Irish Experience (London: Pluto) 
 
Garner, Steve (2006) The Uses of Whiteness:  What Sociologists Working on Europe Can 
Draw From US Research on Whiteness, Sociology 40(2): 257-75 
 
Garner, Steve (2007b) Whiteness: An Introduction (London: Routledge) 
 
Garner, Steve (2012) A Moral Economy of Whiteness: Behaviours, Belonging and 
Britishness, Ethnicities 12(4): 445-64 
 284 
Garner, Steve et al (2009) Sources of Resentment, and Perceptions of Ethnic Minorities 




Gazeta Współczesna (2003) Polska nie ma innej alternatywy wobec członkostwa w Unii 
Europejskiej [Poland has no Alternatives to EU Membership], 2 April  
 
Gazeta Wyborcza (2002) Unia Nasza [Our Union], 16 December  
 
Geddes, Andrew (2004) Britain, France, and EU Anti-Discrimination Policy: The 
Emergence of an EU Policy Paradigm, West European Politics 27(2): 334-53 
 
Geddes, Andrew and Virginie Guiraudon (2004) Britain, France, and EU Anti-
Discrimination Policy: The Emergence of an EU Policy Paradigm, West European Politics 
27(2): 334-53 
 
Genova, Elena (2017) ‘Between a rock and a hard place’: Bulgarian highly skilled migrants’ 
experiences of external and internal stereotypes in the context of the European crisis, 
National Identities 19(1): 33-51 
 
Gillborn, David (2005) Education policy as an act of white supremacy: whiteness, critical 
race theory and education reform, Journal of Education Policy 20(4): 485-505 
 
Gilpin, Nicola et al (2006) The Impact of Free Movement of Workers from Central and 
Eastern Europe on the UK Labour Market, Working Paper 29 (Leeds: Department of 
Work and Pensions), http://cream-migration.org/files/Working_paper_291.pdf 
 
Gilroy, Paul (2001) Joined-up Politics and Post-Colonial Melancholia, Theory, Culture & 
Society 18(2/3): 151–67 
 
Gilroy, Paul (2005) Postcolonial Melancholia (New York: Columbia University Press) 
 
Gilroy, Paul (2006) Multiculture in Times of War: An Inaugural Lecture Given at the 
London School of Economics, Critical Quarterly 48(4): 27–45 
 
Glasman, Maurice (1996) Unnecessary Suffering: Managing Market Utopia (London: 
Verso) 
 
Goldberg, David Theo (2006) Racial Europeanization, Ethnic and Racial Studies 29(2): 
331-64 
 
Goodwin, Matthew and Caitlin Milazzo (2017) Taking back control? Investigating the role 
of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit, The British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 19(3): 450–64 
 
Gorny, Agata and Agnieszka Fihel (2013) To settle or to leave again? Patterns of return 
migration to Poland during the transition period, Central and Eastern Migration Review 
2(1): 55-76 
 
Gozdiak, Elzbieta and Marek Pawlak (2016) Theorizing Polish Migration Across Europe: 
Perspectives, Concepts, and Methodologies, Nationalities Affairs 48: 106-27 
 
 285 
Grabowska-Lusinska, Izabela (2008) Migrations from Poland after 1 May 2004 with 
Special Focus on British Isles, Space, Populations, Societies 2008(2): 247-60 
 
Grabowska-Lusińska, Izabela and Marek Okólski (2008) Migracja z Polski po 1 maja 2004 
r.: jej intensywność i kierunki geograficzne oraz alokacja migrantów na rynkach pracy 
krajów Unii Europejskiej [Migration from Poland after 1 May 2004: Its intensity and 
geographical directions, and allocation of migrants on labour markets in EU states], 
Working Paper No 33/91(University of Warsaw: Centre of Migration Research), 
http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/033_91___.pdf 
 
Grahn-Farley, Maria (2008) Race and Class: More Than a Liberal Paradox, Buffalo Law 
Review 56(4): 935-52 
 
Grayson, John (2013) The rhetoric on migrants shows how politicians and the media have 
created, and embedded, racism in British politics, 22 August (London: Institute of Race 
Relations), http://www.irr.org.uk/news/the-shameful-go-home-campaign/#_edn15  
 
Gregory, Derek (2004) The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq (Malden, Mass: 
Blackwell)  
 
Griffiths, Clare E (2017) The disjuncture between confidence and cooperation: Police 
contact amongst Polish migrants and established residents, European Journal of 
Criminology 15(2): 197-216 
 
Groenendijk, Kees et al (2013) European Report on the Free Movement of Workers in 
Europe in 2011-2012 (EC, Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion), 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=10443&langId=en 
 
Groenendijk, Kees et al (2014) European Report on the Free Movement of Workers in 
Europe in 2012-2013 (EC, Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion), 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=13423&langId=en 
 
Grosfoguel, Ramon et al (2015) ‘Racism´, intersectionality and migration studies: framing 
some theoretical reflections, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 22(6): 635-52 
 
Grzymala-Kazlowska, Aleksandra (2017) From connecting to social anchoring: adaptation 
and ‘settlement’ of Polish migrants in the UK, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 
DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2017.1341713 
 
Guardian (2017) Home Office threatens to deport Polish man seeking help after attack, 6 
December  
 
Guinier, Lani and Gerald Torres (2002) The Miner’s Canary: Enlisting Race, Resisting 
Power, Transforming Democracy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press) 
 
Guiraudon, Virginie (2009) Equality in the making: implementing European 
non-discrimination law, Citizenship Studies 13(5): 527-49 
 
Guliyeva, Gulara (2014) Defining the Undefinable: A Definition of ‘Minority’ in EU Law, 
in Tove H Malloy and Joseph Marko (eds) Governance in and beyond Europe 165-98 
(Leiden: Brill Nujhoff) 
 
 286 
Halej, Julia Oktawia (2014) Other Whites, White Others: East European Migrants and the 
Boundaries of Whiteness, PhD Dissertation (UCL, School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies) 
 
Hallstein, Walter (1968) Speech before the Federal Council of the European Movement, 
20 January, Rome 
 
Hamman, Philippe and Cecile Frank (2015) The EU’s Racial Equality Directive and the 
Evolution of Discourse in the Field of the Fight Against Discrimination: A Comparison 
Between France, the UK and Spain, Sociological Research Online 20(2): 1-20, 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/20/2/1.html 
 
Hansen, Peo and Sandy Hager (2010) The Politics of European Citizenship: Deepening 
Contradictions in Social Rights and Migration Policy (New York: Berghahn Books) 
 
Hantrais, Linda (2007) Social Policy in the European Union (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan) 
 
Hardy, Jane and Ian Fitzgerald (2008) Cross Border Trade Union Collaboration in the 
Context of Competition and Arbitraging Labour in an Enlarged Europe, Paper Presented 




Harris, Angela P (1990) Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, Stanford Law 
Review 42: 581-616 
 
Harris, Angela P (ed) (2013) Race and Equality Law (Burlington, Vt: Ashgate) 
 
Harris, Katie (2013) Forced labour in the UK: ‘There was no escape. I lived every day in 
fear’, Guardian, 20 November 
 
Hartigan, John Jr (1999) Racial Situations: Class predicaments of Whiteness in Detroit 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press) 
 
Hayden, Jacqueline (1994) Poles Apart: Solidarity and the New Poland (Dublin: Irish 
Academic Press) 
 
Haylett, Chris (2001) Illegitimate subjects? Abject whites, neoliberal modernisation, and 
middle-class multiculturalism, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 19 (3): 351 
– 70 
 
Haynes, Michael (1998) European Union and Its Periphery: Inclusion and Exclusion, 
Economic and Political Weekly 33(35): 87-97 
 
Hayward, Keith and Majid Yar (2006) The ‘Chav’ phenomenon: consumption, media and 
the construction of a new underclass’, Crime, Media, Culture 2(1): 9-28 
 
Heath, Anthony and Sin Yi Cheung (2006) Ethnic Penalties in the Labour Market: 
Employers and Discrimination, Research Report No 341 (Leeds: Department of Works 




Heinze, Eric (2008) Truth and Myth in Critical Race Theory and LatCrit: Human Rights 
and the Ethnocentrism of Anti-Ethnocentrism, National Black Law Journal 20(2): 107-62 
 
Henrard, Kristin (2011) An EU Perspective on New versus Traditional Minorities: On 
Semi-Inclusive Socio-Economic Integration and Expanding Visions of ‘European’ Culture 
and Identity, Columbia Journal of European Law: 57-99 
 
Hepburn, Henry (2017) Eastern European pupils ‘more likely to experience racism’ after 
Brexit vote, Tes, 14 November 
 
Hepple, BA (1969) The British Race Relations Acts, 1965 and 1968, University of Toronto 
Law Journal 19(2): 248-57 
 
Hepple, Bob (2004) Race and Law in Fortress Europe, Modern Law Review 67(1): 1-15 
 
Hepple, Bob (2010) The New Single Equality Act in Britain, The Equal Rights Review 5: 
11-24 
 
Hepple, Bob (2014) Equality: The Legal Framework (Oxford: Hart) 
 
Hernandez-Truyol, Berta et al (2006) Beyond the First Decade: A Forward-Looking 
History of LatCrit Theory, Community and Praxis, Berkeley La Raza Law Journal 17(1): 
169-216 
 
Heuser, Annette (2001) No Second-Class EU Membership: Against the Restriction of the 
Freedom of Movement (Brussels: Bertelsmann Foundation) 
 
Hickman, Mary J et al (2005) The limitations of whiteness and the boundaries of 
Englishness, Ethnicities 5(2): 160-82 
 
Hills, John et al (eds) (2009) Towards a More Equal Society? Poverty, Inequality and Policy 
Since 1997 (Bristol: Policy Press) 
 
Hipfl, Brigitte and Daniela Gronold (2011) Asylum seekers as Austria’s other: The re-
emergence of Austria’s colonial past in a state-of-exception, Social Identities 17(1): 27-40 
 
HM Gov’t (2005) Controlling Our Borders: Making Migration Work for Britain – Five 
Year Strategy for Asylum and Immigration, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/251091/6472.pdf 
 




HMICFRS (HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services) (2018) 








HMRC (2016) How to do a compliance check: starting a compliance check: case selection, 
CH206200 in HMRC Compliance Handbook, 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/Manuals/chmanual/CH206200.htm 
 
HMRC (2016b) Statistics on recently arrived non-UK EEA nationals subject to income 





Hobsbawm, Eric and T Ranger (eds) (1983) The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: 
CUP) 
 
Hofbauer, Hannes (2006) EU Enlargement: Political Recognition of an Economic 
Process, in Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro (ed) The European’s Burden: Global Imperialism in 
EU Expansion 53-70 (New York: Peter Lang) 
 
Höfer, Peter et al (2012) Forty years of increasing suicide mortality in Poland: 
Undercounting amidst a hanging epidemic?, BMC Public Health 12: 644-53 
 
Home Office (1965) Command Paper 2739, Immigration from the Commonwealth, 
August (London) 
 
Home Office (1975) Command Paper 6234: on Racial Discrimination (London) 
 
Home Office (2005) Integration Matters: A National Refugee Strategy (London) 
 




Home Office (2017) Hate crime, England and Wales, 2016 to 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2016-to-2017 
 








Hood, Roger (1992) Race and Sentencing (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
 
hooks, bell (1982) Ain’t I A Woman? Black Women and Feminism (London: Pluto Press) 
 
Horridge, Mark and Bartlomiej Rokicki (2018) The impact of European Union accession 
on regional income convergence within the Visegrad countries, Regional Studies 52(4): 
503-15 
 
Howard, Erica (2004) The EU Race Directive: Its Symbolic Value – Its Only Value?, 
International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 6: 141-63 
 
 289 
Howard, Erica (2008) The European Year of Equal Opportunities for All—2007: Is the 
EU Moving Away From a Formal Idea of Equality?, European Law Journal 14(2): 168–85 
 
Howard, Erica (2009) The EU Race Directive: Developing the Protection against Racial 
Discrimination within the EU (London: Routledge) 
 
Howard, Erica (2009a) Equality: A Fundamental Right in the European Union?, 
International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 10: 19-38 
 
Hucker, John (1975) The House of Lords and the Race Relations Act: A Comment on 
Ealing v. Race Relations Board, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 24(2): 284-
304 
 
Hunter, Rosemary (ed) (2008) Rethinking Equality Projects in Law: Feminist Challenges 
(Oxford: Hart) 
 
Hylton, Kevin (2009) ‘Race’ and Sport: Critical Race Theory (London: Routledge) 
 
ICF GHK (2013b) A fact finding analysis on the impact on the Member States’ social 
security systems of the entitlements of non-active intra-EU movers to special non-
contributory cash benefits and healthcare granted on the basis of residence, Final report, 
14 October, https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ 
c6de1d0a-2a5b-4e03-9efb-ed522e6a27f5 
 
Ignatiev, Noel (2008) How the Irish Became White (New York: Routledge) 
 
Inglis, Kirstyn (2004) The Union’s Fifth Accession Treaty: New Means to Make 
Enlargement Possible, Common Market Law Review 41(4): 937-73 
 
Ipsos MORI (2007) Immigration Poll, 2 November, https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-
mori/en-uk/immigration-poll 
 
Ironmonger, Ian (2018) EU rough sleepers win damages for illegal deportations, BBC 
News, 13 May 
 
Jackson, Peter (1992) The racialization of labour in post-war Bradford, Journal of 
Historical Geography 18(2): 190-209 
 
Jacobson, Matthew F (1998) Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and 
the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press)  
 
Jasiewicz, Krzysztof (2004) Knocking on Europe’s Door: Voting Behavior in the EU 
Accession Referendum in Poland, Problems of Post-Communism 51(5): 34-44 
 
Jedlicki, Jerzy (2005) East-European Historical Bequest en Route to an Enlarged Europe, 
in Klaus Eder and W Spohn (eds) Collective Memory and European Identity: The Effects 
of Integration and European Identity 37-48 (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate) 
 
Jefferys, Steve (2007) Why do unions find fighting workplace racism difficult?, Transfer 
13(3): 377–91 
 
Jefferys, Steve (2015) The Context to Challenging Discrimination Against Ethnic 
Minorities and Migrant Workers at Work, Transfer 21(1): 9-22 
 290 
Jessoula, Matteo et al (2014) The Europe 2020 Anti-Poverty Arena (Milan: COPE), 
http://cope-research.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/COPE_Deliverable-4.7.pdf 
 
Jiang, Zhe (2013) Collective mobilisations among immigrant workers in low-skilled 
sectors: a study of community organising of immigrant workers in the UK, PhD Thesis, 
(Loughborough University: Business Faculty) 
 
Jileva, Elena (2002) Visa and free movement of labour: the uneven imposition of the EU 
acquis on the accession states, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28(4): 683-700  
 
Jileva, Elena (2004) Do norms matter? The principle of solidarity and the EU’s eastern 
enlargement, Journal of International Relations and Development 7(1): 3-23 
 
Jo, Sam-Sang (2007) European Myths: Resolving the Crises in the European Community/ 
European Union (Lanham, MD: University Press of America) 
 
Johns, Michael (2013) Post-Accession Polish Migration in Ireland and Britain: Challenges 
and Obstacles to Integration in the European Union, European Journal of Migration and 
Law 15: 29-45 
 
Johns, Michael (2013b) The Long-Term Future of Polish Migrants in Ireland and Britain, 
in Willem Maas (ed) Democratic Citizenship and the Free Movement of People 91-113 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff) 
 
Johns, Michael (2013c) Under-Appreciated, Under-Employed and Potentially Unwelcome: 
The Long-Term Future of Polish Migrants in Ireland and Britain, in Willem Maas (ed) 
Democratic Citizenship and the Free Movement of People (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff) 
 
Johns, Michael (2014) The New Minorities of Europe: Social Cohesion in the European 
Union (Lanham: Lexington Books) 
 
Johnson, Kevin (2004) The “huddled masses” myth: Immigration and civil rights 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press) 
 
Johnston, Ron et al (2015) East versus West? Over-qualification and Earnings among the 
UK’s European Migrants, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41(2): 196–218 
 
Johnstone, Chris (2007) Nine More Countries Tear Down Their Walls, Edmonton 
Journal, 21 December, E7 
 
Jones, Erik (2010) The Economic Mythology of European Integration, Journal of 
Common Market Studies 48(1): 89-109 
 
Jones, Katharine (2014) It Was a Whirlwind. A Lot of People Made a Lot of Money: The 
Role of Agencies in Facilitating Migration from Poland into the UK between 2004 and 
2008, Central and Eastern European Migration Review 3(2): 105–25 
 
Jones, Owen (2011) Chavs: The Demonisation of the Working Class in Britain (London: 
Verso) 
 
Jonsson, Stefan and Peo Hansen (2018) European Integration as a Colonial Project, in 
Olivia U Rutazibwa and Robbie Shilliam (eds) Routledge Handbook of Postcolonial 
Politics vol 1: 32-47 (London: Routledge) 
 291 
Jordan, Bill and Franck Duvell (2002) Irregular migration – the dilemmas of transnational 
mobility (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) 
 
Jovanovic, Miroslav (2004) Eastern Enlargement of the EU: a Topsy-Turvy Endgame or 
Permanent Disillusionment, Journal of Economic Integration 19(4): 830-68 
 
Kahanec, Martin and Mariola Pytliková (2017) The economic impact of east–west 
migration on the European Union, Empirica 44(3): 407-34 
 
Kahanec, Martin et al (2009) Lessons from Migration after EU Enlargement, in Martin 
Kahanec and Klaus Zimmermann, EU Labor Markets after Post-Enlargement Migration 
3-45 (Berlin: Springer Verlag)  
 
Kahn, Jean (1995) European Council Consultative Committee on Racism and 
Xenophobia, Final Report, 23 May (Brussels: General Secretariat of the Council of the 
European Union), http://aei.pitt.edu/1588/1/Kahn_report.pdf 
 
Karaszewska, Hanna (2012) Wynagrodzenie Gigantow Polskiej Gospodarki po Akcesji to 
UE [Rewards to Giants of the Polish Economy After Accession to the EU], Acta 
Universitatis Nicolai Copernici. Nauki Humanistyczno-Spoleczne. Ekonomia 2012: 23-35 
 
Karolak, Mateusz (2016) From Potential to Actual Social Remittances? Exploring How 
Polish Return Migrants Cope with Difficult Employment Conditions Central and Eastern 
European, Migration Review 5(2): 21-39 
 
Kaufmann, Eric P (ed) (2004) Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant 
Minorities (London: Routledge) 
 
Kaufmann, Eric P (2016) It’s NOT the economy, stupid: Brexit as a story of personal 
values, 7 July, LSE British Politics and Policy Blog, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ 
politicsandpolicy/personal-values-brexit-vote/ 
 
Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, Elżbieta (2004) Financial Conditions of Poland’s Accession to 
the European Union, in Ewa Synowiec, Poland in the European Union 13-36 (Warsaw) 
 
Keereman, Filip and Istvan Szekely (eds) (2009) Five Years of an Enlarged EU: A Positive 
Sum Game (Berlin: Springer) 
 
Kennedy, Duncan (2014) Left Theory and Left Practice: A Memoir in the Form of a 
Speech, Transnational Legal Theory 5(4): 577-95 
 
Kennedy, Steven (2011) EEA Nationals: the ‘right to reside’ requirement for benefits, 
House of Commons, Standard Note SN/SP/5972, http://researchbriefings.files. 
parliament.uk/documents/SN05972/SN05972.pdf 
 
Kentish, Benjamin (2017) Oxfordshire fishery facing legal action over ‘NO Eastern 
Europeans’ sign, Independent, 19 December 
 
Kerner, Ina (2018) Postcolonial theories as global critical theories, Constellations 25: 614–
28 
 
King, Desmond (2002) Making Americans: Immigration, Race, and the Origins of the 
Diverse Democracy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press) 
 292 
Kinnvall, Catarina (2016) The Postcolonial has Moved into Europe: Bordering, Security 
and Ethno-Cultural Belonging, Journal of Common Market Studies 54(1): 152–68 
 
Kiossev, Alexander (1995) Notes on self-colonising cultures, in Dimitŭr Ginev et al, 
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Appendix 1: Empirical Evidence of CEE Movers’ Inequalities and Exploitation in the UK 
 
 
Study and Findings Methodology 
 
 
(A) CEE Movers Collectively 
 
 
Anderson et al (2008): 
 
occupational attainment: manufacturing (32%, especially 
in food processing and packaging), hospitality (24%), 
transportation, storage and communication (11%), and 
health and social work (10%, especially as care assistants) 
 
employment agencies: 21% working for an agency 
(including 51% of workers in manufacturing, 20% in 
transport, and 10% in hospitality) 
 
working with co-ethnics: 25% estimated 10-25% of their 
co-workers to be of their nationality; 24% estimated it to 
be 26%-50%; those working for agencies more likely to 
report that more than 50% of their co-workers were co-
nationals; working with more than 50% co-nationals 
most prevalent in agriculture, transport, and 
manufacturing  
 
earnings: majority working for very low wages; 3% 
earning over £10 an hour; 12% earning below the 
minimum wage 
 
exploitation at work: 24% had no written contract 
(including 32% of agency workers); good written terms 
often not honoured (e.g., worse pay, unpaid breaks, and 
overcrowded overpriced accommodation); some 
dismissed when they asked for a written contract; 26% 
reported pay issues (e.g., not being paid for the hours 
worked, not being paid at all for overtime, errors in 
calculations, discrepancies between pay and timesheets, 
unauthorised deductions, lateness of pay, and being asked 
to pay advance fees to secure jobs); 8% reported 
problems with working conditions (e.g., poor working 
conditions, high intensity of work, aggression, bullying, 
harassment) 
 
tied accommodation730: 31% living in accommodation 
found or provided by employer (some forced into it); 
particularly prevalent in agriculture, hospitality, 
manufacturing (especially food processing), and health 
and social work; 40% of those working 48-60 hours a 
mail survey of Polish and 
Lithuanian WRS applicants 
in 2005-6:  
 
463 Polish and 45 
Lithuanian respondents  
 




                                                      
730 Provided or arranged by employer, and available only while employed by that particular employer. 
731 Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. 
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week living in employer accommodation; often 
overpriced, and in poor condition; appears to be a link 
between tied accommodation, below minimum wage pay, 
and excessive work hours 
 
Barslund and Busse (2014): 
 
overqualification: CEE and A-2 workers’ rate of return in 
grade and salary to education among the lowest in the 
labour market; in 2010, UK and EU-14 nationals 
employed mainly as white-collar workers (56% and 64%), 
while 82% of CEE and 79% of A-2 nationals as blue-
collar workers; 64% of CEE workers with tertiary 
education in blue-collar jobs  
 
earnings: in 2013, EU-14 nationals earned £618 per 
week; CEE nationals £367 
 
occupational attainment: 41% of EU-14 and 9% of CEE 
workers in 2013 in the two highest occupational 
categories (managers, directors and senior officials, and 
professional occupations) 
 
Labour Force Survey (‘LFS’) 
2010, 2013 
 
comparison groups: CEE; 
A-2; EU-14; UK 
Ciupijus (2012c); Ciupijus (2012b): 
 
respondents’ description of their employer: ‘labour 
camp’; management’s attitude towards workers 
‘inhuman’; treats people ‘like dogs’ (Ciupijus 2012c) 
 
exploitation at work: long work hours (many leaving 
home at 4am and returning at 8pm, and working during 
weekends); frequent commands from managers to work 
faster; being assigned shifts without prior consultation 
(including at plants in Germany and Belgium); abusive 
language and insults by supervisors; retaliation when 
speaking up (e.g., dismissal, and ceasing overtime or 
holiday pay); no written contracts; pitting non-EU 
migrants against Polish workers; extortion (demanding 
cash payments in return for job offers or promotions) 
 
Ciupijus 2012c: in-depth 
biographical interviews of 6 
CEE workers (Polish, 
Estonian, and Latvian) 
employed at a glass 
repackaging company732 in a 
medium sized city in 
Yorkshire (2009-10) 
 
Ciupijus 2012b: qualitative 
ethnographic fieldwork in 
2009-10 in three cities in 
Yorkshire: 
(1) 18 biographic interviews 
with movers from Poland, 
Latvia, and Slovakia; 
(2) focus groups with 24 
participants from Poland 
and Estonia, and 6 from 




representatives of social 
support agencies and trade 
unions; and   
(4) non-participant 
observations in CEE 
                                                      
732 Employing mostly Polish, other CEE, and non-EU migrants. 
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community centres, CEE 
grocery shops, and a 
Catholic Church  
 
Cook et al (2010): 
 
deskilling: majority of CEE participants employed 
significantly below their skill levels and abilities; 
concentrated in largely unskilled sectors and doing 
unpopular low-paid work (routinely populated by CEE 
movers and/or workers from BAME communities) 
 
career prospects: despite their interest in improving their 
language skills, CEE workers’ ability to attend classes 
severely constrained due to their need to work long shifts 
and overtime (given their low wages); employers’ 
unwillingness to recognise qualifications and work 
experience attained in CEE countries; employers’ attitude 




qualitative study in a major 
northern English city in 
2008: 
(1) group interviews of 31 
CEE movers (including 17 
Poles);  
(2) interviews with 10 key 
informants (who recruited, 
employed or acted as 
community support workers 
for CEE migrants); 
(3) 4 focus groups with 
members of established 
West Indian, Pakistani, and 
white British local 
communities; and 
(4) 3 focus groups with 
agencies involved in the 
provision and/or 
administration of local 
public services (City Council 
services, primary care trusts, 
housing providers, and 
schools) 
 
Drinkwater et al (2009): 
 
occupational attainment: during 2004-06, CEE workers 
predominantly took up low-skill jobs (unlike non-EU and 
EU-14 workers, who had patterns similar to British 
workers); 33% of CEE workers employed in business, 
management and administration sectors, 20% in 
hospitality and catering, 10% in agriculture, and 25% in 
process operatives; 75% of CEE workers in semi-routine 
and routine occupations; 63% of workers from English 
Speaking Countries in professional ⁄ managerial jobs, 
compared to 42% of EU-14, and 10% of CEE workers 
 
comparison to pre-04 arrivals: larger proportion from 
earlier CEE cohorts (2000-03) in high or intermediate 
occupations; CEE workers arriving after 2004 earn 24% 
less than those arriving before 1980; CEE migrants 
arriving immediately prior to enlargement have similar 
characteristics and labour market outcomes as those after 
2004 
  
earnings: in 2004-06, CEE movers earned £6 an hour, 
which is 30% less than EU-14 and British workers, 32% 
less than those from English Speaking Countries, and 
LFS (2001-06); WRS (2004-
6)  
 
quantitative: equations for 
earnings and return to 
education 
 
comparison groups: Polish; 
other CEE; Other 
Europeans (EU-14); English 
Speaking Countries (South 
Africa, USA, Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and 
the Caribbean); Other 
Countries (including India, 
Pakistan, and Zimbabwe); 
British (all ethnicities) 
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17% less than migrants from the rest of the world; when 
controlling for industry and other employment 
characteristics, CEE workers earned 21% less than EU-
14 workers, and 28% less than those from English 
Speaking Countries 
 
Eade et al (2007): 
 
earnings: CEE movers earn on average £6 an hour, EU-
14 workers £10.52 
 
occupational attainment: 75% of CEE movers employed 
in semi-routine and routine jobs; 68% of English 
Speaking Countries, 42% EU-14, and 10% CEE workers 
had professional/managerial jobs; higher proportions of 
pre-2000 CEE cohorts than post-04 CEE movers in high 
level or intermediate/skilled occupations 
 
mixed methods: 
(1) quantitative: LFS 2004-
06, Census 2001-06, WRS 
2004-06 (analysed using 
standard labour economics 
techniques, including wage 
equations); and 
(2) qualitative: 50 in-depth 
interviews and participant 
observations of Poles in 
London (analysed using 
Envivo) 
 
comparison groups: Polish; 
CEE; EU-14; British; 




housing: 70% of those renting privately expressed 
concerns (e.g., poor quality, lack of necessary repairs, 
overcrowding, and non-return of deposit) 
 
exploitation at work: 40% faced serious work-related 
issues - especially exploitation (21%), withholding of 
wages (11%), abuse in the workplace (7%), and unfair 
dismissal (5%); 50% reported other (less serious) issues; 
30% put up with work issues, and 27% felt unable to take 
any action other than leaving 
 
earnings: 20% ‘struggling’ or ‘really struggling’ on their 
current income; 30% have faced a financial crisis since 
they have been in the UK (that is, lacked money for food, 
medicines, bills, and other essentials) 
 
qualitative study in 2013 in 
London:  
(1) peer-led survey of 455 
CEE nationals; and  
(2) 57 CEE participants in 




occupational attainment: most CEE workers in low-skill, 
low-wage jobs, which do not match their relatively high 
qualification levels 
 
employment agencies: most CEE workers secure jobs 
through employment agencies 
mixed methods:  
(1) labour market data - 
Nomis733 (2009), LFS and 
WRS (2004-09);  
(2) survey of 103 CEE and 
A-2 respondents (83% 
Polish734) in 2009-10; and  
                                                      
733 ONS service, which compiles labour market statistics from official sources. See: 
http://www.nomisweb.co.uk. 
734 Followed by Latvians (7.8%), with the other participants being Czech, Slovakian, Slovenian, Hungarian, 
Romanian, Bulgarian, and Russian, in that order. 
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career prospects: although CEE workers desire to 
improve their socio-economic position through further 
study (including language classes) and by seeking better 
jobs, many are constrained from doing so - due to long 
working hours; lacking awareness of career opportunities; 
unavailability of further education; lack of recognition or 
accreditation of existing skills; employers’ and 
employment agencies’ assumptions about suitable 
‘migrant jobs’; and employers’ failure to assess their 
training needs and to provide them with training 
 
(3) semi-structured 
interviews with 15 CEE 
respondents (14 Poles, 1 
Latvian) in 2009-10  
 
all data from Derby and 
East Staffordshire 
 
quantitative survey analysis: 
aggregate data; statistical 
(chi-square) tests 
 
Johnston et al (2015): 
 
occupational attainment: CEE+A-2 men and women 
concentrated in skilled trades, routine industrial roles, and 
elementary occupations, more so than EU-14 workers 
and white Britons; EU-14 males five times more likely 
than CEE+A-2 males in managerial or professional jobs; 
CEE+A-2 females more than twice as likely than EU-14 
and British females in personal service or elementary 
occupations 
 
overqualification: CEE+A-2 workers suffer much greater 
overqualification penalty than EU-14 workers and white 
Britons; 30% CEE+A-2 males overqualified, compared 
to 20% of EU-14 and 25% white British men; 45% of 
CEE+A-2 women overqualified, compared to 22% of 
EU-14 females  
 
earnings: EU-14 workers paid significantly more than 
Britons, whereas CEE+A-2 paid significantly less; EU-14 
males earned more than twice as much as CEE+A-2 
men, and £3.50 per hour more than white British men; 
same ordering for women (EU-14 women earned most, 




comparison groups: white 
British; EU-14; CEE+A-2  
 
overall sample size: 448,584 
individuals  
 
quantitative: equations to 
measure overqualification 




Kofman et al (2009): 
 
occupational attainment: in 2006, 28% of UK nationals in 
managerial and professional groups, compared to 21% of 
Bangladeshis, 9% of Poles, 12% of Portuguese, and no 
Somalis; 28% of UK nationals in process, plant and 
machine operating jobs or elementary occupations, 
compared to 5% of Australians, 33% of Bangladeshis, 
56% of Poles, 54% of Portuguese, and 52% of Somalis 
 
review of: 
 (1) statistical data (including 
Census, APS737, LFS, IPS738, 
NiNo739, WRS, work 
permits, English House 
Condition Survey, CORE740, 
and local authorities’ data 
on housing and crime); and  
                                                      
735 Although differences less substantial for women than men. 
737 APS combines data from the LFS and national boosts from the English Local Labour Force Survey, The 
Welsh Labour Force Survey, and the Scottish Labour Force Survey. 
738 International Passenger Survey. 
739 National Insurance numbers. 
740 Continuous Recording System on Social Housing. 
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exploitation at work: considerable evidence of CEE 
workers’ facing poor conditions, unfair treatment, and 
workplace harassment (e.g., lower wages than other 
groups, required payments to secure jobs, illegal or 
excessive deductions by gangmasters, name-calling and 
racial harassment by supervisors and co-workers); those 
employed by agencies (especially common in cleaning, 
health, hospitality and manufacturing) exploited even 
more   
 
housing: much anecdotal evidence of widespread 
discrimination against CEE housing applicants (e.g., 
being turned away by local housing authorities; poor 
treatment and discrimination by estate agents; excessive 
rent levels; and poor quality of accommodation); in 2004-
07, 35% of CEE nationals’ applications to local 
authorities for homelessness assistance accepted, 
compared to 47% of all applications nationally 
 
overqualification: in 2006, 40% of CEE workers at NVQ 
levels 4 or 5736, compared to 25% of UK workers; local 
studies in 2007 found that 70% of CEE workers were 
not making use of their skills, and that highly educated 
Poles were more likely than those with vocational 
qualifications to be working in elementary occupations 
(such as cleaning) 
 
harassment and violence: mounting evidence of racial 
harassment against all new migrants, but especially 
against CEE movers; the public often does not 
distinguish between refugees, asylum seekers, and 
migrant workers  
 
earnings: in 2005-6, Americans (£17.10), Canadians 
(£15.60) and Australians (£15.20) earned the most, UK-
born population earned £11.10, and those born in the 
Philippines (£8.30), Turkey (£8.20), Portugal (£8.10), 
Somalia (£7.90), and Poland (£7.30) the least  
 
 (2) more than 100 
qualitative and quantitative 
studies  
 
most data from 2004-08, 
although some stretching 
back to 1980s 
 
comparison groups: British 
and varied migrant groups, 
depending on the source 
MacKenzie and Forde (2009); MacKenzie and Forde 
(2009a): 
 
exploitation at work: 52% reported unauthorised 
deductions from wages for uniform; 17% unauthorised 
deductions for employer-provided travel coach; 4% 
difficulties getting paid; 4% poor treatment from 
supervisors; 80% employees sent to work off-site at client 
or other sites 
mixed-methods case study 
of a Yorkshire glass 
packaging plant employing 
large numbers of Polish (as 
well as Baltic) workers741, in 
2005-6: 
(1) interviews with 
managing director, general 
manager, training manager, 
                                                      
736 National Vocational Qualification Level 4 includes certificate of higher education, and advanced 
professional awards, certificates or diplomas. NVQ Level 5 includes postgraduate and fellowship diplomas, 
and master’s and doctorate degrees. 
741 At the time of research, 90% of the 200+ employees were migrants, the majority from CEE States 
(mostly from Poland). 
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deskilling: many had extensive experience in semi-skilled 
and skilled occupations in their home countries 
 
earnings: 78% paid minimum wage, and 6% paid less 
than the minimum wage, with no opportunity for 
progression 
 
work hours: 40% worked more than 48 hours per week 
 
employer’s attitudes: CEE workers praised for strong 
‘work ethic’ (willingness to work hard and 24/7, and to 
follow instructions and last-minute scheduling without 
complaining) and for their willingness to work at a low 
pay rate; contacted employment agencies in CEE states 
to establish a regular supply of labour 
 
10 employees (from Poland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
Albania, and Portugal), and 
trade union representatives; 
and 
(2) 38 survey questionnaire 
responses from employees  
ONS (2016): 
 
occupational attainment: highest proportion of CEE 
nationals worked in the wholesale and retail trade, hotels 
and restaurants sector (26%), and in manufacturing 
sector (22%); British, EU-14, and non-EU nationals most 
likely to work in professional occupations (21%, 30% and 
26%); CEE nationals most likely to work in lower-skilled 
occupations, with 51% employed in the process, plant 
and machine operatives or elementary occupations; the 
lowest proportion of CEE and EU-2 nationals worked as 
managers, directors and senior officials (3% and 4%); 
37% of EU-14 nationals and 8% of CEE nationals 
employed in high-skill jobs; 69% of CEE nationals and 
61% of EU-2 nationals employed in low- or lower-
middle skilled jobs, compared to 50% of workers from 
the UK, EU-14, and non-EU countries 
 
overqualification: 15% of UK nationals employed in jobs 
they were overeducated for, compared to 37% of EU-14, 
EU-2, and non-EU nationals, and 40% of CEE nationals 
 
work hours: 50% of CEE nationals and 61% of EU-2 
nationals work more than 40 hours per week, compared 
to 32% of UK nationals 
 
earnings: compared to the national median earnings 
(£11.30 per hour), EU-14 nationals earned the most 
(£12.59), whereas CEE and EU-2 the least (£8.33); UK 
nationals earned £11.53, non-EU nationals £10.97, and 




comparison groups: CEE; 
British; EU-14; EU-2; non-
EU; EU Other (Cyprus, 
Malta, and Croatia)  
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Pemberton and Stevens (2010): 
 
employers’ attitudes: believe that CEE workers and those 
from countries that were not part of the Commonwealth 
do not understand cultural practices and social norms 
associated with the care sector; view CEE workers as 
flexible (e.g., willing to work unpopular shifts); do not try 
to retain or promote CEE workers because assume that 
are short-term only (especially if overqualified)  
 
employment agencies: some encourage employers to 
adopt poor practices in respect of CEE employees (e.g., 
deduction from wages for tied housing; working 60-70 
hrs per week; and lower pay than other staff); many make 
false promises to CEE workers, to a significantly greater 
extent than to non-EU workers (especially about free 
accommodation; choosing work hours; and matching 
jobs with skills and experiences) 
 
case study of adult social 
care sector742 in the North 
West of England in 2008: 
(1) 14 in-depth, face-to-face 
structured interviews with 
employers; 
(2) 45 semi-structured 
interviews with employers; 
and 
(3) 11 semi-structured in-
depth interviews  
with CEE workers (10 
Poles, 1 Lithuanian) 
 
Sime et al (2017): 
 
racism: most had experienced or witnessed racist 
incidents since the Brexit referendum; 49% had seen 
‘more racism’ since the referendum, while 23.5% had 
seen ‘about the same amount’; 77% reported that they 
had experienced racism because of their nationality, 
accent or the way they look; for 19%, racist experiences 
happen ‘often’ or ‘very often’; incidents ranged from 
‘everyday racism’ (e.g., name calling; jokes) to physical 
attacks and damage to homes or property, and included 
online and face-to-face attacks (at schools, public 
transport, parks, and shops) 
 
online survey across 
England and Scotland in 
urban and rural areas in 
2016-7: 
- 1120 CEE youth (aged 12-
18) who migrated after 2004 
and have lived in the UK 
for at least 3 years 
(respondents - 56% Polish, 
10% Romanian, 9% 
Lithuanian) 
Sirkeci et al (2018): 
 
occupational attainment: on average (during 2005-12), 
10% of white Britons in elementary occupations, 
compared to 40% of CEE workers, and 18% of 
Bangladeshis, and Black African and other black workers; 
30% of white Britons at the top occupational level 
(managers, senior officials and professional occupations), 
compared to 8% of CEE; 5% of CEE workers at 
associate professional and technical occupations, 
compared to the average for all ethnic groups three times 
higher 
 
overqualification: during all years 2005-12, CEE workers 
consistently overqualified compared to white Britons and 
other migrant and minority groups (indicates long-term 
patterns of overqualification); CEE, and Black African 
and other black groups more likely significantly 
APS 2005-12 
 
comparison groups: white 
British; CEE; white EU-14; 
mixed; Black Caribbean; 
Indian; Pakistani; 
Bangladeshi; Black African 
and other black; Other 
 
sample size per year: 
between 78,000 (including 
636 CEE) in 2011, and 
179,000 (including 2,095 
CEE) in 2008 
 
quantitative: same equation 
formulas as Johnston et al 
2015; regression analysis 
                                                      
742 Domiciliary care, community-based support services and nursing, and residential and care homes. 
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overqualified compared to white Britons; Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis also more likely overqualified than white 
Britons (albeit Pakistani men only in 2012, and 
Bangladeshi women only in 2007 and 2012); Indians not 
overqualified compared to white Britons; CEE workers 
suffered greater disadvantages than other minority 
groups (surpassed only by Bangladeshis in 2007 and 





Sumption and Sommerville (2010): 
 
occupational attainment: CEE movers work in less 
skilled occupations than other immigrant groups; in 2008, 
more than 50% of CEE workers in unskilled 
occupations743, compared to 20% of other immigrants744 
and 18% of Britons 
 
earnings: when controlling for individual characteristics 
including education, recent CEE movers earn the least of 
any immigrant group; during 2004-09, CEE movers 
earned 12.5% less than Britons, while non-EU 
immigrants and EU-14 workers earned more than British 
workers; in 2007, 89% of CEE and A-2 workers earned 
less than £400 per week, compared to 57% of Britons; 
recent Pakistani immigrants have wages similar to British 
workers 
 
return on education: CEE workers have lower return on 
education than other immigrants, with less differentiation 
in wages between those with more education and those 
with less; while Britons earn 10% more if they complete 
one additional year of education, CEE workers gain 
1.1%, Australasians gain 4.9%, Americans and Canadians 
gain 2.8%, and immigrants from Africa gain 1.5% 
 
recruitment agencies: CEE workers substantially more 
likely to use private employment agencies than other 
immigrants or British workers; in 2004-08, half of WRS 
registrants were working for staffing agencies; for some 
large food-processing employers, agencies are the only 
route into employment; 26% of CEE workers recruited 
in 2005-6 and 16% of CEE workers recruited in 2007-8 
found their jobs through agencies  
 
exploitation at work: widespread evidence, typically 
qualitative, of CEE workers’ exploitation (especially 
failure to pay wages; failure to pay the minimum wage; 
disproportionate wage deductions for employer-provided 
housing; and dangerous or unhealthy working conditions) 
 
review of: 
(1) LFS, WRS, other 
government data; and  
(2) related literature, 




comparison groups: British 
and varied migrant groups, 
depending on the source 
                                                      
743 Including process, plant and machine operatives; assemblers; construction workers; transport and 
machine drivers; other labourers; porters; bar and restaurant staff; and cleaners. 
744 Based on countries of origin as reported in the LFS. 
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career prospects: very limited for CEE workers (due to 
lack of support networks; lack of access to information; 
being overrepresented in jobs with limited career 
prospects; high reliance on social contacts to find work; 
and tending to work alongside fellow co-ethnics) 
 
housing: many CEE movers live in overcrowded 
temporary accommodation, at high rents, and/or in poor 
conditions; substantial numbers live in employer-
provided housing (especially in agriculture), which 
magnifies risks associated with unstable employment; 
homeless agencies have noted an increase in rough 
sleeping among CEE nationals 
 
 
(B) Polish Movers 
 
 
Drinkwater et al (2009): 
 
return on education: Poles left full-time education at 
much higher age than other CEE movers, hence have 
lowest returns on education among CEE workers 
 
overqualification: Poles primarily employed in low paying 
jobs, and typically have lower rates of return to their 
human capital than other recent migrants (after 
controlling for personal and job-related characteristics) 
 
occupational attainment: 25% of Poles employed in 
hospitality (retail ⁄ hotels ⁄ catering), which is the highest 
% of any CEE group  
 
work hours: recent arrivals from English Speaking 
Countries and Poland work the longest hours 
 
wages: Polish movers earn 28% less than EU-14 movers, 
58% less than migrants from English Speaking Countries, 
and 8% less than workers from Other Countries 





Eade et al (2007): 
 
return on education: although Polish movers have similar 
levels of education as other CEE movers, they benefit 
the least from their education and experience; Polish 
movers also benefit less from their education and 
experience than pre-04 Polish migrants 
 
occupational attainment: lower proportion of Poles in 
London in managerial/professional jobs in 2001 than in 






employment agencies: marketed Poles to potential 
employers as ‘hard-working’ (willing to work for less pay) 
and as having ‘superior work ethic’ and being ‘flexible’ 
(less inclined to complain and less likely to be unionised); 
often recruited directly from Poland745  
 
qualitative analysis in 2008-
12: 
(1) in-depth interviews and 
follow-up email discussions 
and telephone calls of: 
a) senior representatives of 
18 employment agencies (10 
in the UK, 8 in Poland) 
which had recruited Polish 
workers in 2004-08, and 
b) 35 experts in Poland and 
the UK (including 
government officials, 
regulators, and trade union 
and civil society 
representatives); and 
(2) content analysis of 
agency promotional 
materials, websites, and 




racism before the referendum: commonly perpetrated by 
both (white) British youth and adults; e.g., cars with 
Polish registration plates being kicked and having 
windows broken; daily physical and emotional 
harassment by neighbours (including being hit with a 
shoe and stones, being called ‘Polish cunt’, having 
rubbish bins and home doors kicked, and being flashed); 
being hospitalised after an attack in a bar by a British 
man 
 
racism after the referendum: same types as before; in 
addition, being ignored by a British neighbour who used 
to be friendly, and having (white) British co-workers 
shout ‘No more Polish vermin’ and telling Polish workers 
to go back to Poland 
 
narrative interviews with 21 
Polish women in 







                                                      
745 Hence bypassing prohibitions on discriminatory advertising for a particular nationality of workers. 
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COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2000/43/EC
of 29 June 2000
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic
origin
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community and in particular Article 13 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (2),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee (3),
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the
Regions (4),
Whereas:
(1) The Treaty on European Union marks a new stage in the
process of creating an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe.
(2) In accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty on European
Union, the European Union is founded on the principles
of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles
which are common to the Member States, and should
respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Euro-
pean Convention for the protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States,
as general principles of Community Law.
(3) The right to equality before the law and protection
against discrimination for all persons constitutes a
universal right recognised by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women, the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of all forms of Racial Discrimination and the United
Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and by the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, to which all Member States
are signatories.
(4) It is important to respect such fundamental rights and
freedoms, including the right to freedom of association.
It is also important, in the context of the access to and
provision of goods and services, to respect the protec-
tion of private and family life and transactions carried
out in this context.
(5) The European Parliament has adopted a number of
Resolutions on the fight against racism in the European
Union.
(6) The European Union rejects theories which attempt to
determine the existence of separate human races. The
use of the term ‘racial origin’ in this Directive does not
imply an acceptance of such theories.
(7) The European Council in Tampere, on 15 and 16
October 1999, invited the Commission to come forward
as soon as possible with proposals implementing Article
13 of the EC Treaty as regards the fight against racism
and xenophobia.
(8) The Employment Guidelines 2000 agreed by the Euro-
pean Council in Helsinki, on 10 and 11 December
1999, stress the need to foster conditions for a socially
inclusive labour market by formulating a coherent set of
policies aimed at combating discrimination against
groups such as ethnic minorities.
(9) Discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin may
undermine the achievement of the objectives of the EC
Treaty, in particular the attainment of a high level of
employment and of social protection, the raising of the
standard of living and quality of life, economic and
social cohesion and solidarity. It may also undermine the
objective of developing the European Union as an area
of freedom, security and justice.
(10) The Commission presented a communication on racism,
xenophobia and anti-Semitism in December 1995.
(11) The Council adopted on 15 July 1996 Joint Action
(96/443/JHA) concerning action to combat racism and
xenophobia (5) under which the Member States under-
take to ensure effective judicial cooperation in respect of
offences based on racist or xenophobic behaviour.
(12) To ensure the development of democratic and tolerant
societies which allow the participation of all persons
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, specific action in
the field of discrimination based on racial or ethnic
origin should go beyond access to employed and self-
employed activities and cover areas such as education,
social protection including social security and health-
care, social advantages and access to and supply of
goods and services.
(1) Not yet published in the Official Journal.
(2) Opinion delivered on 18.5.2000 (not yet published in the Official
Journal).
(3) Opinion delivered on 12.4.2000 (not yet published in the Official
Journal).
(4) Opinion delivered on 31.5.2000 (not yet published in the Official
Journal). (5) OJ L 185, 24.7.1996, p. 5.
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(13) To this end, any direct or indirect discrimination based
on racial or ethnic origin as regards the areas covered by
this Directive should be prohibited throughout the
Community. This prohibition of discrimination should
also apply to nationals of third countries, but does not
cover differences of treatment based on nationality and
is without prejudice to provisions governing the entry
and residence of third-country nationals and their access
to employment and to occupation.
(14) In implementing the principle of equal treatment irres-
pective of racial or ethnic origin, the Community should,
in accordance with Article 3(2) of the EC Treaty, aim to
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between
men and women, especially since women are often the
victims of multiple discrimination.
(15) The appreciation of the facts from which it may be
inferred that there has been direct or indirect discrim-
ination is a matter for national judicial or other
competent bodies, in accordance with rules of national
law or practice. Such rules may provide in particular for
indirect discrimination to be established by any means
including on the basis of statistical evidence.
(16) It is important to protect all natural persons against
discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin.
Member States should also provide, where appropriate
and in accordance with their national traditions and
practice, protection for legal persons where they suffer
discrimination on grounds of the racial or ethnic origin
of their members.
(17) The prohibition of discrimination should be without
prejudice to the maintenance or adoption of measures
intended to prevent or compensate for disadvantages
suffered by a group of persons of a particular racial or
ethnic origin, and such measures may permit organ-
isations of persons of a particular racial or ethnic origin
where their main object is the promotion of the special
needs of those persons.
(18) In very limited circumstances, a difference of treatment
may be justified where a characteristic related to racial
or ethnic origin constitutes a genuine and determining
occupational requirement, when the objective is legiti-
mate and the requirement is proportionate. Such
circumstances should be included in the information
provided by the Member States to the Commission.
(19) Persons who have been subject to discrimination based
on racial and ethnic origin should have adequate means
of legal protection. To provide a more effective level of
protection, associations or legal entities should also be
empowered to engage, as the Member States so deter-
mine, either on behalf or in support of any victim, in
proceedings, without prejudice to national rules of
procedure concerning representation and defence before
the courts.
(20) The effective implementation of the principle of equality
requires adequate judicial protection against victimisa-
tion.
(21) The rules on the burden of proof must be adapted when
there is a prima facie case of discrimination and, for the
principle of equal treatment to be applied effectively, the
burden of proof must shift back to the respondent when
evidence of such discrimination is brought.
(22) Member States need not apply the rules on the burden
of proof to proceedings in which it is for the court or
other competent body to investigate the facts of the
case. The procedures thus referred to are those in which
the plaintiff is not required to prove the facts, which it is
for the court or competent body to investigate.
(23) Member States should promote dialogue between the
social partners and with non-governmental organ-
isations to address different forms of discrimination and
to combat them.
(24) Protection against discrimination based on racial or
ethnic origin would itself be strengthened by the exis-
tence of a body or bodies in each Member State, with
competence to analyse the problems involved, to study
possible solutions and to provide concrete assistance for
the victims.
(25) This Directive lays down minimum requirements, thus
giving the Member States the option of introducing or
maintaining more favourable provisions. The imple-
mentation of this Directive should not serve to justify
any regression in relation to the situation which already
prevails in each Member State.
(26) Member States should provide for effective, propor-
tionate and dissuasive sanctions in case of breaches of
the obligations under this Directive.
(27) The Member States may entrust management and
labour, at their joint request, with the implementation of
this Directive as regards provisions falling within the
scope of collective agreements, provided that the
Member States take all the necessary steps to ensure that
they can at all times guarantee the results imposed by
this Directive.
(28) In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality as set out in Article 5 of the EC Treaty,
the objective of this Directive, namely ensuring a
common high level of protection against discrimination
in all the Member States, cannot be sufficiently achieved
by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of
the scale and impact of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community. This Directive does not go
beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those
objectives,
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The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a framework for
combating discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic
origin, with a view to putting into effect in the Member States
the principle of equal treatment.
Article 2
Concept of discrimination
1. For the purposes of this Directive, the principle of equal
treatment shall mean that there shall be no direct or indirect
discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1:
(a) direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one
person is treated less favourably than another is, has been
or would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds
of racial or ethnic origin;
(b) indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would
put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular
disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that
provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a
legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are
appropriate and necessary.
3. Harassment shall be deemed to be discrimination within
the meaning of paragraph 1, when an unwanted conduct
related to racial or ethnic origin takes place with the purpose
or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an
intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive envir-
onment. In this context, the concept of harassment may be
defined in accordance with the national laws and practice of
the Member States.
4. An instruction to discriminate against persons on
grounds of racial or ethnic origin shall be deemed to be
discrimination within the meaning of paragraph 1.
Article 3
Scope
1. Within the limits of the powers conferred upon the
Community, this Directive shall apply to all persons, as regards
both the public and private sectors, including public bodies, in
relation to:
(a) conditions for access to employment, to self-employment
and to occupation, including selection criteria and recruit-
ment conditions, whatever the branch of activity and at all
levels of the professional hierarchy, including promotion;
(b) access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance,
vocational training, advanced vocational training and
retraining, including practical work experience;
(c) employment and working conditions, including dismissals
and pay;
(d) membership of and involvement in an organisation of
workers or employers, or any organisation whose members
carry on a particular profession, including the benefits
provided for by such organisations;
(e) social protection, including social security and healthcare;
(f) social advantages;
(g) education;
(h) access to and supply of goods and services which are
available to the public, including housing.
2. This Directive does not cover difference of treatment
based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions and
conditions relating to the entry into and residence of third-
country nationals and stateless persons on the territory of
Member States, and to any treatment which arises from the
legal status of the third-country nationals and stateless persons
concerned.
Article 4
Genuine and determining occupational requirements
Notwithstanding Article 2(1) and (2), Member States may
provide that a difference of treatment which is based on a
characteristic related to racial or ethnic origin shall not consti-
tute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the
particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in
which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a
genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided




With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the principle
of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from
maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or
compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin.
Article 6
Minimum requirements
1. Member States may introduce or maintain provisions
which are more favourable to the protection of the principle of
equal treatment than those laid down in this Directive.
2. The implementation of this Directive shall under no
circumstances constitute grounds for a reduction in the level of
protection against discrimination already afforded by Member
States in the fields covered by this Directive.
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1. Member States shall ensure that judicial and/or adminis-
trative procedures, including where they deem it appropriate
conciliation procedures, for the enforcement of obligations
under this Directive are available to all persons who consider
themselves wronged by failure to apply the principle of equal
treatment to them, even after the relationship in which the
discrimination is alleged to have occurred has ended.
2. Member States shall ensure that associations, organ-
isations or other legal entities, which have, in accordance with
the criteria laid down by their national law, a legitimate interest
in ensuring that the provisions of this Directive are complied
with, may engage, either on behalf or in support of the
complainant, with his or her approval, in any judicial and/or
administrative procedure provided for the enforcement of obli-
gations under this Directive.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are without prejudice to national
rules relating to time limits for bringing actions as regards the
principle of equality of treatment.
Article 8
Burden of proof
1. Member States shall take such measures as are necessary,
in accordance with their national judicial systems, to ensure
that, when persons who consider themselves wronged because
the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them
establish, before a court or other competent authority, facts
from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or
indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove
that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treat-
ment.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent Member States from intro-
ducing rules of evidence which are more favourable to plain-
tiffs.
3. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to criminal procedures.
4. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall also apply to any proceedings
brought in accordance with Article 7(2).
5. Member States need not apply paragraph 1 to proceed-
ings in which it is for the court or competent body to investi-
gate the facts of the case.
Article 9
Victimisation
Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems
such measures as are necessary to protect individuals from any
adverse treatment or adverse consequence as a reaction to a
complaint or to proceedings aimed at enforcing compliance
with the principle of equal treatment.
Article 10
Dissemination of information
Member States shall take care that the provisions adopted
pursuant to this Directive, together with the relevant provisions
already in force, are brought to the attention of the persons
concerned by all appropriate means throughout their territory.
Article 11
Social dialogue
1. Member States shall, in accordance with national tradi-
tions and practice, take adequate measures to promote the
social dialogue between the two sides of industry with a view
to fostering equal treatment, including through the monitoring
of workplace practices, collective agreements, codes of conduct,
research or exchange of experiences and good practices.
2. Where consistent with national traditions and practice,
Member States shall encourage the two sides of the industry
without prejudice to their autonomy to conclude, at the appro-
priate level, agreements laying down anti-discrimination rules
in the fields referred to in Article 3 which fall within the scope
of collective bargaining. These agreements shall respect the
minimum requirements laid down by this Directive and the
relevant national implementing measures.
Article 12
Dialogue with non-governmental organisations
Member States shall encourage dialogue with appropriate non-
governmental organisations which have, in accordance with
their national law and practice, a legitimate interest in contri-
buting to the fight against discrimination on grounds of racial
and ethnic origin with a view to promoting the principle of
equal treatment.
CHAPTER III
BODIES FOR THE PROMOTION OF EQUAL TREATMENT
Article 13
1. Member States shall designate a body or bodies for the
promotion of equal treatment of all persons without discrim-
ination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. These bodies
may form part of agencies charged at national level with the
defence of human rights or the safeguard of individuals' rights.
2. Member States shall ensure that the competences of these
bodies include:
— without prejudice to the right of victims and of associa-
tions, organisations or other legal entities referred to in
Article 7(2), providing independent assistance to victims of
discrimination in pursuing their complaints about discrim-
ination,
— conducting independent surveys concerning discrimination,
— publishing independent reports and making recommenda-
tions on any issue relating to such discrimination.
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Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that:
(a) any laws, regulations and administrative provisions
contrary to the principle of equal treatment are abolished;
(b) any provisions contrary to the principle of equal treatment
which are included in individual or collective contracts or
agreements, internal rules of undertakings, rules governing
profit-making or non-profit-making associations, and rules
governing the independent professions and workers' and
employers' organisations, are or may be declared, null and
void or are amended.
Article 15
Sanctions
Member States shall lay down the rules on sanctions applicable
to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant
to this Directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure
that they are applied. The sanctions, which may comprise the
payment of compensation to the victim, must be effective,
proportionate and dissuasive. The Member States shall notify
those provisions to the Commission by 19 July 2003 at the




Member States shall adopt the laws, regulations and adminis-
trative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by
19 July 2003 or may entrust management and labour, at their
joint request, with the implementation of this Directive as
regards provisions falling within the scope of collective agree-
ments. In such cases, Member States shall ensure that by 19
July 2003, management and labour introduce the necessary
measures by agreement, Member States being required to take
any necessary measures to enable them at any time to be in a
position to guarantee the results imposed by this Directive.
They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain
a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a
reference on the occasion of their official publication. The




1. Member States shall communicate to the Commission by
19 July 2005, and every five years thereafter, all the informa-
tion necessary for the Commission to draw up a report to the
European Parliament and the Council on the application of this
Directive.
2. The Commission's report shall take into account, as
appropriate, the views of the European Monitoring Centre on
Racism and Xenophobia, as well as the viewpoints of the social
partners and relevant non-governmental organisations. In
accordance with the principle of gender mainstreaming, this
report shall, inter alia, provide an assessment of the impact of
the measures taken on women and men. In the light of the
information received, this report shall include, if necessary,
proposals to revise and update this Directive.
Article 18
Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the day of its publica-
tion in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
Article 19
Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Luxembourg, 29 June 2000.
For the Council
The President
M. ARCANJO
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